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The very first question the Summa theologiae asks is whether, over
and above what philosophy can tell us about God, there is need for another
doctrine. See ST, la. 1. 1. (This will be our mode of citation: Summa
theologiae, part one, question 1, article 1.) Another and thorough comparison of the two theologies is found in Thomas's exposition of the De
Trinitate of Boethius, question 5, article 4. Translation in Armand
Maurer, The Division and Methods of the Sciences (Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1953).
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of the saint for discussions of the remaining topics. Not that there
is any real need for a work such as John of St. Thomas's. The
Summa itself wears the structure of its bones very near the skin,
and Thomas is at pains to connect discussions and to indicate w h y
this problem is taken up before that, and so on. What justification
does Thomas offer for the apparent postponement of an issue that
seems to demand settlement prior to doing theology? L e t us glance
at what goes on prior to the discussion of the divine names.
Question 1 of the first part is methodological, concerning itself
w i t h the nature and scope of sacred doctrine. Indeed, articles 9 and
10 discuss aspects of the language of Scripture, its largely symbolic,
or metaphorical, character, and the fact that, i n interpreting i t , we
must recognize a plurality of senses of the narrative. Question 2
is the well-known discussion of the existence of God, w i t h its elaboration of the quinque
viae.
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When Thomas turns from all this to ask how God can be known
and named by us, i t might be said that he is now intent on raising
questions as to what the earlier considerations involved, that these
earlier considerations provide him w i t h a body of data to which he
can refer for concrete examples i n undertaking to discuss the general
problems of God's knowability and nameability. I n short, we could
say that, on Thomistic principles, we must first know something
before we can reflect on the nature of knowledge. F r o m that perspective, we would seek in questions 12 and 13, not some establishment of the transcendental possibility of knowing and naming God,
but the relatively more modest effort to reflect on acknowledged
instances of knowing and naming, w i t h an eye to characterizing them
generally.
This possible explanation for the place of questions 12 and 13,
while not without merit, is nonetheless not what we find Thomas
offering.
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I
Since the philosophy of religion, i n recent years and in countries
where English is the native tongue, has turned on the question
whether meaningful language about God is possible, we find what
might be called the charter of this discipline in its Thomistic form
in the following passage.
In reply I say that, as Aristotle said, vocal sounds are signs of concepts and concepts are likenesses of things and thus it is clear that
vocal sounds are referred to the things to be signified by way of the
mind's conception of them. Thus it is that, to the degree a thing can
be intellectually known by us, it can be named by us. But it has been
shown earlier that in this life God cannot be seen by us in his essence
but rather is known by us from creatures, according to the relation
of principle and by way of excellence and remotion. So it is, then, that
he can be named by us from creatures.
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11
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This conception differs from the forgoing three. (1) From the thing understood, because that is sometimes outside the mind whereas the
conception of the intellect is in the
intellect; again, the conception of
ST 3. 60. 4.
See John of St. Thomas, Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus, ed.
P. B. Reiser, 3 vols. (Turin: Marietti 1930), 1: 646-722, esp. pp. 702-707.
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(1) and (3) above express truths which depend on one or the
other kind of existence. I f (1) is true, this is because some man
is white, while (3) is true because human nature is predicable of
many numerically distinct things. "To be predicable of many" (universality) is not part of the nature of man nor of the meaning of
'man' as i f f r o m "Man is a species" and "Socrates is a man" we could
infer "Socrates is a species." To be universal is something that
happens to a nature as i t is known by us, just as to be white is
something accidental to the nature as i t is found i n such individuals
as Socrates. The meanings of common nouns do not include, as a
constituent or component, "existing i n the mind." No more does the
meaning of 'man' include the traits of singular existents. This
prompts a f u r t h e r essential consideration.
When the common name is said to signify immediately the conception of the intellect and mediately the thing, this cannot be taken
to say that thanks to its immediate meaning the common name names
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course, difficulties are not refutations. L e t us t u r n now to the argument which presupposes the theory of meaning we have been discussing.
II
God's nameability is a problem for Thomas because of the following assumptions. First, human intellection, presupposing as i t does
sense experience, has as its connatural object the nature or quiddity
of sensible r e a l i t y .
Second, the intellect's dependence on the senses
is not merely genetic but constant. Natures which exist i n material
singulars are grasped intellectually in an immaterial way. B y this is
meant that the mind's concepts do not include singular and individuating notes; the nature is conceived as formal, as apt to be found i n
many. But the nature of a material thing can only be grasped t r u l y
and completely when i t is known as existing i n particulars. Particulars are grasped through sense and imagination. Thus there is
a continuing reliance on the senses i f the intellect is to have adequate
knowledge of its commensurate or connatural object.
