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ARTICLE I. NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises of the Philippine Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domain, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
MAGALLONA v ERMITA
Facts: In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over
their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during
the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA
3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (RA 5446)
correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.
Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the
location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation
of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and
(2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclearfree policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in
the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress
their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and
included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework
of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9522, an act which is adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and
classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories, is constitutional.
Held: RA 9522 is constitutional.
It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS
III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical

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miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades-long negotiations among UN members to codify norms regulating the conduct of
States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to markout specific base points along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of
the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2),
the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article
33), and the right to exploit the living and nonliving resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56)
and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioner's theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within
the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be
drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with
UNCLOS III.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and
are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the
baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our
territorial claim over that area. The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522
shows that RA 9522 merely followed the base points mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine base
points that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of base points and adjust the length of one baseline
(and thus comply with UNCLOS III's limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as
under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the
Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument
branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that
baselines are relevant for this purpose.
RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical
miles.

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Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that
RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text
the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of
two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such
baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles, save for three percent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125
nautical miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the
nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III's limits. The need to
shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of base points using current maps, became
imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of
its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of
[UNCLOS III].
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress
decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III,
any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as
portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of the baselines, including the airspace over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed
and subsoil.

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1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil,
and the resources contained therein.
3. xxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the
status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its
sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the
interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international
law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine
government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing
nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty's
limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States
which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage
through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under
UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters
landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters
subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago
and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands
as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the
waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the State's territorial
sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and nonliving resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance
of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis
maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III
grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200
nautical miles.UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that
attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to
pass RA 9522.We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III and we find petitioner's reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court.

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Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III
compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally
acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured.
This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it
weakens the country's case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are
consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas,
as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them.
SOVEREIGNTY
PEOPLE v GOZO
Facts: The accused bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in its place,
without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto
Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building
permit was not necessary for the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a
building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon
Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on the house of the
accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation. After
due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with
the City Fiscal's Office. The City Court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance
No. 14, Series of 1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs.
The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of violating such
municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and to demolish the house
thus erected. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue the
validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to her in view of
the location of her dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution of
January 29, 1973, noting the constitutional question raised, certified the case to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the municipal ordinance is constitutional.
Held: The municipal ordinance is constitutional.
Two leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of
sovereignty, People v. Acierto, and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. As was so emphatically
set forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto: "By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government
merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given
purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine
sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration

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of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond
its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein,
and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both
territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to
be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign
rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." The
opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional
rights, not its disappearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within
its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another
power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it
by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status
as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory."
ACCFA v. CUGCO
Facts: A CBA, which was to be effective for a period of one (1) year from July 1, 1961, was entered into
by and between the Unions and the ACCFA. A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting
against alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. Finally, on October 25, 1962 the
Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on November
26, 1962.
On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations
against the ACCFA (Case No. 3450-ULP) for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice,
namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the
Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter
of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and
special defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract,
expiration of said contract and lack of approval by the office of the President of the fringe benefits
provided for therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the CIR in its decision dated March 25, 1963
ordered the ACCFA:
1. To cease and desist from committing further acts tending to discourage the members of complainant
unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
2. To comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract executed on September
4, 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living allowance;
3. To bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants.
The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en
banc. Thereupon it brought this appeal by certiorari.
During the pendency of the above mentioned case, the President of the Philippines signed into law the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), which among other things required the
reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration (ACCFA) and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). On March 17,
1964 the ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association filed a petition for
certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 1327-MC) praying that they be

