ANNUALTHREATASSESSMENT

StatementBeforethe
SenateArmedServicesCommittee
UnitedStatesSenate
11February2014

MichaelT.Flynn,LieutenantGeneral,U.S.Army
Director,DefenseIntelligenceAgency
Goodmorning,ChairmanLevin,RankingMemberInhofe,andmembersofthecommittee.Thankyou
forthisopportunitytotestifyandforyourcontinuedsupporttothededicatedmenandwomenofthe
DefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA),manyofwhomremainforwarddeployeddirectlysupportingU.S.
andalliedmilitaryforcesinAfghanistanandotherplacesaroundtheworld.

DIAsmissionistopreventstrategicsurprise,deliveradecisionadvantage,andtodeploygloballyto
meetanychallenge.OurgoalistohelptheNationunderstandthethreatsitfaces,enabledecisions
andactionsfromthePresidentoftheUnitedStatestoaprivateonthegroundandhelpour

countryprepareforthethreatswewillfaceinthefuture.Withourfocusonfoundationalintelligence
andfocusedintelligencecollectionandanalysisthatsupportswarfightersaswellaspolicymakers,we
bringauniqueperspectivetotheIntelligenceCommunity(IC).

TheUnitedStatescontinuestofaceacomplexsecurityenvironmentmarkedbyabroadspectrumof
dissimilarthreatsemergingfromcountriesandhighlyadaptivetransnationalterroristnetworks.DIAis
focusedonimmediateandlongtermthreatstoalliedforcesinAfghanistan;risksposedby
transnationalterroristorganizations,especiallyastheyrelatetothreatstomilitaryforcesandfacilities;
thethreatofweaponsofmassdestructionfallingintothehandsofnonstateactorsandthe
proliferationoftheseweaponstostateactors;monitoringthepotentialthreattotheU.S.from
ongoingconflicts;theemergenceofforeignmilitarieswithnearpeercapabilities;andsupportforUS
andAlliedforces,atseaorontheground,deployedaroundtheworld.

Defenseintelligencemustbeabletoprovidetimelyandactionableintelligenceacrosstheentire
threatspectrum.Ourassessmentsarebasedupontheagencysworldwidehumanintelligence,
technicalintelligence,counterintelligence,anddocumentandmediaexploitationcapabilities,along
withinformationfromDIAspartnersintheICandtheentiredefenseintelligenceenterprise,
internationalallies,andopensources.Incooperationwiththesepartnersandallies,DIAis
strengtheningitscollectionandanalysisaswellassharingmoreinformationacrossintelligence
disciplines,andwithournationscloseallies,tobetterunderstandthemultitudeofthethreatsfacing
thenation.

ThemenandwomenofDIAknowtheyhaveauniqueresponsibilitytotheAmericanpeopleandtake
greatprideintheirwork.Iamprivilegedtoservewiththemandpresenttheiranalysistoyou.On
behalfoftheentiredefenseintelligenceenterprise,thankyouforyourcontinuingconfidence.Your
supportisvitaltous.

IwillbeginmytestimonyfirstwithanassessmentofAfghanistan,wheretheDepartmentofDefense
(DoD),theIC,DIA,andourcoalitionpartnersremainactivelyengagedsupportingmilitaryoperations
againstthethreatofalQaidaandotherantigovernmentofAfghanistanforces,transitiontoglobal
threats,andconcludewithanoverviewofotherregionalchallenges.

AFGHANISTAN

AstheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)continuesthetransitioninAfghanistan,the
AfghangovernmentandtheAfghanNationalSecurityForces(ANSF)willseektoconductpresidential
andprovincialcouncilelectionsin2014andmaintainsecurityfollowingtheANSFsassumptionoffull
securityresponsibilitiesleadforallofAfghanistanin2013.

AfghanSecurityForceshaveshownprogressintheirabilitytoclearinsurgentsfromcontestedareas,
buthaveexhibitedproblemsholdingclearedareaslongterm.AsanauxiliarytoAfghanistansformal
securityforces,theAfghanLocalPolice(ALP)continuedtosupportbroadereffortsbysecuringsome
ruralareasthatmightotherwiselackacentralgovernmentpresence.

Operationally,AfghanforceshaveadaptedtothereductionofISAFenablersupportbymakingbetter
useoftheirowncapabilitiesandshowingtacticalcompetenceinplanningandconductingsecurity
operations.However,theystruggleduetothelackofintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissance,
(ISR)capability,aswellasexpertisein,andtechnologyforcounteringcounterimprovisedexplosive
device(IED)programs.Thischallenge,alongwithstretchedANSFairliftandlogisticalcapacity,limits
theAfghanNationalArmys(ANA)abilitytosustainoperationsoutsideoflargeurbanareasand
logisticalhubs.Theyhavebeenunabletodenyfreedomofmovementtotheinsurgencyinruralareas.

Uncertaintyoverthepost2014securityenvironmentU.S.presence,funding,governmentcohesion
andTalibanstrengthislikelytodrivedecisionsatalllevelsoverthenextyearasANSFleadersare
forcedtoprioritizeobjectives,whilehedgingagainstthisuncertainty.Influentialpowerbrokersand

regionalsecurityofficialsareincreasinglyconcernedwithstrengtheningtheirinfluenceoverANSF
unitsandensuringsecurityacrosstheirrespectiveareasofauthority.Thesecompetingpriorities
couldresultinpoliticallydrivenmissionsthatunderminetheANSFsabilitytoaddressmilitarily
necessaryrequirements.

TheAfghanNationalArmy(ANA)andAfghanNationalPolice(ANP)manningofapproximately340,000
personnelremainedshortofthefundedceilingof352,000.Highattrition,lowrecruitment,and
inconsistentpayreducetheANAsonhandstrengthandremainanimpedimenttotheANAs
resilience.

ThenumberofinsiderattacksfromwithintheAfghansecurityforcesagainstISAFpersonnel
significantlydecreasedin2013(13incidentscomparedto48in2012).Thischangeislikelyaresultof
areducedISAFpresenceandimprovedmitigationeffortsbybothISAFandtheANSF.Thenumberof
insiderattacksagainstAfghansecurityforcepersonnelincreasedto76incidents,comparedto50in
2012.ApproximatelyhalfofallattacksinvolvedANPasperpetrators,andtheALPaccountedforthe
secondlargestshare.

Afghanistanspoliticalstabilitydependsonsuccessfulelectionsin2014andthesubsequenttransferof
powerfromPresidentHamidKarzaitohissuccessor.AfghanpreparationsfortheApril5thpresidential
andprovincialcouncilelectionsareontrack.Thelackofaconsensuscandidatecouldleadtoa
potentiallydestabilizingrunoffelectionthatwouldoccurduringthepeakoftheinsurgentfighting
seasonandISAFsdrawdown.Postelectionstabilitywilldependonthenewpresidentsabilityto
maintainthesupportofthepoliticaleliteandANSFthroughbalancedallocationofpoliticalpositions
anddomesticandinternationalfunding.

PresidentKarzairemainsresistanttosigningtheAfghanU.S.BilateralSecurityAgreement(BSA)
despitetheapprovaloftheNovember2013LoyaJirgaandpopularsupport,mostrecentlyinsisting
thatpreconditionsconcerningtheAfghanpeaceprocessandraidsonAfghanhomesbemet.The

delayinsigningtheBSAincreasestherisktopoliticalcohesionasthepotentiallossofforeign
assistancepromptsAfghanelitestoreevaluatetheviabilityof,andsupportfor,thegovernment.

Persistenthumancapitalshortages,weakinstitutions,andcorruptionwillcontinuetolimitthereach
ofthecentralgovernment,impedeservicedelivery,anderodethegovernmentsconnectiontothe
population.Powerbrokerswillstrengthentheirpatronagenetworksinanticipationofanuncertain
futurepost2014,encouragingdevolutionofpower.

In2013,theTalibanledinsurgencyfailedtoseizeandholdterritoryintwoofitstraditional
strongholds,KandaharandHelmandProvinces.However,weassesstheinsurgencywasabletosustain
nationwideviolencelevelscomparabletothoseofthepasttwoyears,withattacksincreasingly
directedagainstANSF.Talibanseniorleaderslikelybelievethattheyonlyneedtocontinuepresent
levelsofmilitaryengagementtobeposturedforvictoryfollowingISAFdrawdownandwithdrawalof
keyANSFenablers.TheHaqqaniNetworkisasemiautonomousorganizationunderthebroader
Talibaninsurgency,whichwejudgetobethemostproficientgroupplanningandconducting
spectacularandcomplexattacksinAfghanistan.TheHaqqaniNetworkposesaseriousandongoing
threattoU.S.personnelandfacilitiesinAfghanistan.
TheTalibanmaintainspublicoppositiontoanynegotiationswiththeAfghangovernmentandfurther
intendstochallengeitslegitimacybyimpedingthepresidentialelectionscheduledforApril2014,
usingviolenceandintimidationtodeterprospectivevotersanddisrupttheprocess.TheTalibanisalso
makingproactiveeffortstobuildpoliticallegitimacyinadvanceofISAFsdrawdown,increasingly
attemptingtoprovidelimitedcivilservicestolocalpopulations.ReducedCoalitionpresencewill
presentnewopportunitiesfortheTalibantomobilizelocalsentimentandincreasetheirpolitical
influenceintheruralareas,theirmainconstituency.WejudgeTalibanleaderswilllikelybechallenged
tofulfillgovernancerolesatthenationallevelorinmajorurbancenterswithanydegreeof
competencyinthenearterm.Bottomline,theTalibanoffernomorethananeconomicandsocial
deadend.