Third, God
is not a material object.
Fourth, obliquely and by extrapolation
f r o m its connatural object, the human mind can gain some knowledge
of immaterial things. Finally, the obliquity and indirection of our
knowledge of God w i l l be reflected i n the way we talk about him,
including the meaning of the names attributed to him.
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The second premise of the argument in our charter text is, in its
entirety, this: " I t was shown above that God cannot in this life be
seen in his essence but is known by us f r o m creatures according to
the relation of principle and by way of excellence and remotion."
The threefold distinction is an abiding feature of Thomas's thought
and permits us to speak of three kinds of divine attribute: negative,
relative, and affirmative. Our earlier remarks about the characterization of questions 3-11 suggests that in them Thomas is
concerned with negative attributes. (Actually, this turns out to be not
wholly true because of questions 5 and 6 which deal w i t h the good
in general and the goodness of God, respectively.) I t is certainly the
case that articles 2 - 7 of question 13 t u r n on the other two kinds of
divine attribute. When, in article 2, Thomas asks i f any name is
said of God substantialiter,
he is, in effect, asking i f there is not a
kind of attribute which is neither negative nor relative. Having
assured himself that there is, he asks in article 3 whether all such
attributes are metaphorical and argues that they are not. Article
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4 argues that such attributes are many but not synonymous, for
reasons we have touched on. Article 5 is the famous claim that the
affirmative attributes are names analogically common to God and
creatures, which (article 6) are said first of creatures, f r o m one point
of view, and first of God, f r o m another. Article 7 discusses relative attributes. Articles 8 and 9 discuss the name 'God' w i t h particular reference to the question whether i t is a proper name. Article 11
discusses 'He who is' as the most proper name of God and a final
article asks whether, given the simplicity of God, i t is possible to form
affirmative propositions (with their suggestion of complexity: "God
is P") about God.
I mention the wider setting i n order not to mislead the reader as
to the adequency of the few remarks to follow. I t is the affirmative,
as opposed to the negative and relative, divine attributes that are said
to be analogically common to God and creature. We shall examine
this doctrine which, while in many ways familiar, is not always understood, w i t h a particular eye to seeing the role of negativity i n the
affirmative attributes.
Ill
I t is what I have called affirmative attributes that Thomas says
may be predicated of God substantialiter,
that is, may be taken to express, not simply what he is not, by removing some characteristic
f r o m him, nor what he is i n relation to something else or, more accurately, that something is related to him, but the divine nature or
substance itself, however inadequately. The examples of this kind
of attribute that Thomas gives are 'good' and 'wise'. When God is
said to be wise, the sense of the claim is not simply that God is the
cause of created wisdom or that he is unlike things which lack cognition. Rather, 'wise' is taken to express, inadequately to be sure,
what God is: "Therefore, i t must be said, on the contrary, that names
of this sort signify the divine substance and are predicated of God
substantially, but are deficient i n the way they represent h i m . "
Now this claim seems to contradict his reiterated remark that i t is
impossible to know what God is and that we can know only what God is
not. I n explicating what he means, Thomas repeats that God is
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known f r o m his creatures, and thus God is knowable only to the degree that creatures manifest or represent what he is. Some perfections found in creatures are such that they can be thought of as
in God, though i n a manner that escapes our comprehension. The
preexistence of perfections i n God is grounded i n (a) the fact that he
is the cause of creatures and that the perfection of the effect must i n
some way preexist i n the cause, and (b) that God is the summation of
perfections. Names signifying perfections found i n creatures can
signify the divine nature insofar as those created perfections manifest
or represent their source.
When therefore it is said, 'God is good', the sense is not, 'God is the
cause of goodness', or, 'God is not evil', but the sense is 'that which we
call goodness in creatures preexists in God' and this indeed in a
higher way.
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I n order to get some understanding of this, we must take into account the distinction Thomas introduced i n article 1 between a perfection and its mode. There he exemplifies the contrast by noting
the difference between such concrete and abstract terms as 'white'
and 'whiteness'. Of these, he wants to say that they signify the
same thing (res significata),
that is, the same quality or accidental
form, but in different ways (modi significandi).
The concrete term
signifies a quod, the perfection i n a subsistent, so that the account of
'white' would be 'that which has whiteness' (Habens
albedinem),
whereas the account of 'whiteness' would be 'that whereby something is white', in short, a quo. Now i f every name is either concrete or abstract, no name seems appropriate to God. Names which
signify a subsistent thing imply composition, and God is simple;
names which signify the simple perfection do not signify i t as subsisting. As Thomas says elsewhere, "omne nomen cum defectu est
quantum ad modum significandi," every name is defective w i t h respect to its mode of signifying when applied to God.
