BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, CARMEN M.

VELEZ-TING,
Respondent
SUBJECT: Stare Decisis (NCC, Art. 8)
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen
Velez-Ting (Carmen) wed on July 26, 1975. On October 21, 1993,
Ms. Carmen filed a petition before the RTC praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. In summation, Carmens basis of Benjamins
psychological
incapacity
consisted
of
the
following
manifestations: (a) alcoholism; (b) violent nature; (c) his
compulsive gambling habit; and (d) Benjamins irresponsibility
and immaturity. Mr. Benjamin denied all these allegations. On
January 28, 1998, RTC declared their marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to Courts of Appeal then on October 19,
2000, CA reversed the trials court ruling. Carmen filed a motion
for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina case guidelines
should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was
promulgated only on February 13, 1997. She claimed that the
Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it
would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Undaunted,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. In a
Resolution dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition
and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for
reconsideration. On review, the CA decided to reconsider its
previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an
Amended Decision reversing its first ruling and sustaining the
trial courts decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed, this
time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its
December 13, 2004 Resolution. Hence, the petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis
when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
(2) Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement
of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized; and
(3) Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.

HELD:
(1) No. respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis
is no longer new.
(2) No. Case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
(3) No. Evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove
that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of
the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
SC reversed the trial courts and the appellate courts
rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio.

AYALA CORP VS. ROSA DIANA REALTY

346 SCRA 663 December 1, 2000
Facts: In April 1976, Ayala Corp. entered into a transaction with
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng where former sold a lot in Salcedo
Village in Makati. The deed of sale had some encumbrances
contained in the Special Conditions of Sale (SCS) and Deed of
Restrictions (DR), which should be followed by the vendees. The
stipulations in the SCS are:
1) a building proposal must be submitted to Ayala which must
be in accordance with the DR,
2) the construction of the building must be completed on or
before 1979, and
3) that there will be no resale of the lot.
The DR specified the limits in height and floor area of the
building to be constructed. However, Sy and Kieng, failed to
build a building but nonetheless with the permission of Ayala,
the vendees sold the said lot to the respondent, Rosa Diana
Realty. Respondent Company agreed to abode by the SCS and
the DR stipulations. Prior to the construction, Rosa Diana
submitted a building plan to Ayala complying with the DR but it
also passed a different building plan to the building

administrator of Makati, which did not comply with the

stipulations in the DR. While the building, The Peak, was
being constructed, Ayala filed a case praying that: 1) Rosa
Diana, be compelled to comply with the DR and build the
building in accordance with the building plan submitted to
Ayala; or 2) on the alternative, the rescission of the deed of
sale.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and thus, Rosa
Diana was able to complete the construction of The Peak.
Undeterred, Ayala filed before the Register of Deeds (RD) of
Makati a cause of annotation lis pendens. RD refused to grant
Ayala such registration for in the lower court; the case is of
personal action for a specific performance and/or rescission.
However, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed RDs
ruling. The appellate court upheld the RDs ruling stating that
the case before the trial court is a personal action for the cause
of action arises from the alleged violation of the DR. The trial
court sustained the respondents point saying that Ayala was
guilty of abandonment and/or estoppels due to its failure to
enforce the terms of the DR and SCS against Sy and Kieng.
Ayala discriminately chose which obligor would be made to
follow certain conditions, which is not fair and legal. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the lower courts ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Rosa Diana committed a breach of
contract
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Rosa Diana
committed a breach of contract by submitting a building plan to
Ayala complying with the DR and submitting a different building
plan to the building administrator of Makati, which did not
comply
with
the
stipulations
in
the
DR.
Contractual Obligations between parties have the force of law
between them and absent any allegation that the same are
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy,
they
must
complied
with
in
good
faith.
Thus, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside
AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondent.
December 1, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner, Ayala Corporation, was the registered owner of a
parcel of land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati
City with an area of 840 square meters, more or less, and

