International Phenomenological Society

Leibniz and Aesthetic

Author(s): Clifford Brown
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Sep., 1967), pp. 70-80
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105324 .
Accessed: 16/10/2012 05:54
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org

LEIBNIZ AND AESTHETIC

There is a great volume of commentaryon Leibniz, and an extraordinarilywide rangeof interpretation:Cassirer'sLeibnizis not Russell's.
This is undoubtedlydue to the fecundity of Leibniz's thought coupled
with the diversity of his interests and the ad hoc nature of much of
his writing.In addition,his tendencyto treat the positions of others as
partialmanifestationsof his own more comprehensiveview helped bring
about syntheseswhich later critics have found unstableenough to justify
chargesof inconsistencyor even of writing in bad faith.
While it is a commonplace among historians of philosophy that
Leibniz'swritingsare laden with the past and pregnantwith the future,
there has been little recognitionin the English speaking world of his
role in the developmentof modem aesthetic. Works of art and their
making, however, are often used by Leibniz to throw light on metaphysical,epistemological,and ethical problems;he makes aestheticexperience a specific kind of knowing, he relates this kind of knowing to
other kinds of knowingunderthe relationshipof the one and the many,
and he deals with the problem of the combinedpresence of originality
and intelligibilityin the work of art. These are the problemswith which
I am primarilyconcernedin this paper. The concluding section points
to Leibniz's influence on Baumgarten and Kant, two philosophers
frequentlymentionedas the foundersof modern aesthetic.
II
For Leibniz, the Cartesiancriteria of clearness and distinctnessare
not sufficient for a proper classificationof our ideas. The content of
the Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas of 1684 1 appears as

a constant in all the later writings of Leibniz. Here Leibniz provides

a series of dichotomies:knowledgeis obscure or clear, if clear, then it
is either confusedor distinct;and if distinct,then it is either inadequate
1 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. and ed.
Leroy E. Loemker, 2 Vols. (Chicago, 1956), I, 448-454.

70

LEIBNIZANDAESTHETIC

71

or adequate, and also either symbolic or intuitive. My knowledge is

clear if it enablesme simplyto recognizewhat is represented.This clear
knowledge is confused when I am unable to enumerate the various
marks which distinguish the object known from other objects, even
thoughthe object may possess such marks. This is the way in which I
know things in sensation;the evidence providedby the senses is direct
and does not provideme with characteristicsto which I can give verbal
expression.Thus color cannot be explainedto a blind man or, for that
matter,to those who can see; all that we can do is to providethem with
the direct experienceor to help them recall some direct experiencethey
have had in the past.
This direct experience of quality in sensation has a parallel in art.
"Likewisewe sometimes see painters and other artists correctly judge
what has been done well or badly; yet they are often unable to give a
reason for their judgmentbut tell the inquirerthat the-work which displeases them lacks 'something,I know not what."' 2
Thus the artist knows which is the right shape or the right color, but
this is a knowledge for which he has no conceptual expression. The
judgmentthat Leibniz makes here is not an isolated one made only in
passing,but rather is reiteratedthroughouthis mature writing. One instance occurs in the essay On Wisdom,written in the 1690's: "We do
not always observe wherein the perfection of pleasing things consists,
or what kind of perfectionwithin ourselvesthey serve, yet our feelings
(Gemfith) perceive it, even though our understandingdoes not. We
commonlysay, 'There is something,I know not what, that pleases me
in the matter'. This we call 'sympathy'.But those who seek the causes
of things will usually find a groundfor this and understandthat there
is somethingat the bottom of the matterwhich, thoughunnoticed,really
appeals to us." 3 And toward the end of his life, in 1712, in some
remarks on Shaftsbury'sCharacteristicsof Men, Manners, Opinions,
Times, he writes: "Taste as distinguishedfrom understandingconsists
of confusedperceptionsfor which one cannot give an adequatereason.
It is somethinglike an instinct. Tastes are formed by nature and by
habits. To have good taste, one must practice enjoying the good things
which reason and experiencehave already authorized."4
It is difficult to assess the degree to which Leibniz concedes an
autonomouskind of knowing to aestheticexperience.It is certainlythe
case that he allows for a properkind of knowingwhich lies outside the
2

Ibid., I, 449.

