FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 68566. April 15, 1985.]

ALEX COMBATE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. GERONIMO R. SAN JOSE, JR., Municipal Trial Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RULE OF SUMMARY PROCEDURE; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The
Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases applies only to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not
exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both. The crime of Theft as charged herein is penalized with
arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or, from two (2) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four
(4) months. Clearly, the Rule on Summary Procedure is inapplicable.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL INDISPENSABLE. But even assuming that the case falls under the coverage of said Rule, the same does not
dispense with trial. On the contrary, it specifically provides: "Section 11. When case set for arraignment and trial. Should the court, upon a
consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the defendant for trial, it
shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial. "Section 14. Procedure of Trial. Upon a plea
of not guilty being entered, the trial shall immediately proceed.
3.
ID.; ID.; PETITIONER DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW; PROCEEDING COMPLETELY VOID. In the case at bar, since
petitioner-accused had pleaded not guilty, trial should have proceeded immediately. But not only was petitioner unrepresented by counsel upon
arraignment; he was neither accorded the benefit of trial. Respondent Judge based his judgment of conviction merely on the affidavits submitted,
without the petitioner having been even given the chance to confront or cross-examine the affiants. There being a clear deprivation of petitioner's
fundamental right to due process of law, (Section 17 & 19, Article IV, 1973 Constitution,) the assailed Decision should be set aside. When judgment
is rendered in complete disregard of all norms of procedure, the whole proceeding in question is completely void, People vs. Kayanan, 83 SCRA 437
(1978), and the case should be remanded for trial and proceedings strictly in accordance with law. (People vs. Bacong, 54 SCRA 289 (1973).
Considering that the judgment is void, it is as if there were no judgment at all and no double jeopardy attaches. (People vs. Court of Appeals, 101
SCRA 450 (1980); People vs. Brecinio, 125 SCRA 182 (1983)).
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

In this Petition for Certiorari, filed with the assistance of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (Naga City), petitioner-accused seeks to
annul respondent Judge's Decision in Criminal Case No. 1915 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines
Sur, convicting him of Theft, on the ground that it was rendered in violation of his constitutional rights. LLjur
The records disclose that petitioner was charged before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur,
presided by respondent Judge, with the crime of Theft of "one (1) Rooster [Fighting Cock] color red, belonging to Romeo Posada
worth P200.00." 1
Following the procedure laid down in the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, respondent Judge required petitioner and his
witnesses to submit counter-affidavits to the supporting affidavits of the complainant, 2 with which petitioner complied within the
period designated by the Court.
On June 5, 1984, petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before respondent Judge and was arraigned without the assistance of counsel.
He pleaded not guilty. 3
Subsequently, in an Order dated July 5, 1984, respondent Judge deemed the case submitted for resolution purportedly pursuant to the
Rule on Summary Procedure. 4
In a Decision promulgated on July 16, 1984, without benefit of trial, petitioner was sentenced to suffer six (6) months' imprisonment
and to pay the complainant the amount of P200.00, plus costs. 5
Seeking redress before this Court, petitioner alleges that respondent Judge had denied him due process for having been arraigned
without the assistance of counsel, and for having been convicted without the benefit of trial.
The Petition is highly meritorious. The Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases applies only to criminal cases where the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00),
or both. The crime of Theft as charged herein is penalized with arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, or, from two (2) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 6 Clearly, the Rule on Summary
Procedure is inapplicable. LLphil
But even assuming that the case falls under the coverage of said Rule, the same does not dispense with trial. On the contrary, it
specifically provides:
"Section 11.
When case set for arraignment and trial. Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information
and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the defendant for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the
case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
"Section 14.
Procedure of Trial. Upon a plea of not guilty being entered, the trial shall immediately proceed. The affidavits
submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be
subjected to cross-examination. Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the
party presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose.
"No witness shall be allowed to testify unless he had previously submitted an affidavit to the court in accordance with Sections 9 and
10 hereof." (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, since petitioner-accused had pleaded not guilty, trial should have proceeded immediately. But not only was
petitioner unrepresented by counsel upon arraignment; he was neither accorded the benefit of trial. Respondent Judge based his
judgment of conviction merely on the affidavits submitted, without the petitioner having been even given the chance to confront or
cross-examine the affiants. There being a clear deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process of law, 7 the assailed
Decision should be set aside. When judgment is rendered in complete disregard of all norms of procedure, the whole proceeding in
question is completely void, 8 and the case should be remanded for trial and proceedings strictly in accordance with law. 9
Considering that the judgment is void, it is as if there were no judgment at all and no double jeopardy attaches. 10
ACCORDINGLY, granting Certiorari, respondent Judge's Decision promulgated on July 16, 1984, is hereby ANNULLED for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The case is remanded to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman,
Camarines Sur, for proceedings strictly in accordance with law. llcd
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 43.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
3. Ibid., p. 52.
4. Ibid., p. 53.
5. Ibid., p. 62.

