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Tanada vs Tuvera GR no.

(Apr 24, 1985)

Even though Central Bank circular no. 2 is not a statute,

it has the force and effect of law, it binding the public to its
provisions and it providing penalties for their violation.
Phil. Intl Trading Corp. Vs. Judge Angeles; Remington;
Petitioners seek to compel the publication of various and Firestone
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, GR no. 108461 (Oct 21, 1996)
proclamation, executive orders, letters of implementation, and
administrative orders through a writ of mandamus.
PITC is a branch of the DTI with the function of regulating
imports and exports. It required in AO no. SOCPEC 89-08-01 that
General rule is that writ of mandamus can be invoked by RP application for import of goods from PROC should be
a private person only when he has a private of particularbalanced by an export of Philippine products of equal value.
interest to be subserved, or a right to be protected, which right When Remington and Firestone failed to adhere to the export of
is independent of that which he holds with the public. Philippine products requirement, their applications to import
EXCEPTION is when the question is one of public right and the from PROC were subsequently denied by PTIC. However, when a
mandamus is intended to procure enforcement of a public duty, new trade agreement was entered into between RP and PROC
in which case, the people are considered as the real parties in encouraging liberalization of trade, the DTI was directed to
cease the implementation of SOCPEC. Thereafter, PTIC did away
Publication is necessary to inform the people of the with the trade balancing requirement and allowed respondents
existence of laws under which they are to be bound. Failure to to import anew from PROC.
do so takes away the basis for application of ignorantia legis
The lower courts held that PTICs authority to process
non excusat.
and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue
It is the constitutional right of the people to be informed rules and regulations has already been repealed by EO 133 (Feb
on matters of public concern.
27, 1987).
Presidential issuances that apply to the general public
The constitutionality of SOCPEC is also assailed.
and provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation
must be published. Those that apply only to particular persons Held:
or a class thereof need not be published.
EO 133 did not repeal PTICs authority to issue rules and
regulations. There is no indication of the removal of PTICs
regulatory functions. While it does not grant regulatory power,
People of the Philippines vs. Que Po Lay GR no. L-6791 EO 133 is also silent as to the abolition or limitation of such
March 29, 1954
powers. The general repealing clause in EO 133 does not hold in
the case at bar, there being no repeal absent irreconcilable
inconsistency [relating to PTICs regulatory powers].
Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange amounting to
In sum, PTIC derives its authority from the DTI (which
about 7000 USD. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bankwas granted quasi-legislative powers), of which it is an
within one day following their receipt, which was a violation of implementing arm.
the requirement of Circular no. 20. The circular was issued in
The AO, however, while issued in valid exercise of
1949 but was not published until November 1951, which was 3 authority, is invalid for violation of the publishing requirement
months after Que Po Lays conviction of its violation.
under Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The original AO being issued on
Aug 30, 1989, and its amendments filed in the UP Law Center,
and published in the National Administrative Register only on
Circular no. 2 was not binding at the time Que Po Lay March 30, 1992, the respondents are not bound by the said AO,
failed to sell the foreign exchange he possessed in pursuant their application to import having been filed before march 30,

Quoting Tanada vs Tuvera: ...Administrative rules and petitioners witnesses and to present evidence, the case was
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce submitted for decision.
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Respondents appealed but failed to submit the required
printed copies of their record on appeal. Respondents also failed
to act on the appellate courts directive to show cause why their
appeal should not be dismissed.
The resolution dismissing respondents appeal became
final and executory on September 27, 1982, and a writ of
execution issued on February 1, 1983.
Roy vs. CA GR no. 80718
BP 129 (Sec. 39): No record on appeal shall be required
(Jan 29, 1988)
to take an appeal...
Interim of Rules of Court promulgated on Jan 11, 1983
(Secs. 18): ...the filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed
Petitioners firewall collapsed and destroyed the neighbouringwith...
tailoring shop owned by respondents, resulting in physical
(Sec. 19b): ...In appeals in special proceedings in
injuries and death. The RTC found petitioners guilty of accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases
negligence and awarded damages accordingly, which decision wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall
was echoed by the CA. On the last day to file an appeal, be 30 days, a record of appeal being required.
petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion
In a supplemental motion dated April 12, 1983,
for reconsideration, which was denied on the basis of a 1985 respondents maintained that since, under the present law,
jurisprudence that the 15-day period to file an appeal or aprinted records on appeal are no longer required, the rule on
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. On August 30, technicalities should be relaxed and their right to appeal
1986, the SC resolution clarifying the matter was enforced.
On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued a resolution
seeking to revive the case.
Petitioners motion was filed on September 9, 1987. It is no
longer covered by the grace period running from June 30-AugustHeld:
30, 1986.
The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that
SC decisions do not have to be published in the Official Gazette may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law.
for them to be binding and effective. It is Counsels duty to keep
Quoting Alday vs. Camilon, Statues regulating the
informed on the recent developments in the judiciary.
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural rules are retrospective in that sense and to that
Mun. Govt of Coron vs. Carino
GR no. L-65894 (Sept 24, 1987)

Benzonan vs. CA GR no. 97973 (Jan 27, 1992)

Then Pres Marcos directed the mayor of Coron to clear a DBP vs CA and Pe GR no. 97998 (Jan 27, 1992)
certain space the government then needed. The clearing of that
space would require the demolishment of respondents Facts:
structures. The case was brought to court. After a series of
Pe obtained a parcel of land through Free Patent issued
postponements, a date for the final hearing was set, during on Oct 29, 1969. He mortgaged the land to secure a commercial
which respondents and their counsel failed to appear. Upon loan, the proceeds of which he used to build improvements
petitioners motion that respondents failure to appear be upon the land. Upon failure to pay back his loan, DBP foreclosed
construed as a waiver of their right to cross-examine the mortgage on June 28, 1977 and was the highest bidder. The
certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds on