3 Loemker, II, 698.

4 Loemker, II, 1031. See Ernst Cassirer, "Verhiltnis zur Aesthetik," Leibniz'
System (Marburg, 1902), p. 459.

72

PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

conceptualizeddistinctnessof scientificthought. We can certainlyknow

a quality for which no concept is immediatelyavailable. Moreover it
is the case that in the knowledge of such sense qualities as color no
conceptualizedexpression will ever be found to be equivalent to the
direct experiencein sensation.In regardto the experiencingof art, the
situationis more complicated.Here Leibniz specificallysays that while
our immediateand clear experienceof aestheticperfectionmay be confused, that nonetheless in most cases further investigationwill reveal
the cause of our pleasure. What this cause of our pleasureis we shall
considerpresently.But for the moment we may at least say that while
what the artistknows clearlybut confusedlyis subjectto furtherrational
scrutiny, it is nonetheless known immediately and without conscious
concept in aesthetic experience.
Croce was willing to credit Leibnizwith makinga place for taste and
imagination,contraryto the practice of the Cartesians,and with maintaining a difference of degree between aesthetic and intellectualexperience. Croce also maintainedthat ultimately Leibniz's place must be
with the rationalizers:"It might seem that by according claritas and
denyingdistinctioto aestheticfacts Leibnizrecognizedthat their peculiar
characteris neither sensuous nor intellectual.He might seem to have
distinguishedthem by their 'claritas'from pleasure or sense-motions,
. But the lex continueand
and from intellect by their lack of distinction'
the Leibnitian intellectualismforbid this interpretation.In this case
obscurity and clarity are quantitativedegrees of one single consciousness, distinct or intellectual, towards which both converge and with
which in the extreme case they unite."5 Croce also held that Kant's
idea of art is basically identical with that of Baumgarten and the
Wolffianschool, i.e., that art is ". . . the sensibleand imaginativevesture
of an intellectualconcept."6 In the concludingsection of this paper I
hope to show that these are faulty interpretations.Leibniz's "clear but
confused knowledge," Baumgarten's "extensive clarity," and Kant's
"aestheticalidea" all recognize an aesthetic perception which is not
merely an unsuccessfulattempt at conceptualization.
III
Leibnizthus holds that furtherinvestigationwill often reveal the true
source of the pleasure realized in the clear but confused knowledge
presentin aestheticexperience.He is explicit on the results of such an
5 Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic, tr. Douglas Ainslie, 2nd ed. (New York, 1920),
p. 208.
6 Ibid., p. 273.

LEIBNIZ AND AESTHETIC

73

investigation:"Joy is a pleasure which the soul feels in itself. Pleasure

is the feeling of a perfectionor an excellence, whether in ourselves or
in somethingelse. For the perfectionof other beings also is agreeable,
such as understanding,courage,and especiallybeauty in anotherhuman
being, or in an animal or even in a lifeless creature, a painting or a
work of craftsmanship,as well. For the image of such perfection in
others, impressed upon us, causes some of this perfection to be implanted and arousedwithin ourselves."7
Thus the cause of our joy or pleasure is perfection, a perfection
which our feelings may perceiveeven when our understandingdoes not.
Leibniz does not fail to provide in this same essay a definitionof perfection: "I call any elevationof being a perfection... perfectionshows
itself in great freedom and power of action, since all being consists in
a kind of power.... The greater any power is, moreover, the more
there is found in it the many revealed through the one and in the
one.... Now unity in pluralityis nothing but harmony [tUbereinstimmung], and, since any particularbeing agrees with one rather than
another being, there flows from this harmony the order from which
beauty arises, and beauty awakens love." 8 Thus the source of our
pleasure in aesthetic experience is our clear but confused (i.e., nonconceptual)perceptionof the perfection of a unity in variety. Leibniz
cites a numberof specific examples:the orderedvariationsof music, the
rhythmsand rhymes of poetry, "the beat and cadence of the dance,"
in all of which we can find the fitness of order as an aid to our
emotions.
There is, of course, no more pervasivetheme in Leibniz'sworld view
than that of parsimony. The world taken as a whole combines the
simplesthypotheseswith the richest compossiblevariety of phenomena.
Every perceptionis a greateror lesser realizationof this universalharmony. The principles of continuity and the identity of indiscernibles
combineas we move towardever more comprehensiveunities-in-variety.
A suggestedtool for this creative human advance is the art of combinations,