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 233435 of the

Register of Deeds of Rizal.
On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to
Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of
Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained special
conditions of sale and deed restrictions. The Deed Restrictions
contained the stipulation that the gross floor area of the
building to be constructed shall not be more than five (5) times
the lot area and the total height shall not exceed forty-two (42)
meters. The restrictions were to expire in the year 2025.
The buyers Sy and Kieng failed to construct the building in
violation of the Special Conditions of Sale. Notwithstanding the
violation, in April 1989 they were able to sell the lot to
respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation
with Ayalas approval and with the same special conditions and
restrictions.
In consideration for Ayala to release the Certificate of Title of
the property, Rosa Diana, on July 27, 1989, executed an
Undertaking promising to abide by the special conditions of sale
executed by Ayala with the original buyers. Upon submission of
the Undertaking together with the building plans for a
condominium project, known as The Peak, Ayala released title
to the lot, thereby enabling Rosa-Diana to register the deed of
sale in its favor and obtain Certificate of Title No. 165720 in its
name. The title carried as encumbrances the special conditions
of sale and the deed restrictions. Rosa-Dianas building plans as
approved by Ayala were subject to strict compliance of
cautionary notices appearing on the building plans and to the
restrictions encumbering the Lot regarding the use and
occupancy of the same.
Rosa-Diana submitted to Ayala for approval envisioned a 24meter high, seven-(7) storey condominium project with a gross
floor area of 3,968.56 square meters. It, however, submitted a
different set of building plan of The Peak to the building
official of Makati that contemplated a 91.65-meter high, 38storey condominium building with a gross floor area of
23,305.09 square meters. The construction of the building
ensued.
Thereafter, Ayala prayed for rescission of the sale of the subject
lot to Rosa-Diana Realty. The lower court denied Ayalas prayer
for injunctive relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the
construction of the building. Undeterred, Ayala tried to cause
the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on Rosa-Dianas title.
The Register of Deeds of Makati, however, refused registration

of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that the case pending
before the trial court, being an action for specific performance
and/or rescission, is an action in personal, which does not
involve the title, use or possession of the property. The Land
Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the ruling of the Register
of Deeds saying that an action for specific performance or
recession may be classified as a proceeding of any kind in court
directly affecting title to the land or the use or occupation
thereof for which a notice of lis pendens may be held proper.
The decision of the LRA, nevertheless, was overturned by the
Court of Appeals citing its decision under the doctrine of stare
decisis in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development
Corporation, a case similar to the present case. Ayala however
contended that the pronouncement by the CA in its case with
Ray Burton Development Corporation is merely an obiter dictum
in as much as the only issue raised in the present case was the
propriety of the lis pendens annotation on the Certificate of Title
of the subject lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Ayalas
appeal based on its decision on Ayala vs. Ray Burton
Development Corporation under the doctrine of stare decisis.
HELD:
Yes. There is no reason how the law of the case or stare decisis
can be held to be applicable in the case at bar. If at all, the
pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner
Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed of restrictions can only
be considered as an obiter dicta. As earlier mentioned, the only
issue before the Court of Appeals at the time was the propriety
of the annotation of the lis pendens. The additional
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that Ayala is estopped
from enforcing the deed of restrictions even as it recognized
that the said issue is being tried before the trial court was not
necessary to dispose of the issue as to the propriety of the
annotation of the lis pendens. A dictum is an opinion of the
judge, which does not embody the resolution or determination
of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration
of the point, not the proffered deliberate opinion of the judge
himself. It is not necessarily limited to the issues essential to
the decision but may also include expressions or opinion, which
are not necessary to support the decision reached by the court.
Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.
The appellate courts decision in Ayala vs. Ray Burton cannot
also be cited as a precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis.

It must be pointed out that the time the presently assailed

decision of the CA was rendered, the Ayala vs. Ray Burton case
was on appeal to the Court. As held by the Court in Ayala vs.
Ray Burton, the CA went beyond the sole issue raised before it
and made factual findings without any basis in the record to
rule inappropriately that Ayala is in estoppel and has waived its
right to enforce the subject restrictions. Thus, the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals was reversed
and set aside. Rosa Diana was also ordered to pay Ayala
development charges and damages.
PP vs Veneracion
249 SCRA 244 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application
of Laws Duty of a Judge to Impose Prescribed Penalty
In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide committed against a
seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo
Veneracion.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the
crime of Rape with Homicide, the penalty imposable shall be
death. However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the death
penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion
perpetua. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four
accused but the judge refused to act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to
impose a lesser penalty than that imposed by law.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that
after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the
proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused
regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the
judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the
rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof) which
provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Roldan v Madrona (Natural Resources)
ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA
G.R. No. 152989
September 4, 2002
FACTS:

Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of about

60,000 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. TP-331 which he bought from a certain Ildefonso O.
Maglasang.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * Trial court: denied the motion

but reduced the recommended bail of petitioner
TRIAL STILL IN PROGRESS... ISSUES & RULINGS:

On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber

Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and
poultry farm in his property.
While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was
allegedly informed by some employees from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he could
proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application
was still awaiting approval.
Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees
and bulldozing of the roadway.He used the cut logs as materials
to build his chicken cages.
About three weeks later, representatives of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner's place,
allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut
trees was conducted. The logs were not confiscated but were
entrusted to a barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no
search warrant at that time.
Several days thereafter, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned,
this time armed with a search warrant and proceeded to
confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet)
and three felled timber logs with a total market value of
P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
Consequently, on September 21, 2001, a complaint for violation
of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended was filed against herein
petitioner by CENRO before the City Prosecutor of Ormoc City.
A warrant for the arrest of petitioner was then issued by the
court a quo. In view thereof, herein petitioner filed with the trial
court a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and
the recall of his warrant of arrest.

(1) whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner in this

case, is criminally liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting
trees within his own property;
YES, he is still liable. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by
E.O. 277, it is clear that the violators of the said law are not
declared as being guilty of qualified theft. Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code were referred to only for the purpose
of determining the imposable penalties and not to define acts
which constitute qualified theft.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code:Provided, That in case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis
supplied)

The said law does not even distinguish whether or not the
person who commits the punishable acts under the
aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is
material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or
not the person or entity involved or charged with its violation
POSSESSES
THE
REQUIRED
PERMIT,
LICENSE
OR
AUTHORIZATION FROM DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers
or collects timber or other forest products.
(2) whether the owner of the private property is
administratively liable under Sec. 14 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the
logs out of his property and just used them for his own
agricultural purposes therein and
The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere
act of transporting any wood product or timber without the
prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the
penalties provided for by law. As to the defense of petitioner
that he never transported the logs out of his property, suffice it
to say that such is a factual issue which this Court under Rule
45 cannot determine. We are limited to resolving questions of
law.
Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the "Revised
Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special
Private Land Timber Permit," provides:
SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood
products covered by these regulations which are transported
without the prescribed documents shall be considered illegal
and, therefore, subject to confiscation in favor of the
government and shall be disposed in accordance with laws,
rules and regulations governing the matter.
DENR Officials found issuing defective certificate of origin and
other transport documents required in this Order shall be
subject to suspension without prejudice to the imposition of
other penalties as may be warranted by extant Civil Service
Laws, rules and regulations.
(3) whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be
returned to the petitioner considering that the same were not

transported out and merely used for his own agricultural

purposes.
any pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature
as the guilt of the petitioner has not been legally established.
The records of the case indicate that trial on the merits is still in
progress. Hence, this Court is not in a position to speculate on
or prescribe the courses of action or remedies the petitioner
may avail of under the aforementioned law. Well-entrenched is
the rule that this Court is not duty bound to render advisory
opinions.
Philippine Rabbit Vs. Arciaga
148 SCRA 438 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application
of Laws Finality of Judgment
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson as paying passenger on
board a bus belonging to the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
sustained multiple serious physical injuries when the said bus
crashed against an acacia tree somewhere in Balaoan, La
Union. Thereafter, he brought a complaint for contractual tort.
In their answer, Philippine Rabbit interposed the defense that
the collision was due to fortuitous event. The case was set for
trial but the case was dismissed for non appearance of the
plaintiff (Singson). He then filed a motion for relief on the
grounds of equity. He averred that the jeepney he was riding on
the way to court for trial had engine trouble hence he was too
late in court (when he arrived, the case was already dismissed.)
Judge Ludivico Arciaga, the hearing judge, granted the motion.
Philippine Rabbit questioned the grant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case filed by Taurino Singson should
be dismissed.
HELD: Yes. Normally, a petition for relief may be granted by the
courts but in this case, there is no reason to grant such. It
appears that in this case, Singson and his lawyer let 61 days
lapse before filing their petition/motion for relief. Under the
rules, a petition for relief must be filed within 60 days from the
order of dismissal otherwise, the judgment shall become final
and executory. It is already too late for Singson when he filed
his petition on the 61st day. Equity aids the vigilant, not those
who slumber on their rights
Ursua vs CA

256 SCRA 149 Statutory Construction Purpose of a

Law
Civil Law Application of Laws Interpretation of Laws
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and
dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get a copy of the
complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His
lawyer asked him that because the law firms messenger, a
certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He
revealed to him that he feels uncomfortable asking for a copy of
the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case.
Perez then told him than he can go there as Oscar Perez so
that he does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook
there as Oscar Perez. When he was handed a copy of the
complaint, he signed the receipt as Oscar Perez. However, a
staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact
Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal
case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to
three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended,
otherwise known as An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cesario Ursuas conviction is proper.
HELD: No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled
that a strict application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this
case only leads to absurdity something which could not have
been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a
person is not allowed to use a name or an alias other than his
registered name or that which he was baptized. Under the law,
what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being
used habitually and publicly in business transactions without
prior authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua
merely used the name Oscar Perez once, it was not used in a
business transaction, the use of the name was with the consent
of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in
this instance, he was not even required to disclose his identity
at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was requesting a
copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because
the complaint is a public record open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was
not brought about when Ursua used a name other than his
name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When
Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed;
there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142.