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certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively,
in the ACA.
Issue: Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction over this case, which in turn depends on whether or not
ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions.
Held: No.
Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other
governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture, in pursuance of the policy
enunciated in Section 2 as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State:
(1) To establish owner-cultivatorships and the economic family-size farm as the basis of
Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial
development;
(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional
restraints and practices;
(3) To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive to greater
productivity and higher farm incomes;
(4) To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both industrial and agricultural
wage earners;
(5) To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement program and public land
distribution; and
(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a
source of genuine strength in our democratic society.
The implementation of the policy thus enunciated, insofar as the role of the ACA therein is concerned, is
spelled out in Sections 110 to 118, inclusive, of the Land Reform Code. Section 110 provides that "the
administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the
requirements and objective of this Code and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration."
Under Section 112 the sum of P150,000,000 was appropriated out of national funds to finance the
additional credit functions of the ACA as a result of the land reform program laid down in the Code.
Section 103 grants the ACA the privilege of rediscounting with the Central Bank, the Development Bank of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank. Section 105 directs the loaning activities of the ACA "to
stimulate the development of farmers' cooperatives," including those "relating to the production and
marketing of agricultural products and those formed to manage and/or own, on a cooperative basis,
services and facilities, such as irrigation and transport systems, established to support production and/or
marketing of agricultural products." Section 106 deals with the extension by ACA of credit to small farmers
in order to stimulate agricultural production. Sections 107 to 112 lay down certain guidelines to be
followed in connection with the granting of loans, such as security, interest and supervision of credit.
Sections 113 to 118, inclusive, invest the ACA with certain rights and powers not accorded to nongovernmental entities.
The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as
given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government
agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise.
The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act No. 3844 is
most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75
has placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration together with the other member
agencies, the personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool and made available for
assignment from one agency to another, subject only to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, position
classification and wage structures.

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The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These
functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from
"ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter
functions being ministrant he exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
It was in furtherance of such policy (promotion of social justice) that the Land Reform Code was enacted
and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no
dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the
capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less
than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside
from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform
program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of
policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but
in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are
subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any
vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.
In view of the foregoing premises, we hold that the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification
election sought in the Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of
the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a
coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (G.R. No. L21824). This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875 (Prohibition against strike in the
government)
GOVERNMENT DE JURE and DE FACTO
CO KIM CHAM v VALDEZ
Facts: Petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the
ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect
of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under
the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the
absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and
memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their
Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the
Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the
laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and
carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive
Commission was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of

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the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was
instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs and
judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said Commander in Chief,
who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal
courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the
instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in Chief of
Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic
principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and
judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the administration organs and judicial
courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs. . . ."
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial
change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned
during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a
proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the
Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over
the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control.
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General
MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and
responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here established as
provided by law."
Issue: Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
Held:
It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be
determined is whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the names of the
Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces.
There are several kinds of de facto governments.
1. Government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the
rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, (eg. government of England
under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.)

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2. Government that is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force (eg. Castine, in
Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied
during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States).
a. Characteristics (cited Thorington v Smith):
i.
its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of
an established and lawful government
ii.
that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience
rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though
not warranted by the laws of the rightful government
b. The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the
Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on
the same subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the legislative power having actually passed
into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."
c. According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is
burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all
the powers of a de facto government, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and
make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the
country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial life of the
country. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among
others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely
in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation.
Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a
country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own
hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges
and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or
are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities
appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction
of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and
applied by the President of the United States.
d. The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military
possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do
not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government
for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which
the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived
directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings
of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a
conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation,
excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all
the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make
new ones."
e. And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later
embodied in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of
War of May 19,1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part:
"Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal
laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and
property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are
not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered
by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This

WEEK 1
enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of
justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to
administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the
supervision of the American Commander in Chief."
3. Government that is established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state.
a. In Thorington vs. Smith, it was held that "the central government established for the insurgent States
differed from the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did
not originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was not, on the account, less actual or less supreme. And
we think that it must be classed among the governments of which these are examples. . . .
b. In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the US SC, discussing the validity of the acts of the
Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general laws for the
administration of justice and protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the
rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or
tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution,
they are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21
Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do
away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police
regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated,
estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No
one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the
insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in their purpose
or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of
citizens under the Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."
c. And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occurred or
was done in respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments
should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those governments were organized in
hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution; this, because the existence of war between
the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the insurrectionary
lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of
civil society as organized within the enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or remotely
promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union,
were without blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or
insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing the so-called
Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of
enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under
the Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by
Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil
government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the
second kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by
the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government established over an enemy's
territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the
conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little
consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same
and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and
so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the
legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a
civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no
consequence.