"....

that science in which are treated the forms or formulas

of things in general, that is, quality in general or similarityand dissimilarity."9 This art is superiorto algebrain being more comprehenOn Wisdom, Loemker, II, 697.
Ibid., p. 699. Cf. the Preface to the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus of
1693 (Loemker, II, 690-691): "Thus the contemplation of beautiful things is in
itself pleasant, and a painting of Raphael affects him who understands it, even
if it offers no material gains, so that he keeps it in his sight and takes delight
in it, in a kind of image of love."
9 On Universal Synthesis and Analysis, Or the Art of Discovery and Judgment,
Loemker, I, 359.
7
8

74

RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY

sive and in applyingnot only to mathematicsbut also to deciphering,

to various games, and to

"...

all matters involving relations of simi-

larity." Thus the advancingunity-in-varietyessential to the successful

work of art shares its organic structuringwith the expressionsof logic,
science, and philosophyitself.
A harmoniousresolution of apparent incompatibilitiesthus characterizes our knowledge at every level. This principle is also used by
Leibnizto explain the seemingpresenceof evil in the world on analogy
to the seeming presence of ugliness in a successful work of art; the
supposedevil or ugliness is due to our taking a partialview and to our
frequentfailure to realize that what appears evil or ugly is actually a
necessary condition for the realization of a greater moral or artistic
good: "If we look at a very beautifulpicture but cover up all of it but
a tiny spot, what more will appearin it ... than a confused mixtureof
colors withoutbeauty and withoutart. Yet when the coveringis removed
and the whole paintingis viewed from a position that suits it, we come
to understandthat what seemed to be a thoughtlesssmearon the canvas
has really been done with the highest artistry by the creator of the
work."la A similar experience is available in music when an initial
dissonancearouses our attentionand concern, and paves the way for a
resolution.
It is not my concern in this paper to support Leibniz's analogical
defense of the propositionthat everythinghappens for the best in the
best of all possible worlds. The difficultiesof Leibnizianoptimism are
manifest, and it has been tirelessly pointed out that he is simply
assumingthat a highest perfectiondoes exist, that there is in actuality
a whole picture of which we see but a part. I wish only to point out
that for Leibniz compossible perfection and organic unity and articulation are characteristicscommon to all forms of humanknowledgeand
activity, and, as I hope to show, that for better and for worse, this
emphasis on the structuralaspect of works of art has had a strong
influence on later aesthetic speculation.
IV
That the source of our pleasurein aestheticexperienceis the perfection of a unity-in-varietyis a principlewhich Leibniz was not the first
to pronounce,however significanthis role as a carrierand reshaperof
this idea may be. Perhaps the most importantoriginal contributionof
Leibniz to the developmentof modem aesthetic theory is the impetus
10

On the Radical Origination of Things, Loemker, II, 795.