Jan 24, 1978. Pe leased the lot and its improvements from DBP
Tujan filed motion invoking his right to a preliminary
but failed to redeem it within the one year period. DBP then investigation, but during the hearing, his counsel withdrew the
sold the lot to spouses Benzonan on Sept 24, 1979.
same, stating his intention to file a motion to quash on ground
On July 12, 1983, Pe offered to repurchase the land from of double jeopardy. The same motion was granted insofar as
DBP. Upon denial, he filed a complaint for repurchase under Sec subversion is concerned without prejudice to the prosecution for
119 of CA 141. RTC and CA upon appeal both affirmed that the Illegal Possession of firearms.
land should be reconveyed to Pe.
Spouses Benzonan raised the issue of when to count the Held:
five-year period for repurchase from date of foreclosure sale or
At the time of Tujans arrest, the prevailing laws were PD
from expiration of one year period to redeem foreclosed 1866, which punished the illegal possession of firearms and
makes the violation, when done in furtherance of, or incident
Section 119 of CA 141 provides: Every conveyance ofto, or in connection with, the crime of rebellion, insurrection, or
land acquired under the free patent or homestead provision, subversion, a qualifying circumstance to increase penalty to
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, death; and RA 1700, which penalizes any person who
his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the knowingly, wilfully, and by overt act affiliates with, becomes or
date of conveyance.
remains a member of a subversive association or organization.
In the Mongan and Tupas cases prevailing at the time the
No double jeopardy was found because Tujan was
lot was mortgaged, acquired in a foreclosure sale, and sold arrested for two different offenses springing from two different
subsequently to the Benzonan spouses, it was held that the laws.
five-year period should be counted from the date of the
The effectivity of RA 7636 on September 22, 1992 totally
foreclosure sale.
repealed RA 1700 while the present petition was pending in the
Reversing this decision was the Bellisiano case (1988)SC; and on June 6, 1997, RA 8294 amended PD 1866 to the
which held that the five-year period should be counted from the effect that violation thereof becomes bailable and the death
day after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase penalty was replaced by 4 years 2 months 1 day to 6 years
allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure.
imprisonment and a fine of 15,000.
Amending laws were held to have a retroactive effect
because (1) they are favourable to the accused (2) who is not a
Monge and Tupas cases hold in the instant case for habitual
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view decriminalized, should be dismissed, and the penalty under RA
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and 8294 applied to the illegal possession charge.
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof.
Aguillon vs. Director of Lands
People vs. Pimentel
GR no. 100210 (Apr 1, 1998)


In 1983, Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion

under RA 1700. A warrant of arrest was issued but not served People vs. Patalin
because he could not be found.
GR no. 125539 (July 27, 1999)
On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested on basis of the 1983
warrant. During the arrest, he was discovered to have in his Facts:
possession firearms and ammunition and was subsequently
Respondents were found guilty of robbery with multiple
charged with Illegal possession of Firearms and Ammunition in rape and were sentenced to death by the RTC. At the time of
Furtherance of Subversion under PD 1866.
the commission of the crimes (1984) robbery with rape was

punishable by death. However, the ratification of the 1987 stated that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding
Constitution caused the death penalty to be abolished with the to [these] scholarships should not be subsequently charges to
qualifier that Congress may thereafter provide for it for the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. On January 1, transfer to another institution.
1994, Congress restored death penalty by virtue of RA no. 7659
Cui asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the
or the Death Penalty Law.
issue of his right to secure his transcripts without need of
When the 1987 Constitution immediately took effectrefunding Arellano. The Bureau upheld his position and advised
upon its ratification, the case was still in its trial stage.
Arellano, who, nonetheless, refused to issue the transcripts
without refund.
Arellano questioned the validity of the Memorandum,
The constitutional provision abolishing death penaltyholding that it was not a law; that the provisions are advisory,
obviously intended to give it a retroactive effect with the clause not mandatory; that the Director of Private Schools had no
...any death penalty imposed shall be reduced to reclusion authority to issue it and that, further, it has not been approved
by the corresponding department head not published in the
Since the retroactivity of a penal provision can be made Official Gazette.
effective during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution
(1-commission of the crime and start of the prosecution; 2- Held:
sentence has been passed but service not yet begun; and 3-The SC did not find it necessary to pass upon the validity of the
sentence is being carried out), the death sentence meted in the Memorandum since it found the disputed clause in the contract
present case shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
to be contrary to public policy; hence, null and void, since the
Also, the retroactive application of a law usually divests main purpose of awarding scholarships is to reward merit or to
rights that have already become vested (in this case, the aid gifted students, not to attract and keep them in school for
accuseds rights to be benefited by the abolition of the death the schools private propaganda.
penalty). [Hence] the rule that all statues are to be construed as
having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and Leal vs. IAC
intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is GR no. L-65425 (Nov 5, 1987)
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
On March 21, 1941, a compraventa was entered into
between Vicente and Luis Santiago and Cirilio Leal, involving
Cui vs. Arellano University
three parcels of land. Therein was contained the phrase (orig in
GR no. L-15127 (May 30, 1961)
Spanish) they shall not sell to others these three lots but only
to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his heirs or successors,
referring to Cirilio Leals heirs.
Cui was a scholar of Arellano University. As a condition of
When Cirilio died in 1959, his children inherited the
his scholarship grant, he was made to sign a contract waiving subject lands, which they then either mortgaged or leased.
his right to transfer to another school without refunding Arellano Vicente Santiago approached the Leals and offered to
the equivalent of his scholarship in cash. He studied in Arellano repurchase the properties, but was refused. His complaint for
until the first semester of his fourth year whereupon he specific performance was dismissed by both the trial court and
transferred to Abad Santos University and finished his law the IAC, there being no sale or alienation equivalent to a sale
course there. In order to take the bar exam, he needed the yet. Later on, however, the IAC reversed its decision, ordering
transcripts of his records from Arellano, which were released the Leals to accept the offer of repurchase.
only after he had paid the monetary equivalent of the tuition
The issue now raised is whether the clause gives
fees refunded to him by virtue of the scholarship grant.
Santiago a right of repurchase.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools
issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, where in was Held:

Provisions that restrict the right of ownership, indefinite a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement,
as to time, are null as being against public order, under Art praying for its annulment on ground of fraud.
1255 of the Civil Code of Spain and Art 1306 of the Civil Code of
Issues raised were (1) the propriety of certiorari as a
the Philippines.
remedy, (2) the validity of the compromise agreement, and (3)
Even assuming the validity of the provision, the law the presence of fraud in the execution of the compromise
requires the vendor to reserve his right to repurchase the thing and/or collation of the properties sold [to Rosalias children by
sold in no uncertain terms, in order for a conventional Juan and Maria during their lifetime].
redemption to take place. There was no such reservation,
express or implied, in the compraventa.
Furthermore, the phrase en caso de venta should be
Certiorari was the proper remedy because the lower
construed to mean should the buyers wish to sell and not the courts exceeded its jurisdiction when, being only a probate
buyers should sell, in which case, Art 1508 of the Civil code of court, it adjudicated on the title to properties when all it had
Spain (Art 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines), applies, power to do was to determine whether the disputed properties
wherein is stated that the right to redeem of repurchase in the should be included in the inventory to be administered.
absence of an agreement as to time, shall last four years from
The compromise agreement and all the waivers therein
the date of the contract. Repurchase under this should have contained were binding. A compromise agreement is a contract
been done in 1945.
whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
Assuming again that the phrase siempre y cuando estos litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Hence,
ultimos puden hacer de compra (when the buyer has money to judicial approval is not required for its perfection. In the present
buy) can be construed to be an agreement as to time, the case, however, the so-called compromise agreement actually
second paragraph of the same Articles provide that the right partakes more of the nature of a deed of partition. But since all
should exercised within ten years because the law does not its requisites are present (1-no will left by decedent; 2-no debt
favour suspended ownership. In this second case, Santiagos or all debts settled; 3-heirs and liquidators all of age or duly
right to repurchase has already expired, 1966 being 25 years represented if minors; and 4-partition done through public
from the date of contract.
instrument of affidavit duly filed with the register of Deeds) the
compromise agreement/partition is valid.
The contested waiver is also deemed valid because the
heirs waived a known and existing interest (their hereditary
Sanchez vs. CA and Lugod
right vested in them by the death of their father). Furthermore,
GR no. 108947 (Sept 29, 1997)
there is not legal obstacle to an heirs waiver of his/her
hereditary share even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. The
Spouses Juan and Maria begot an only child, Rosalia. Sanchezes have also already availed themselves of the benefits
Maria died first. Rosalia was named adminitratrix of her of the compromise. They are thus barred by judicial principle
property, as well of her fathers who was senile at that time. from asking for a recission of a compromise after enjoying their
Upon the death of Juan, his illegitimate children petitioned for benefits. Compromise entered into and carried out in good
administration of his estate, which was opposed by Rosalia. The faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or
parties entered into and executed a compromise agreement fact..
wherein they agreed to divide the enumerated properties of
Finally, with regards the alleged fraud, there was no
Juan. Item (8) of the same agreement stated that the Sanchezessufficient evidence proving the same. It cannot be presumed.
absolutely and irrevocably waive all their rights, interests, and Even arguing to the contrary, the alleged errors and deficiencies
shares in the property in favour of Rosalia, who was later named regarding the delivery of shares, concealment of properties and
administratrix of her fathers estate.
fraud are questions of fact not reviewable by the SC.
In 1970, Rosalia and the Sanchezes entered into and
executed a memorandum of agreement modifying the
compromise agreement. However, in 1979, the Sanchezes filed Allied Banking Corp vs CA

