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1. Constantino vs.

Mendez
FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate
child, as represented by Amelita, her
mother, sought monthly support from
Ivan
Mendez
including
Amelias
complaint on damages. The latter and
Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila
where she was working as a waitress.
Ivan invited him at his hotel and through
promise of marriage succeeded in having
sexual
intercourse
with
Amelita,
afterwards, he admitted being a married
man. In spite of that, they repeated their
sexual contact.
Subsequently, she
became pregnant and had to resign from
work.
Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita
providing actual and moral damages,
acknowledging
Michael
as
Ivans
illegitimate child and giving monthly
support to the latter which was set aside
by CA.
ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child
is entitled for the monthly support.
HELD:
Amelita Constantino has not proved by
clear and convincing evidence her claim
that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son
Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of
Ivan and Amelita in the first or second
week of November, 1974 is the crucial
point that was not even established on
direct examination as she merely
testified that she had sexual intercourse
with Ivan in the months of September,
October and November, 1974. More so,
Amelita admitted that she was attracted
to Ivan and their repeated sexual
intercourse indicated that passion and

not alleged promise to marriage was the


moving force to submit herself with Ivan.
The petition was dismissed for lack of
merit.

CONDE v. ABAYA
FACTS:
Casiano Abaya died unmarried however
leaving two unaknowledged children by
herein plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The
latter, as a ascendant heir of her
children, sued for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Casiano along with the
acknowledgment of the two as natural
children of the deceased. The trial court,
with the opposition of the defendantappellant Roman Abaya, brother of the
deceased, rendered judgment bestowing
the estate of Casiano to Conde as
legitimate heir of the decedent's natural
children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child


now deceased, bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in
favor of such child in order to appear in
his behalf to receive the inheritance from
the deceased natural father.
HELD: The right of action that devolves
upon the child to claim his legitimacy
lasts during his whole life, while the right
to claim the acknowledgment of a natural
child lasts only during the life of his
presumed parents. An action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child may,
as an exception, be exercised against the
heirs of the presumed parents in two
cases: first, in the event of the death of
the latter during the minority of the child,

and second, upon the discovery of some


instrument of express acknowledgment
of the child, executed by the father or
mother, the existence of which was
unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment
of a natural child can only be exercised
by him. It cannot be transmitted to his
descendants, or his ascendants.

Jison vs. CA
FACTS:
Private
respondent,
Monina
Jison,
instituted a complaint against petitioner,
Francisco Jison, for recognition as
illegitimate child of the latter. The case
was filed 20 years after her mothers
death and when she was already 39
years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas
mother.
Monina alleged that since
childhood,
she
had
enjoyed
the
continuous, implied recognition as the
illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts
and that of his family. It was likewise
alleged that petitioner supported her and
spent for her education such that she
became a CPA and eventually a Central
Bank Examiner. Monina was able to
present total of 11 witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared
as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code,
illegitimate filiation may be established
in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children.

Article 172 thereof provides the various


forms of evidence by which legitimate
filiation is established.
To
prove
open
and
continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention
of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and
care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a
nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the
child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.
The following facts was established
based on the testimonial evidences
offered by Monina:
1.
That Francisco was her father and
she was conceived at the time when her
mother was employed by the former;
2.
That Francisco recognized Monina as
his child through his overt acts and
conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competence evidence as to
the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of
participation in the preparation of
baptismal certificates and school records
render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity. With
regard to the affidavit signed by Monina
when she was 25 years of age attesting
that Francisco was not her father, SC was
in the position that if Monina were truly
not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would
be unnecessary for him to have gone to

such great lengths in order that Monina


denounce
her
filiation.
Moninas
evidence hurdles the high standard of
proof required for the success of an
action to establish ones illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on
open and continuous possession.
Hence, Monina proved her filiation by
more than mere preponderance of
evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity
and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina
filed her action well within the period
granted her by a positive provision of
law. A denial then of her action on ground
of laches would clearly be inequitable
and unjust. Petition was denied.

Preliminary Injunction, appending a


notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition
of
Paternity
of
the
children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering
the Office of the City Registrar to cause
the entry of the name of Antonio as the
father of the aforementioned minors in
their respective Certificate of Live Birth
and causing the correction/change and/or
annotation of the surnames of said
minors in their Certificate of Live Birth
from Grande to Antonio; granting the
right of parental authority over the
minors; granting the primary right and
immediate custody over the minors; and
ordering
Grande
to
immediately
surrender the persons and custody of the
minors
to
Antonio.

GRACE M. GRANDE vs. PATRICIO T.