6. Article 309[4] Revised Penal Code.

7. Sections 17 & 19, Article IV, 1973 Constitution.
8. People vs. Kayanan, 83 SCRA 437 [1978].
9. People vs. Bacong, 54 SCRA 289 [1973].
10. People vs. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 450 [1980]; People vs. Brecinio,
125 SCRA 182 [1983].

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 96432. October 21, 1992.]
LORENZO P. LESACA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALFREDO RAVELO, respondents.
Lesaca, Espiritu & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
Manuel R. Recto for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT; CANNOT BE
ORDERED WHEN DEFENDANT FILED AN ANSWER TO
THE COMPLAINT. In this case, since Ravelo did file an
answer to the complaint, the trial court may not declare
him as in default (despite his absence and that of his
counsel at the pre-trial conference on May 3, 1990) because
a motion to declare the defendant in default is a prohibited
pleading under Section 15 (h) of the Rule on Summary
Procedure. It is the policy of the law to have every litigated
case tried on the merits. It is for this reason that judgments
by defaults are generally looked upon with disfavor. As this
Court observed in the "case of Coombs vs. Santos, (24
Phil. 446): a default judgment does not pretend to be based
upon the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified
on the ground that it is the one final expedient to induce
the defendant to join issue upon the allegations tendered
by the plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay. A
judgment by default may amount to a positive and
considerable injustice to the defendant; and the possibility
of such serious consequences necessitates a careful
examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks
that it be set aside."
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, from the decision dated November 29, 1990 of
the Court of Appeals which sets aside the decisions of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch III, and remands the case to the
MeTC for further proceedings and reception of the parties'
evidence as provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure.
On February 23, 1990, the petitioner, as plaintiff, filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) a complaint for
ejectment against the private respondent, Alfredo Ravelo,
to oust him from the commercial premises located at 671
Sales Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, on the grounds of: (1)
expiration of the month-to-month lease contract between
the parties; and (2) non-payment of rentals. Ravelo filed
an answer to the complaint. LLjur
During the first preliminary conference on April 19, 1990, all
the parties were present and duly represented by their
respective counsel. However, the preliminary conference was
reset to May 3, 1990, upon request of both parties, to give
them time to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement
and submit a compromise agreement.
On the scheduled date of the next conference, May 3, 1990,
only the plaintiff (now petitioner) appeared. On motion of
plaintiff's counsel, the MeTC declared defendant Ravelo "as in
default" for failure to appear at the preliminary conference
despite previous notice. The court considered the case
submitted for decision "as warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint" (p. 35, Rollo).

