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(Mindanao Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 429 [1982].

Seller bound himself to work for the titling at his own expense the portion of the land sold to buyer but
title issued in name of seller.
In 1939,Francisco Ang Bansing, owner of an unregistered tract of land with an area of 29 hectares, sold
to Juan Cruz Yap Chuy a portion of said land (DAVAO CITY), Lot 1846-C with an area of around 5
hectares. In the deed of sale, BANSING made the following commitment: I hereby agree to work for
the titling of the entire area of land under my own expenses and the expenses for the titling of the
portion sold (by) me shall be under the expenses of CHUY. Ten months later, CHUY sold to the
Government Lot 1846-C. In 1941, BANSING executed an afdavit wherein he conrmed the previous
sale to CHUY clarifying that the exact area of the lot sold is 61,107 square meters and certifying that he
intended to cede and transfer the lot to CHUY after the survey of BANSINGs land. The afdavit was
registered. Subsequently, BANSING obtained original certicate of title for the 29-hectare land. By
Presidential Proclamation, certain parcels of land forming part of the Governments private domain
were transferred to MDA (Mindanao Development Authority, now Southern Philippines Development
Administration), a government agency, subject to private rights, if any. Lot 1846-C was among the
parcels of land transferred to MDA in said proclamation. In 1969, MDA led suit against BASNSING
for the reconveyance of the title over Lot 1846-C after the latter ignored repeated demands to the
transfer of title to MDA.
Whether BANSING a trustee in an express trust covering Lot 1846-C, and, therefore, the lot should be
adjudicated to MDA?
No. The stipulation in the deed of sale does not categorically create an obligation on the part of
BANSING to hold the property in trust for CHUY. Hence, there is no express trust. It is essential to the
creation of an express trust that the settlor presently and unequivocably make a disposition of property
and make himself the trustee of the property for the benet of another. While BANSING had agreed
that he will work for the titling of the entire area of my land under my own expenses, it is not clear
therefrom whether said statement refers to the 29-hectare parcel of land or to that portion left to him
after the sale. A failure on the part of the settlor de nitely to describe the subject matter of the
supposed trust or the bene ciaries or object thereof is strong evidence that he intended no trust. And
even assuming that an express trust was created, BANSING had long repudiated it when he refused to
deliver and convey the title to the property to MDA, the alleged bene ciary to the trust. MDA did not
take any action until after the lapse of 23 years. (Mindanao Development Authority vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.)

Aquino, J., dissenting:

BANSING created an express trust by executing later an af davit that he intended to transfer the
disputed lot to CHUY. Prescription in the case of express trusts can be invoked only from the time the
trust is repudiated. And a trustee who takes a torrens title in his name for the land held in trust cannot
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. That is one of the limitations upon the nality of a
decree of title. In any event, the real plaintiff in this case is the Republic of the Philippines and
prescription does not run against the State. The maxim is nullum tempus o occurrit reg or nullum
tempus occurrit reipublicae (lapse of time does not bar the right of the crown or lapse of time does not
bar the commonwealth). The rule is now embodied in Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code. The
negligence of government of cials concerned in not intervening in the land registration proceeding or
in not promptly asking S to reconvey the disputed lot to the Government does not prejudice the State.
The negligence or omissions of public of cers as to their public duties will not work an estoppel
against the State. (Ibid.)

