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Journal of Positive Philosophy
(ISSN: 2249-8389)

Volume V, No. 02
(September, 2015)

Desh Raj Sirswal

Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary

Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa (Kurukshetra)-136128

Lokyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN 2249-8389)

Lokyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy is an online bi-annual interdisciplinary
journal of the Center for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies
(CPPIS) . The name Lokyata can be traced to Kautilya's Arthashastra , which
refers to three nv k ik s (logical philosophies), Yoga, Sam khya and Lokyata.
Lokyata here still refers to logical debate ( disputatio , "criticism") in general and
not to a m aterialist doctrine in particular. The objectives of the journal are to
encourage new thinking on concepts and theoretical fram eworks in the disciplines
of hum anities and social sciences to dissem inate such new ideas and research
papers (with strong emphasis on modern implications of philosophy) which have
broad relevance in society in general and m ans life in particular. The Centre
publishes two issues of the journal every year. Each regular issue of the journal
contains full-length papers, discussions and comments, book reviews, information
on new books and other relevant academic information. Each issue contains about
100 Pages.
Centre for







Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal (Assistant Professor (Philosophy, P.G.Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11,

Associate Editors:
Dr. Merina Islam, Dr. Sandhya Gupta

Editorial Advisory Board
Prof. K.K. Sharma (Former-Pro-Vice-Chancellor, NEHU, Shillong).
Prof. (Dr.) Sohan Raj Tater, Former Vice Chancellor, Singhania University , Rajasthan).
Dr. Ranjan Kumar Behera (Patkai Christian College (Autonomous), Nagaland).
Dr. Geetesh Nirban (Kamala Nehru College, University of Delhi).
Dr. K. Victor Babu (Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Andhra University,
Dr Rasmita Satapathy (Department of Philosophy, Ramnagar College, West Bengal.)
Mr.Pankoj Kanti Sarkar (Department of Philosophy, Debra Thana Sahid Kshudiram Smriti
Mahavidyalaya, Paschim Medinipur, West Bengal).
Declaration: The opinions expressed in the articles of this journal are those of the
individual authors, and not necessary of those of CPPIS or the Chief-Editor.


In this issue..

Title of the Paper & Author

Page No.









Gaganjot Kaur

Ahinpunya Mitra


Reni Pal


Desh Raj Sirswal

MkW ch-vkj- vEcs M dj dh nfyrks a ds mRFkku es a ;ks x nku

dh ,s f rgkfld i` " BHkw f e


iz d k'k pUnz cMok;k

Report of the Programme












Gaganjot Kaur
The conventional scheme of education is a set of teaching and learning techniques with
predominantly vocational goals, determined for every individual who is enrolled in an
institute of formal education. Spiritual development of the individual remains largely
untouched and consequently, many individuals compromise their real identities for a
conventionally successful life. The problem is not limited to ones professional
compromises. Rather, the deeper crisis is a philosophical one existential possibilities of
an individual lie in oblivion. In this research article, I address the problem of
commensuration in education and how it acts as an impediment to an individuals holistic
growth. The primary reference for this article is Richard Rortys Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature.
Keywords: Education, Commensuration, Edification
Philosophy and education, as endeavours of individual pursuit, have a certain
similarity in the way they have developed over the years, that is, both have become
highly professionalized and scholastic. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard
Rorty expresses his concern over the intransigent methods of philosophical thinking.
Similar concerns arise in the field of education as well.

In this article, I present the

relevance of Rortys ideas in the area of education.

I explain the problem of

commensuration in education how the conventional methods have constantly been

estimating the potential identities of individuals on a common criterion, and how this
commensuration prevents individuals from feeling spiritually involved in the process and
transcending their limited selves. In the later part of the article, I put together certain
ideas on the need to edify education and how it may be achieved. Through this article,
I intend to present a case for reappraisal of the common idea of education, its objectives
and practices.


Primarily, there are two aspects to an individual that call for perfection
intellectual and moral. For Aristotle, the goal of education is identical with the goal of
man. Although all forms of education are explicitly or implicitly directed towards a
human ideal, in Aristotles view, education is essential for the complete self-realization of

He categorizes virtues as intellectual and moral, and holds that the former is

achieved by being taught and the latter is the result of habit. Alfred North Whitehead
contends that education should aim at producing men who possess both culture and
expert knowledge in some specific direction. In their expert knowledge, they will find
the ground to start from and their culture will lead them as deep as philosophy and as
high as art.2 For Whitehead, valuable intellectual development is self-development.
Almost all institutions of formal education would agree on the view that education
must facilitate the intellectual and moral growth of an individual. In all conventional
schools, there is a well-defined subject-matter for the purpose of acquisition of
knowledge. But, pursuance of moral development of students is only superficial they
are taught manners, etiquettes, right conduct, right speech, etc. but not the meaning and
importance of moral commitments in ones personal and social life. What remains
largely absent from most of the curricula is acknowledgment of the individuals
existential and spiritual matters.3 Understanding ones situation in the larger framework
of life, and relevance and significance of ones actions in the moral sphere, comes only
through a thorough examination of oneself and ones experiences. Intellectual and moral
development of an individual without examination of the self is sufficient if education is
seen as extrinsically valuable, as a venture that has high utility. For an educational
experience to have an intrinsic worth, the learner must feel spiritually involved in the
process. Complete self-realization or self-development can happen only when all the
dimensions of human existence are addressed and worked upon when there is
transformation of the consciousness.