When this
realization is applied to the affirmative divine attributes, the threefold viae deriving f r o m Pseudo-Dionysius can be illustrated i n the
following w a y .
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Ibid.
Summa contra gentiles, bk. 1, chap. 30. English translation by
Anton Pegis (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).
Scriptum super sententiis, 1, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 3 and dist. 3, q. 1, a. 3.
3 6
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(1) God is wise.
(2) God is not wise.
(3) God is wisdom.
The way of affirmation, (1), does not compare to the way of negation, (2), as its contradictory, because what is affirmed is the perfection (res significata)
and what is denied is the mode (modus
significandi).
This same terminology is employed to express the doctrine of the analogically common name.
The briefest comparison Thomas gives of univocal, equivocal, and
analogous names is this: when things are named univocally, the
same name signifies the same perfection i n the same way; when
things are named equivocally, the same name signifies quite different perfections; when things are named analogically, the same name
signifies the same perfection i n different ways.
That is, a name predicated analogically of many has the same res significata but different modi significandi.
The familiar example is 'healthy' as i t occurs
in:
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Beyond this, the doctrine of the analogous name requires that one
account of the name be privileged, the ratio propria, which will be
found i n only one of the analogates, of which accordingly the analogous
Ibid., dist. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2m: "Ad secundum dicendum quod
aliter dividitur aequivocum, analogum et univocum. Aequivocum enim
dividitur secundum res significatas, univocum vero dividitur secundum
diversas differentias, sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos."
The abstract form of the term enters into the account of the concrete form and vice versa, underscoring the fact that the perfection is
never grasped independently of these modes.
ST, la. 13. 5.
3 9
4 0
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in such a way that we see that the adjectival name 'wise' signifies
the same perfection (res significata)
but i n different ways (modi
significandi).
Now Socrates has wisdom, meaning that the subsistent entity Socrates possesses an accidental quality whereby he
grasps cognitively the order of things. The res significata
here,
awareness of order (sapientis
est ordinre),
is taken to be distinguishable f r o m the mode of having i t peculiar to humans, i.e., as
ST, la. 16. 6.
See Logic of Analogy, p. 166-69. For another view, see J. M.
Ramirez, Opera omnia, vol. 2: De analogia (Madrid: Vives, 1972), pp. 1675
88. The view of analogy presented in the text of this article is, however
solidly grounded in the texts, not universally shared by students of
Aquinas. Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and
Catholic Theology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) accepts it. An
excellent book, B. Montagnes, La doctrine de Vanalogie de Vetre dlapres
saint Thomas dAquin Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1963), pursues the matter
chronologically and finds many of the most vexing texts to be early formulations later abandoned by Thomas. Even if true, this would not relieve us of
the necessity of understanding the various formulations, not least in order
to assess Montagnes's interpretation.
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and Belief,
(The Hague:
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IV
While the short Thomistic answer to our titular question might
seem to be, "Yes, but analogically," we have seen that analogy is
invoked only i n the discussion of affirmative attributes. The negative and relative attributes have their own difficulties, to be sure.
One might wonder if the name 'God' itself is caught by one of the categories of divine attribute. I n article 10 of question 13, Thomas discusses univocal and analogical uses of the name 'God' and that already makes i t clear that 'God' is not a proper name according to
Thomas since, i n order to be univocal or equivocal, a name must be
shared, common. But while he holds that 'God' is an appellative
rather than a proper name, Thomas, in discussing the Trinity, indicates that in some ways 'God' is like a proper name.
I t is just because any adequate discussion of whether 'God' is a proper name
would necessitate introducing the philosophical distinctions made i n
the difficult context of Thomas's discussion of the Trinity of Persons
in God that I do not enter into i t here. One can appreciate the
subtleties required to move intelligibly among predications true of
the divine nature and those true of a divine person. Things get
even more complicated in the discussion of the Incarnate God. I f
Christ died for our sins, did God die? Indeed, was God born in
Bethlehem? The ascription of predicates to Christ i n virtue of his
humanity or in virtue of his divinity calls for a niceness of distinction
and precision of language that cannot fail to attract the interest of
the philosopher. Of course, i t was not to titillate the philosophical
mind that Thomas generated such linguistic precisions as he did,
but in order to get as clear as he could about what God had revealed
to man. There is perhaps no better way to realize the ineffability
of God.
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University
of Notre
Dame.