What Popular Unity Can Do

Ahead of the Greek elections tomorrow, Popular Unity remains the best hope for t
he radical left.
by Panagiotis Sotiris

Greece votes tomorrow, but it seems as if all the major questions facing Greek s
ociety are absent from the pre-election debates. Both Syriza and New Democracy c
ompete for the popular vote by avoiding any discussion of the real problem
that
is, the very fact that both Syriza and New Democracy, along with other pro-auste
rity parties, voted for another austerity memorandum.
It seems like it is not a political debate but a contest between two parties who
share the same political program. In a certain sense, this is real. These loan
agreements are not just a set of terms and conditions. They include a mechanism
of constant supervision and control of all major economic decisions through proc
esses of constant evaluation.
This means that Greece s creditors can always ask for
oliberal measures, and more reforms. The agreements
ernance, based on a condition of limited sovereignty.
anda government will have very limited space to move,
ement the measures dictated to it.

more austerity cuts, more ne

are a regime and a form of gov
As a result, any pro-memor
and will be forced to impl

Alexis Tsipras and the leadership of Syriza have fully accepted this condition.
The basic political message is that Syriza must be in a position to be the leadi
ng force in a pro-memoranda government. Their explicit message is that the party
must be strong enough to form a progressive government
a government with Pasok an
d the openly neoliberal River.
However, in reality there is strong pressure by the European Union for a grand co
alition with New Democracy. This kind of special purpose pro-austerity coalition is
one of the trademarks of contemporary European post-democracy. In a break with
all traditions of the Left, Syriza s campaign is based not on political proposals
but on Tsipras s suitability to be prime minister once again.
This pre-election political landscape, where both Syriza and the other pro-memor
anda parties reproduce ad nauseam the message that there is no alternative, is i
n sharp contrast to the sharp divisions and dynamics inside society. In one of t
he strongest electoral expressions of class polarization, the massive no vote in t
he July 5 referendum made explicit the political will of the broad popular masse
s to reject austerity, to demand popular sovereignty, to fight against the embed
ded neoliberalism of the eurozone.
This discrepancy between the political scene and the divisions and dynamics insi
de society is an expression of the new phase of Greece s political crisis.
Greek society is deeply traumatized. The abrupt shift from the determination and
collective aspiration of the no vote to a painful feeling of defeat and humiliati
on has left society without a positive point of reference. It is the first elect
ion since 2012 where there is no obvious pole of hope. Moreover, for the first t
ime many view the Left as part of the political game and part of the problem. This
can easily turn hope into despair and desperation.
It is here that Popular Unity enters the political debate. It attempts to change
its terms, to insist that there is an alternative to the memoranda and that ano
ther road is possible. It is trying to transform the dynamic of the no vote into a
political alternative.

It has a radical program whose basic positions include the stoppage of debt paym
ents, exit from the eurozone, the nationalization of banks and strategic enterpr
ises, and the reversal of the neoliberal reforms associated with the memoranda.
It is based on the collaboration of the left tendencies of Syriza that exited th
e party in protest of its pro-austerity mutation and important segments of the a
nticapitalist left. It has roots in social movements.
As should be expected for an electoral coalition that has been active for less t
han one month, Popular Unity is not yet the kind of united front that is urgentl
y needed. Some of the problematic aspects of Syriza
both in terms of a certain b
ureaucratic organizational culture and of a reformist conception of the politica
l program are being reproduced inside Popular Unity. Many people are still criti
cal of the leading figures of Popular Unity because of their participation in th
e Syriza government.
Above all, we are far from presenting a new political synthesis not only between
the traditions of Syriza and the anticapitalist left, but also between the nece
ssary political program and the collective experiences of solidarity and self-or
ganization.
However, in a political landscape dominated by pro-memoranda positions, Popular
Unity can indeed make a difference, represent the dynamic of the no vote, and pote
ntially be the starting point for the radical left front that is urgently needed
.
The post-election period will be marked by the aggressive implementation of the
third memorandum and an avalanche of cuts and neoliberal reforms. There is the p
ossibility of a new wave of struggles and protests, including demonstrations fro
m new forces that were not active in the previous period, such as farmers.
Moreover, the deterioration of social conditions, because of the new cuts in pen
sions and social spending, will increase the need for solidarity networks. Popul
ar Unity has the opportunity to prove that it is not only an electoral outlet of
protest, but also a leading force in the collective resistance.
Syriza s capitulation is not the end of the political crisis in Greece. Greek soci
ety remains deeply divided and polarized. The trauma of the defeat is here, but
it is possible to transform despair into hope and determination. This is the cha
llenge Popular Unity faces.
However, to meet this challenge Popular Unity must not remain the coalition betw
een the left wing of Syriza and some segments of the anticapitalist left. It mus
t become something radically new and original. It should combine and, at the sam
e time, transcend the experience of both Syriza and Antarsya.
It is necessary to elaborate a political program that goes beyond simply calling
for an exit from the eurozone and an end to austerity and offers a new vision b
ased on public ownership, democratic planning, and worker self-management.
It must insist on an open appeal not only to other forces of the Left such as An
tarsya, but also to the militants and activists from the movements and the solid
arity networks. It should experiment with new forms of collective social organiz
ation, especially given the extremely precarious situation of the workforce of t
he private sector. It must attempt to be really democratic and make itself into
an open political laboratory of radical alternatives.
As is the case with most aspects of life, the first steps are the most difficult
. Popular Unity still has great potential, provided that we remember that in a n
ew situation we will need not just commitment and energy, but creative new ways
of thinking about organizing.