The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so

when no such evil was produced by Ursuas act, said law need
not be applied.
CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March
11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which Primetown
paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund
because they suffered losses that year due to the increase of
cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses,
they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were
claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer
Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional
documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its
claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for
review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it
was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a
judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.
According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days
pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final
adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a
leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed
its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary
period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of
CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a
year shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC
defined a calendar month as a month designated in the
calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.
The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly
repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable.
Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2year reglementary period.
MA. VILMA S. LABAD, plaintiff, v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES,
defendant.
G. R. No. 139665. August 9, 2001.
Facts:

Labad, an employee of University of Southern Philippines (USP),

was under probation due to a complaint filed to her by the
Parent-Teacher Association on February 1, 1996. The complaints
rooted on Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Unfitness as a teacher,
which involved incidents when Labad lied of the amount she
paid for the yearbook, violation of RA 7079 (Campus Journalism
Act of 1991), no release of the said yearbook, and abuse of
students. The Investigation Committee, constructed by USP,
held that there should be a non renewal of Labads probationary
status. The salient dates are summarized as follows:
April 14, 1998- Civil Service affirmed the Investigation
Committees
decision
December 11, 1998- Civil services Committee denied Labads
Motion
for
Reconsideration.
December 28, 1998- Labad filed a Motion for Extension to file
Petition
to
CA.
January 12, 1999- Labad filed a Petition for Review to CA.
February 17, 1999- Labad received a Resolution granting her
Petition
for
Extension.
March 10, 1999- Labad received a Resolution from the CA
dismissing her Petition for Review.
The Court also stated that the Petiton for Review was filed
beyond the extended period which ended January 10, 1999.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for
Review filed by petitioner before it on the ground that the
petition was filed late.
Whether the extension period started on December 26,1998 or
on December 28, 1998.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the date when the extension should take
effect was on December 28, 1998 since December 26, 1998 fell
on a Saturday. According to Sec 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court,
if the last day of the period, as computed, falls on a Saturday,
on Sunday or on a legal holiday in a place where the Court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day. Therefore,
the Petition for Review can be submitted until January 12, 1999.
Henceforth, the petition was granted and remanded that the
appellate court for further proceedings.
Garcia-Recio vs Recio
Garcia vs. Recio [366 SCRA 437]

Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy alleging
respondent was not legally capacitated to marry her on January
12, 1994 because of his prior subsisting marriage to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen. Respondent claimed that
petitioner knew of his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution. He had obtained a divorce decree as proof of his
legal capacity to marry petitioner in 1994.
While the suit for the declaration of nullity was still pending,
respondent, who had become a naturalized Australian citizen in
1992, secured a divorce decree in Sydney, Australia for the
dissolution of his marriage with petitioner on the ground that
the marriage had irretrievably broken down. This was
recognized by the trial court in rendering its assailed decision
that deemed the marriage between respondent and petitioner
ended not on the basis of respondents alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry but on the basis of the divorce decree
(Australian divorce) obtained by respondent.
Petitioner argues that the divorce decree may only be given
recognition in this jurisdiction upon proof of existence of (1) the
foreign law allowing absolute divorce, and (2) the alleged
divorce decree itself.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven; and
(2) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner.
Held:
(1) Yes. The divorce decree has to be admitted in evidence with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of
the Family Code in order to prove the divorce as a fact and
prove its conformity to the foreign law allowing it for our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, compliance
with the registration requirements is no longer binding to
respondent for he has acquired Australian Citizenship and
therefore, he is no longer bound by Philippine personal laws.
Respondent submitted the divorce decree and was rendered
admissible by the trial court as a written act of the Family Court
of Sydney, Autralia and accorded weight by the judge.