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The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government
established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same
character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same
the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of
October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called
government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon
neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States."
Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the
United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation
and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a
treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in
International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion
of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), the belligerent
occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory
controlled although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to
exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4
Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the
Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing
in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of
government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that by doing so,
Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the
United States and other allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who,
taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by
the Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent government under the name with the
support and backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as one established by the
Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the United States. And as such, it would
have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states during the war of
secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases,
notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted. That is to
say, that the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion
against the parent state, rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army
of an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were
good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle
in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the
power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the
effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus
judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so
done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done
during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it
otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the
state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, it would be hard for example that payment of
taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the
sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ."
And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the
present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time

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substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to
the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political
complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is
confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which
declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to
abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
IN RE LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO

Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14,
1990 addressed to the SC questioning the seniority ranking in the CA.
Background:
Petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1980 but took his oath of office
for said position only in 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General
In 1983, the CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary
Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
In 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be ceased to be a member of the Judiciary
After of the EDSA Revolution in 1986, There was a reorganization of the entire government, including the
Judiciary.
To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening
Committee was created
President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive
Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary.
The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new CA and
assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices.
BUT when the appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioners seniority
ranking changed, however, from number 11 to 26.
To strengthen his position, petitioner points to the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano, former Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals who, according to petitioner, was transferred from his position as Justice
of the Court of Appeals to the Ministry of Justice as Commissioner of Land Registration and in 1986 was
reappointed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner states that his (Victorianos) stint in the Commission of
Land Registration did not adversely affect his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals, for, in his case,
Executive Order No. 33 was correctly applied
It was initially granted but a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc was r filed by
Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, 2 of the Associate Justices affected by the
ordered correction.
Issue: Whether the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to
precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate
Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 or whether the present Court of Appeals is
merely a continuation of the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said
Executive Order No. 33.
Held: The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the

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massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath
of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986.
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive
Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of
Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointments thereto
having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence in
rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33
refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.
But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive Order No. 33 did not abolish the precedence or seniority
ranking resulting from previous appointment to the Court of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court
existing prior to the 1986 revolution, it is believed that President Aquino as head of then revolutionary
government, could disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her
appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.

REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN (2003) *not sure if this is the correct case-nikki

Facts:
After the EDSA Revolution, Pres. Corazon C. Aquino issued EO No.1 PCGG to recover all ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.
EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power
o to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the
purposes of this order" and the power
o to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of
this order
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its Chairman, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board. The Board tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas (Commanding General of Phil Army) and finds that a prima facie case exists against
respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas be prosecuted and tried for violation as
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. The Court held in
Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason
of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.
Issue: W/N PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas
for unexplained wealth?

Ruling: NO.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired. The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on its
findings. The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of
EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all

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business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or
using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to
the Commission from time to time.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board,
can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who
fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1.
1. AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration
of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or
close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence
x x x; or
(2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the
President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could
exercise its jurisdiction over him.
Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his
position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief,
undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the illgotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates both here and abroad.
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during
the administration of former President Marcos.
There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General
does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its
amendments.
The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President
Marcos
in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former
President Marcos were close to him.
Such close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President
Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President
Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
Thus, the questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of this case to the
Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

OPOSA v FACTORAN, JR.

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Facts:
This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice."
Background:
The principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, nonstock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources.
They filed a complaint and prayed that the defendant be ordered to cancel all existing timber license
agreements and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. On the basis of the ff:
25 years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) M hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of
the country's land mass.
More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are
already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on the ff:
The plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and
The petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary
for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental
right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners has cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth?
Held: YES

CAUSE of ACTION-an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and
its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
It is settled that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; the only issue to be resolved in such a case is:

WEEK 1

admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint.
SC do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16.
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15.
The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
MMDA v CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY (December 8, 2008)
Facts: This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the
water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration,
the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the
defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held
jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its
water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

1.
2.
3.
4.