GR no. 123871 (Aug 31, 1998)


The validity of the clause exempting Seven Brothers

from liability is assailed.

Two crossed checks drawn against Allied in favour of Held:

Meszellen were deposited with the ComTrust. The checks were
The invalidity of contractual stipulations stating that ship
cleared through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation owners shall not be liable for loss even due to the negligence of
(PCHC) and then the proceeds thereof were paid by Allied to his employees/agents is applicable only for common carriers, in
ComTrust. Allied was later sued by Meszellen who alleged that which case the stipulation is invalidated for being contrary to
payment had been made by somebody else. Almost ten years public policy. The same is, however, not true for private carriers
later, Allied filed a third party complaint against BPI, successor- whose contracts are not contracts of adhesion but one wherein
in-interest of ComTrust, for reimbursement in the event that it both parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations. In
would be judged liable in the main case to pay Mezellen.
the latter case, such stipulations shall be binding upon them.
Central issue was whether trial court had authority to
Whatever rights Valenzuela had under Articles 586 and
admit a third party complaint filed by one bank against another 587 of the Code of Commerce it waived when it entered into the
involving a check cleared through PCHC.
charter party wherein obligation to bear the loss was shifted to
Trial court had no such authority. PCHC rules and
regulations hold that disputes between two or more clearing Pleasantville Devt Corp vs Ca, et al.
participants involving items cleared through PCHC should be GR no. 79688 (Feb 1, 1996)
submitted to the Arbitration Committee without prejudice to
recourse to the courts in case of an adverse decision. A banks Facts:
participation in the clearing operations of PCHC is deemed its
Jardinico bought vacant subdivision Lot 9 and later
written and subscribed consent to the binding effect of the discovered that improvements have been introduced to it by
arbitration agreement.
Kee. Kee bought Lot 8 from C.T. Torres Enterprises (CTTE), the
The doctrine that a trial court that has jurisdiction over exclusive real estate agent of Pleasantville. However, CTTEs
the main action also had jurisdiction over the third party employee, instead of pointing out Lot 8, pointed out Lot 9,
complaint, even if said court would have none of that which Kee relied upon.
jurisdiction had the third party complaint been filed as an
The issues raised are (1) whether Kee was a builder in
independent actions admits of an exception in the case of good faith; (2) the liability, if any, of Pleasantville and CTTE.
banks that have given written and subscribed consent to
arbitration under PCHC. Third party complaint is merely a Held:
procedural device allowed when the court so permits.
Kee is a builder in good faith. He applied and paid for a
relocation of the lot as well the lot plan of the subdivision and,
Valenzuela hardwood vs. CA and Seven Brothers
accompanied by CTTEs employee, set out to survey the lot he
GR no. 102316 (June 30, 1997)
bought. The steps he had taken to protect his interests were
Pleasantvilles contention that Kee cannot claim the
Valenzuela entered into an agreement with Seven erroneous pointing out of the lot to him because of the provision
Brothers for the latter to ship its logs to Manila as a private in the Contract of Sale on Installment stating that the vendee
carrier. The same were insured with South Sea Surety and has personally examined or inspected the property as to its
Insurance Co. The Seven Brothers ship sank, resulting in thelocation, contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots
loss of Vvalenzuelas logs, which sinking was due to the and...expenses for fillings (should the vendee wish it) owing to
negligence of the captain. Seven Brothers maintained that it consequential changes due to erosion should be borne by the
was not liable for the loss because of stipulation in the charter vendee should not be construed to man that Kee contracted
party exempting the ship owner from liability in case of loss.
away his right to recover damages resulting from Pleasantvilles

negligence, since the same provision refers only to shouldering

of expenses due to change from erosion.
Van Dorn vs Romillo
Pleasantville is to be liable for the negligence of its GR no. 68470 (Oct 8, 1985)
agent. The principal must still be responsible for acts done by
its agent within the scope of that latters authority, and should Facts:
bear damages caused to third persons. The agent who
Reyes-van Dorn is a Filipino citizen while Upton is an
exceeded his authority, however, may be personally liable for American. They were married in Hong Kong and later absolutely
the damage. Thus, Pleasantville and CTTE are solidarily liable divorced in Nevada, the court there having obtained jurisdiction
for damages due to negligence.
over both parties. Upton later filed suit against Reyes-van Dorn
alleging that, since divorce decrees obtained abroad are not
binding in the Philippines, her shop in Manila is still considered
People vs Veneracion
their conjugal property and that he should be declared to have
GR no. (Oct 12, 1995)
the right to manage it also.
Explicitly stated in Uptons Power of Attorney executed in
Nevada, he stated that his [then] spouse sought divorce, that
there is neither community property nor community obligations
to be adjudicated by court.
Issue raised is the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Upton, being an American citizen, is bound by the
Astorga Garcia Honoration B. Catindig
divorce decree obtained in his country. The same is recognized
GR no. 148311 (March 31, 2005)
in the Philippines, he being an alien. Thus, according to his
national law, he is no longer the husband of Reyes-van Dorn
and therefore bereft of the standing to sue as her husband. The
Honoration Catindig adopted his illegitimate daughter. decision of his countrys court (which validly obtained
As a consequence of which, her name was changed to jurisdiction over him) binding upon him, and which he does not
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. The issue on the childs middle repudiate, estoppes him from asserting his right over the
name, however, was untouched, so Catindig petitioned that she alleged conjugal property.
be allowed to use her mothers surname of Garcia as a middle
[Note: non-binding of divorce decree upon Filipino
citizens applies only insofar as remarriage is concerned?]
Issue raised is whether a child adopted by her natural
father may use the surname of her mother as her middle name.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, et al.
GR no. 80116 (June 30, 1999)
The law is silent as to what middle name an adopted
natural child may use. The Civil Code and Family Law Facts:
Committees, however, agreed that the initial or surname of the
Pilapil and Geiling were married and absolutely divorced
mother shall immediately precede the surname of the father, in Germany, the divorce decree made by a court locally and
which is the established Filipino way.
internationally competent for divorce proceedings and that the
adoption statues should be liberally construed in favour of dissolution of the marriage was legally founded upon and
adoption. Therefore, it was held that there being no law authorized by the law of that foreign jurisdiction.
expressly prohibiting the adopted natural childs use of her
After the decree of divorce, Geiling filed two complaints
mothers surname as a middle name, it is allowed.
for adultery against Pilapil. The same were raised to the Office
of the secretary of Justice.