(2) No. The court held that respondents presentation of a

decree nisi or an interlocutory decree-a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce showed that the divorce
obtained may have been restricted; it did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to national law.
Respondent also failed to submit a Certificate of Legal Capacity
together with the application for a marriage license required by
Article 21 of the Family Code which would have been admitted
as a prima facie evidence of his legal capacity to marry. The
Court finds no absolute evidence that proves that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
Case remanded
Llorente VS CA
345 SCRA 592 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign
Laws Nationality Principle Effects of Foreign Divorce
Succession Last Will and Testament of an Alien
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the
U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married in
Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He
discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino
Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had a
son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give
her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in
writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the latter
agrees to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later,
Lorenzo returned to the United States.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in
California. Paula was represented by an American counsel. The
divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married
Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he
left all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for Paula).
In 1983, he went to court for the wills probate and to have
Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the
probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later,
Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate.

The trial court ruled that Lorenzos marriage with Alicia is void
because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court
ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not
applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzos divorce abroad should be
recognized.
HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo
became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he obtained
the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to
family rights, duties, or status are no longer applicable to him.
Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be
respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as
for the latter to determine the effects of the divorce as to the
successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
Anent the issue on Lorenzos last will and testament, it must be
respected. He is an alien and is not covered by our laws on
succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts
for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court
where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the
validity of the will.
Van Dorn vs Romillo
139 SCRA 139 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign
Laws Nationality Principle Divorce Obtained Abroad
In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an
American, married in Hong Kong. However, in 1982,
Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA.
Later, Reyes married Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City.
Upton was petitioning that he be granted management rights
over a property in Manila (The Galleon). It was his contention
that the divorce decree they obtained abroad do not apply to
properties in the Philippines, hence, despite the divorce,
Reyess property in the Philippines remained conjugal with
Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge
ruled that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court, a

foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared national policy of

the Philippines which prohibits divorce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.
HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality (nationality principle). Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada Upton from the marriage from the
standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer
the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as
Reyess husband as he is not entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his own
countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
Aznar Vs, Garcia
7 SCRA 95 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Law
Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to
California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he
came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir,
but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the
estate. Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16,
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied;
that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law
of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred
that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should
be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.

HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional

rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter; the internal law which applies to
Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for
Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being
domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be
followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings the determination of the successional rights
under Philippine law only.

20 SCRA 358 Civil Law Application of Laws

Nationality Principle
Succession Nationality of the Decedent Legitimes
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the
United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five
legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children. He, however,
also had three illegitimate children in the Philippines (Maria
Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his
Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were
not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on
the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to
which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be
applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should
determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children,
maria Kristina et al, are not entitled to their legitimes under the
Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no
legitimes.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. BERNARD L. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA,
respondents
G.R No. 116044-45.
March 9, 2000
Facts:
Private respondent purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila
conjunction tickets from Manila-Singapore-Athens-LarnacaRome-Turin-Zurich-Geneva-Copenhagen-New York. In Geneva,

he decided to forego his trip to Copenhagen and go straight to

New York. In the absence of a direct flight under his conjunction
tickets from Geneva to New York, he exchanged the unused
portion of the conjunction ticket for a one way ticket from
Geneva to New York from American Airlines, which issued its
own ticket to respondent in Geneva and claimed the value of
the unused portion of the conjunction ticket from the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) clearing house in
Geneva. In September, 1989, respondent filed an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the alleged
embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva
Airport when American Airlines security officers prevented him
from boarding the plane.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of American Airlines of a new ticket
in exchange of the conjunction ticket the respondent purchased
in Manila bar him from seeking recourse in Philippine courts.
Ruling:
The petitioner contends that under Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention, action for damages may only be brought upon the
following courst:
a.) Domicile of the carrier
b.) Carriers principal place of business
c.) Place where carrier has a place of business
d.) Place of destination
Since neither of these elements is present in the case, the
petitioner contends that plaintiff cannot file the case in the
Philippines. He further posits that the second contract cannot
be deemed as an extension of the first as the petitioner airline
is not a participating airline in any of the destinations under the
first contract.
Respondent on the other hand contends that the second
contract she entered into at Geneva is part and parcel of the
first contract, thus the third option under Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention would apply to him. He further pointed out
that petitioner cannot deny the contract of agency with
Singapore Airlines after it honored the conjunction tickets
issued by the latter.
The court ruled that petitioners argument is void of merit with
reference to Article 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention. According to
the said article, transportation to be performed by several
carriers shall be deemed as one and undivided. The number of
tickets issued does not detract from the oneness of the contract

of carriage. Hence, the third option of the plaintiff under Article

28 of the Warsaw Convention is clothed with jurisdiction.