In his Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer talks about the notion of bildung.
Literally, the German term bildung means education or self-formation, or culture.
However, Gadamer clarifies that bildung does not simply mean developing ones
capacities or talents.

He cites Wilhelm von Humboldts definition of bildung,

something both higher and more inward, namely the disposition of mind which, from
the knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavour, flows
harmoniously into sensibility and character.4

Gadamer substitutes the notion of

knowledge with that of bildung as the goal of thinking.

He explains that bildung is

not achieved in the manner of a technical construction, but grows out of an inner process
of formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state of continual
bildung.5 What we need is substitution of knowledge with self-formation as goal of
education, too.

The experience of education can be completely transformed if the

learners are not only getting information about the world, but realize the possibility of
self-transcendence. Development of an individual beyond his/her definable extent calls
for an approach different from the usual school programs. Learning scientific facts, for
example, is useless if it does not expand the horizon of the learners consciousness.
Using facts in ones work is, of course, intelligent but that is only a very limited way of
defining the aim of education.
Despite all the criticism it received, Rortys Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
proved to be one of the most provocative works of the 20th century. The basic objective
carried through the book is to question the notion of human mind as mirror of nature.
With a sharp anti-positivistic approach, he intends to set aside the notion of philosophy
as the means to achieve objective knowledge. However, Rortys problem does not lie
with the belief that philosophy is a knowledge-bearing discipline, but rather with the
belief that a philosophical enquiry has significance only if it is an epistemological pursuit
that philosophy ought to be a knowledge-bearing discipline.

As a result of such

approach, the sense of wonder that Plato called the beginning of philosophy seems to
get overcast by ones longing for certain answers.


In Rortys view, our present notions of philosophy are strongly tied-up with the
Kantian idea that all knowledge-claims are commensurable, thereby making it hard to
imagine philosophy without epistemology. By commensuration, Rorty means bringing
under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what
would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict. These rules tell
us how to create an ideal situation.6 Resolution of conflict is, of course, gratifying but it
also causes complacence in thought.

Gratification that arises from resolution of

disagreements relies on the idea that man is meant to find the most accurate explanation
to life that cannot be challenged. We see education serving the same purpose for us as
epistemology does for philosophy. Thus, we yearn an approach that would simplify the
task of imparting education. And, commensuration has already proven itself to be a very
convenient technique. Thus, our notion of education is also so strongly tied-up with the
customary practices of classroom teaching that it is hard to conceive of an alternative idea
of education. In J. Krishnamurtis words:
In seeking comfort, we generally find a quiet corner in life where there is a
minimum of conflict, and then we are afraid to step out of that seclusion.
This fear of life, this fear of struggle and of new experience, kills in us the
spirit of adventure; our whole upbringing and education have made us
afraid to be different from our neighbour, afraid to think contrary to the
established pattern of society, falsely respectful of authority and tradition.7
For Rorty, the difficulty is rooted in the Platonic, Kantian and positivistic idea:
that man has an essence namely, to discover essences. And, to discover these essences,
there must be a unified technique that is safe and guarantees success. Training for this
realization begins as soon as a child is enrolled in a school. Based on assumption of
commensurability of individual dispositions, contents of courses and methods of
classroom teaching are founded.
Most of the subjects in school curriculum have been included there on grounds of
being useful. But, apparently, there is no clarity regarding which subjects/skills are to be
considered more useful than others or useful at all, and which subjects are to be seen

essentially connected with being educated. Also, it may be added here, that what is
useful to one may not be useful to another. However, when a curriculum is designed, it is
done for the entire class or group of students. Among these are students who would find
a certain subject useful or personally satisfying, and also those who would not find them
of any interest whatsoever. For example, David Carr notes that the standard school
curriculum seems to contain forms of knowledge, understanding and skill of rather
diverse human significance and value. These could be seen as useful for post-school
individual functioning like home economics and woodwork, or they could be
considered indispensable to the vocational training of certain types of learner like auto
repair techniques or secretarial training.