Issue raised as to whether the charge for adultery may

be filed by one who is no longer a spouse at the time of filing Held:
the same.
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen at the time of his
divorce from Paula, marriage to Alicia, execution of his will, and
death, the same should all be governed by applicable foreign
American jurisprudence was resorted to wherein was law. Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Civil Code was cited:
ruled that in cases where statue provides that the innocent ...intestate and testamentary succession...shall be regulated
spouse has the exclusive right to institute a prosecution forby the national law of the person whose succession is under
adultery, such innocent spouse no longer has the right to consideration. Lorenzos will, executed in the Philippines
institute proceedings against the guilty spouse after a divorce according to the formalities required under Philippine law and
has been decreed. Even in Philippine law, a charge for adultery admitted to probate by the local court, is declared extrinsically
must be initiated by the offended spouse who has the status, valid. The intrinsic validity of the provisions thereon are left to
capacity, or legal representation to do so at the time of the the determination of the applicable foreign law.
filing of the criminal action.
The divorce obtained by Lorenzo was also declared valid
The reason for this is that the charge of adultery is and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
allowed because the innocent spouse has a family or marriage
to protect, or is interested in preventing the introduction of
spurious heirs into the family. After the dissolution of a Garcia vs. Recio
marriage, that reason naturally disappears.
GR no. 138322 (Oct 2, 2001)
Llorente vs CA
GR no. 124371 (Nov 23, 2000)

Recio was a Filipino citizen when he married Editha

Samson, an Australian citizen. Their marriage was subsequently
dissolved by a divorce decree issued by an Australian family
Lorenzo was a US serviceman who married Paula. In
In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and in 1994
1943 he was granted US citizenship. When he returned from the married Garcia, a Filipino citizen. They began living separately
US he discovered that Paula was having an illicit affair and was in 1995, and their conjugal assets in 1996 were divided in
pregnant. Lorenzo returned to the US where he filed for, and accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
was granted, a [absolute] divorce effective 1952. He laterAustralia.
married Alicia and had three children all surnamed Llorente,
In 1998 Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity
with her during their 25-year marriage. Alicia did not know of of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, alleging the existence of a
Lorenzos first marriage.
subsisting marriage at the time Recio married her. Recio was
In 1981, Lorenzo executed a last will and testament later able to secure a divorce decree in Australia dissolving his
bequeathing all his properties to Alicia and their three children. marriage to Garcia, and prayed that the complaint be dissolved
The will was admitted to probate by the trial court, but Lorenzo on the ground that it stated no cause of action.
died before the proceedings could be terminated.
Issues raised were (1) whether the fist divorce was
Paula then filed for letters of administration over proven, and (2) whether Recio was proven to be legally
Lorenzos property, contending that she was his surviving capacitated to marry Garcia.
spouse and, therefore, compulsory heir; that the property in his
will were acquired during their marriage; and that Lorenzos Held:
bequeathment encroached upon her legitime and share in
There are two kinds of divorce: (1) absolute divorce
the conjugal property.
(vinculo matrimonii) that terminates the marriage; and (2)
Issues raised as to the validity of Lorennzos divorce in limited divorce (mensa et thoro) that suspends the marriage but
the Philippines, and, subsequently, as to who should inherit leaves the bond in full force.
from him.

The Australian divorce decree Recio presented contained

Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the restriction that A party to a marriage who married again marriage, to which Roehr filed a motion to dismiss. The latter
before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other partywas denied by the trial court. Roehr meanwhile obtained a
has died) commits the offence of bigamy. From this it can be decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburgconcluded that Recio obtained a limited divorce that did not Blankenese wherein custody of both their children was granted
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to to him through summary proceedings. Records remain unclear
his national law. Furthermore, Recios failure to present a as to Rodriguezs participation in the proceedings. The decree of
certificate establishing his legal capacity to remarry prevents divorce was recognized by the RTC when it endowed Roehr the
the court from concluding that he was legally capacitated to capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
remarry. The trial court erred in finding that the divorce decree
Issue raised as to the effects of the divorce decree,
ipso facto clothed Recio with legal capacity to remarry without especially on custody.
requiring him to present evidence regarding Australian personal
law governing his status, or at least proving his legal capacity to Held:
A foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
However, neither can Garcias petition to declare her in the Philippines insofar as the foreign spouse is concerned in
marriage null and void on ground of bigamy be granted because view of the nationality principle in Philippine civil law on status
Recio may, after all, turn out to be capacitated to remarry under of persons, provided that such decree is valid according to the
Australian law. The case should therefore be remanded to the national law of the foreigner.
trial court to receive evidence, if any, showing Recios legal
However, legal effects as to custody, care, and support
capacity to marry petitioner. Only upon failure of that can the of the children must still be determined by Philippine courts.
marriage be declared null and void on the ground of bigamy.
Before res judicata can be given to a foreign judgment, there
The court also ruled that divorce is a question of fact must be sufficient proof that the parties opposed to such foreign
that must be proved by the one alleging it as a defense before it judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so (ie. may
can be admitted in evidence.
repel such judgment by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
A writing or document may be proven as a public ornotice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official fact).
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
Also, with respect to actions in personam, a foreign
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate justness of a partys claim, and is subject to proof to the
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the contrary.
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and (b) authenticated by seal of his
Republic vs. Crasus L. Iyoy
Although insufficient with regards to the aboveGR no. 152577 (Sept 21, 2005)
requirements, the divorce decree between Recio and his first
wife Samson was admitted as evidence due to Garias failure to Facts:
properly object to its admissibility.
Crasus married Fely and had five children with her. In
1984, Fely left for the US, leaving their children with Crasus. She
sent divorce papers to Crasus not long after, around which time
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
Crasus also learned that she was married to an American and
GR no. 142820 (Jun 30, 2003)
bore a child with him. Fely returned to the Philippines on several
occasions, flaunting her American family and American last
name. She claimed to have become an American citizen in
Roehr and Rodriguez were married in Hamburg, 1988. Crasus filed for declaration of nullity of marriage in 1997
Germany, and then had their marriage subsequently ratified in under grounds of psychological incapacity.
Tayasan, Negros Oriental.