ANTONIO

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for


reconsideration. However, her motion
was
denied
by
the
trial
court.

FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and
respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for
a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was
at that time already married to someone
else.Out of this illicit relationship, two
sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard
Patrick, both minors. The children were
not expressly recognized by respondent
as his own in the Record of Births of the
children in the Civil Registry. The parties
relationship, however, eventually turned
sour, and Grande left for the United
States with her two children. This
prompted respondent Antonio to file a
Petition
for
Judicial
Approval
of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
and for the Issuance of Writ of

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal


with the CA attributing grave error on the
part of the RTC for allegedly ruling
contrary to the law and jurisprudence
respecting the grant of sole custody to
the mother over her illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of
the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil
Registrar General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City to enter the
surname Antonio as the surname of the
minors in their respective certificates of
live birth, and record the same in the
Register of Births; ordering Antonio to
deliver the custody to their mother;
Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon
Grandes consent; parties are directed to
give and share in support of the minor
children.

The
appellate
court,
however,
maintained that the legal consequence of
the recognition made by respondent
Antonio that he is the father of the
minors, taken in conjunction with the
universally protected "best-interest-ofthe-child" clause, compels the use by the
children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision,
petitioner Grande interposed a partial
motion for reconsideration, particularly
assailing the order of the CA insofar as it
decreed the change of the minors
surname to "Antonio." When her motion
was denied, petitioner came to this Court
via
the
present
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the
right to compel the use of his surname
by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition
of
their
filiation.
HELD: The petition is partially granted
CIVIL

LAW

Filation

Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally


phrased
as
follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for
this modification, all other provisions in
the Civil Code governing successional
rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on


March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now
reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public
document
or
private
handwritten
instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his
lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime
of
a
legitimate
child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate
child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA
9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father
through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or when an admission in
a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. In such
a situation, the illegitimate child may use
the
surname
of
the
father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a
petition
for
judicial
approval
of
recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the
correction or change of the surname of
the minors from Grande to Antonio when
a public document acknowledged before
a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court is enough to

establish the paternity of his children.


But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment
of
parental
authority,
parental
custody,
and
an
official
declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the
right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not
the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted
by law the right to dictate the surname of
their
illegitimate
children.
Nothing is more settled than that when
the law is clear and free from ambiguity,
it must be taken to mean what it says
and it must be given its literal meaning
free from any interpretation.Respondents
position that the court can order the
minors to use his surname, therefore, has
no
legal
basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free
from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words.
The use of the word "may" in the
provision
readily
shows
that
an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under
no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children.
6.
7. Malkenson v. Agrava
Facts:
On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses
filed with respondent court their verified
petition to adopt the minor Luis Alberto
Martin de Santos, who was born a Filipino

citizen in Madrid, Spain on August 4,


1969, the acknowledged natural child of
petitioner Ana Marie de Santos Malkinson
who alone of his parents extended him
recognition.
The petitioners claim that the child
concerned has been living with them
under their care and custody since their
marriage in 1972. Petitioner Frederick
Malkinson is an American citizen, while
his spouse is a Filipino citizen and owns a
property in the Philippines. They claim
that it is to the best interest of the child
that he be adopted by the spouses who
are qualified for such legal adoption.
Respondent Judge Hon. Corazon Agrava
dismissed the abovementioned petition
in November 1972 because the court
opined that the position was insufficient
due to the fact that the petitioner
husband is an alien while the child
sought to be adopted is a citizen of the
country.
Petitioners
then
moved
for
reconsideration on the ground that no
law prohibits a resident alien, who is
neither a citizen of a country without
diplomatic relations with the Philippines
nor otherwise legally disqualified from
adopting a Filipino. Respondent court
again denied the same in December
1972.
Issue: WON an alien who is not legally
disqualified may adopt a Filipino
Held:
If alienage alone of the adopter or of the
adopted were to be a disqualification, it
is inconceivable that the lawmakers
would not have so explicitly provided.
Article 335 of the New Civil Code only
provides that non-resident aliens and

resident aliens with whose government


the Philippines has broken diplomatic
relations are the only two classes of
aliens
expressly
disqualified
and
prohibited to adopt, while Article 339
provides that only an alien with whose
state our government has broken
diplomatic
relations
is
expressly
disqualified and prohibited
to be
adopted.
Inclusio unius exclusion alterius (The
inclusion of one is the exclusion of
another)
Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interest and welfare of
the
child
to
be
of
paramount
consideration and are designed to
provide homes, parental care, and
education for the unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter as well as to allow
childless
couples
or
persons
to
experience the joys of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural
parental
instincts.
Every
reasonable
intendment
should
be
sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.
Ultimately, under the plain language of
the law, alienage by itself does not
disqualify a foreigner such as the
petitioner-husband from adopting a
Filipino child. Under Art. 338 of the Civil
Code, the petitioner-wife who is also the
natural mother, is authorized to adopt
her natural child and raise its status to
that of a legitimate child while the
petitioner husband is likewise authorized
to adopt his step-child and that such

adoption would strengthen the family


solidarity of the petitioner-spouses and
the child.