RegardingIranianinfluenceinAfghanistan,Iranmaintainsamoderatedegreeofeconomicleverage
overAfghanistan,whichithasattemptedtousetoextractpoliticalconcessionsfromtheAfghan
governmentwithlimitedsuccess.Iranisakeytradepartner,providingcriticalimportsoffuelto
Afghanistan.IranalsohostsapproximatelythreemillionAfghanrefugeesand,inMayoflastyear,
threatenedtheirexpulsioniftheAfghanparliamentapprovedtheU.S.AfghanStrategicPartnership
Agreement.Althoughthethreatwasunsuccessfulindeterringtheagreement,amassdeportation
fromIranwouldcauseahumanitariancrisisinsideAfghanistan.

AlQaidaleaderscontinuetoviewparticipationinattacksagainsttheCoalitionascentraltotheir
standingasleaderoftheglobaljihad.DespitetheoutflowoffighterstoSyria,thehistoricaland
symbolicimportanceofAfghanistanremains.AsmallAlQaidapresenceresidesinthenortheastern
mountains,withpocketsofitsfighterselsewhereinthecountry;however,thegroupsoperational
capacityinAfghanistanislimited.WeexpectalQaidatousemediastatementstohailthepending
2014drawdownasavictoryforjihadists,andcontinueitslimitedsupporttotheAfghaninsurgency.

GLOBALTHREATS

CYBER
Cyberreconnaissance,exploitation,andthepotentialforattacksagainstDoDforcesaroundtheglobe
isareality.TheseactivitiesindicateaninterestinhowDODoperatesincyberspaceandmayallowour
adversariestoidentifyopportunitiestotrytodisruptordegrademilitaryoperations.Additionally,
stateactorsareusingcyberespionageinattemptstostealcriticalinformationfromDoDanddefense
contractors.Weremainconcernedaboutthispersistentthreattoourabilitytoplan,prepareand
readyourforcesforfutureconflicts.

TheU.S.,theDoD,andourinterdependentdefensesystemsandcriticalinfrastructurecontinuetorely
ontheconvergenceofmilitarynetworksandtheInternettoenableustoperformourmission.As
othernationsdevelopmilitarycyberwarfaredoctrineandcyberforces,weknowtheywillcultivate
tactics,techniques,tools,capabilities,andprocedurestothreatenourtechnologicalsuperiority.Itis
imperativethatweunderstandtheadversariesintentandcapabilities.

Asconflictbetweenstatesevolves,thecyberspaceisbecominganincreasinglyvitalcomponentof
strategyanddoctrineforwarfighting.Nonstateactorsremainunpredictable,andtheentrybarrierto
procuredisruptivecybertoolsandcapabilitiesremainsverylow.Weneedtobevigilanttothe
broadersetofstateandnonstateactorsthatcontinuetoseecyberasadomainforoffensiveand
defensiveinfluenceandopportunity.DoDmuststrengthenourunderstandingofthecomplexitiesof
ouradversaries,protectoursystems,buildresilienceinourcriticalinfrastructure,andleveragethe
experienceandknowledgeofourforeignpartners.
TheroletheInternetandcommunicationnetworksplayinpoliticalstabilityandregimechange
remainsasignificantglobalcyberissue.Repressivegovernmentsareattemptingtoasserttheir
controloverinformationtransmittedthroughcyberspace,andseveralnationsadvocatepoliciesto
centralizecontrolovertheinternetthoughatopdownintergovernmentalapproach.Notonlywould
suchproposalsslowthepaceofinnovationandhamperglobaleconomicdevelopment,theywould
underminethecurrent,successfulmultistakeholderapproachtoInternetgovernanceandfrustrate
theinteroperabilityofnetworksuponwhichDoDrelies.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Globalization,rapidtechnologicaladvancements,andanuncertainfiscalenvironmentpresentnew
avenuesofcollectionandthreatsfromtraditionalnationstateintelligenceservicesandnonstate
entitiestotargetU.S.nationalsecurityinformation,systems,andpersonnel.Increasedfinancial

pressuresduetoresourcecutscreatepotentialvulnerabilitiesthatforeignintelligenceentitiesseekto
exploittoidentifyvulnerableemployeesandcontractorswithaccesstosensitiveandclassified
nationalsecurityinformation.Foreignintelligenceentitiesconductawiderangeofintelligenceand
clandestineactivitiesthatthreatenandundermineournationalsecurityinterestsandobjectives
worldwide.Suchactorstargetourarmedforces;ourmilitaryandnationalsecurityrelatedresearch,
development,andacquisitionactivities;ournationalintelligencesystem;andourgovernments
decisionmakingprocesses.Inadditiontothreatsbyforeignintelligenceentities,insiderthreatswill
alsoposeapersistentchallenge.Trustedinsiderswiththeintenttodoharmcanexploittheiraccess
tocompromisevastamountsofsensitiveandclassifiedinformationaspartofpersonalideologyorat
thedirectionofaforeigngovernment.Theunauthorizeddisclosureofthisinformationtostate
adversaries,nonstateactivists,orotherentitieswillcontinuetoposeacriticalthreat.

DIAisleadinganInformationReviewTaskForcetoexaminegravedamagecausedtoDepartmentof
DefenseequitiesandUSnationalsecurityasaresultoftheunauthorizedNSAdisclosures.An
emergingthreatthatconcernsthedepartmentinvolvesthepotentialforforeignintelligenceentities
tocompromisecriticalsupplychainsorcorruptkeycomponentsboundforvitalwarfightingsystems.
Additionally,afewtransnationalterroristgroupshavedevelopedeffectiveintelligenceand
counterintelligencecapabilitieswehaveseenthismanifestinIraqandAfghanistan,andterrorist
groupsarenowusingandsharingtheknowledgeandexperiencetheygainedinthoseconflicts.

TRANSNATIONALTERRORISTTHREATS

AlQaidaCommandandControl:Severalyearsofsustainedcounterterrorismpressurehave
degradedalQaida'sPakistanbasedleadership.AlQaidaisnowforcedtorelyonalimitedcadreof
experiencedleaders,whoarerestrictedtooperatingprimarilyinsideaHaqqaniNetworkfacilitated
safehaveninNorthWaziristan,Pakistan.ThispressurehasmadeitdifficultforalQaidatoreplenish

itsseniorrankswiththeexperiencedleaders,trainers,andattackplannersitwasabletopromotein
previousyears.Itisfocusedonitssecurityandsurvivalattheexpenseofoperationsagainstthe
Homeland.

AlQaidasleadershipinPakistancontinueseffortstoinspireandguidesomeofitsregionalnodes,
allies,andlikemindedextremiststoengageinterrorismagainsttheWest,butalsostressesthe
importanceofregionalagendasandwinningheartsandminds.AbsentthedeathofAymanal
Zawahiri,PakistanbasedalQaidawillretainitsroleastheideologicalleaderoftheglobaljihad.

AlQaidaintheArabianPeninsula(AQAP):FromitsbaseofoperationsinYemen,thegroupremains
resoluteintargetingtheHomeland,aswellasU.S.andWesterninterestsinYemenandtheArabian
Peninsula.However,ongoingcounterterrorismpressureislikelyslowingand/ordelayingsomeattack
plans.AQAPsrecentattacksagainstYemenimilitarytargetshighlightthegroupsabilitytoconduct
complexattacks.

AlQaidainIraq(AQI),alsoknownastheIslamicStateofIraqandLevant(ISIL):AQI/ISILprobably
willattempttotaketerritoryinIraqandSyriatoexhibititsstrengthin2014,asdemonstratedrecently
inRamadiandFallujah,andthegroupsabilitytoconcurrentlymaintainmultiplesafehavensinSyria.
However,itsabilitytoholdterritorywilldependonthegroupsresources,localsupport,aswellasthe
responsesofISFandotheroppositiongroupsinSyria.WhilemostSunnisprobablyremainopposedto
AQIsideologyandpresenceinIraqandSyria,someSunnitribesandinsurgentgroupsappearwilling
toworktacticallywithAQIastheysharecommonantigovernmentgoals.Baghdadsrefusalto
addresslongstandingSunnigrievances,andcontinuedheavyhandedapproachtocounterterror
operationshaveledsomeSunnitribesinAnbartobemorepermissiveofAQIspresence.Sincethe
departureofU.S.forcesattheendof2011,AQI/ISILhasexploitedthepermissivesecurity
environmenttoincreaseitsoperationsandpresenceinmanylocationsandalsohasexpandedinto
SyriaandLebanontoinflametensionsthroughouttheregion.Forexample,AQI/ISILclaimedcreditfor
the2January2014carbombinginBeirut,inaHezbollahstronghold,furtheringsectarianconflictand
demonstratingitsstrengththroughouttheregion.And,thelikelihoodofmoreattacksinLebanonis

high.Concurrently,AQIremainsincontrolofnumerousSyriancitessuchasRaqqah,AlBab,and
Jarablus.