However, there are many other skills and

subjects in school curriculum that are not useful in this sense. For example, physical
education and dance are activities that are considered to be instrumentally useful and
conducive to the health and fitness, but the time allocated to them is hardly sufficient to
thoroughly learn either of the practices. It is also interesting to see that while it may not
affect ones standing as educated if one has never played a sport like golf or football, but
it creates a suspicion on ones educated-ness if one has never read a great novel, drama
or poetry.8
Yet, the standard educational practices are followed in a mechanical way because
they cut down the otherwise ambitious task of formulating curriculum that is more
individual-centric. This is how commensuration happens, not only of interests but also of
identities. Basically, every year, a school releases a batch of individuals who know the
same skills (perhaps in varying degrees), have learnt the same subjects, and are mostly
identical in their intellectual dispositions. In the context of philosophy, Rorty says that
to construct an epistemology is to find the maximum amount of common ground with
others, and the assumption that an epistemology can be constructed is the assumption that
such common ground exists.9 Similarly, in constructing school curriculum for mass of
students, the assumption is that their interests and identities can be brought to a common

Desperation for objectivity in philosophy is found in education, too

desperation for an objective structure of curriculum and model of education.



The problem with conventional education is certainly not limited to its content or

There is a deeper issue that must be addressed here the idea of

existence, or in a narrow sense the idea of personal existence. In Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature, Rorty refers to Jean Paul Sartres notions of en-soi and pour-soi, or
being-in-itself and being-for-itself. The former refers to things that are definable and
complete, but they lack consciousness; the latter refers to beings that possess
consciousness but lack definability. These two may be understood as two dimensions to
human existence. There is a part to us that is definable, fixed, and completely known.
There is also a part to us that is transcendent, dynamic, and never completely known. In
order to understand the latter, as Rorty rightly suggests, we must first see ourselves as ensoi.

Similarly, to be educated, we must have a thorough understanding of the

descriptions of the phenomenal world. Understanding of the seen is a pre-requisite to

understanding of the unseen.
However, it is tragic that in all the years of schooling, students learn how to exist
as en-soi, but not as pour-soi. Ones self-realization dwells in being able to exist as poursoi. Schools functioning on the conventional methods of education may want to avert the
responsibility of guiding children to become liberal creators, as this requires them to be
always on the periphery rather than following a secure path.

There is no doubt that

conventional techniques of individual training at schools have been generating desired

results, but it is these results, too, that we need to reassess the desirability of. Rorty
attacks the methodologies of mainstream philosophers and says that they want to
reshape all enquiry and culture according to that line of enquiry which they have tested
and which has had a stunning success. The motive is to model all systems of thought
based on rationality and objectivity in understanding.

This is exactly how schools and

other institutions of education generally function they conform to the tried-and-tested

methods. Yet, we cannot be sure if that, indeed, is a useful strategy.
The definable aspect of the framework of human existence is that which is
completely knowable the human body and its functions, the physical world in which


human being exists and its various phenomena. Science has certainly been successful at
explaining the anatomy of human body and neurological mechanism of the system. But
theories about human mind, behaviour and existence are only approximate. It is in
actions that ones existence is manifested, and it cannot be denied that human beings are
extremely dynamic and complex systems. We may have found descriptions for the
definable part of human existence en-soi but, it is not possible to define that which is
never final pour-soi. The point here is that our education very well trains individuals in
grasping information, but does not kindle their minds with the desire to explore their
consciousness. Many individuals do not even have a basic vocabulary to wonder about
their being beyond their en-soi reality.
I would like to clarify here that I do not condemn conventional schooling, but I
strongly believe that there is a serious need to reevaluate our idea of education and its
objectives. We need such educational programs where examination of the outside world
and the inside, knowledge and reflection, science and poetry, epistemology and art, can
co-operate. But, it is appalling to see that understanding of ones consciousness is often
procrastinated for the reason that school children are not enlightened enough for
something as deep as that. But, then, that argument may also be insinuated for other
subjects that are taught in schools. It is astounding how students are grouped under
certain broad classes and are taught the same subjects, adjourning their individual
instincts. This commensuration makes the task of integrated education of the student
rather counterproductive. The suggestion here is to edify education to introduce new
methods of learning and growing, to be comfortable with co-existence of
incommensurable ideas, to understand that there is not just one way to be, to prevent
education from further degenerating into factories mass-producing identical individuals.
Rorty uses the term edification inspired by Gadamers interpretation of bildung and
The attempt to edify (ourselves or others) may consist in the hermeneutic
activity of making connections between our own culture and some exotic


culture or historical period, or between our own discipline and another

discipline which seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an
incommensurable vocabulary.10
Rortys views are rooted in the existentialist idea that human beings are selfcreative.