Issues raised as to the continued validity of the marriage

between Crasus and Fely.

Quoting Santos vs cA, psychological incapacity was

defined as a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly [in]cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage...[including] their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
Psychological incapacity should be characterized by:
(1) Gravity must be so serious that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage;
(2) Juridical antecedence must be existing before the
marriage although the overt manifestations may
emerge only thereafter;
(3) Incurability either incurable, or the cure must be
beyond the means of the party involved.

(6) Affected marital obligations must be those embraced

by Articles 68-71 and 220, 221, and 225 of the Family
(7) Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines,
while not controlling nor decisive, to be given great
respect by the courts;
(8) Trial court must order appearance of prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and SolGen as counsel for the
State. No decision shall be handed down without
SolGen certification stating his reasons for approval
or opposition to the petition.
(9) (from Marcos vs Marcos) there is no requirement for
the respondent spouse to be examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for declaration of nullity based on psychological
incapacity. Such incapacity, however, must be
established by evidence during trial.

As to the divorce allegedly obtained by Fely, it was ruled

invalid for Fely was a Filipino citizen at the time she filed for
In republic vs. CA and Molina:
divorce. Thus, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
(1) Burden of proof to show nullity of marriage belongs rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity. Since
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved inPhilippine laws do not allow and recognize divorce between
favour of the validity of marriage;
Filipino spouses, the divorce she obtained couldnt have been
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must valid. The marriage between parties continues to exist.
(a) Medically or clinically identified,
Republic vs Orbecido III
(b) Alleged in the complaint,
GR no. 154380 (Oct 5, 2005)
(c) Sufficiently proven by experts
(d) Clearly explained in the decision
(e) Incapacity must be psychological, although
At the time of marriage, Orbecido and his wife were both
manifestations may be physical
Filipino citizens. The wife went to America, became a
(3) Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time naturalized citizen, obtained a divorce decree, and married an
of celebration of the marriage, or prior thereto, even American instead.
though manifestations need not be perceivable at
Orbecido is petitioning that the court grant him the
such time;
capacity to remarry under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
(4) Incapacity must be medically or clinically incurable; the Family Code that recognizes a divorce obtained by an alien
may be absolute or only in regard to the otherspouse abroad.
spouse; and must be relevant to the assumption of
Issue raised as to whether said Article 26 also covers
marriage obligations;
cases wherein both parties were Filipinos at the time of
(5) Such must be grave enough to bring about thecelebration of marriage.
disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage;

Orbecido should be considered capacitated to remarry. some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
The legislative intention behind Article 26 was to avoid the does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse is still considered results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
married to an alien spouse who is no longer considered married committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
to him by virtue of a divorce decree obtained abroad.
Damnum absque injuria doesnt apply in abuse of rights.
Jurisprudence cited was Quita vs CA wherein the court hinted,
by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine RCPI vs. CA
law and can thus remarry.
GR no. 79578 (March 13, 1991)
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties
at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship Facts:
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
Spouses Timan sent a telegram of condolence through
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
RCPI. The telegram, however, was typed on a Happy Birthday
These, however, must be proven s that Filipino spouse card and placed inside a Christmasgram envelope. Spouses
may be granted the capacity to remarry:
sued for damages.
(1) Naturalization of the alien spouse;
(2) Fact of the divorce and its conformity to the foreignHeld:
RCPI is guilty of gross negligence, wanton misconduct,
law allowing it;
of contract. The Timan spouses chose to send the
(3) The fact of such foreign law; and
a social form which provides for an
(4) That under such foreign law, the alien spouse is also
form and envelope, and for which they
capacitated to remarry.
paid a premium. RCPIs excuse that it ran out of condolence
cards and envelopes is untenable, for it could have delivered
the message in ordinary form and reimbursed the difference of
Cebu Country Club vs. Elizagaque
GR no. 160273 (Jan 18, 2008)
In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages
awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
San Miguel Corp, a special company proprietary memberreckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Gross carelessness
of CCCI, designated Elizagaque as a special non-proprietary or negligence constitutes wanton misconduct, which
member, which was approved by CCCIs BOD. Elizagaque later misconduct, performed by RCPI employees, must hold the
filed an applicationfor proprietary membership, purchased company liable, for punitive damages may be recovered for
proprietary shares and was issued a Proprietary Ownershipwilful or wantonly negligent acts in respect of messages, even
though those acts are neither authorized nor ratified.
The application was disapproved, prompting Elizagaque
to write several letters of reconsideration and inquiry as to the
status of his application. No reply was made by the BOD. Meralco vs CA
GR no. L-39019 (Jan 22, 1988)
Elizagaque filed for damages.
The Chaves family was a customer of Meralco. They
CCCIs BOD members are liable for damages under the
with two overdue bills by Yambao, a Meralco bill
principle of abuse of rights. They failed to print the amended
told that the bills would be paid at the
procedure (amended 20 years ago) for admission to the
One of the bills was thus paid on April 2,
Eligible-For-Membership list on the application form filled out
by Elizagaque.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of

Past 2:30 pm on April 21, 1965, the electricity was cut

Garciano sued for damages, discrimination, and unjust
off in the Chaves residence. The following day, the second bill and illegal dismissal.
was paid and the electric service restored.
Chaves family sued for damages arising from failure of Held:
Meralco to give the required notice of disconnection before it
There was no termination in the first place, the letter
cut off their electrical service.
purportedly terminating her services being null and void for
being invalid. Hence, Garcianos failure to report for work even
after receiving the BODs letter should be construed as
Meralco has the absolute right to disconnect thevoluntary desistance from her teaching job, from which she is
electrical service of a delinquent customer, but it should give a not entitled to recover damages. Furthermore, there is no
written notice of disconnection 48 hours in advance.evidence showing that the members of the faculty she
Furthermore, under Revised Order no. 1 of the Public Service impleaded [physically] prevented her from reporting for work.
Commission, disconnections shall not be made after 2 pm of Their threat to resign en masse does not make them liable for
any working day, amongst other qualifications. Failure to give damages, for it was simply an exercise of their right of free
such notice amounts to a[n independent] tort as the speech to dissent from the BODs decision. It was not contrary
prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause to law, morals, good customs, or public policy.
additional mental and moral suffering...This is a clear violation
Volenti non fit injuria.
of Article 21 of the Civil Code...
Article 21 should also be construed as granting the right
Meralcos reliance on the clean hands doctrine (he who to recover damages to injured persons who are not themselves
comes to court in demand of equity must come with clean at fault (clean hands doctrine). This was not the case at
hands) also finds no application. At most, it can be considered present. Garciano could be faulted for her indefinite leave of
a mitigating circumstance in ascertaining the amount for absence and failure to report back in time for regular opening of
class, her refusal to sign a written contract of employment, and
her ignoring the BODs order for her to report to duty.
Garciano vs. CA
GR no. 96126 (Aug 10, 1992)