(Geronimo and Isidro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145 [1959].)
Vendee a retro, though the title to the property was still in his name, recognized the right to repurchase
of vendor a retro by allowing the latter to exercise acts of ownership over the property.
The trial court declared in a decision that JOSE NAVA and WIFE FELISA AQUINO had the right to
redeem four (4) lots with a house of strong materials, and ordered AGATONA GERONIMO and
HUSBAND INOCENCIO ISIDORO to make the resale of the property in favor of JOSE NAVA and WIFE
FELISA AQUINO . After the decision had become nal and executory, AGATONA GERONIMO and
HUSBAND INOCENCIO ISIDORO suggested that the tenants of the house pay his rentals to S instead of
to him. Not only this but when the tenants left the house, JOSE NAVA and WIFE FELISA AQUINO took
possession of, and exercised acts of, ownership over the house and AGATONA GERONIMO and
HUSBAND INOCENCIO ISIDORO all along showed conformity thereto.
Whether there was an express trust?
Yes. The acts of AGATONA GERONIMO and HUSBAND INOCENCIO ISIDORO should be construed as
a recognition of the fact that the property, though still in his name, is to be held in trust for JOSE NAVA
and WIFE FELISA AQUINO , to be conveyed to the latter upon payment of the repurchase price. Such
trust is an express one, not subject to prescription.

(Julio vs. Dalandan, 21 SCRA 543 [1967])

Document imposes upon a person the duty to turn over the possession of property to another.
A private document labelled Statement recites that the riceland owned by the deceased mother
(VICTORIANA DALANDAN) of VICTORIA JULIO was posted as security for an obligation assumed
was foreclosed due to the failure of EMILIANO & MARIA DALANDANs father to fulll his
obligation. In said document, it was agreed between E & M DALANDANs father and VICTORIA
JULIO that the former held himself liable to VICTORIA JULIOs mother for such foreclosure and
promised that he would replace such riceland with another of his own. VICTORIA JULIO brought
action because of E & M DALANDANs refusal to deliver the promised land.
Whether the document create an express trust?
Yes. The document itself imposes a duty upon E & M DALANDAN to turn over both the fruits and the
possession of the property to VICTORIA JULIO. An express trust is thereby created, imposed upon E
& M DALANDAN by his predecessor and no evidence aliunde is necessary for its recognition,
considering that no particular words are required for the creation of an express trust under Article 1444.

(Vda. de Mapa vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 294 [1987].)

Husband designated as sole heir with obligation to deliver properties to certain persons referred to as
In her will,Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, testatrix, designated her husband, Ludovico Hidrosollo, as
universal and sole heir with the obligation to deliver the properties in question to certain persons who
were referred to as beneciaries. The word trust does not appear in the will.
Whether Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo effectively create a trust in favor of the parties over the
properties adverted to in the will?
Yes. The designations, coupled with the other provisions for co-ownership and joint administration of
the properties and other conditions imposed by Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, clearly demonstrated
the intent of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo that the legal title to the properties should vest in
Ludovico Hidrosollo and the bene cial or equitable interest thereto should repose in said persons.

(Sunga vs. De Guzman, 90 SCRA 618 [1979].)

When failure to pay share of one of co-owners as promised by new co-owner (buyer from a co-owner)
will constitute an act of repudiation.
DE GUZMAN, etc. and B are the co-owners of a shpond which they inherited from their parents.
Without the knowledge of DE GUZMAN, etc., B sold his undivided share to SUNGA in a private
contract of sale. A, etc. brought action to recover their shares against SUNGA who relied on the
defense of prescription in resisting the action, alleging adverse possession. SUNGA argues that he has
not been giving DE GUZMAN, etc. their share of the sh harvested and by such act, he has shown
repudiation of the trust which may have been created. It appears, however, that SUNGA had promised
one of the heirs (DE GUZMAN, etc.) to pay him for his share in the shpond. No date has been xed
for the ful llment of the promise. SUNGA has not paid as promised.
Does the failure of C to pay constitute a repudiation of the trust?
(1) No unequivocal act of refusal to make payment. The promise made by SUNGA interrupted his
possession as a source of prescriptive rights. It manifested his continuing recognition of the right of DE
GUZMAN, etc. as long as the promise was not expressly withdrawn. To constitute the failure to pay as
promised as an act of repudiation of the trust, or as a manifestation of adverse possession, there should
be an unequivocal act of refusal to make payment, or a de nite reneging from the promise. This can
happen only if a date has been xed for the ful llment of the promise, but the period had lapsed
without the promise having been redeemed.
(2) New co-owners possession not completely adverse or open. Furthermore, it appearing that the
tax declaration to the property remained in the parents of DE GUZMAN, etc., SUNGAs possession
was not completely adverse or open, nor was it truly in the concept of an owner, which are
indispensable elements for prescription to become legally effective as a means of acquiring real
property. Finally, when one harvests from a shpond of which is only a part-owner, it must be assumed
that his harvest is only to the extent he is rightfully entitled to, until the contrary is positively shown.