Ravelo filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for annulment

of the decisions of the MeTC and RTC and to remand the case
to the MeTC for reception of evidence.
On November 29, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Metropolitan Trial
Court decision and the respondent court's decision are
hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, Branch III for further
proceedings and reception of the evidence of the parties as
provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure." (p. 21,
Rollo.).
Hence, the present petition for review alleging that the Court
of Appeals erred: cdrep
1.
when it ruled that the only instance (when) Section 5
of the Summary Rule can be applied is when the defendant
fails to answer.
2.
when it ruled that should a party fail to attend/comply
with the preliminary conference mandated under Section 6 of
the Summary Rule, the court below is powerless and has no
discretion but to still proceed under Section 6 of same rule to
issue an order clarifying and defining the issues of the case
and to proceed under Section 7 of same Rule for submission of
affidavits of parties.
3.
when it ruled that "as in default" declaration is
prohibited by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
We find no merit in the petition for review.
Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure provides:
"SECTION 6.
Preliminary conference. Not later than
thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, the case shall be
calendared for a preliminary conference. Among other matters,
should the parties fail to arrive at an amicable settlement, the
court must clarify and define the issues of the case, which
must be clearly and distinctly set forth in the order to be issued
immediately after such preliminary conference, together with
the other matters taken up during the same."
As found by the Court of Appeals, when the private
respondent (then defendant) and his counsel failed to appear at
the pre-trial conference and no compromise agreement was
reached by the parties despite the opportunity given them by
the court, the situation was similar to that provided in Section
6 of the Summary Rule above quoted. The Court should have
issued a "preliminary conference order" defining" the issues in
the case as provided in Section 6. Thereafter the parties should
have submitted their affidavits and other evidence as provided
in Section 7 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, to wit: prLL
"SECTION 7.
Submission of affidavits. Within ten (10)
days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses and
other evidences on the factual issues defined therein, together
with a brief statement of their positions setting forth the law
and the facts relied upon by them."
Only when the defendant failed to answer the complaint may
the Court proceed to judgment. Thus does Section 5 provide:

On May 23, 1990, the MeTC rendered a decision ordering the

defendant, Ravelo, to vacate the premises in question.

"SECTION 5.
Effect of failure to answer. Should the
defendant fail to answer the complaint, crossclaim or
permissive counterclaim within the reglementary 10-day
period herein provided, the court motu proprio, or on motion
of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed
for therein except as to the amount of damages which the
Court may reduce in its discretion."

Said defendant appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Manila. After the submission of the parties' respective
memoranda, the RTC promulgated a decision affirming in toto
the decision of the MeTC.

In this case, since Ravelo did file an answer to the

complaint, the trial court may not declare him as in default
(despite his absence and that of his counsel at the pre-trial
conference on May 3, 1990) because a motion to declare

the defendant in default is a prohibited pleading under

Section 15 (h) of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
It is the policy of the law to have every litigated case tried on
the merits. It is for this reason that judgments by defaults are
generally looked upon with disfavor. As this Court observed in
the "case of Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil. 446: a default
judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of the
controversy. Its existence is justified on the ground that it is
the one final expedient to induce the defendant to join issue
upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so
without unnecessary delay. A judgment by default may amount
to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and
the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a
careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant
asks that it be set aside." (Trajano vs. Cruz, 80 SCRA 712,
713.).
The same doctrine was laid down by this Court in Rosario vs.
Alonzo, 8 SCRA 397, where we ruled that "the defendants
could not be in default after they had answered the complaint."
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 1990 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22801 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Let the record of this case be remanded to the
MeTC of Manila for further proceedings and reception of
evidence in accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure.
cdphil
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
Padilla, J ., took no part, related to petitioner

FIRST DIVISION

CRUZ, J p:

[G.R. No. 105866. July 6, 1993.]

The proceeding at bar traces its origin to an action for

VICTORIA D. BAYUBAY, represented by her attorney-infact, MARIBEL MAMARIL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Former Fourth Division and BIG MAK BURGER,
INC., respondents.

ejectment filed by petitioner Victoria D. Bayubay in

the Municipal Trial Court of Los Baos, Laguna, on
April 11, 1990, on the ground of expiration of the
contract of lease.

