The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act

or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c)

identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11,
2014, citing Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238 (1999)
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact 41 when the offender
makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high
degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he
published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to
establish actual malice.

Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing New York Times v.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) and Annette F. v.
Sharon S., 119 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1151 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
2004).

In Brillante v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571,

October 19, 2004, the Supreme Court stated indeed, the purpose
of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit all
interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely
communicate, with immunity, to the persons who could furnish
the protection asked for.
The Supreme Court stressed that the plainest principles of
natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost
possible freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to
the supervising, removing and appointing authorities of the

misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into

contact, and like considerations make it equally proper that
members of a religious organization should enjoy equal freedom
in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the
misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members. The
said right must be exercised in good faith and that such
complaints must be made to a functionary having authority to
redress the evils complained of, that they must be made in good
faith, and that they must not be actuated by malice.
The Supreme Court further held that the remedy of the person
allegedly libeled is to show proof that an article was written with
the authors knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not. While the law itself creates the
presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious,
nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication
destroys said presumption. The burden of proving actual malice
shall then rest on the plaintiff.
Baguio Midland Courier, et al. v. Court Of Appeals, et al., G. R. NO.
107566, November 25, 2004
In other words, the onus of proving actual malice is placed on the
plaintiff-appellee who must convince the Court that the offender
was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is accomplished, the
defense of privilege is unavailing. [Nanerico D. Santos vs. The
Court of Appeals, et. al., 203 SCRA 110, 114]
Malice exists when there is an intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause. An imputation is legally malicious if done
without any reason that would justify a normally conscientious
man in so making the imputation. While the law presumes every
defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are exceptions to
this rule.
A privileged communication is one made bona fide upon any
subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest,
or in reference to which he has a duty. Discussing the scope of

this rule, former Chief Justice Fernando, in Mercado v. CFI of Rizal

(116 SCRA 93 [1982])., explained that:
Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge
is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover
the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be
made under an honest sense of duty;
Fortich v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120769, February 12, 1997
While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory
words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the
presumption of malice (Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669
(1946).
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty
but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel.
United States v. Caete, 38 Phil. 253, 265 (1918)
Potts v. Dies, 132 Fed 734, 735
Rice v. Simmons, Del 2 Har. 309, 310.
Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements
must be shown to have been written or published with the
knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether
they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or not"
means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth
of the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 US 731.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 US 74.
Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999]

If nothing but the defamatory imputation itself is laid before the

court, malice is presumed from it, and to overcome this
presumption there must be a showing of good intention and
justifiable motive. In other words, the burden is upon the
defendants to overcome the legal inference of malice. Under the
doctrine of qualified privilege, however, this burden does not
arise, for the occasion on which the communication was made,
that is, in the performance of a legal, moral or social duty, rebuts
the inference.
People v. Monton, et al., G.R. No. L-16772, November 30, 1962
Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of
the subject printed phrase must be proved first because this is so
vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words imputed not
defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is
necessarily rendered immaterial.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person
the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words
used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, [a]
charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the
hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons
against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or
are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to
hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.
Buatis, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 142509, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA
275, 286.
United States v. OConnel, 37 Phil. 767, 772 (1918)
Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011

Then, again, in order to escape criminal responsibility for libel or

slander, it is not enough for the party who writes a defamatory
communication to another to say that he (the writer) expresses
therein no more than his opinion or belief. The communication
must be made in the performance of a "legal, moral, or social
duty."
Orfanel v. People, 30 SCRA 819
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation
is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in
the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.
Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the
defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a
qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as
claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the
one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an
officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought;

and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good

faith and without malice.
Buatis v. People 677 SCRA 478
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made
out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such
statement must be communicated only to the person or persons
who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who
have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of
the statement.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its
people from vicious acts which endanger the proper
administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to
prosecute and punish violators of the law. This is essential for its
self-preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not confer
a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the
State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents
to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens under the
Constitution. Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192)