8. Tamargo vs. CA
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc,
minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries
that resulted in her death.
The
petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo,
filed a complaint for damages against the
natural parents of Adelberto with whom
he was living the time of the tragic
incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura
filed a petition to adopt Adelberto
Bundoc. Such petition was granted on
November
1982
after
the
tragic
incident.
ISSUE: WON
parental
authority
concerned may be given retroactive
effect so as to make adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case
filed against the adopted child where
actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical
consequence
of
duties
and
responsibilities of parents, their parental
authority which includes instructing,
controlling and disciplining the child. In
the case at bar, during the shooting
incident,
parental
authority
over
Adelberto was still lodged with the
natural parents. It follows that they are
the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages. Parents and guardians are

responsible for the damage caused by


the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil code.
SC did not consider that retroactive
effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at the time
when they had no actual or physical
custody
over
the
adopted
child.
Retroactivity may be essential if it
permits accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child.
Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody
however in this case, trial custody period
either had not yet begin nor had been
completed at the time of the shooting
incident. Hence, actual custody was then
with the natural parents of Adelberto.
Petition for review was hereby granted.
9.
10. Cang v. CA
Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano
were married and begot three children.
Ana Marie upon learning of her husband's
illicit liaison file a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite
which was approved. Petitioner then left
for the United States where he sought a
divorce from Ana Marie. He was issued a
divorce decree and granted sole custody
of the children to Ana Marie, reserving
rights of visitation at all reasonable times
and
places
to
petitioner.
Private
respondents who were the brother and
sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition
for adoption of the three minor Cang
children. The trial court granted the
petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the

only parent who gives consent to the


adoption of their children. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned
his children, thereby making his consent
to
the
adoption
necessary.
Ruling: The law is clear that either parent
may lose parental authority over the
child only for a valid reason. No such
reason was established in the legal
separation case. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a decree
of adoption. But there cannot be a valid
decree of adoption in this case precisely
because the findings of the lower courts
on the issue of abandonment of facts on
record. The petition for adoption must be
denied as it was filed without the
required consent of their father who, by
law and under the facts of the case at
bar, has not abandoned them.

11. Santos v. Aranzanso


Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina,
17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years
old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and
Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was
alleged that both parents of the minors
have long been unheard from and could
not be found in spite of diligent efforts to
locate them; that since the war said
minors have been abandoned; and that
for years since their infancy, said children
have
been
continuously
been
in
petitioners care and custody. The
consent to the adoption has been given
by the guardian ad litem appointed by
the Court. After due publication and

hearing, the adoption court granted the


petition for the adoption.
Subsequently eight years later Juliana
Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos
filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the former, stating
among other things that the surviving
heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked
that he be appointed administrator of the
estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the
first cousin of the deceased, filed an
opposition
to
the
petition
for
appointment of administrator, asserting
among others that the adoption of
Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab
initio for want of the written consent of
their parents, who were then living and
had not abandoned them.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be
the first cousin of the deceased and
mother of Paulina opposed also the
petition of Simplicio and adopted the
pleadings filed by Aranzanso.
The
Court
of
Appeals
sustained
respondent-oppositors right to make a
collateral attack against the adoption
decree on the ground of failure to obtain
the consent of the natural parents was a
jurisdictional
defect
rendering
the
adoption void ab initio.
Issue: WON a decree of adoption could
be assailed collaterally in a settlement
proceeding.
Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents
is not an absolute requisite if child was
abandoned, consent by the guardian ad
litem suffices.

Second,
in
adoption
proceedings,
abandonment imports any conduct on
the part of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forgo all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims
to the child. It means neglect or refusal
to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which
parents owe to their children.
Third, the settled rule is that even when
the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal
depends upon the existence of a fact to
be
established
before
it,
the
determination of that fact by the tribunal
cannot be questioned in a collateral
attack upon its order. Hence, the CA
erred in reviewing under a collateral
attack, the determination of the adoption
court that the parents of the adopted
children had abandoned them.