Rodolfo P. Orticio for petitioner.

Robles, Ricafrente & Aguirre Law Firm for private
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; RULE ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE; OBSERVANCE OF SECS. 6 AND 7
THEREOF MANDATORY. We see nothing wrong with the
decision of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the
Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings. The respondent
court was merely enforcing the mandatory provisions of the
Rule on Summary Procedure. The record shows that the
Municipal Trial Court failed to take into account the following
pertinent provisions of the Rule: Sec. 6. Preliminary
Conference. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed, the case shall be calendared for a preliminary
conference. Among other matters, should the parties fail to
arrive at an amicable settlement, the court must clarify and
define the issues of the case, which must be clearly and
distinctly set forth in the order to be issued immediately after
such preliminary conference, together with the other matters
taken up during the same. Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits.
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in
the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of witnesses and other evidences on the factual
issues defined therein, together with a brief statement of their
positions setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by
them. The above provisions require that immediately after the
preliminary conference, the Municipal Trial Court should
issue an order clearly and distinctly setting forth the issues of
the case and the other matters taken up during the preliminary
conference. The order is an important part of the summary
procedure because it is its receipt by the parties that begins the
ten-day period to submit the affidavits and other evidence
mentioned in Sec. 7. The minutes of the Municipal Trial Court
dated August 22, 1989, contained a notation that the pre-trial
had been "terminated" and that the parties were to submit
position papers. However, there was no order to this effect nor
was there an indication of when the position papers were to be
submitted for the purpose of discussing the factual questions
raised. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals We
think that the failure of the MTC to give the petitioner the
opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavit of
witnesses constituted a denial of due process. True, between
August 22, 1989 and December 18, 1989, when the MTC
rendered its decision was a period of more than three months.
But under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the ten-day period
for submitting affidavits and position papers did not
commence to run until receipt by a party of the order of the
court embodying the results of the pre-trial conference. Here,
as already stated, the MTC never issued such an order and so
the ten day period never started to run. It is not true, as the
MTC said, that the only questions raised were questions of
law. The petitioner's answer contained a counterclaim for
reimbursement of improvements allegedly made by it on the
premises, as well as claim for damages for alleged bad faith of
private respondent in bringing the case questions which
obviously required at least the affidavits of witnesses. The
Court of Appeals did not err therefore in calling for the
remand of the case to the Municipal Trial Court. While the
municipal judge may be commended for his zeal in speeding
up the resolution of the case, he nevertheless cannot be
sustained for his non-observance of the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
DECISION

Private respondent Big Mak Burger argued in its answer

that it had the option to renew the term of the lease
contract "under such conditions as may be agreed upon by
the parties" and set up the defense of estoppel. It also alleged
a counterclaim for damages and reimbursement of expenses
allegedly incurred by it on the leased premises.
The Municipal Trial Court issued summons with the
notification that the case would be heard under the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
After three pre-trial meetings and the marking of the exhibits,
which included the lease contract and the exchange of letters
between the parties, Judge Romulo G. Carteciano rendered
a decision holding that the contract of lease had expired
because no extension had been agreed upon by the parties
as required by the agreement. 1
The private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, on the ground that "the MTC violated
Secs. 6 and 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure by
rendering judgment without ordering the parties to submit
their respective position papers and affidavits of their
respective witnesses, as a consequence of which,
defendant's right to due process was violated." 2
On December 23, 1991, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the
appealed decision in toto. 3 However, it was reversed by the
Court of Appeals, which ordered the remand of the case to the
Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings. 4
The decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us. The
petitioner contends that the respondent court erred in ruling
that: (1) the failure of the MTC to give the private respondent
the opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavit of
witnesses constituted a denial of due process; (2) the questions
raised were not only questions of law because the answer
contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements
allegedly made by the lessee on the premises, and damages;
and (3) there was still a necessity for the MTC to issue an
order following the close of the pre-trial conference.
In its Comment, the private respondent refutes these
contentions and argues that (1) the petition raises questions of
fact as well as law, such as the expenses incurred by the lessor
in the improvement of the leased premises and the damages
sustained by it as a result of the filing of the complaint; (2) it
was deprived of the opportunity to submit its position paper
and/or affidavits of witnesses and so denied due process; and
(3) there was a need to remand the case to the MTC so that
evidence could be presented to prove the factual issues
through position papers and affidavits.
We see nothing wrong with the decision of the Court of
Appeals remanding the case to the Municipal Trial Court for
further proceedings. The respondent court was merely
enforcing the mandatory provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The record shows that the Municipal Trial Court failed to take
into account the following pertinent provisions of the Rule:
Sec. 6. Preliminary Conference. Not later than thirty (30)
days after the last answer is filed, the case shall be calendared
for a preliminary conference. Among other matters, should the
parties fail to arrive at an amicable settlement, the court must
clarify and define the issues of the case, which must be clearly
and distinctly set forth in the order to be issued immediately
after such preliminary conference, together with the other
matters taken up during the same.

Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits. Within ten (10) days

from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of witnesses and
other evidences on the factual issues defined therein, together
with a brief statement of their positions setting forth the law
and the facts relied upon by them.
The above provisions require that immediately after the
preliminary conference, the Municipal Trial Court should
issue an order clearly and distinctly setting forth the issues of
the case and the other matters taken up during the preliminary
conference.

1.

Rollo, pp. 55-61.

2.

Ibid, p. 80.

3.

Id., pp. 79-80.

4. Id., pp. 32-45; Mendoza, J. ponente with Herrera and Sempio Diy, JJ.
concurring.
5.

Id., p. 40.

6.

Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 597.

The order is an important part of the summary procedure

because it is its receipt by the parties that begins the ten-day
period to submit the affidavits and other evidence mentioned
in Sec. 7.
The minutes of the Municipal Trial Court dated August 22,
1989, contained a notation that the pre-trial had been
"terminated" and that the parties were to submit position
papers. 5 However, there was no order to this effect nor was
there an indication of when the position papers were to be
submitted for the purpose of discussing the factual questions
raised.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals
We think that the failure of the MTC to give the petitioner
the opportunity to submit its position paper and/or
affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of due process.
True, between August 22, 1989 and December 18, 1989,
when the MTC rendered its decision was a period of more
than three months. But under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, the ten-day period for submitting affidavits
and position papers did not commence to run until receipt
by a party of the order of the court embodying the results
of the pre-trial conference. Here, as already stated, the
MTC never issued such an order and so the ten day period
never started to run.
It is not true, as the MTC said, that the only questions raised
were questions of law. The petitioner's answer contained a
counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements allegedly
made by it on the premises, as well as claim for damages for
alleged bad faith of private respondent in bringing the case
questions which obviously required at least the affidavits of
witnesses.
The Court of Appeals did not err therefore in calling for the
remand of the case to the Municipal Trial Court. While the
municipal judge may be commended for his zeal in speeding
up the resolution of the case, he nevertheless cannot be
sustained for his non-observance of the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
We conclude with the following reminder:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly
administration of justice and the protection of substantive
rights in judicial and extra-judicial proceedings. It is a mistake
to suppose that substantive law and adjective law are
contradictory to each other or, as has been often suggested,
that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights
of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much
misunderstood. As a matter of fact the policy of the courts is to
give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other,
in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the
parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights
is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a
rule of court. 6
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Grio-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 78343. May 21, 1988.]
HEIRS OF RICARDO OLIVAS, represented by
POMPEYO F. OLIVAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
FLORENTINO A. FLOR (Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 79, Morong, Rizal), JOSE A.
MATAWARAN, respondents.
Belo, Abiera & Associates for petitioners.
Domingo Z. Legaspi for respondents.
SYLLABUS
petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry in
Morong Rizal. MTC issued summons and that
rules on sumpro will apply.
4 mos after filing of answer, defendant after
answer filed a motion to dismiss- w/c was qnd by
the petitioner being a prohibited pleading.
Held:
Compliance by the MTC with the Rules on
Summary Procedure in Special Cases was
wanting. For example, "a preliminary
conference during which the Court must clarify
and define the issues of the case, which must be
clearly and distinctly set forth in the Order to be
issued immediately after such preliminary
conference" (Section 6), was not followed.
Neither was Section 7 thereof which further
requires that within ten (10) days from receipt of
the said order, "the parties shall submit the
affidavits of witnesses and other evidences
on the factual issues defined therein,
together with a brief statement of their
positions setting forth the law and the facts
relied upon by them."
-