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
The Environment Code (PD 1152);
The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
The Water Code (PD 1067);

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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
Executive Order No. 192;
The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
RTC, finding merit in the complaint,rendered a judgment ordering the defendant-government agencies,
jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to
make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.
Held: Yes. In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the
extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and
discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a
need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them
by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be
overemphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring
back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they
may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded
individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State,
through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes
unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot
shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the
Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be
a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a
discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the
State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal
provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing
them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay
clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WEEK 1
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
GARCIA v BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

Facts:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the BOI/ DTI approving the transfer of the site of
the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG
Background:
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and
applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified
Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was the use of
"naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant
was to be a joint venture with PNOC and was issued registration certification
In February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC,
personally delivered to DTI a letter advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration
certification of its project by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas
The reason for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in
Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.
Further that the final say is in the investor
Petitioner opposed
Notwithstanding opposition, BOI approved the transfer as this would provide a better distribution of
industries around the Metro Manila area.
The BOI, however, made it clear, that... BOI or the government for that COULD ONLY recommend as to
where the project should be located and recognizes and respect the principle that the final choice is
still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project.
Issue: W/N it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the
investor, national interest notwithstanding.
Held: YES
It is the duty of the State to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of
the Constitution.
Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of
national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the development
and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in
accordance with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a garment
or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer
chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry is
essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government
superintends the industry by controlling the upstream or cracker facility.
Also, The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan
or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas.
The BRC, produces 60% of the national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in
Bataan. It can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of
LPG and there is need to import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof
by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be
diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of the transferred
petrochemical plant.

WEEK 1

Naphtha as feedstock has also been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval of
Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax. The
law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both Congress
and the President is clear.
Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the
feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
Further, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the great
benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the management of the
project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.
Thus, in the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically
nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to
investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which
remain murky to say the least.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v GSIS

Facts:
A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a domestic
corporation, to stop GSIS from selling the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign
corporation. Allegedly, the sale violates the 60%-40% rule.
Background:
In 1995, Manila hotel was included in the privatization program of the government.
GSIS, the sole owner of Manila Hotel, proposed to sell to interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares.
Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT
Sheraton as operator, prequalified as bidders.
The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder.
10 days after, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that
the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution (60%40% rule)
GSIS refused to entertain petitioner's request.
TRO was issued
Issue:
(1)Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
(2)Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
(3)Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked
is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not
the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC
cannot be considered part of the national patrimony
(4)Whether GSIS failed to give preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation;
(5)Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation.

Held:GSIS was directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
1) Sec. 10.The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

WEEK 1
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe
a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a selfexecuting constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation.
First and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction,
BUT as to the 2nd paragraph, it is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
2) YES. the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos
3) 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
4)In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm
the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
5)The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to
Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could
participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to
the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified
Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. Since petitioner has already
matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent
GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent
GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

WEEK 1
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.
PAMATONG v COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December
17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners
Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was
not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include
petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. The COMELEC
denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The
COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By
then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
Issue: Whether or not the resolutions were rendered in violation of his right to " equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987.
Held: No. Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office
and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not selfexecutory. The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment"
indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy
objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Davide Amendment: I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is
important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the
government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many
people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in
order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to
limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I
change the word "broaden."
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal
access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their

WEEK 1
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452
dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give
due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access
clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is
no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed
validity stands and has to be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of
course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time,
remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and
proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that
erodes faith in our democratic institutions.
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national
positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a
national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of
Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the
government. For the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page
would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00). I]t serves
no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign
enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates"
to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such
as watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral
contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent
on the number of candidates in a given election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute
a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a
senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

WEEK 1