(Villarta vs. Cuyno, 17 SCRA 100 [1966].)

A person, to prevent sale at public auction of forfeited real estate belonging to another, paid the
delinquent taxes due on the property.
To prevent the eventual sale at public auction of the land of ISIDRO CUYNO (deceased owner) which
was forfeited by the Government for delinquency in payment of real estate taxes, GREGORIO
VILLARTA paid the delinquent taxes and accepted receipts for payments issued in the name of
Whether GREGORIO VILLARTA acquire the rights of ISIDRO CUYNO in and to said property by
reason of said payments?
No. GREGORIO VILLARTA became a trustee of the land for the benet of the heirs of ISIDRO

(Calero vs. Carrion, 107 Phil. 549 [1960])

The agreement of the parties is that the property would be bought in the name and for the account of
the two of them and the third would be paid a commission as compensation on the sale of the property.
Although the original proposal was for the parties to purchase the property jointly, the same was
abandoned and the parties subsequently agreed that EMILIA CARRION et. al. would buy the property
exclusively in their names and for their own account, to avoid the difculties to be encountered in
acquiring the property in common. FEDERICO CALERO accepted this proposition with the
understanding that the property would be sold as soon as a buyer who can pay P300,000.00 could be
found, with the obligation on the part of EMILIA CARRION et. al. to pay C 20% of the proceeds after
deducting the purchase price thereof.
Whether Article 1452 applicable?
ART. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title
is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of
the others in proportion to the interest of each.
No, because nothing contained in the agreement would indicate that the property was being purchased
for the benet of EMILIA CARRION et. al and FEDERICO CALERO. The recitals in the contract
containing the obligation assumed by EMILIA CARRION et. al. merely refer to the services rendered
by FEDERICO CALERO as broker who negotiated the sale of the property to EMILIA CARRION et.
al., and which EMILIA CARRION et. al. agreed to compensate. The terms of the contract admit no
doubt that the 20% to be paid FEDERICO CALERO is of any amount which may be obtained by the
sale of the property after deducting the purchase price therefor, which shall be taken from the liquidated
benet obtained by the owners out of the sale of said property.
Neither is Article 1453 applicable (ART. 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance
upon his declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an implied
trust in favor of the person whose benefit is contemplated.), because there is absolutely nothing in the
agreement which even remotely indicates that the property was conveyed to EMILIA CARRION et. al.
in reliance upon their declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor.

(Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan Ling, 19 Phil. 202 [1911])

Title to property purchased with funds furnished by members of an association without legal
personality was placed in the name of one of them.
A number of Chinese merchants raised a fund by voluntary subscription with which they purchased a
valuable tract of land and erected a large building to be used as a sort of club house for the mutual
benet of the subscribers to the fund. The subscribers organized themselves into an irregular
association, which had no regular articles of association and was not registered in any commercial
registry or elsewhere. The association not having any existence as a legal entity, it was agreed to have
the title to the property placed in the name of CHO JAN LING, one of the members of the association.
Whether CHO JAN LING the right to set up title in himself to the club property as well as to the rents
accruing therefrom?
No. The evidence clearly discloses not only that the funds with which the property in question was
purchased were furnished by the members of the association but that CHO JAN LING, in whose name
it was registered, received and holds the property as the agent and trustee of the association. In this
case, the legal title of CHO JAN LING is not questioned and the other members of the association do
not seek such cancellation but they maintain that CHO JAN LING holds it under an obligation, both
express and implied, to deal with it exclusively for the benet of the members of the association and
subject to their will.

(Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Garcia, 143 SCRA 178 [1986].)

Party allegedly defrauded by fraudulent registration of property has no right to the same.
MACROPPER MINING Corporation purchased in 1972 a parcel of land from BUENEVENTURA
PAEZ who had been in continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1921, having
consistently declared it for taxation purposes in his name and religiously paid taxes thereon to the
government. It appears that MIGUEL GARCIA obtained a free patent to the property and the
corresponding original certicate of title in his name. MARCROPPER MINING CORP. claimed that it
was not able to assert its rights over the disputed land because it had no notice of the proceedings
before the Bureau of Lands; that MIGUEL GARCIA, through fraud and misrepresentation succeeded
in misleading the Director of Lands to believe that the land was still part of the public domain; and that
a constructive fraud was created in its favor as the defrauded party.
Whether there was an implied or constructive trust created?
No. MACROPPER MINING CORP. is not entitled to be declared the true and lawful owner of the land
in question. The mere more than 30 years possession of the property by BUENEVENTURA PAEZ did
not automatically divest the land of its public character. BUENEVENTURA PAEZ did not do anything
to secure a title or conrm his imperfect title, assuming he was entitled to the same. An implied or
constructive fraud presupposes the existence of a defrauded party who is the rightful owner of the
disputed property. MIGUEL GARCIA could not have committed fraud against MACROPPER CORP
or PAEZ, in view of the absence of any relationship, duciary or otherwise, between them which would
justify the creation of an implied trust. There being no constructive trust, MACROPPER cannot invoke
the ten-year prescriptive period within which to le an action for reconveyance. Even assuming that
GARCIA was guilty of fraud and MACROPPER was entitled to the issuance of a patent, the action
should have been led within four (4) years from the issuance of the original certicate of title in favor

MANZANILLA VS. CA 183 SCRA 207 Mach 15, 1990

Buyer of mortgaged property, with full knowledge of the mortgage, demands reconveyance from the
seller/mortgagor who was able to buy said property from the mortgagee after the property was legally
foreclosed and ownership duly consolidated in the name of the mortgagee, and to sell again to another.
In 1963, spouses Celedonio and Dolores Manzanilla sold on installment an undivided one-half portion
of their residential house and lot. At the time of the sale, the said property was mortgaged to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), which fact was known to the vendees, spouses
Magdaleno and Justina Campo. The Campo spouses took possession of the premises upon payment of
the first installment. Some payments were made to petitioners while some were made directly to GSIS.
On May 17, 1965, the GSIS filed its application to foreclose the mortgage on the property for failure of
the Manzanilla spouses to pay their monthly amortizations.
On October 11, 1965, the property was sold at public auction where GSIS was the highest bidder.
Two months before the expiration of the period to redeem or on August 31, 1966, the Manzanilla
spouses executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the undivided one half portion of their property in favor of
the Campo spouses.
Upon the expiration of the period to redeem without the Manzanilla spouses exercising their right of
redemption, title to the property was consolidated in favor of the GSIS and a new title issued in its
In January 1969, the Manzanilla spouses made representations and succeeded in reacquiring the
property form the GSIS. Upon full payment of the purchase price, an Absolute Deed of Sale was
executed by GSIS in favor of the Manzanilla spouses.
On May 14, 1973, the Manzanilla spouses mortgaged the property to the Binan Rural Bank. On
September 7, 1973, petitioner Ines Carpio purchased the property from the Manzanilla spouses and
agreed to assume the mortgage in favor of Binan Rural Bank; November 12, 1973, private respondent
Justina Campo registered her adverse claim over the lot; October 3, 1977, petitioner Carpio filed an
ejectment case against private respondent Justina Campo.
On July 31, 1979, private respondent Justina Campo (already a widow) filed a complaint for quieting of
title against the Manzanilla spouses and Ines Carpio praying among others, for the issuance to her of a
certificate of title over the undivided one-half portion of the property.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Campo. The decision was appealed by petitioners to the
Court of Appeals; however it only affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners Motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Whether or not petitioners are under any legal duty to reconvey the undivided one- half portion of the
property to private respondent Justina Campo.