if there is no prelim con- there can be no

prelim order which is impt bec it is the one
that sets motion for filing of position
papers.

motion to dismiss filed after answer is not a

prohibited pleading what is prohibited is if it was
resorted to in order to stop the running of the pd
to answer and cause undue delay.
lack of cause of action- not warranted-desc may
be wanting but answer left no rm for doubt as to
the identity of the prop.

WARRANTED. Be that as it may, dismissal of

the case by the MTC, as affirmed by
Respondent RTC, for failure to state a cause
of action, is not in order. The description of
the land in the Complaint, quoted
hereunder, may, indeed, have been wanting.
Nonetheless, private respondent's Answer
(paragraph 3, supra) left no room for doubt
that the parties were acquainted with the
identity of the disputed property. It would be
sheer technicality, destructive of the ends of
substantial justice, were the case to be dismissed
on the ground of lack of particularity of the
disputed property. In fact, if the Rule on
Summary Procedure had been followed,
such additional data as were needed to
define the issues of the case could have
been threshed out in the preliminary
conference.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
WHEN PERMISSIBLE. It is true that the Rule
on Summary Procedure allows the dismissal
of a case outright due to failure to state a
cause of action. However, such dismissal is a
permissible upon the filing of the complaint
from a consideration by the Court of the
allegations thereof. In this case, the
proceedings had gone far afield. The outright
dismissal was not ordered upon the filing of
the complaint. On the contrary, the MTC made
a determination that the case falls under
summary procedure, issued summons
stating that fact, and subsequently even
issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

The background facts disclose that:

On 16 May 1986, petitioners filed a complaint
for Forcible Entry before the Municipal Trial
Court of Morong, Rizal (MTC, for short),
alleging that private respondent, through stealth
and strategy, unlawfully took possession of
the disputed property and ousted petitioners from
their possession thereof.

outright dismissal= only upon filing of complaint.

The MTC issued summons stating that the

Rule on Summary Procedure in Special
Cases shall apply.

1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULE
ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; MOTION TO
DISMISS FILED BEFORE AN ANSWER,
PROHIBITED PLEADING. In the guise of a
position paper, private respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss. While this is, indeed, a
prohibited pleading (Sec. 15[a], Rule on
Summary Procedure) it should be noted that the
Motion was filed after an Answer had
already been submitted within the
reglementary period. In essence, therefore, it
is not the pleading prohibited by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. What the Rule
proscribes is a Motion to Dismiss, which
would stop the running of the period to file
an Answer and cause undue delay.

On 29 May 1986, private respondent filed an

Answer with Counterclaim stating, inter alia:

2.
ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION; NOT

On 19 September 1986, or approximately four

(4) months after the filing of the Answer,

"3.
Paragraph 4 of the complaint is admitted
insofar as the fact that defendant did complain to
the Barangay Chairman regarding the repeated
attempts of plaintiff to unlawfully grab
possession of the property owned by
defendant and his other brothers and
sisters."
On 30 June 1986, the MTC granted the
Temporary Restraining Order petitioners
prayed for.
On 15 August 1986, the MTC required the
parties to submit position papers within ten
(10) days.

private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss

alleging that the case should be dismissed
outright for failure to state a cause of
action. Petitioners submitted an Opposition
contending that a Motion to Dismiss is a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

ground of lack of particularity of the disputed

property. In fact, if the Rule on Summary
Procedure had been followed, such
additional data as were needed to define
the issues of the case could have been
threshed out in the preliminary conference.
1

On 29 December 1986, the MTC dismissed the

case for failure of petitioners' Complaint to
state a cause of action in that it failed to
identify sufficiently the land subject matter
of this case.