AlNusrahFront:ThegroupisworkingtooverthrowPresidentBasharalAssadsregimebyattacking
theregimeanditsalliesinSyriawhilebuildingpopularsupportthroughhumanitarianaidcampaigns.
WejudgealNusrahFrontisseekingtoexpanditsinfluenceintheregionandtoadvanceitslongterm
goalsofattackingIsraelandstrengtheningthealQaidafootprintintheLevant.

AlQaidaintheLandsoftheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM):Althoughcounterterrorismpressureis
probablycompellingAQIMtoconsideralternativesafehavensinotherundergovernedareasinthe
region,thegroupmostlikelyretainsthecapabilitytolaunchattacksagainstregionalandWestern
interestsinMaliandneighboringcountries.Duringthenextyear,weexpectAQIMtolikelybolsterits
tiestoalQaidaalignedterroristgroupsinNorthandWestAfrica.

AlShabaab:ThegroupcontinuedtoposeathreattoWesterninterestsinEastAfricaasdemonstrated
bytheSeptemberattackontheWestgateMallinNairobi,Kenya,whichleftatleast67dead.During
2014,aregroupedalShabaabwillcontinuetoposeathreattothefragileSomaligovernmentandits
regionalbackers.ItwillattempttoreplicatethesuccessofitsWestgateattackwithadditional
operationsoutsideSomalia.

OTHERTERRORISTACTIVITIESOFCONCERN

AlMurabitun:ThisnewlyformedgroupposesagrowingthreattoWesterninterestsinNorthAfrica,
basedonthenetworksrecordofsophisticatedattacksagainstWesternmineralandenergyinterestsin
NigerandAlgeriain2013.

IslamicRevolutionaryGuardCorpsQodsForce(IRGCQF)andHizballah:Irancontinuestosupport
andarmterroristandmilitantgroupsintheMiddleEast.TheIRGCQFhassupportedproregime
fightersinSyria,includingelementsfromLebaneseHizballah,IraqiShiagroups,andSyrianmilitias.
CapturedvideofootagesuggeststheQodsForceisoperatingartilleryandleadingattacksagainst
Syrianopposition.HizballahalsocontinuestosendoperativestootherlocationsoutsideSyriatoplan
externalattacksandoperations.

LashkareTayyiba(LT):ThegrouphasfocusedonIndia,buthasdedicatedgreateroperational
resourcesfromIndianKashmirtoAfghanistanintheyearsfollowingthe2008Mumbaiattacks.LT
ideologicallyadvocateskillingAmericansandotherWesterners,andinpreviousyearshasadvanced
plotsultimatelydisruptedbycounterterrorismauthoritiesinAustraliaandDenmark.

IslamicMovementofUzbekistanandtheIslamicJihadUnion:AsCoalitionforceswithdrawfrom
Afghanistanin2014,theseterroristgroupswithCentralAsianlinksmightseizetheopportunityto
redirectsometargetingeffortsagainstCentralAsia.

ImiratKavkaz(IK):ThisNorthCaucasusbasedterroristgrouporIKlinkedCaucasusbasedmilitants
werelikelyresponsiblefortheOctoberandDecember2013suicideattacksinVolgograd,Russia.These
attacksandtheJuly2013statementbyIKleaderDokuUmarovthreateningthe2014WinterOlympics
suggeststhelikelihoodofcontinuedIslamicextremistattacksinRussiainthisyearaimedat
underminingMoscowanddeterringattendanceattheFebruaryWinterGamesinSochi,Russia.

RevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(FARC):Thisgroupposesasignificantandcontinuingthreat
toU.S.personnelandinterestsin2014,despitepeacetalkswithBogota.

EuropeanHomeGrownViolentExtremists(HVEs):Individualswillremainanongoingsecurity
concernandchallengeforWesternsecurityservicesastheyradicalizewithintheirhomebase;return
homeaftergainingterroristtrainingand/or,combatexperienceabroad;ordevelopcontacts
domesticallyorabroadtoplanattacksagainstWesterninterests.Althoughnotallreturningfighters

willposeathreat,DIAisparticularlyconcernedaboutselfinitiatedorlonewolfattacksonU.S.
militaryandalliedmilitarymembersinEurope.TheRevolutionaryPeoplesLiberationParty/Front
(DHKP/C)alsosignaledarenewedefforttotargetU.S./DoDinterestswithits1February2013attack
ontheU.S.EmbassyinAnkaraandhasprovenresilientdespitecrackdownsontheorganizationin
Turkeyandelsewhere.

U.S.HomegrownViolentExtremists(HVEs)andInsiderThreats:HVEscontinuetoposethemost
likelyterroristthreattoDoD,asevidencedbyseveralsuccessfulattacksandnumerousdisruptedplots
targetingDoDfacilities,installations,andpersonnelinrecentyears.Whiletheyarelesslikelyto
generatecomplexandspectacularattacksthantransnationalterrorgroups,HVEscanconductattacks
withlittleornowarning,complicatingeffortsbylawenforcementandintelligenceagenciestodetect
anddisruptthem.Since2009,asmallnumberofindividualsworkingfororwithaccesstoDoD
personnelandfacilitieshaveactedonbehalfoforhavebeeninspiredbyterroristgroups.We
anticipateterroristgroupsandsympatheticviolentextremistswillcontinueseektoestablish
relationshipswithindividualsassociatedwithDoDtocollectinformationandconductattacks.

WEAPONSOFMASSDESTRUCTION(WMD),DELIVERYSYSTEMS,
PROLIFERATION,ANDADVANCEDCONVENTIONALWEAPONS

TheproliferationandpotentialforuseofWMDandballisticmissilesisagraveandenduringthreat.
Securingnuclearweaponsandmaterialsisaworldwideimperativetopreventaccidentsandthe
potentialdiversionoffissileorradiologicalmaterials.Astechnologyproliferateschemicaland
biologicalweaponsarebecomingmoresophisticated.AlQaidaandsomeofitsaffiliateorganizations
aspiretoacquireandemploychemical,biological,radiologicalandnuclear(CBRN)materials.Theyare
mostlikelyseekinglowlevelCBRagents,suchasricin,botulinumtoxin,radiologicaldispersaldevices,
andtoxicindustrialchemicalslikecyanideandchlorineaslowcostalternatives.

WeareconcernedaboutthepotentialforterroriststoacquireSyrianWMDmaterials.WhileSyrias
chemicalandbiologicalweaponsstockpilesarecurrentlyunderthecontroloftheregime,alQa'ida
anditsregionalaffiliatescouldseektoobtainSyrianstockpilesshouldsecuritybeinsufficient.We
anticipatethemovementofconvoyscarryingCWfromitscurrentlocationsfordisposalcouldprovide
anopportunityforoneormoreofthesegroupstotrytoobtainCWagentsormaterial.

Determinedgroupsandindividuals,aswellastheproliferationnetworkstheytieinto,oftenworkto
sidestepinternationaldetectionandavoidexportcontrols.Suchentitiesregularlychangethenames
oftheirfrontcompanies,operateincountrieswithpermissiveenvironmentsorlaxenforcement,and
avoidinternationalfinancialinstitutions.Anothermilitaryissueistheproliferationofadvanced
conventionalweapons,especiallyairdefensesystemsandantishipcruisemissiles.Weremain
concernedespeciallywithRussiasexportsofthesearms,includingtheSA17,SA22andSA20
surfacetoairmissile(SAM)systems,aswellasthesupersonicYakhontantishipcruisemissile.Russia
hasexportedseveralofthesesystemstocountriesofconcern,includingtheSA17toVenezuela,and
theSA17,SA22andYakhonttoSyria.IrancontinuestopressRussiatosellittheSA20,amodern
longrangeSAM.The300kmrangeYakhontposesamajorthreattonavaloperationsparticularlyin
theeasternMediterranean.RussiacontinuestomarkettheClubKcruisemissilesystem,afamilyof
weaponsdeployedinsidestandardizedcommercialshippingcontainerssimilartothosefoundon
merchantvessels,freightrailtrains,androadvehicles.Thecovertnatureofthisweaponwouldrender
identifyingthreatplatformsverydifficultandreducewarningofanattack.

Chinaisexpandingasasupplierofadvancedconventionalweapons,supplementingitstraditional
exportsofbasicbattlefieldequipmentsuchassmallarms,artilleryandarmoredvehiclestoinclude
moreadvancedexamplesoflongrangemultiplelaunchrocketartillery,improvedsurfacetoairmissile
systemsandantishipcruisemissiles,andunmannedaerialvehicles,severalofwhicharearmed
variants.Chinasrapiddevelopmentofnewproducts,aggressivemarketing,andrelativelylowpricing
willallowmorecountrieswithlimitedaccesstoadvancedweaponstoacquiresomeofthese
capabilities.


THEATERBALLISTICMISSILES

Ballisticmissilesarebecomingmoresurvivable,reliable,andaccurateatgreaterranges.Potential
adversariesarebasingmoremissilesonmobileplatformsatseaandonland.Technicaland
operationalmeasurestodefeatmissiledefensesalsoareincreasing.China,Iran,andNorthKorea,for
example,exercisenearsimultaneoussalvofiringsfrommultiplelocationstosaturatemissiledefenses.
Countriesaredesigningmissilestolaunchfrommultipletransportersagainstabroadarrayoftargets,
enhancingtheirmobilityandeffectivenessonthebattlefield.Shorterlaunchpreparationtimesand
smallerfootprintsaremakingnewsystemsmoresurvivable,andmanyhavemeasurestodefeat
missiledefenses.