12. Adoption of Stephanie Garcia


Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a
petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He
averred that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using
her mothers middle name and surname;
and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanies middle name be
changed to
Garcia, her
mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia
be changed to Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for
adoption, and ordered that pursuant to
article 189 of the Family Code, the minor
shall be known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification
and/or reconsideration praying that

Stephanie be allowed to use the surname


of her natural mother (Garcia) as her
middle name. The lower court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child
to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate
child may use the surname of her mother
as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the
adopted is deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adapter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the
Family Code and Section 17 of Article V
of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law
to
a
legitimate
child
without
discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother. This is consistent with
the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees. In
fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial
or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the
father.

marriages during his lifetime.


He
acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he
was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano,
who died in 1904 namely Baldomera,
Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.
Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia
and Federico, all surnamed Espina.
Ireneo on the other hand had a son
named Ruperto. On the other hand,
Lupos
second
wife
is
Flaviana
Montellano where they had a daughter
named Cresenciana. Lupo got married
for the third time in 1930 with Felipa
Velasco and had 3 children namely
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto
testified that his parents got married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig
Rizal. The spouses deported themselves
as husband and wife, and were known in
the community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and
second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of
the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected
to a voluntary registration proceedings
and a decree ordering the registration of
the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the
partition of the estate of their deceased
father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

13. Mariategui vs. CA

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo


with Felipa is valid in the absence of a
marriage license.

GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

HELD:

FACTS:

Although no marriage certificate was


introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas
marriage, no evidence was likewise
offered to controvert these facts.

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on


June 26, 1953 and contracted 3

Moreover, the mere fact that no record of


the marriage exists does not invalidate
the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage
may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman,
deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage; that a child born in lawful
wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute
or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate
and therefore have successional rights.

14. Santos vs. Republic


Petitioner Santos spouses seek to adopt
the 4-year old sickly brother of the wife.
It was established that the petitioners are
both 32 years of age and have
maintained a conjugal home of their own.
They do not have a child of their own
blood nor has any one of them been
convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer,
with business interests in a textile
development enterprise and the IBA
electric plant, and is the general
manager of Medry Inc. and the secretarytreasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His copetitioner-wife is a nurse by profession.
The parents of the child testified that
they entrusted him to the petitioners who
reared and brought him up.
Issue: Can
brother?

sister

adopt

her

own

Held:
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates
those persons who may not adopt, and it
has been shown that petitionersappellants herein are not among those
prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of
the same code names those who cannot
be adopted, and the minor child whose
adoption is under consideration, is not
one of those excluded by the law. Article
338, on the other hand, allows the
adoption of a natural child by the natural
father or mother, of other illegitimate
children by their father or mother, and of
a step-child by the step-father or
stepmother. This last article is, of course,
necessary to remove all doubts that
adoption is not prohibited even in these
cases where there already exist a
relationship of parent and child between
them by nature. To say that adoption
should not be allowed when the adopter
and the adopted are related to each
other, except in these cases enumerated
in Article 338, is to preclude adoption
among relatives no matter how far
removed or in whatever degree that
relationship might be, which in our
opinion is not the policy of the law. The
interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted should be of paramount
consideration.
15.
16. FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO
ADRIANO, ET AL.,
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a
partner in the Pelaez Adriano and
Gregorio Law Office, married respondent
Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November
15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons,
three (3) daughters, and one (1) adopted

daughter,

Leah

Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and


Rosario, however, turned sour and they
were eventually separated-in-fact. Years
later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of
his clients, until they decided to live
together as husband and wife. Despite
such arrangement, he continued to
provide financial support to Rosario and
their
children
(respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute
emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in
the United States spending Christmas
with her children. As none of the family
members was around, Valino took it upon
herself to shoulder the funeral and burial
expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario
learned about the death of her husband,
she immediately called Valino and
requested that she delay the interment
for a few days but her request was not
heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano
were then interred at the mausoleum of
the family of Valino at the Manila
Memorial Park. Respondents were not
able
to
attend
the
interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the
chance to view the remains of Atty.
Adriano before he was buried and that
his burial at the Manila Memorial Park
was contrary to his wishes, respondents
commenced suit against Valino praying
that they be indemnified for actual,
moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees and that the remains of
Atty.
Adriano
be
exhumed
and
transferred to the family plot at the Holy
Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches,
Quezon
City.

Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been


separated for more than twenty (20)
years before he courted her. Valino
claimed that throughout the time they
were together, he had introduced her to
his friends and associates as his wife.
Although they were living together,
Valino admitted that he never forgot his
obligation to support the respondents.
She contended that, unlike Rosario, she
took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid
for all his medical expenses when he got
seriously ill. She also claimed that
despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in
a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the
United States. According to Valino, it was
Atty. Adrianos last wish that his remains
be interred in the Valino family
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had
suffered damages as result of the suit
brought by respondents. Thus, she
prayed that she be awarded moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of
respondents for lack of merit. On appeal,
the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and directed Valino to have the
remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the
expense of respondents. It likewise
directed respondents, at their expense,
to transfer, transport and inter the
remains of the decedent in the family
plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in
Novaliches,
Quezon
City.
ISSUE: Who between Rosario and Valino
is entitled to the remains of Atty.
Adriano.
HELD:

In her defense, Valino countered that

CIVIL LAW: article 305 in relation to


article
1996
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to
what is now Article 1996 of the Family
Code, specifies the persons who have the
right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order
established for support, under Article
294. In case of descendants of the same
degree, or of brothers and sisters, the
oldest shall be preferred. In case of
ascendants, the paternal shall have a
better
right.
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons
are obliged to give support, the liability
shall devolve upon the following persons
in
the
order
herein
provided:
(1)

The

spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest


degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest
degree;
and
(4)

The

brothers

and

sisters.

Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code


provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be
retained, interred, disposed of or
exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in Articles 294 and
305.
In this connection, Section 1103 of the

Revised Administrative Code provides:


Section 1103. Persons charged with the
duty of burial. The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person,
regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons
herein
below
specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or
woman, the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the surviving spouse if he
or she possesses sufficient means to pay
the
necessary
expenses;
CIVIL
LAW:
relationships

common

law

From the aforecited provisions, it is


undeniable that the law simply confines
the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the
family to the exclusion of ones common
law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v.
Velez, a petition for habeas corpus was
filed by the brothers and sisters of the
late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover,
Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the
latter forcibly took her and confined her
in his residence. It appearing that she
already died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr.
sought the dismissal of the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right
to bury the deceased, as the commonlaw
husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that
the trial court continued to have
jurisdiction
over
the
case
notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana
Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio,
Sr. that he should be considered a spouse
having the right and duty to make

funeral arrangements for his commonlaw


wife,
the
Court
ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man
and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and
wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be
considered legally married in common
law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just
brush
aside
the
fact
that
such
relationships are present in our society,
and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is
governed by law, authority exists in case
law to the effect that such form of coownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any
way be incapacitated to contract
marriage.
In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman,
a legal impediment which disqualified
him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
There is a view that under Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code, the term
"spouse" embraces common law relation
for purposes of exemption from criminal
liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by spouses. The Penal Code
article, it is said, makes no distinction
between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie
and another who are husband and wife
de facto. But this view cannot even apply

to the facts of the case at bar. We hold


that the provisions of the Civil Code,
unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring
to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis
Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the
law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she
being the surviving legal wife of Atty.
Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in
the United States when he died has no
controlling
significance.
To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived
or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her
right and duty to make arrangements for
the funeral of her deceased husband is
baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other
right, will not be considered as having
been waived or renounced, except upon
clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent
to
that
end.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes
of the deceased should nevertheless
prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil
Code. Valinos own testimony that it was
Atty. Adrianos wish to be buried in their
family plot is being relied upon heavily. It
should be noted, however, that other
than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried at the Manila
Memorial Park, no other evidence was
presented to corroborate such claim.
Considering that Rosario equally claims
that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in

the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it


becomes apparent that the supposed
burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear
and
indefinite.
Considering this ambiguity as to the true
wishes of the deceased, it is the law that
supplies the presumption as to his intent.
No presumption can be said to have been
created in Valinos favor, solely on
account of a long-time relationship with
Atty. Adriano.

17. Leouel Santos vs. CA


FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The
two got married in 1986 before a
municipal trial court followed shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. The
couple lived with Julias parents at the J.
Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a
baby boy in 1987 and was named as
Leouel Santos Jr.
Occasionally, the
couple will quarrel over a number of
things aside from the interference of
Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse
despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, she
called her husband and promised to
return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989 but she never did.

Leouel got a chance to visit US where he


underwent a training program under AFP,
he desperately tried to locate or
somehow get in touch with Julia but all
his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their


marriage declared void under Article 36
of the Family Code. He argued that
failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5
years are circumstances that show her
being psychologically incapacitated to
enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be
considered void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of
personal disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel
stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every
individual problem.
Wherefore, his
petition was denied.