No, there may be a moral duty on the part of petitioners to convey the one-half portion of the property
previously sold to private respondent. However, they are under no legal obligation to do so. Hence, the
action to quiet title filed by private respondent must fail.
(1) Petitioners did not act in bad faith. There is no suf cient basis for the trial court to conclude
that herein petitioners acted in bad faith in their dealings with the Campo spouses. The latter had full
knowledge of the existing mortgage of the whole property in favor of GSIS prior to the sale of the onehalf portion to them. There is also no showing that as one of the considerations of the sale, herein
petitioners undertook to release the property from the mortgage at all costs. With this condition of the
property at the time of the sale, private respondents were forewarned of the consequences of their
transaction with the petitioners.
(2) Petitioners did not deliberately allow the mortgage to be foreclosed. There is also no basis to
conclude that petitioners deliberately allowed the loan to lapse and the mortgage to be foreclosed. No
speci c act or series of acts were presented and proven from which it could be safely concluded that
the failure of petitioners to pay off their loan was deliberate. They explained that their nancial
condition prevented them from dutifully complying with their obligations to the GSIS. In a display of
their good faith and fair dealing after the property was foreclosed, the petitioners, realizing the
imminent loss of the said property, even granted the private respondent the right to redeem it from the
GSIS. This right was granted in the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by petitioners in favor of the
Campo spouses. Moreover, it was also stipulated that private respondent recognized the superior lien of
GSIS on the property and agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the mortgage. These
stipulations were all contained in the Deed. In view of the failure of either the Manzanilla spouses or
the Campo spouses to redeem the property from GSIS, title to the property was consolidated in the
name of GSIS. The new title cancelled the old title in the name of the Manzanilla spouses. GSIS at this
point had a clean title free from any lien in favor of any person including that of the Campo spouses.
(3) Action to quiet title must fail. If it were true that petitioners deliberately allowed the loan to
lapse and the mortgage to be foreclosed, we do not see how these circumstances can be utilized by
them to their advantage. There was no guarantee that petitioners would be able to redeem the property
in the event the mortgage thereon was foreclosed as in fact they failed to redeem because they had no
money. On the other hand, had they opted to eventually exercise their right of redemption after
foreclosure, they would be under a legal duty to convey one-half portion thereof sold to the Campo
spouses because by then, title to the property would still be in their name. Either way, petitioners were
bound to lose either the entire property in case of failure to redeem or the one-half portion thereof sold
to private respondent in the case of redemption. Further, should petitioners let the period of redemption
lapse without exercising the right of redemption, as what happened in this case, there was no guarantee
that the same could be reacquired by them from GSIS nor would GSIS be under any legal duty to resell
the property to them. There may be a moral duty on the part of petitioners to convey the one-half
portion of the property previously sold to private respondents. However, they are under no legal
obligation to do so. Hence, the action to quiet title led by private respondent must fail.
(4) There was no mistake or fraud on the part of petitioners. Article 1456 has no application in the
case at bar. There was no mistake nor fraud on the part of petitioners when the subject property was
reacquired from the GSIS. The fact that they previously sold one-half portion thereof has no more
signi cance in this re-acquisition. Private respondents right over the one-half portion was obliterated

when absolute ownership and title passed on to the GSIS after the foreclosure
sale. The property as held by GSIS had a clean title. The property that was passed on to petitioners
retained that quality of title.
(5) Second buyer acted in good faith. As regards the rights of private respondent Ines Carpio, she is
a buyer in good faith and for value. There was no showing that at the time of the sale to her of the
subject property, she knew of any lien on the property except the mortgage in favor of the Bian Rural
Bank. No other lien was annotated on the certi cate of title. She is also not required by law to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certi cate of title to indicate
any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property or any encumbrances thereon, the purchaser is not
required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden
defect or inchoate right thereof.