SPACEANDCOUNTERSPACE

Spaceisbecominganincreasinglycongested,competitive,andcontestedenvironment.Thequantity
and quality of foreign satellites on orbit is rapidly increasing and foreign countries are developing
counterstotheUSspaceadvantage,includingmethodstodisruptordenyaccesstocommunications;
position,navigation,andtiming;andintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissancesatellites.

China:Beijingispursuingspaceeffortsformilitary,economicandpoliticalobjectives.Chinasmilitary
operates satellites for communications, navigation, earth resources, weather, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes, in addition to manned space and space exploration
missions. Typically, China has emphasized the domestic and international benefits of its space
program.Internationally,Chinaviewsthesuccessofthesecapabilitiesasacontributortoitsgrowing
statusandinfluence,butrefrainsfromhighlightinganyspecificmilitaryapplicability.

Regardingitscounterspaceactivities,Chinastestofagroundbasedantisatellitemissilein2007and
the resulting debris generation in the atmosphere has been well publicized. If deployed, such a

capabilityandtheresultantorbitaldebrisisathreattoallcountriesmilitary,civilian,andcommercial
spaceassetstothepeacefulusageofouterspace.Nonkineticcounterspacesolutionsindevelopment
alsoincludejammers.

Russia:Moscowrecognizesthestrategicvalueofspace,andunderstandsspaceasaforcemultiplier
andviewsUSdependencyonspaceforprojectionofmilitarypowerasavulnerability.Russiasspace
sectorhasexperiencedaseriesoffailuresinrecentyearsbutistakingstepstocorrectqualitycontrol
problems within its satellite and space launch vehicle industries. In the past year, Russia completed
populationofitsGLONASSnavigationsatelliteconstellationandismakinggradualimprovementstoits
communications, ballistic missile launch detection, and intelligencegathering satellites. The Russian
militaryhasahighlyadvancedspacesurveillancenetwork,aprerequisiteforcounterspaceoperations,
and is modernizing and expanding these systems. Russia has satellite jamming capabilities and is
pursuingothercounterspacecapabilities.

HARD,DEEP,BURIEDTARGETS/UNDERGROUNDFACILITIES

Theuseofundergroundfacilities(UGFs)toconcealandprotectcriticalmilitaryandotherassetsand
functionsiswidespreadandexpanding.UGFsconcealandincreasethesurvivabilityofweaponsof
massdestruction,strategiccommandandcontrol,leadershipprotectionandrelocation,military
researchanddevelopment,militaryproductionandstrategicmilitaryassets.Asignificanttrendof
concernisthebasingofballisticandcruisemissilesandothersystemsdesignedforantiaccess/area
denialweaponsdirectlywithinUGFs.Inaddition,Russia,China,Iran,andNorthKoreaoperate
nationallevelmilitarydenialanddeceptionprograms.Thesefourstatesaredevotingincreased
resources,andparticularattention,toimprovingthedenialanddeceptiontactics,techniques,and
procedures,fortheirroadmobilemissileandcruisemissileforces.

REGIONALTHREATS
MIDDLEEASTANDNORTHAFRICA

Egypt:TheunrestfollowingtheJulydeposalofMursihasbeendealtwithbytheinterimgovernment
throughlawsandtacticstoquelldissent,sometimesviolently.Whiletheinterimgovernment
promisedanambitioustimetablefortransitiontoanelectedgovernment,ithasmissedsomeofits
ownsetdeadlines.Countrywideprotestsbyoppositiongroupshavebeenovershadowedbyterrorist
violence,whichisnolongerlimitedtotheSinai.Growingpopularoppositionagainstmilitary
dominanceinsocietythreatensthecohesionofthepoliticalpartiescurrentlysupportingtheinterim
government.FrustrationamongIslamistpoliticalgroupsoverchangestotheconstitutionandtheir
expulsionfrompoliticallifeandpartsofcivilsocietythreatenstoleadtoradicalization.Thenew
constitutionwasfinalizedbypopularreferendumwith98%approvaland38.6%participation,helped
inpartbychangestoregulationstoallowforeasiervoting,lackoffreeandfairenvironmentintherun
uptotheelections,andtheMuslimBrotherhoodandmajorityofotheroppositiongroupsboycotting
thevote.Cairoplanstobeginthepresidentialelectionprocessinthespringandtheparliamentary
processinthesummer.
SecurityintheSinaiPeninsulaisparticularlypoordespiteEgyptiansecurityeffortstheresincefallof
lastyearanddomesticsecurityelsewhereremainsdifficult.Increasinglylethalandbrazenattackson
securityandmilitaryforcesintheSinaipersisteveninareasgarrisonedbylargenumbersofEgyptian
forces.Terroristnetworksretaintheircapabilitiesandaredemonstratingtheirresiliencedespite
increasedEgyptianCTefforts,whileexploitingsecurityvacuumsinpartsoftheSinai.
SecurityforceselsewhereinEgyptfacefrequentpublicdisobedience,asantiinterimgovernment
Islamistsfocusonlowlevelresistance,suchasstudentdisturbancesatuniversitycampuses,andavoid
otherformsofpopularprotestlikelytobeforciblybrokenupbyauthorities.

Syria:Threeyearsintotheconflict,Syriaremainsdividedandneithertheregimenortheopposition
hasadecisiveadvantageonthebattlefield.Theregimedominatescentralandwesternareaswhilethe
oppositionremainsdominantinnorthernandeasternareas.Inlate2013,theregimeaccededtothe
ChemicalWeaponsConvention(CWC)andbegandismantlingitschemicalweaponsprogram.Thefirst

shipmentofCWcomponentsleftSyriainJanuaryandtheOrganizationforthePreventionofChemical
Weapons(OPCW)issupportingtheongoingremoval.

AssadsinnercircleandtheSyrianmilitaryremaincohesive,butthemilitaryisstretchedthinby
constantoperations.Theregimesstrategyhasbeentoencirclethevillagesandsuburbssurrounding
oppositionheldareas,andthenemployartillerybombardmentsandairstrikesbeforeconducting
clearingoperations.Althoughthesetacticsarenotnew,theregimehasdemonstratedanincreased
proficiencyandprofessionalismintheirexecutioncomparedtothepastandhasreliedmoreon
irregulartroopssuchasmilitiasandHizballahfighters.Thisincreasedeffectivenessprobablyisatleast
inpartduetoIraniansupport,particularlyintraining,advising,andintelligence.Syriacontinuestorely
onRussiaformajormaintenanceandrefittingofitshelicoptersandlikelyotherheavyequipmentafter
2yearsofheavyuse.

Hizballahcontinuestoprovidetraining,advice,andextensivelogisticsupporttotheSyrian
governmentanditssupporters.HizballahhasdirectlytrainedSyriangovernmentpersonnelinside
SyriaandhasfacilitatedIRGCQFtrainingofsomeSyrianforces.Hizballahalsohascontributedtroops
toSyrianregimeoffensives,playingasubstantialcombatroleinoperationsinDamascus,alQusayr,
Qalamoun,andotherareaswithinSyria.IranalsohasactivelysupportedtheSyrianregimeinitsfight
againsttheopposition.

TheSyrianregimemaintainsthemilitaryadvantageparticularlyinfirepowerandairsuperiority,but
struggleswithanoverallinabilitytodecisivelydefeattheopposition.Theoppositionhasthusfar
failedtotranslatetheirtacticalgainsintheruralareasofnorthernandeasternSyriaintogainsin
southernorwesternSyria.Competitionoverresourcesandviolentinfightinghaslimitedthe
oppositionsoverallcombateffectiveness.Ineffectivedistributionsystems,weaponshoarding,and
lackofacoherentandunifiedcampaignplanhaslimitedoppositionsuccess.Salafistandextremist
groupsareincreasinglychallengingWesternbackedelementssuchastheSyrianMilitaryCouncil
(SMC).Thecompetitionbetweengroups,andsometimesviolence,distractsthemfromtheirfight
againsttheregime.


Syriasmostprominentexternalpoliticaloppositiongroup,theSyrianOppositionCoalition(SOC),
strugglestogaininternallegitimacy,andnogrouphasbeenabletounitethediversegroupsbehinda
strategyforreplacingtheregime.SaudiArabiaandQatararefundingandarmingSyrianrebels
seekingtooverthrowtheAssadregimetoweakenIranianinfluenceintheregionandsetthestagefor
apostAssadgovernmentfriendlytotheirowninterests.SaudiArabiaworriesaboutempowered
jihadistsinSyriawhileQatarsupportssomeIslamistgroups.