It is true that the Rule on Summary Procedure

allows the dismissal of a case outright due
to failure to state a cause of action. 2
However, such dismissal is a permissible
upon the filing of the complaint from a
consideration by the Court of the
allegations thereof. In this case, the
proceedings had gone far afield. The outright
dismissal was not ordered upon the filing of
the complaint. On the contrary, the MTC made
a determination that the case falls under
summary procedure, issued summons
stating that fact, and subsequently even
issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

An appeal was seasonably interposed by

petitioners to respondent Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 79, Morong, Rizal.
On 28 April 1987, Respondent RTC rendered a
Decision affirming in toto the dismissal of the
case by the MTC.
Before us now, petitioners maintain that the MTC
Decision is violative of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, and that Respondent RTC erred in
affirming the MTC's dismissal of the case. LexLib
We resolved to give due course to the
Petition finding, as we do, merit in the
foregoing submissions.
Compliance by the MTC with the Rules on
Summary Procedure in Special Cases was
wanting. For example, "a preliminary
conference during which the Court must clarify
and define the issues of the case, which must be
clearly and distinctly set forth in the Order to be
issued immediately after such preliminary
conference" (Section 6), was not followed.
Neither was Section 7 thereof which further
requires that within ten (10) days from receipt of
the said order, "the parties shall submit the
affidavits of witnesses and other evidences
on the factual issues defined therein,
together with a brief statement of their
positions setting forth the law and the facts
relied upon by them."
In the guise of a position paper, private
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. While
this is, indeed, a prohibited pleading (Sec.
15[a], Rule on Summary Procedure) it should be
noted that the Motion was filed after an
Answer had already been submitted within
the reglementary period. In essence,
therefore, it is not the pleading prohibited by the
Rule on Summary Procedure. What the Rule
proscribes is a Motion to Dismiss, which
would stop the running of the period to file
an Answer and cause undue delay.
Be that as it may, dismissal of the case by the
MTC, as affirmed by Respondent RTC, for failure to
state a cause of action, is not in order. The
description of the land in the Complaint, quoted
hereunder, may, indeed, have been wanting:
"Bounded on the North, by Francisco Ramos; on
the East by Ramon Aquino & Cipriano Aquino; on
the South by Felisa Aquino; on the West by
Casimiro, Francisco & Benito Ramos."

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision under review is

hereby SET ASIDE and this case is hereby
ordered remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of
Morong, Rizal, for further proceedings on the
merits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
"Section 6.
Preliminary conference.
Not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed, the case shall be calendared for a
preliminary conference. Among other matters,
should the parties fail to arrive at an amicable
settlement, the court must clarify and define the
issues of the case, which must be clearly and
distinctly set forth in the order to be issued
immediately after such preliminary conference,
together with the other matters taken up during
the same."
2.
"Section 3.
Duty of court upon filing of
complaint. Upon the filing of the complaint, the
court, from a consideration of the allegations
thereof
A.
may dismiss the case
outright due to lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, failure to state a cause of action, or for
any other valid ground for the dismissal of a civil
action; or
B.
if a dismissal is not
ordered, shall make a determination whether the
case falls under summary procedure. In the
affirmative case, the summons must state that
the summary procedure under this Rule shall
apply."
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l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

Nonetheless, private respondent's Answer

(paragraph 3, supra) left no room for doubt that
the parties were acquainted with the identity of
the disputed property. It would be sheer
technicality, destructive of the ends of substantial
justice, were the case to be dismissed on the