LEIBNIZANDAESTHETIC

75

his psychologygives to -the establishingof the autonomyof the human

mind in its powers of perception.
In the Principlesof Nature and Grace of 1714 Leibniz speaks of an
analogicalfree creativepower of the mind: "As for the reasonablesoul
or spirit, there is somethingmore in it than in monads or simple souls.
It is'not only a mirrorof the universe of creaturesbut also an image
of divinity. The spirit not only has a perceptionof the works of God
but is even capable of producingsomethingwhich resemblesthem....
our soul is architectonic... in its voluntaryaction and in discovering
the sciences according to which God has regulated things.... In its
own realm and in the small world in which it is allowedto act, the soul
imitateswhat God performsin the great world."11
It must not be supposedthat Leibniz uses this notion of free creative
power to refer only to our capacitiesfor establishingnew scientificlaws
and inventingnew machines.In his Preceptsfor Advancingthe Sciences
and Arts of 168012 he invests imaginationwith a power for originality
in art which goes beyond the compass of rule and rote. While music
is subordinateto mathematicswith regard to intervals and harmonies,
and while rules of musical compositionmay be taught to a man who
is ignorantof music, the possessionof such knowledgedoes not thereby
enable a man to compose successfully.What is needed is an intimate
acquaintancewith the works of successful artists of the past, together
with a vivid aural imagination. In activity dependent on sensation
"... we do better by letting ourselves go automatically by imitation and
practise than by sticking to dry precepts ....
imagining a beautiful

melody, making a good poem, promptly sketching architecturalornaments or the plan of a creative painting require that our imagination
itself acquire a habit after which it can be given the freedom to go its
own way without consultingreason.... reason must afterwardsexamine
and correct and polish the work of the imagination;that is where the
precepts of art are needed to produce something finished and excellent." 13

From this we may concludethat there is a sense in which for Leibniz

the successfulwork of art is always both original and intelligible.The
work is not done by mechanicallyfollowing an establishedformula,yet
it does present the requisiteintelligibleperfectionof a unity-in-variety.
The work of a Cicero or a Raphaelis originalin the sense of not being
arrivedat by rule, and yet it is at the same time intelligiblein its presentation of a new form.
1041.
Leibniz Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York, 1951), pp. 29-46.
Ibid., p. 43.

-11 Loeniker, II,

12

'3

76

ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY
RESEARCH

Leibniz's artist is clearly not a creator ex nihilo. He must always

make use of materialsand laws which are not of his own making.But
these limits constituteprecisely a conditionwithoutwhich creativework
would be meaningless or inconceivable. In developing the idea of
economy in the essay On the Radical Originationof Things of 1697,
Leibniz uses the example of an architect's being both limited and
challengedby the nature of the terrain on which his building is to be
erected.'4 The principle of economy maintainsthat the universe combines the simplest hypotheses with the richest compossible variety of
phenomena.And thus the successfulwork of art emulates this best of
all possible worlds in achievingthe greatestexpressionof a felt unityin-varietycompossible within the receptivityor capacity of the world
which the artist is attemptingto shape. The successful artist, like the
successful chess player, subjects himself to conditions and rules of
procedurewhich are not the result of his own volition, and these limitations enable him to show us his originalityand his intelligencein the
shapingof his art.15
V

Writers on the history of modem aesthetic frequently attribute its

beginnings to either Baumgartenor Kant. Both men were, however,
heavily influencedin some of their most central theses by Leibniz.
The classificationsof Leibniz'sMeditationson Knowledge,Truth,and
Ideas are repeated in Baumgarten's Reflections on Poetry: "? 12 ...
poetic representations are either obscure or clear ....
? 13. In obscure

representationsthere are not contained as many representationsof

characteristictraits as would suffice for recognizingthem and for distinguishingthem from others.... ? 14. Distinct representations,complete, adequate, profound through every degree, are not sensate, and,
therefore,not poetic.... ? 15. Since poetic representationsare clear
representations... and since they will be either distinct or confused,
and since they are not distinct ...

therefore, they are confused." 16

These classifications,considered at length in Section Two of this

article, provide the entire systematic framework of the Baumgarten
work. Moreover, the Leibnizian root-idea of perfection as unity-invarietyreappearsin Baumgarten'saccount as the simultaneouspresence
14

Loemker, II, 791.