PriortoitsaccessiontotheCWC,webelieveSyriamaintainedanadvancedCWprogramandhada
stockpilethatincludedeithercompleteorbinarycomponentsofmustard,sarin,andVXalongwith
weaponssystemstodelivertheseagents.Syriahassigned,butdidnotratifytheBiologicalWeapons
(BW)Convention.Syriamaybecapableoflimitedagentproduction,howeverwedonotbelieveSyria
hasachievedacapabilitytousebiologicalagentsaseffectivemasscasualtyweapons.Weremain
concernedaboutinsurgentsandterroristsattemptingtoacquirestateWMDmaterialsshouldsecurity
failatCWsitesinthewakeofunrestorduringmovementtothecoast.WhileSyriaschemical
weaponsstockpilesarecurrentlyunderthecontroloftheSyrianregime,Sunniterroristgroups
includingalQaidainIraq/IslamicStateofIraqandtheLevant(AQI/ISIL)andalNusrahFronthave
aspiredtoobtainWMDinthepast.

SyriahasseveralhundredSCUDB,C,andD,andSS21SRBMs.Syriaalsohasadomesticversionof
theIranianFateh110SRBM.AllofSyriasmissilesaremobileandcanreachmuchofIsraelandlarge
portionsofIraq,Jordan,andTurkeyfromlaunchsiteswellwithinthecountry.Damascusrelieson
foreignhelp,mainlyfromIran,toadvanceitssolidpropellantrocketandmissiledevelopmentand
productioncapability.Syriasliquidpropellantmissileprogramalsoremainsdependentonessential
foreignequipmentandassistance.

Iran:TehranposesamajorthreattoU.S.intereststhroughitsregionalambitions,supporttoterrorist
andmilitantgroups,improvingmilitarycapabilitiesandnuclearambitions.Iranisactivethroughout

theregionandhasincreaseditsinfluenceduringthepasttwelvemonthsinSyria,Iraq,Yemen,and
Bahrain.

However,IranhassomewhattempereditsbelligerentrhetoricsincePresidentHasanRuhanitook
officeinAugust2013.Ruhanisinternationalmessageofmoderationandpragmatismisintendedto
supportTehransenduringobjectives,whicharetopreservetheSupremeLeadersrule,counter
Westerninfluence,andestablishIranasthedominantregionalpower.SupremeLeaderAliKhamenei
continuestodominateIranspowerstructureasboththepoliticalspiritualguideandthecommander
inchiefofthearmedforces.

IranhasthreatenedtotemporarilyimpedeinternationalshiptraffictransitingthroughtheStraitof
Hormuzifitisattackedorinresponsetofurthersanctionsonitsoilexports.Additionally,Iranhas
threatenedtolaunchmissilesagainstU.S.targetsandourregionalalliesinresponsetoanattack.
Tehrancouldalsoemployitsterroristsurrogates.However,itisunlikelytoinitiateorintentionally
provokeaconflictorlaunchapreemptiveattack.

InIraq,IranworkscloselywithBaghdadtomaintainitsinfluenceanditsaccesstoSyriaandLevantvia
airandgroundtransport.Irancontinuestofund,train,andsupportIraqiShiagroupstodefendthe
ShialedgovernmentagainsttheperceivedthreatofSunniviolence,includingspilloverfromthe
conflictinSyria.IranwilllikelyuseitsleveragewithShiagroupsandIraqigovernmentofficialsto
influencethe2014IraqielectionstomaintainanIranfriendlygovernmentregimeinBaghdad.

Inadditiontoitssupportofirregularforces,Iranissteadilyimprovingitsmilitarycapabilities.Thenavy
isdevelopingfaster,morelethalsurfacevessels,growingitssubmarineforce,expandingitscruise
missiledefensecapabilities,andincreasingitspresenceininternationalwaters.Thenavyconducted
itsfarthestoutofareadeploymenttodateinMarch2013,dockinginChina,andforthefirsttimeever
anIraniansubmarinevisitedIndiainDecember2013.ThenavyaspirestotravelasfarastheAtlantic
Ocean.

Iranislaboringtomodernizeitsairandairdefenseforcesundertheweightofinternationalsanctions.
Eachyear,Iranunveilswhatitclaimsarestateoftheart,Iranianmadesystems,includingSAMs,
radars,unmannedaerialvehicles,anditdidsoagainin2013.Itcontinuestoseekanadvancedlong
rangesurfacetoairmissilesystem.

IrancanstriketargetsthroughouttheregionandintoEasternEurope.Inadditiontoitsgrowingmissile
androcketinventories,Iranisseekingtoenhancelethalityandeffectivenessofexistingsystemswith
improvementsinaccuracyandwarheaddesigns.IranisdevelopingtheKhalijFars,anantishipballistic
missilewhichcouldthreatenmaritimeactivitythroughoutthePersianGulfandStraitofHormuz.
Iran'sSimorghspacelaunchvehicleshowsthecountry'sintenttodevelopintercontinentalballistic
missile(ICBM)technology.

Iraq:SincethewithdrawalofU.S.forcesinDecember2011,theIraqiSecurityForces(ISF)have
struggledtosecureallofIraq,maintainingsecurityprimarilyinShiamajorityareas.Tensionsbetween
SunnisandShia,andArabsandKurds,havepersistedduetothegovernmentsunwillingnesstoshare
powerandthespillovereffectsfromthecrisisinSyria.Violencelevelsarerisingandlikelywill
continuein2014aslongastheShiadominatedgovernmentavoidspoliticalaccommodationandthe
conflictinSyriacontinues.

IraqiShiamilitantgroupshavelargelyrefrainedfromattacksonU.S.interestsandsofarhaveinitiated
onlylimitedoperationsagainstSunnitargets,despiterisingAQIviolenceagainstIraqiShiaand
increasingdemandsforShiamilitiastoprotecttheircommunities.Shiamilitantgroupshavefocused
onbuildingtheirpopularbaseaheadofIraqs2014nationalelections.Theyalsocontinuetosend
fighterstoSyriatoaugmentIranianled,proregimeforcesandhaveconductedattacksagainstthe
MujahedineKhalq(MEK)presenceinIraq.DespitetheirrestraintinIraq,Shiamilitantsremain
capableofviolentactionandtheyarepreparingforviolencetospilloverfromSyria.

TheIraqiSunnipopulationisincreasinglydistraughtoveritsfortunesinIraq.Thegovernmentsrefusal
toreformdeBaathificationandantiterrorlawsakeySunnidemanddeepensSunnialienation.
AntigovernmentdemonstrationsinIraqsthreemajorSunniprovinceshavecontinuedforayear.
RecentviolenceinRamadiandFallujahineasternAnbarProvincesparkedfromSunniperceptionsthat
theIraqigovernmentaggressivelytargetedSunnicivilians.Thesituationinbothcitiesisfluidand
controlofdifferentportionsofthecitiesandtheirsurroundingareaswilllikelychange.UnilateralIraqi
militaryactiontocontaintheviolence,ifconductedbypredominantlyShiaunits,wouldonlydeepen
thedivideandcouldconvinceSunnistorejectfutureparticipationinthegovernment.

ISFhavebeenunabletostemrisingviolenceinpartbecausetheylackmatureintelligence,logistics,
andothercapabilities,andstillrequiresubstantialassistancetointegratenewlyacquiredequipment.
ISFhavedemonstratedtheabilitytoputforcesonthestreet,conductstaticsecurityofhighprofile
sitesandevents,andtooperatecheckpoints.However,theseabilitieshavenotenabledthemto
suppressAQIorotherinternalthreats.ISFareincreasinglychallengedinSunnimajorityandethnically
mixedareasofIraq,especiallyAnbarandNinewaProvinces.Iraqimilitaryandpoliceforceslack
cohesion,areundermanned,andarepoorlytrained,equipped,andsupplied.Thisleavesthem
vulnerabletoterroristattack,infiltration,andcorruption.

TheISFisinadequatelypreparedtodefendagainstexternalthreatsbyland,air,orsea.Iraqsground
forceshavelimitedabilitytoconductandsustainconventionalmilitaryoperationsagainstapeer,and
Iraqhasfewforcesandcapabilitiestodefenditsairspaceorcoastalwaters.Iraqhaspursued
numerousforeignmilitarysalescontractstoovercomeequipmentshortfallsandgapsinISF
capabilities.IraqisdiversifyingitsdefenseacquisitionswithmoreRussianandothernonU.S.
equipment.InNovember2013,Iraqreceivedaninitialdeliveryofattackhelicoptersfromarmsdeals
withRussiaworthover$4billionthatincludeairdefensesystemsandotherarms.TheUnitedStates
alsocompleteddeliveryofC130Jtransportaircraftand30armedreconnaissancehelicoptersinMay
2013.InDecember2013Iraqconcludeda$2.1BilliondealwithSouthKoreaforFA50combatcapable

trainingaircraft.However,weexpectitwilltakeseveralyearsforIraqimilitarystrengthand
capabilitiestoimprovesubstantially.