Bunag, Jr. Vs. CA

GR no. 101749 (July 10, 1992)

Garciano is a teacher at ICI. She filed for an indefinite Facts:

leave of absence, which was approved by the BOD President.
Bunag and Cirilo were sweethearts who had a falling-out.
Before the opening of the following school year, the school Bunag, abducted Cirilo, raped her, and thereafter promised to
principal, through Garcianos husband, wrote her that her marry her. They cohabited in the house of Bunags grandmother
services were being terminated by the schools founder, Fr. for 21 days, during which they filed their respective applications
Wiertz, concurred in by the PTA, because of (1) absence of a for marriage license, only for Bunag to later file an affidavit
written contract of employment due to her refusal to sign one; withdrawing his application for the marriage license. Cirilo sued
and (2) difficulty of getting a substitute teacher for her on for damages based on breach of promise to marry. The criminal
temporary basis since no one would accept the post without acase against Bunag was dismissed by resolution of the fiscal at
the preliminary investigation stage.
Upon her return, Garciano received a letter signed by the
BOD, with the exception of Fr. Wiertz, reinstating her to her Held:
duties and invalidating previous letters of termination for not
Breach of promise to marry is generally not actionable,
being approved by the BOD. Six of nine members of the BOD per se, except when plaintiff has already incurred expense for
later resigned because of the ICI facultys acid reaction to the the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However,
reinstatement of Garciano.
moral damages are allowed in specified cases or in those
analogous to Article 2219, paragraph 10. Article 21 also allows

for damages to be collected from one who causes loss or injury

(1) Conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation,
to another in a way contrary to good morals, good customs, or
surmises, or conjectures
public policy.
(2) inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
In the present case, the SC stuck to the factual findings
of the CA, where Bunag was found guilty of abduction with rape.
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion
The dismissal of the criminal case does not preclude an action
(4) judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
for civil liability, for there was no declaration in final judgment
(5) findings of fact are conflicting
that the fact from which the civil case arises did not exist.
(6) CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto
case, which are contrary to the admissions of both
only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
CA findings are contrary to that of the trial courts
Hence, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds
specific evidence upon which they are based
from a declaration in final judgment that the fact from which the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in petitioners
civil action might arise did not exist.
main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondents
Finally, in Rillon, et al, vs Rillon, it was held no longer
Finding of fact of the CA is premised on the
necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on
the evidence on record.
said offense in favour of the offended woman can likewise be
Article 21 has the purpose of expanding the concept of
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment. This is owing to the
quasi-delicts, which are acts or omissions that cause damage to
difference in quantum of evidence required.
another, there being fault or negligence nor pre-existing
contractual relations between the parties, but which give rise to
an obligation to pay for the damage done. In Spanish, these are
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA and Gonzales
culpa aquiliana (civil law concept). In Anglo-American common
GR no. 97336 (Feb 19, 1993)
law concept, these are torts and cover assault and battery, false
imprisonment, and deceit.
Although breach of promise to marry is generally not
Gonzales and Baksh became sweethearts, after which
the latter proposed to her. He went to meet with her parents to actionable, the law admits of exception where there is seduction
ask for her hand. They later began to live together, during and where preparations for the wedding have already been
which time Gonzales surrendered her virginity to him. Baksh,done. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
however, began maltreating Gonzales. Yet still she continued to sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
remind him of his promise to marry her. Eventually, Baksh said because of said promise or inducement... In other words, if the
he couldnt marry her because he was already married to CAUSE is the promise to marry, and the EFFECT is carnal
another girl. Gonzales left him and upon consultation with her knowledge, there is a chance of the existence of criminal or
lawyer, sought the help of the barangay, which sent tanods to moral seduction...if it is the other way around, mutual lust is
try to convince Baksh to keep his promise to marry Gonzales. [considered to have] intervened. Moral damages may be
recovered in the former, but not in the latter.
He continued to refuse.
Lastly, Bakkshs contention that Gonzales cannot recover
Sole issue is whether or not Baksh is liable for damages
damages because she was in pari delicto for allegedly receiving
under Article 21.
his love because of her desire for economic security is
unaccepted. Pari delicto requires equal fault; in a similar
The court adheres to the factual findings of the lower offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault. At fault, she
court, for only questions of law can be raised on appeal to it can only be considered to be in delicto. The principle is: Equity
often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties,
except when:
where his transgression has been brought about by the

imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden

of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to Buenaventura vs CA
the transaction was itself procured by fraud.
GR no. S 127358, 127449 (March 31, 2005)
Loreta Serrano vs CA
GR no. 45125 (April 22, 1991)

Noel and Isabel Buenaventura were married. Noel filed a

petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage wherein he
pleaded that he was psychologically incapacitated. The same
was granted by the trial court, along with Isabels prayer for
Ribaya sold Serrano pieces of jewellery which the latter moral and exemplary damages.
sent her private secretary Rocco to pawn to Long Life
Issues raised as to whether said damages should be
Pawnshop. The pawnshop ticket issued stipulated that it was awarded. Judgment includes how the common property should
redeemable on presentation by the bearer. Rocco disappeared be divided between the parties.
with the loan.
Three months later, Ribaya was informed that a Held:
pawnshop ticket issued by Long Life was for sale, which ticket
Isabel depends on the provisions of Art 2217, which
probably covered the jewellery she sold. Ribaya informed allows for moral damages from physical suffering, mental
Serrano, who went to Long Life and verified that it was her anguish, fright, social anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
missing jewellery. She told the owner Yu An Kiong not to allow feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and the like, and Art
anyone to redeem the jewellery because she was the lawful 21, which makes a person who WILFULY causes loss or injury to
owner thereof, to which Yu An Kiong agreed. Serrano reported another be liable for damages.
the loss to the police and charged Rocco for estafa. Detective
The above is inapplicable. For damages to be awarded
Corporal Mateo thereafter left a note asking Yu An Kiong to hold under Article 21, the injury must have been done wilfully. Such
the jewellery and to notify the police in case someone shouldis contrary to a finding of psychological incapacity for the
redeem the same. The next day, however, Yu An Kiong, allowed products of psychological incapacity are caused by an innate
redemption of the jewellery by one de Leon, upon her inability and, hence, beyond the control of the party. For moral
presentation of the appropriate pawnshop ticket.
damages to be awarded, there should be evidence that the
Serrano sued Long Life for failure to hold the jewelleryinjury was deliberately and maliciously done by a party who
and for allowing its redemption without first notifying her or the knew of his disability and yet wilfully concealed the same. And
since exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral
damages, the negation of the latter necessarily carries with it
the negation of the former.
Long Life was duty bound under Article 21 to hold the
As to property relations, it is held that in case a marriage
items in question and to notify the owner thereof or the police is declared void ab initio (or when a man and woman
of any effort to redeem them because he had been duly notified capacitated to marry each other live together exclusively as
that it was either stolen or involved in an embezzlement of the husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
proceeds of the pledge. Instead of allowing redemption, Long void marriage), the property regime applicable and to be
Life should have filed an interpleader, impleading both Serrano liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal coand de Leon, where it can demand payment of the loan upon ownership. In this, unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
assumption that it gave the loan in good faith and was not a fruits of the couples separate property are not included in the
fence for stolen articles nor a conspirator with Rocco or de Leon. co-ownership. The provisions regarding the family home (Title
The pawnshop ticket is not a negotiable instrument nor a V, Chapter 2 Family Code), however, remain in force regardless
negotiable document of title. The pawnshop is therefore liable of the property regime of the spouses.
for damages, without prejudice to its right to recover from
Void marriages are inexistent from the beginning and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity EXCEPT for