See Paul Schrecker, "Leibniz and the Timaeus," The Review of Metaphysics,
IV (1950-51), 495-505. On the general problem of originality and intelligibility in
the work of art, see Milton C. Nahm, The Artist As Creator (Baltimore, 1956).
16 Tr. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther (Berkeley,
1954), pp. 40-42.
'5

LEIBNIz AND AESTHETIC

77

i the art work of "extensiveclarity" and "theme."For Baumgaten,

as for Leibniz, clear knowledge enables us to recognize the representation, and this knowledgemay be either confused or distinct. Distinct
knowledgerequiresintensive clarity, i.e., an awarenessof the essential
and definingcharacterof the object. This area of conceptualizationis
the properconcern of philosophyand science. The cognitive import of
the work of art, on the other hand, rests on extensive clarity: "? 16.
When in representationA more is representedthan in B, C, D, and so
on, but all are confused, A will be said to be extensivelyclearer than
the rest."17 Greater extensive clarity in a representationprovokes a
broadeningmultiplicityof characteristictraits in the imaginationof the
percipientby the use of such devices as allusion and partialimages, and
the referenceto individualsrather than to concepts. "? 29 ... when
the poet performs, we develop a more universal notion from these
specific instances and sharp determinations... ." 18
These multiplicitiesobtain their poetic perfection, however, only in
their unity in a single theme: "? 66. By theme we mean that whose
representationcontains the sufficient reason of other representations
supplied in the discourse, but which does not have its own sufficient
reason in them. ? 67 ... a poem having a single theme is more perfect
than one which has several...." 19 Baumgartencloses this section of
his discussionwith a summarystatementin the spiritof the Monadology:
"? 68 . . . representationsmay be altogethergood independentlyof each
other,but ... in the coordinationof them every sense idea, every fiction,
every fantasy must be excluded which does not conform to the design
(theme)and blend into the plot. We observeda little while ago that the
poet is like a makeror a creator.So the poem ought to be like a world.
Hence by analogy whatever is evident to the philosophersconcerning
the real world, the same ought to be thought of a poem."20
The Leibnizianworld-viewis pervasivein Baumgarten'saesthetic;it
is clearlypresentin the foundationsof Kant's.Accordingto Israel Knox,
it is Kant's great merit that he placed in the mainstreamof modern
aesthetictwo central conceptions:"He made the principle of harmony
the root-thoughtof his philosophy of art and beauty.... Of equal
importanceis Kant's emphasisupon the disinterestednessand purposiveness withoutpurpose of the judgmentof Taste."2'
Ibid., p. 43.
Ibid., p. 49.
19 Ibid., p. 62.
20 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
21 Israel Knox, The Aesthetic Theories of Kant,
Hegel, and Schopenhauer
(London, 1958), p. 50.
17
18

78

PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

The historical influences on Kant were many and diverse, yet in

regard to organic unity as an aspect of aesthetic experience, he was
undoubtedly affected both directly and indirectly by the writings of
Leibniz.22 Christian Wolff, who attempted to systematize Leibniz's
world-viewand whom Kant immortalizedas the inducerof his dogmatic
slumber,had definedperfectionas unity-in-varietyand had helped make
this the aesthetic byword of the time.23 Baumgartenalso serves as a
connectinglink, since he was both strongly influencedby the writings
of Leibniz and highly respectedby Kant. Of all the writingsof Leibniz
himself, the one which contributedmost to the formation of Kant's
critical thought is probablythe New Essays ConcerningHuman Understanding,publishedposthumouslyin 1765, with its stresseson universal
harmony,the a priori conditionsof human experience,and the unconscious levels of the human mind.
Knox says that Kant's "fatal dichotomization"of beauty as free or
dependenthas its source in Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten.24There is
some supportfor this contention.For Leibniz, joy is pleasure,pleasure
is a feeling of perfectionin oneself or in others, perfectionis the power
of a unity-in-variety,from this unity comes beauty, and from beauty
comes love. Thus our aesthetic satisfactionis dependenton formal perfection, joy is possible without material gain, and our experience of
beauty is a preparationfor love. For Kant, free beauty satisfies by its
form, this form brings the cognitive powers into play without engaging
them in questionsof utility or moral judgment,hence aesthetic interest
is a disinterestedinterest, and the truest art is free as contemplative
rather than dependent on a conceptual concern for what the object
ought to be. Beauty throughits disinterestednature is a preparationfor
the moral categoricalimperative.
While the parallelsbetween the two argumentsare evident, there are
also some essential differenceswhich must be stressed.Kant holds that
the judgmentof taste is completelyindependentof the idea of perfection. The harmoniousinterplayof our cognitive powers that characterizes our experienceof the beautifulis based on a purposivenesswithout
purpose. This means that objective purposiveness,i.e. conceptualreference of the object to a criterionof what it ought to be, has no place
in the judgment of free beauty. Kant defines perfection as objective
internal purposiveness, and observes that perfection