Yemen:ThesecuritysituationthroughoutYemenremainstenuous,withgovernmentsecurityforces
focusedeitheronprovidingsecurityinSanaaorworkingtocounterAQAP.Iranianmeddlingin
Yemensdomesticaffairs,toincludesupporttosomearmedHuthigroupsintheNorthandsome
secessionistsintheSouth,presentsanadditionalsecurityrisk.Apoliticaltransitionprocess,including
effortstoreformthemilitary,isongoingbutproceedingslowing.TheNationalDialogueConference
concludedinJanuary,allowingforwardmovementonpreparationsforconstitutionalreformand
nationalelections.Notwithstandingpoliticalprogress,Yemensfailingeconomy,dwindlingwater
resources,andfoodinsecuritywillfurthercomplicateefforts.
Libya: Militias that won the revolution against the Qadhafi regime are now also threatening both the
transition process and overall security. Militias present a challenge to internal stability despite Tripolis
recent progress integrating some armed groups into its security forces. To counteract the militias
power, Tripoli seeks international assistance to establish a General Purpose Force (GPF) and controlled
security entity. Militias loyal to Federalists factions, Berbers, and other minority groups have also
occupied oil facilities, decreasing Libyas oil production from 1.4 million barrels per day to 250,000,
and costing the Libyan government over $7.5 billion in revenues.
Mid-November 2013 incidents in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Darnah resulted in more than 40 civilian
deaths. Public and government backlash forced militias to withdraw from these cities. These militia
elements have withdrawn but have not disarmed, and will likely attempt to return to urban areas after
pressure recedes. Other militias not involved in the incidents also remain. Heavily armed militias will
likely continue to threaten stability over the next year. GPF will not be capable of restoring security or
central government authority for at least one-to-two years.

SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan:ThenewgovernmentelectedinMay2013seekstorebuildrelationswiththeUnitedStates,
includingtheresumptionofthestrategicdialogueprocess.Relationshaveimproved,butantiU.S.
sentimentandcriticismofPakistanscooperationwiththeU.S.amongthepopulationremainshigh.

In2013,theciviliangovernment,Army,andtheSupremeCourtalltransitionedtonewleadership,
whichwerethefirstleadershipchangesfortheseinstitutionsinnearlyfiveyears.NawazSharifwas
electedforhisthirdtermasPrimeMinisterafterhispartywonasimplemajorityintheMayelections.
GenRaheelSharif(norelation)wasappointedPakistansChiefofArmyStafffollowingtheretirement
ofGen(ret)AshfaqParvezKayaniinlateNovember2013.JusticeTassaduqHussainJillanibecamethe
ChiefJusticeofPakistansSupremeCourtinDecember,replacingIftikharMuhammadChaudhrywho
retiredduetoage.Jillaniwillonlyholdthepositionforsevenmonthsandthemediaspeculateshewill
belessofanactivistthanhispredecessor.

TheciviliangovernmentisfocusedonaddressingPakistanspressingeconomicissuesaswellas
coordinatingacounterterrorismstrategy.However,itspursuitoftreasonchargesagainstformer
President/ChiefofArmyStaffMusharrafriskscivilmilitarytensionasthecaseproceedsbecauseit
couldtarnishtheimageoftheArmyandputotherseniorofficersinjeopardyofprosecution.

ApproximatelyonethirdofPakistansarmyandparamilitaryforcesaredeployedintheFederally
AdministeredTribalAreas(FATA)andKhyberPakhtunkhwaProvince(KPP)tosupportcombat
operationsatanygiventime.Overthepastyear,Pakistanconductedcounterinsurgencyoperations
targetingmilitantsintheFATAandKPPwhichdirectlythreatenPakistansinternalsecurity.Despite
somesuccessdisruptingPakistanfocusedmilitantactivity,Pakistanscounterinsurgencyefforts
continuetostruggle.ThePakistanmilitaryhasbeenengagedinsomelimitedsecurityoperationsin
NorthWaziristan,althoughitisunclearwhenlargescaleoperationswillcommence.

TensionwithKabulincreasedafterAfghanandPakistanimilitaryforcesexchangeddirectfireacross
theborderinMay2013.However,theelectionofanewPakistanigovernmenthasprovidedan

opportunityforIslamabadtoreengagewithKabulinanefforttoimprovebordercooperationand
crossbordertradeinlinewiththenewgovernmentsfocusonimprovingPakistanseconomy.Pakistan
continuestoreleaseTalibanprisonersandhassoughtwaystosupporttheAfghanpeaceprocess.
However,longstandingissuesincludingperiodiccrossbordershellingandthepresenceofmilitants
onbothsidesofthebordercontinuetofomentdistrustandimpedebroadercooperation.

PrimeMinisterSharifhaspublicallyemphasizedhisdesiretoimproverelationswithIndiasince
assumingofficeinJune2013.Severalhighprofilemeetings,includingthefirstmeetingbetweenthe
PakistaniandIndianDirectorsGeneralofMilitaryOperationsin14years,generatedcommitmentsto
furtherdialogue.However,tensionsovertheLineofControlinKashmir,delaysintheprosecutionof
theallegedMumbaiattackplannersinPakistan,anddomesticpoliticalconstraintsinbothcapitalswill
continuetohinderprogressthisyear.AmajorterroristattackagainstIndialinkedtoPakistanwould
nullifyprospectsforimprovedrelationsandcouldescalatetensions.

India:In2013,Indiacontinueditseffortstomaintainitseconomicandmilitarytieswithimportant
regionalpartnersinEastandSoutheastAsia.IndiaandJapanconductedtheirsecondbilateralnaval
exerciseintheBayofBengalinDecember,andIndiaandVietnamincreasedtheirnavalengagementin
November.IndiaalsosignedatrilateralagreementwiththeMaldivesandSriLankain2013aimedat
improvingmaritimesecuritycooperation.

NewDelhiandBeijingcontinuetoconductmilitarytomilitaryengagementanddiscusstheir
longstandingborderdispute.ThetwocountriessignedaBorderDefenseCooperationAgreementin
October2013toreinforceexistingprocedurestopreventstandoffsalongtheirdisputedborderfrom
escalating.TheIndianArmyandPeoplesLiberationArmyalsoresumedgroundexercises,conducting
acounterterrorismexerciseinChinaduringNovember,thefirstsince2008.

IndiaseeksamoderategovernmentinAfghanistanthatwilldenyantiIndianmilitantgroupstheuseof
itsterritoryfromwhichtolaunchattacksonIndia.NewDelhihaspledgedeconomicanddevelopment

assistanceandprovidestrainingtoAfghanNationalSecurityForcepersonnelatmilitaryinstitutionsin
India.IndianandAfghanSpecialForcesconductedtheirfirstcombinedexerciseinIndiainlate
December.

Indiaisinthemidstofamajormilitarymodernizationeffortundertakenbyallthreemilitaryservices
toaddressproblemswithitsagingequipmentandtopostureitselftodefendagainstbothPakistan
andChina.Majoracquisitionsthatoccurredin2013includedthedeliveryofaRussianbuiltaircraft
carrier,aTalwarClassFrigate,additionalSu30MKIFLANKERs,U.S.builtC17sandP8Imaritimepatrol
aircraft,andthecommissioningofIndiasindigenouslybuiltnuclearpoweredballisticmissile
submarine.Militarymodernizationisprogressingslowly,however,becauseofIndiascumbersome
procurementprocess,budgetconstraints,andadomesticdefenseindustrythatstrugglestoprovide
militaryequipmentthatmeetsservicerequirements.

AFRICA

AfricafacesamyriadofsecuritychallengesthatwillrequirecontinuedU.S.attention.

Somalia:Somaliasawlimitedprogressonitspoliticalandsecurityfrontsin2013,asinternaldivisions
hobbledthenewgovernmentsdevelopmentandinternationalforcesreachedthelimitoftheirability
toholdterritory.AlShabaabhavinglostcontrolofmajorcities,andthefederalgovernmentmade
stepstowardregionalintegration.Despitesignificantandpublicinternaldivisionsin2013,alShabaab
continuedtoconductattacks,oftencomplexinnature,targetingAMISOM,Somaligovernment,and
internationaltargetsinSomalia.AlShabaabaffiliatedmilitantsalsocontinuedtocarryoutattacksin
Kenya,mostprominentlythelateSeptemberattackontheWestgateMallinNairobi.Kenya.The
recentauthorizationofadditionaltroopsfortheAfricanUnion(AU)forcewillpermittheresumption
ofoffensiveactionagainstalShabaabin2014,andthegovernmentwillneedtocapitalizeonthese
securitygains.Onapositivenote,securitymeasuresadoptedbyinternationalshippingcompanies,
coupledwithinternationalnavalpatrols,havehelpedreducepiracyofftheHornofAfricatoitslowest

levelsinfiveyears;novesselswerehijackedin2013.WithintheAfricaHornregioninDjibouti,where
DoDhasitslargestfootprintonthecontinent,thereisconcernregardingtheincreasingpresenceof
foreigncountriesactivities.

CentralAfricanRepublic:AspikeinviolenceinDecember2013intheCentralAfricanRepublic
promptedtheexpeditiousdeploymentofinternationalpeacekeepers,whowillstruggletosecurethe
entirecountryintheabsenceofareliablehostnationsecurityforce.WhiletheU.S.isnotengagedin
combatintheCAR,U.S.logisticsoperationsinsupportofFrenchandAfricanUnionforcesalsoface
potentialthreats.DespitetheeliminationoftheM23armedgroupinlate2013ineasternDemocratic
RepublicoftheCongo,continuedmilitaryoperationsalonewillnotsolvethelongstandingunderlying
causesofconflict,suchaspoverty,humanrightsviolations,andthelackofgovernmentcontrol.
Moreover,thepresenceofRwandanrebelswhoseleadersarededicatedtotheoverthrowofthe
Rwandangovernment,probablywillremainadestabilizingfactoroverthenextyearatleast.Five
yearsofsustainedpursuitbyUgandasmilitaryhasreducedtheLordsResistanceArmysnumbersand
forcedthemtosplitupintosmallergroups;however,thegroupstillconductshitandrunresupply
attacksoncivilians.

