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28. Countries with such a requirement have included Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Greece, Italy, and Switzerland; see Richard L. Hasen, Symposium: Law, Economics, and
Norms: Voting Without Law? University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144 (1996): 2135.
29. See the description in Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force, in Open
Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution, edited by Chris DiBona et al. (Sebastopol,
Cal.: OReilly and Associates, 1999).
30. Michael Froomkin makes a similar point: Export control rules have had an effect on
the domestic market for products with cryptographic capabilities such as e-mail, operating systems, and word processors. Largely because of the ban on export of strong cryptography, there
is today no strong mass-market standard cryptographic product within the U.S. even though
a considerable mathematical and programming base is fully capable of creating one; It Came
from Planet Clipper, 19.
31. See Network Associates and Key Recovery, available at link #32.
32. Cisco has developed products that incorporate the use of network-layer encryption
through the IP Security (IPSec) protocol. For a brief discussion of IPSec, see Cisco Systems,
Inc., IP SecurityIPSec Overview, available at link #33. For a more extensive discussion, see
Cisco Systems, Inc., Cisco IOS Software Feature: Network-Layer EncryptionWhite Paper;
Cisco Systems, Inc. IPSecWhite Paper, available at link #34; see also Dawn Bushaus,
Encryption Can Help ISPs Deliver Safe Services, Tele.Com, March 1, 1997; Beth Davis and
Monua Janah, Cisco Goes End-to-End, Information Week, February 24, 1997, 22.
33. See Internet Architectural Board statement on private doorbell encryption, available
at link #35.
34. Little, but not nothing. Through conditional spending grants, the government was
quite effective initially in increasing Net participation, and it was effective in resisting the
development of encryption technologies; see Whitfield Diffie and Susan Eva Landau, Privacy
on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
Steven Levy tells of a more direct intervention. When Richard Stallman refused to passwordprotect the MIT AI (artificial intelligence) machine, the Department of Defense threatened to
take the machine off the Net unless the architectures were changed to restrict access. For Stallman, this was a matter of high principle; for the Department of Defense, it was business as
usual; see Steven Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1984), 41618.
35. On virtual private networks, see Richard Smith, Internet Cryptography (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1997) chs. 6, 7; on biometric techniques for security, see Trust in Cyberspace,
edited by Fred B. Schneider (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999), 12324,
13334.
36. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 Harvard Law Review 1974 (2006).
37. Ibid., 2010.
38. Ibid., 2012.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 2011.
42. Ibid.
43. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act, Pub. L. No. 10756, 155 STAT. 272
(2001); American Civil Liberties Union, Seeking Truth From Justice: PATRIOT Propaganda
The Justice Departments Campaign to Mislead the Public About the USA PATRIOT Act (American Civil Liberties Union, July 9, 2003).
44. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).