"...

has been

22 See Otto Schlapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der 'Kritik
der Urtheilskraft'(Gdttingen, 1901), p. 70.
23 See Hermann Cohen, Kants Begrfindung der Aesthetik (Berlin, 1889), pp.
28-29.
24 Knox, p. 170.

LEIBNIz AND AESTHETIC

79

regardedby celebratedphilosophersas the same as beauty, with the

proviso, if it is thought in a confused way. It is of the greatest impor-

tance in a critiqueof taste to decide whetherbeauty can thus actually

be resolvedinto the concept of perfection."25
For Kant, the formal element of the art work does not entail an
objectivepurposiveness;in the experienceof beauty, there is a feeling
of harmonyin the interplay of our cognitive powers, but there is no
measuringof the object to a definitepurpose.The free beautyof flowers,
birds, shells, delineationsa la grecque, and all music without words
involves no concept of what the object ought to be. In the dependent
beauty of human and animalfigures, castles, and churchesthere is such
a limitingconcept.26
Thus Kant himself seems anxiousto distinguishhis position from that
of those "celebratedphilosophers"whose aesthetic touchstone is "perfection." There are, however, grounds for maintainingthat Kant's distinction is not altogetherdefensible, and that the distance between his
position and that of his rationalistforerunnersis both greaterand lesser
than he may have supposed.
We must first recall that perfection for Leibniz does not always
involve a conceptualreferenceof the object or event to a criterionof
what it ought to be. Perfectionis simply the manifestationof power in
a unity-in-variety,which unity-in-varietymay be felt as well as conceptualized. We must also recall Baumgarten'snotion of "extensive
clarity."He distinguishesit carefullyfrom that "intensiveclarity"which
is obtained by concept. So when Baumgartenrefers to the clear but
confusednatureof aestheticcognition,he does not mean that it involves
a fumblingand only partiallysuccessfuleffort toward conceptualization.
Clarity may be "extensive"or "intensive,"and neither is a deficient
copy of the other.
Furthermore,this notion of "extensiveclarity"actually recurs in the
work of Kant himself, under the title of the "aestheticalidea." An
aesthetical idea is "...

that representation of the imagination which

occasions much thought,without however any definite thought,i.e. any

concept, being ...

adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely

compassed and made intelligible by language."27 ". . . the aesthetical

idea is a representationof the imaginationassociatedwith a given concept, which is bound up with such a multiplicityof partial representaImmanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. J. H. Bernard (New York, 1951),
pp. 62-63.
26 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
27 Ibid., p. 157.
25

80

PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

tions in its free employment that for it no expression marking a definite

concept can be found... " 28

Thus Kant's "aesthetical idea" is closely related to Baumgarten's

"extensiveclarity"and Leibniz's "clear but confused ideas." Moreover,
the Kantian emphasis on formal structureand unity is anticipatedby
both Baumgartenand Leibniz. Nevertheless,Kant's distinctionbetween
free and dependentbeauty is not maintainedby Leibniz, an essential
mark of the beautifulis that it is a felt unity. The possibilityof a conceptual unity paralleling the felt unity makes no difference. Musical
harmoniescontinue to be felt unities even after the Pythagoreandiscovery of their numerical analogues, and Leibniz specifically lists the
figures of humans and animals, architecture,and craft as examples of
felt unity and hence of beauty.
CLIFFORDBROWN.
RUTGERS
UNIVERSITY.

28

Ibid., p. 160.