Nigeria:Domesticinstability,mostnotablyfromtheterroristgroupBokoHaraminthenortheast,isa
concern.Abujasoffensiveoperationsin2013againstBokoHaramwereinitiallysuccessfulinlowering
thenumberofattacks,but,bySeptember,thegrouphadexpandeditsattackcampaignandnow
conductshighcasualtyattacksonaneardailybasis.BecauseAbujaisfocusingitssecurityserviceson
anumberofinternaloperations,itsmilitaryisoverstretched,erodingitsabilitytosupportexternal
peacekeepingmissions.Moreover,maritimecrimeincreasedsignificantlyintheGulfofGuineain
2013,surpassingthenumberofattacksoffthecoastofSomaliaforthefirsttimesince2008.Criminal
networkshaveexpandedtheirrangeofoperationsandbecomeadaptableandsophisticated,while
regionalstateslackthemaritimesecuritycapacitytosecuresharedwaters,largelyduetoalackof
politicalwill,equipment,maintenancecapacity,training,andcooperation.

EASTASIA

China:ThePeoplesLiberationArmy(PLA)isbuildingamodernmilitarycapableofachievingsuccess
ona21stcenturybattlefield.ThePLAisdevelopingcapabilitiestoprotectChinasdefinedterritorial
integrity,whichincludesTaiwanandotherlandandmaritimeclaimsalongaroundChinasperiphery,
preserveChinaspoliticalsystemandensuresustainableeconomicandsocialdevelopment.
PreparationforaTaiwanconflictwithU.S.interventionremainstheprimarydriverofthePLAs
evolvingforcestructure,weaponsdevelopment,operationalplanningandtraining.

Chinahasspentasmuchas$240billiononmilitaryrelatedgoodsandservicesin2013,incontrastto
the$119.5billionBeijingreportedinitsofficialmilitarybudget.Thisbudgetomitsmajorcategories,
butitdoesshowspendingincreasesfordomesticmilitaryproductionandprogramstoimprove
professionalismandthequalityoflifeformilitarypersonnel.

DisputedterritorialclaimsintheEastandSouthChinaSeasremainpotentialflashpoints.TheChinese
announcementinNovember2013thatitwasestablishinganairidentificationzone(ADIZ)over
portionsoftheEastChinaSeahasincreasedtensionssincethisADIZoverlapswithotherpreexisting
ADIZsandcoversterritoryadministratedbyJapanandtheRepublicofKorea.Chinasannouncement
raisedtensionsandincreasedtheriskofincidentsthatcouldunderminepeace,security,and
prosperityintheregion.

Chinasgroundforceisseekingtorestructureitselfintoamechanized,modularforcethatcanconduct
jointoperationsanywherealongChinasborders.Thiseffortiscurrentlytakingshapewithan
emphasisonbuildingandoutfittingbrigadesasthemainoperationalunitandcreatingflexiblespecial
operationsforces,improvedarmyaviationunits,andC2capabilitieswithimprovednetworksproviding
realtimedatatransmissionswithinandbetweenunits

Chinasairforceistransformingfromaforceorientedsolelyonterritorialdefenseintoonecapableof
bothoffshoreoffensiveanddefensiverolesincludingstrike,airandmissiledefense,earlywarning,
andreconnaissance.Itisalsoseekingtoimproveitsstrategicprojectionbyincreasingitslongrange
transportandlogisticalcapabilities.Modernizationeffortsincludeinvestinginstealthtechnology.
ChinaalsocontinuesnegotiationswithRussiaforSu35fighteraircraft;however,acontractisunlikely
tobesigneduntillaterthisyear,attheearliest.

ThePLAnavyisdevelopingtheJINclassnuclearpoweredballisticmissilesubmarineandJL2
submarinelaunchedballisticmissile.Weexpectthenavywillmaketheirfirstnucleardeterrence
patrolsin2014.Ithasalsorecentlydeployedforthefirsttimeanuclearpoweredattacksubmarineto
theIndianOcean.Chinaisalsocontinuingnegotiationsforthejointdesignandproductionforanew
advancedconventionalsubmarinebasedontheRussianLADAclass.China'sinvestmentinnaval
weaponsprimarilyfocusesonantiairandantisurfacecapabilitiestoachieveperiodicandlocalsea
andairsuperioritywithinthefirstislandchain.China'sfirstaircraftcarrier,commissionedinlate2012,
willnotreachitsfullpotentialuntilitacquiresanoperationalfixedwingairregimentoverthenext
severalyears.

Tomodernizeitsnuclearmissileforce,Chinaisalsoaddingmoresurvivableroadmobilesystemsand
enhancingitssilobasedsystems.Thisnewgenerationofmissilesisintendedtoensuretheviabilityof
Chinasstrategicdeterrentbyensuringasecondstrikecapability.

Themilitaryisalsoaugmentingtheover1,200conventionalshortrangeballisticmissilesdeployed
oppositeTaiwanwithalimitedbutgrowingnumberofconventionallyarmed,mediumrangeballistic
missiles,includingtheDF16,whichwillimproveChinasabilitytostrikeregionaltargets.Chinaalso
continuestodeploygrowingnumbersoftheDF21Dantishipballisticmissile.

DemocraticPeoplesRepublicofKoreas(DPRK):Pyongyangsprimarynationalobjectivesconsistof
preservingthecurrentauthoritystructureundertheleadershipofKimJongUn,improvingthe
countrysdysfunctionalstrugglingeconomy,anddeterringforeignadversariesfromtakingactions
whichcouldthreatentheregime.Inearly2013,KimJongUnarticulatedapolicyofsimultaneously
pursuingtheproductionofnuclearweaponsandthedevelopmentofthenationaleconomy.
Pyongyangislikelytomaintainthiscoursefortheforeseeablefuture.

KimJongUncontinuestoexercisehisauthorityinbothseniorPartyandmilitarypositions,including
FirstSecretaryoftheKoreaWorkersParty,SupremeCommanderoftheKoreanPeoplesArmy,and
FirstChairmanoftheNationalDefenseCommission.SincebecomingleaderofNorthKorea,KimJong
Unhasreplacedorreassignedalargenumberofmanyseniorpartyandmilitaryofficials,placing
youngerofficialsmorecloselyassociatedwithhiminkeyassignments.Kimsexecutionofhis
powerfuluncleChangSongtaekinDecember2013eliminatedthemostinfluentialseniorPartyofficial
remainingfromhisfatherseraandsentastrongmessagetoregimeelitesthattheformationof
factionsorpotentialchallengestoKimJongUnwillnotbetolerated.

AfterChangsexecution,PyongyangreiteratedthreatstoattackSouthKoreaforwhatitcalls
interferenceinitsinternalaffairs.AlthoughNorthKoreaslarge,forwardpositionedconventional
forcesarecapableoflaunchinganattackonSouthKorea,theNorthsmilitarysuffersfromlogistics
shortages,largelyoutdatedequipment,andinadequatetraining.Pyongyanglikelyknowsthatan
attempttoreunifytheKoreanPeninsulabyforcewouldfail,andthatanymajorattackontheSouth
wouldtriggerarobustcounterattack.Recentconventionalmilitaryimprovementshavefocusedon
developingtheNorthsdefensivecapabilitiesandabilitytoconductlimitedscalemilitary
provocations,especiallynearthedemilitarizedzoneandalongthedisputedmaritimeboundaryinthe
YellowSea.

TheKoreanPeoplesArmyconductsthemajorityofitstrainingduringthewintertrainingcycle,from
DecemberthroughMarch.NorthKoreaisstressingincreasedrealisminmilitarytraining,buttraining

stillappearstodolittlemorethanmaintainbasiccompetencies.Becauseofitsconventionalmilitary
deficiencies,NorthKoreaalsohasconcentratedonimprovingitsdeterrencecapabilities,especiallyits
nucleartechnologyandballisticmissileforces.TheNorthconductedanucleartestinFebruary2013,
andinAprilannounceditsintentiontoadjustandaltertheuseofitsexistingnuclearfacilities,
includingtheplutoniumproductionreactoranduraniumenrichmentfacilityatYongbyon.

Onthenuclearfront,weassessthatNorthKoreahasfollowedthroughonitsannouncementby
expandingthesizeofitsYongbyonenrichmentfacilityandrestartingthereactorthatwaspreviously
usedforplutoniumproduction.Theregimeisprobablypursuingauraniumenrichmentcapabilityfor
nuclearweaponsdevelopment,andtherestartandoperationofitsplutoniumproductionreactor
couldprovidetheNorthwithadditionalplutoniumfornuclearweapons.Italsoseekstodevelop
longerrangeballisticmissilescapableofdeliveringnuclearweaponstotheUnitedStates,and
continueseffortstobringitsKN08roadmobileICBM,whichitparadedinJuly2013,tooperational
capacity.InDecember,2012,theNorthalsouseditsTaepoDong2launchvehicletoputasatellitein
orbit,thusdemonstratingitscapabilitiesforanumberoflongrangemissileapplicabletechnologies.