purposes of remarriage, in order to do away with any continuing custom, public order, or public policy; (3) such is done with
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage.
INTENT to injure.
Thus, no recovery may be made under either article
because supposing Lim were guilty, it would only be of bad
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden and Ruby Lim vs Reyes aka judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to
Amay Bisaya
bad faith. Complaints based on either Article must necessarily
GR no. 154259 (Feb 28, 2005)
fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendoes and
Lim, the Executive Secretary of the Nikko Hotel,
organized an exclusive party to which Filart was invited. Reyes Antonia de Jesus, et al. vs Cesar Syquia
alleged that he was a friend of Filarts and that when they met GR no. L-39110 (Nov 28, 1933)
at the lobby of the Nikko Hotel, she invited him to said party,
and that she could vouch for him. During the party, however, he Facts:
was loudly asked to leave by Lim, causing much embarrassment
Antonia begot a male child with Syquia. She presented
and humiliation.
evidence of Syquias recognition of the child by way of letters to
Lim, on the other hand, testified that she discreetly andthe priest who was christen it and several letters addressed to
privately asked Reyes to leave, and that it was he who made a Antonia while she was pregnant. When the child was born, he
scene. Although she did not ask Filart as to whether or not caused a doctor friend of his to attend to Antonia, shouldered
Reyes was of her (Filarts) party, Lim did speak to Filarts sister, expenses during her confinement at the hospital, and thereafter
who said that Filart did not invite Reyes.
lived with her as a common law wife. One year later, when
When Reyes sued for damages, the trial court found in Antonia was showing signs of a second pregnancy, Syquia left
favour of Nikko Hotel and Lim, while the CA held for Reyes.
her and subsequently became married to another girl. Antonia
sued for recognition of her two children, for breach of promise
to marry, and payment for their maintenance.
Upon review of the facts, the SC found Lims testimony
more credible. She, having been in the hotel business for 20Held:
years, cannot be conceived to be so rude, as such is frowned
Acknowledgement of a natural child does not necessarily
upon in favour of politeness and discretion. Furthermore, Reyes have to be done in a single document, addressed to one, or to
himself testified that when Lim asked him to leave, she was any particular individual. The only requirement is that the
very, very close to him. The court found it hard to believe that writing be indubitably that of the recognizing fathers. As to the
she should be shouting at him from such distance.
second child, there was no proof upon which a judgment could
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria finds application. be based requiring the defendant to recognize it.
The doctrine refers to self-inflicted injury, or to the consent to
There is likewise no basis for damages for breach to
injury, which precludes recovery of damages by one who has promise, the same not having been satisfactorily proven.
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even Furthermore, breach of promise is not actionable, except for the
though he is not negligent in doing so.
right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff
Article 19, containing the principle of abuse of rights, is upon the faith of such promise.
not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Its
standards are: (1) acting with justice; (2) giving everyone his
due; and (3) observing honesty and good faith. Its elements are: Magbanua, et. al., vs IAC and Perez
91) the existence of a legal right or duty; (2) exercise in bad GR nos. L-66870-72 (Jun 29, 1985)
faith of such legal right or duty; and (3) doing so for the sole
INTENT of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and have
Petitioners are tenants of the private respondents, who
the elements: (1) legal act; (2) such is contrary to morals, good diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots, which

caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to their great included in the program, Ledesma let her graduate without
damage and prejudice, after which they were told to vacate honours, and only later instructed the registrar to enter into the
their respective areas for they could no longer plant palay for scholastic records of Delmo her honour.
lack of water.
Delmo and her parents sought damages, but in the
The trial court adjudicated in petitioners favour, which course of the proceedings, Delmo passed away. Her parents
was echoed by the CA with an amendment deleting the award thus represented her.
of moral and exemplary damages.
Ledesma is liable for damages. Even though he could not
Petitioners entitled to moral damages under Article 21, furnish Delmo a copy of the Directors decision, he should have
for it appears that the private respondents denied water for informed her of the same and included her name in the list of
their farm lots in an attempt to make them vacate said honour students, or at least met with her father to inform him of
landholdings. They are likewise entitled to exemplary damages the decision, or graduated Violeta Delmo with honours. His
because private respondents acted in an oppressive manner.
disobedience to the order of the Director, his superior,
prejudiced Delmos rights. Such disobedience smacks of
contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power.
Ledesma vs CA
Exemplary or corrective damages have the purpose of
GR no. 96914 (Jul 23, 1992)
proving an example or correction for the public good.

Violeta Delmo was treasurer of their schools Student UE vs Jader

Leadership club. In connection with such office and according to GR no. 132344 (Feb 17, 2000)
the procedures laid down in the club Constitution and By-laws,
she disbursed funds to members and officers in the club as Facts:
loans, monetary aid, and for other humanitarian purposes.
Jader was a law student of UE. On his first semester of
Ledesma, president of her school, learnt of such activities, said his last year, he received an incomplete grade for missing the
that they were against school rules and regulations, and sent regular final examination in Practise Court I. During the second
Delmo a letter informing her that she was dropped from semester, he enrolled as a fourth year student and filed an
membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate application for the removal of the incomplete grade, which was
for any award or citation from the school.
approved by Dean Tiongson after payment of the required fee.
It was shown that Delmo and the other implicated He took the exam he lacked and received a grade of 5.
officers acted in good faith upon their club advisers assurance
During the deliberations for candidates of graduation,
that the latter would cause the approval of their constitution Jaders name was included in the Tentative List of Candidates
and by-laws. Also, the implicated officers were inducted into for Graduation. He took part in the graduation ceremonies and
office by the Superintendent and the club itself was allowed to prepared himself for the bar exams only to find out that he still
cosponsor a school affair.
had a deficiency. He had to drop out of review classes and
The Director of Public School ruled in favour of Delmo. thereafter sued for damages.
The decision and records of the case, however, were mis-sent to
Ledesma, who was asked to return the records. Ledesma, who Held:
had already read the decision, construed it to mean that the
It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely
decision was also to be returned, and complied with the same. inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each
Much later, the Director ordered him to furnish Delmo with a student as to whether he had already complied with all
copy of the decision, but Ledesma said he sent it back.
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they
On the day of graduation, Ledesma received a telegramwould be included among those who will graduate.
from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any
UE, in informing Jader of the result of the removal exam
honours due her. Since Delmos name could no longer be only when had begun preparing for the bar exams, cannot be