RUSSIA

Russiacontinuestoactivelypursueitsactiveforeignanddefensepolicies,bothalongitsperipheryand
elsewhere.In2014,weexpectMoscowwillcontinueeffortstoexpanditsinfluenceinEurasiaby
pushingitsneighborstoincreasecooperationwithRussiaandRussianledorganizationsratherthan
theWest,asMoscowrecentlydidwithUkraineandArmenia.Russianleaderslikelyregardtheir
supportofSyriaasasuccessandMoscowwillcontinuetopromoteanegotiatedresolutiontothe
crisis,considerhigherprofiledefensivearmsdeliveriesonacasebycasebasis,blockeffortstogain
UNauthorizationformilitaryintervention,andinsistthattheSyriansthemselvesratherthanexternal
forcesmustdetermineanytransitioninpower.RussianleadershipfurtherviewstherecentP5+1
agreementanopportunitytoenhancebilateralrelationswithTehran,althoughtheywillbewaryof
improvementinrelationsbetweenIranandtheUnitedStatesandEuropeanUnion.Russiaisreadyto

exploitanydeteriorationofrelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesanditsalliesandwillmovetooffer
supporttosuchstates.

RussiasAfghanistanpolicyreflectsanuneasybalancebetweenMoscowswishforstabilityin
AfghanistananditsdesiretopreventanylongtermU.S.militarypresenceinCentralAsia.Withthe
drawdownofU.S.forcesthisyear,Russiaisincreasinglyworriedaboutsecuritythreatsflowingfrom
Afghanistan.RussiamaintainsfriendlytieswiththeAfghangovernment,butonlyprovidesmodestaid.
However,MoscowviewstheAfghanNationalSecurityForcesasinsufficientlytrainedtosecure
AfghanistanafterthedepartureofISAFforcesin2014.RussiabelievesthatborderingCentralAsian
stateswillbevulnerabletoaspilloverofviolenceandexpandednarcoticstrafficking.Moscow
probablywishestoseizeuponthedepartureofcoalitionforcesfromCentralAsiamostnotablythe
forthcomingclosureoftheManasTransitCenterinKyrgyzstantoreassertitsinfluenceintheregion,
particularlyinthesecuritysphere.

Russia'stenyearrearmamentplanisatoppriorityforthearmedforces,butitfacesfundingand
implementationrisksowinginparttoapotentialdeclineinoilandgasrevenues,spending
inefficiencies,anagingindustrialbase,andcorruption.Russiaspentanannounced$66billiononits
armedforcesin2013,andthecurrentbudgetplancallsfora12.9percentinflationadjustedincrease
in2014.

WeexpectRussiasmilitarymodernizationwillleadtoamoreagileandcompactforcecapableof
moremodernformsofwarfare.Afutureforcewillbesmaller,butmorecapableofhandlingarange
ofcontingenciesonRussiasperiphery.Weexpectcontinuedeffortonimprovementofjoint
operationscapabilitiesandrearmamentbecauseofthehighpriorityRussianleadershipplaceson
theseportfolios.Thegeneralpurposeforceswillcontinuetoacquirenewequipmentinthenear
term,butdeliverieswillbesmallandlargelyconsistofmodernizedSovieteraweapons.Russiaalso
haspurchasedselectforeignsystems,suchasFrance'sMistralamphibiousassaultship,unmanned

aerialvehiclesfromIsrael,andItalianlightarmoredvehicles.ThefirstMistral,purchasedfromFrance,
waslaunchedinFranceon15October2013.

Russiawillcontinuetomaintainarobustandcapablearsenalofstrategicandnonstrategicnuclear
weaponsfortheforeseeablefuture.Tosupportthispolicy,theRussiangovernmentismakingstrong
investmentsinitsnuclearweaponprograms.Prioritiesforthestrategicnuclearforcesincludeforce
modernizationandcommandandcontrolfacilitiesupgrades.RussiawillfieldmoreroadmobileSS27
Mod2ICBMswithmultipleindependentlytargetablereentryvehicles.Italsowillcontinue
developmentoftheRS26intercontinentalballisticmissile,theDolgorukiyballisticmissilesubmarine
andSSNX32Bulavasubmarinelaunchedballisticmissile,andnextgenerationcruisemissiles.

LATINAMERICA

Mexico:PresidentEnriquePenaNietowillcontinuetoprioritizereducinghomicide,kidnappingand
extortionratesasthecentralelementofhissecuritystrategy.Hewillrelyonlargescalemilitarytroop
deploymentstoreducehighprofileviolenceinvolvingdrugtraffickingorganizations.Themilitary
remainstheleadontheseeffortsaspoliceprofessionalizationprogressesslowly.Atthestateand
municipallevels,policefacethechallengesofongoingelevatedviolence,corruption,limitedbudgets
andlackofgovernmentoversight.

ThePenaNietoadministrationhashadsomesecuritysuccesses.Inoneyearthemilitaryhasfulfilled
morethanhalfofitshighvaluetargetingobjectivesforitssixyearterm,arrestingorkilling71drug
traffickersofalistof122prioritytargets.Intentionalhomicidesdeclinedforthesecondconsecutive
year,continuingatrendwhichbeganunderthepreviousadministration,butreportedkidnappingsand
extortionhaveincreased.Morerecently,theMichoacnstategovernmentcalledonthefederal
governmenttoaddressagrowingconflictbetweenvigilanteorselfdefensegroupsandtraffickers,
complicatingthesecuritypicturefortheadministration,andpotentiallypullingresourcesfrom
ongoingsecurityoperationselsewhereinthecountry.


MexicancartelsareexpandingtheirpresencethroughouttheWesternHemisphereandpartnerwith
othercriminalgroupsintheregiontotransshipanddistributecocaine.Mexicoisalreadytheprincipal
transitcountryforU.S.boundcocaineandtheprimaryforeignsupplierofmethamphetamine,heroin,
andmarijuanatotheUnitedStates.ThenetworksofMexicosnineprincipaldrugtrafficking
organizationsalsoextendtosixofsevencontinents,withtheSinaloaCartelandLosZetashavingthe
farthestreachintotheselucrativeinternationalmarkets.Inadditiontotraffickinganddistributing
drugs,Mexicantraffickersrelyonorganizedcrimesyndicatesandsmallcriminalgroupstolaunder
money,obtainprecursorchemicalsfordrugproductioninMexico,andinsomecases,producedrugs
ontheirbehalf.

Honduras,ElSalvadorandGuatemala:Theproliferationofdrugtraffickinggroupsandrecordhigh
violencewillensurethesecountriescontinuetoemploythearmedforcestocombatdrugtrafficking
andperformtraditionallawenforcementfunctionswhileongoingpolicereformsattempttobolster
policecapabilities.Guatemalaalsoisplaguedwithdrugtraffickersthroughoutthecountryandhas
oneofthehighestmurderratesintheworld.

Colombia:TheDefenseMinistryismaintainingsecurityoperationsagainsttheFARCwhileBogota
conductspeacetalks,whichhavebecomePresidentJuanManuelSantossfocuspriortotheMay2014
presidentialelection.SantosreplacedhisdefensehighcommandinAugust2013andtheDefense
MinistryimplementedarevisedcounterinsurgencystrategySwordofHonorIIinOctober.While
therevisedcampaignseekstoemphasizecivilactionprograms,kineticoperationswillcontinueunder
SwordofHonorII.

Colombiascounterdrugperformanceisthestrongestintheregion,andpotentialcocaineproduction
hasdecreasedinrecentyears,butthecountryremainstheleadingproducerofU.S.boundcocaine.

Venezuela:EconomicstresscontinuestobuildinVenezuelawithinflationof56percentin2013and
scarcityofbasicconsumergoods,butfrustrationwithPresidentNicolasMadurospoliciesandthe

economyhasnotledtowidespreadsustainedprotestsandthemilitaryleadershipsupportshim.High
crimeratessomeofthehighestintheregionaddedanadditionallevelofinsecurity,requiringthe
deploymentoflawenforcementandmilitarytroops.PresidentMadurolacksthecharismaand
popularityenjoyedbylatePresidentHugoChavez.Historically,militarysupporthasbeencriticalfor
anyVenezuelanpresidentsabilitytomaintainpowerandensurestability,andMadurohasprovided
incentivestobuildmilitaryloyalty.Hehasannouncedpayincreases,andplanstoimprovemilitary
housingandhealthbenefits.ThemilitarycontinuestomodernizeandwillreceiveadditionalChinese
andRussianequipmentdeliveries.CaracastookpossessionoftwoChinesemediumtransportaircraft
inNovemberandRussianlongrangesurfacetoairmissilesystemsinApril2013.Caracasalso
increasinglyemploysthemilitaryindomesticroles.

Cuba:PresidentRaulCastrowillmanagehisnationspolitical,socioeconomic,andsecurityforce
conditionstomaintainregimeviabilityandkeepthelikelihoodofamassmigrationtoaminimum.
Whilehewillcontinuetoimplementeconomicreformsslowlyandcautiously,Castrowilladjustthe
paceasneededtoassurehisregimescontinuedgriponpower.Cubanintelligenceservices,having
provenverycapableofpenetratingkeyU.S.andDoDtargets,remainthepredominant
counterintelligencethreattotheU.S.emanatingfromLatinAmerica.