said to have acted in good faith, which connotes an honest the client has been paid upon request or upon maturity of the
intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, placement, the banks obligation to said client remains
even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together unextinguished. Furthermore, it has been held that: Payment
with the absence of all information or belief of facts, wouldmade by debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the
render the transaction unconscientious. The want of care to theobligation as to the creditor, if there is no fault or negligence
conscious disregard of civil obligations couple with a conscious which can be imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them, in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the person of his
and conscious indifference to the rights or welfare of thecreditor, or through error induced by the fraud of a third person,
person(s) who may be affected by ones act or omission can the payment to one who is not in fact his creditor, or authorized
support a claim for damages by the one thus injured.
to receive such payment, is void...such payment does not
prejudice the creditor, and accrual of interest is not suspended
by it.
Allied Banking Corp vs Lim Sio Wan
The last indorser is liable for the amount in the
GR no. 133179 (March 27, 2008)
negotiable instrument even if a previous indorsement was
forged (by virtue of sections 65 and 66 of the Negotiable
Instruments Code). Thus, a collecting bank that indorses a
Lim Sio Wan deposited a money market placement withcheck bearing a forged indorsement and presents it to the
Allied. Before its maturity, however, an officer of Allied received drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including the
a phone call instructing her to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans forged indorsement, and ultimately should be liable therefor.
placement, issue a check representing the proceeds thereof,The exception is when the issuance of the check itself was
and to give the check to one Santos, who was going to pick it attended with negligence, in which case th4e institution issuing
up. The check was crossed For Payees Account Only and thus the check becomes just as, or more, liable than the collecting
delivered to Santos. The same check was deposited in the bank.
account of FCC at Metrobank with Lim Sio Wans indorsement.
The question to be asked in determining proximate
FCC had earlier deposited a money market placementcause is: If the event did not happen, would the injury have
with Producers Bank, with Santos handling their account. When resulted? If the answer is NO, then the event is the proximate
placement matured, FCC demanded the proceeds. On the same cause.
day the Allied officer received the phone call, the mangers
As to the question of unjust enrichment. Article 22 of the
check was deposited in FCCs account, purportedly representing Civil Code provides that every person who through an act of
the proceeds of its placement in Producers.
performance by another, or any other means, acquires of comes
Metrobank guaranteed the check, which was funded by into possession of something at the expense of the latter
Allied without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to
purported indorsement. It was only after more than six months him.
after funding the check that Allied informed Metrobank that the
Producers was unjustly enriched (when a person unjustly
signature was forged.
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
Upon the supposed maturity of the placement, Lim Sio money or property of another against the fundamental
Wan went to Allied to withdraw it, only to be informed that itprinciples of justice, equity and good conscience) because the
had been pre-terminated upon her instructions. This Lim Sio deposit made to FCC had the effect of terminating its
Wan denied, and upon which she sued Allied.
indebtedness to FCC.
FCC, on the other hand, cannot be held to have been
unjustly enriched, for when the check was deposited in its
Allied and Metrobank were both found guilty ofaccount purportedly from Producers, its placement with
Producers had already matured, thus justifying the deposit.
The relationship between a bank and its client is one ofAlso, as it was not a party in any stage of the negotiation of the
debtor-creditor. The bank deposit (as well as a money market check, the forgery cannot be raised against it.
placement) is in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum. Until

Allied and Metrobank are to pay Lim Sio Wan on a

Alano sold a piece of lot to Carlos and then sold the
proportion of 60:40, and Producers is held liable to both Allied same piece of lot to Dandoy. Carlos filed a complaint seeking
and Metrobank for the amount of the check plus 12% interest the annulment of the second sale, but Alano brought up the
per annum, moral damages, attorneys fees, and costs of the defence of forgery. Five years later, Carlos brought an estafa
suit against Alano, who moved for its suspension pending the
civil case, which he claimed was a prejudicial question.
In the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial during the
Rolando Landicho vs Hon Relova
criminal action, Alano admitted the validity of his signature in
GR no. L-22579 (Feb 23, 1968)
the first deed of sale as well as his acknowledgement of his
signature in 23 cash vouchers evidencing Carlos payment. He
even wrote to Carlos, offering to refund whatever the latter had
Landicho was charged with bigamy by his first wife paid.
Makatangay for allegedly contracting a second marriage with
Pasia. Pasia filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her Held:
marriage with Landicho on grounds of his alleged use of force,
A prejudicial question exists when both a civil and
threats, and intimidation, and for its bigamous character. criminal question are pending and the civil action involves the
Landicho thereafter filed a third-party complaint against same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
Makatangay seeking to have his marriage with her declared null based, and has an issue that must be resolved before the
and void on grounds of her allegedly employing threats, force, criminal action may proceed because such resolution would be
and intimidation.
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
Landicho then moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal action.
criminal case pending the hearing of both annulment suits.
It was been previously held that a criminal action for
Issue raised as to whether or not those suits constitute aestafa (for alleged double sale of property) is a prejudicial
prejudicial question.
question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale
and the defence of the alleged vendor that his signature
thereon was forged. Also, a stipulation of facts by the parties in
The court ruled in the negative. Supposing the first a criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting
marriage really was null, said nullity must still be declared so judicial admissions, hence, binding, upon the parties, by virtue
that the marriage can be held as void. He who contracts a of which...defense waived the right to contest or dispute the
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit. No proof
first marriage incurs the penalty provided for... Parties should need be offered as to any facts admitted during pre-trial.
not be allowed to judge the nullity of a marriage by themselves.
Thus, Alanos admission during the pre-trial constitutes a
[As to the petition of the second wife, supposing that the waiver of his defence of forgery in the civil case.
second marriage was declared null, it would still have no
bearing on the resolution of the case because Landicho cannot
be allowed to use his own misdeed to defend himself.]
Beltran vs People
A prejudicial question is (1) that which arises in a case, GR no. 137567 (June 20, 2000)
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and (2) the cognizance of which pertains to Facts:
another tribunal.
Beltran filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Felix on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Felix filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against him.
Alano vs CA
GR no. 111244 (Dec 15, 1997)
The rationale behind the prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. The same, however, does not apply in

the present case. For purposes of remarriage, the only legally

acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage null is a
judicial declaration thereof. For purposes other than remarriage, Bobis vs Bobis
however, other evidence is acceptable. Hence, Beltran could GR no. 138509 (July 31, 2000)
present evidence attesting to the nullity of his marriage as his
defence in the concubinage case and need not necessarily rely Facts:
on a proof of final judgment of the same.
As long as there is no judicial declaration, the marriage Held:
is presumed to exist for all intents and purposes.