He realizes that there is apparently a conflict between the Platonic-Aristotalian

view that the only way to be edified is to know what is out there (to reflect the facts
accurately), and the view that the quest for truth is only one among many ways in which
one might be edified.11 The dynamics of a school with philosophy similar to the former
(absolutist) view would be normal or conventional. On the other hand, a school
founded on the principle of the latter kind is able to provide education that is
abnormal12 or unconventional. However, Rorty explains that the contrast between
desire for edification and desire for truth is not an expression of a conflict that needs to be
One fine example of an institution that has made self-formation its goal and has
edified education is the Krishnamurti Foundation. The schools under the foundation are
run on J. Krishnamurtis ideas on education. Krishnamurti saw the present-day education
as a complete failure as it overemphasizes technique without cultivating understanding of
life. His idea of education emphasized not only an understanding of the self but also
cultivating positive feelings and virtues like love and compassion. For him, the right kind
of education should accomplish something greater than imparting technical knowledge to
learners, that is, help them experience the integrated process of life.13 Another example
would be the Call to Care educational research initiative by Mind and Life Institute
(Massachusetts, USA). The basic objective of Call to Care is to address the limited
attention that our educational systems pay towards cultivating care what might be
called the forgotten heart of education. The motive is to nurture the development of
positive human traits like self-awareness, social awareness, care, and compassion, along
with the cultivation of intellectual skills of students. It is based on the idea that these
positive characteristics lead to engaged citizenship, healthy relationships, meaningful
employment, and human flourishing.


The program is currently in year one of


implementation with partner schools located throughout the United States and globally in
countries such as Bhutan, Israel and Vietnam.14
The problem with conventional forms of education that I have highlighted in this
article is their incapability of addressing existential concerns of the individual. Training
of students at schools is such that majority of the individuals pass most of their lives
without ever attempting to explore the depths of their consciousness and understanding
significance of their actions. Gadamers bildung and Sartres pour-soi are results of
exploration of consciousness.

Adamant methods of education have created a necessity

of possessing such-and-such knowledge to be educated that possibility of alternative

ideologies seems unlikely. It is dispiriting to see that although education was supposed to
be a liberating experience for an individual, but has ended up becoming a burden.
Factors like subject-matter or content of education are only partially responsible here.
The root problem is that the learner does not feel involved in the process.
Only the education which lets an individual grow spiritually is edifying. But
when it operates on the assumption of commensuration of identities, it hovers over as a
burdensome obligation. We must understand that the conventional system is only one of
the organized ways of education, and that there can be alternative systems, too.
Incommensurability is to be seen not as a hurdle but rather as an opening to new

As Rorty says, Incommensurability entails irreducibility but not

incompatibility...15 Synergizing technical knowledge with individuals spiritual growth

may come across as an orthodox and unnecessary idea to some. But, the hurried process
of pursuing and utilizing education has become so aggressive that spiritual development
of individuals is rather the need of the hour.
1. Charles Hummel, Aristotle PROSPECTS: The Quarterly Review of
Comparative Education, Vol. 23, No. (1993), 2, Accessed August 16, 2015.



2. Alfred North Whitehead, Aims of Education (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1967), 1
3. Use of the term spirituality in this article does not carry any religious
connotation. Given the expanse of its use in various contexts, it seems difficult to
define it but I use it in the sense of awareness of ones self in state of
immanence as well as transcendence. In state of immanence, being spiritual
would mean deeper understanding of ones consciousness, as it is. In state of
transcendence, being spiritual would refer to the exploration of ones
consciousness in experience with the world. Spiritual involvement of individuals
in their education makes them more reflective about what they are taught, and
there is better appreciation and utilization of the same.
4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Bloomsbury Academic
Publishing plc, 2013), 10
5. Ibid.
6. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (New Jersey: Princeton
University press, 1979), 316
7. J. Krishnamurti, Education and Significance of Life (New York: Harper Collins,
2010), 3, Accessed August 16, 2015, http://www.kritischestudenten.nl/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/J-Krishnamurti-Education-and-the-Significance-oflife.pdf.
8. David Carr, Making Sense of Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy and
Theory of Education and Teaching (London: Routledge, 2005), Accessed August
9. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 316
10. Ibid., 360
11. Ibid.
12. Rorty uses the term abnormal for the kind of philosophy that edifying
philosophers do - something that happens when someone joins in the discourse
who is ignorant of conventions or who sets them aside.
13. J. Krishnamurti, Education and Significance of Life, 11-12, Accessed August 16,
14. Call to Care, Mind and Life Institute, Accessed August 16, 2015,
15. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 388



Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. New Jersey: Princeton
University, 1979.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. London: Bloomsbury Academic
Publishing Plc, 2013.
Whitehead, Alfred N. The Aims of Education and Other Essays. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1967.
Carr, David. Making Sense of Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy and
Theory of Education and Teaching. London: Routledge, 2005. Accessed August


Krishnamurti, J. Education and Significance of Life. New York: Harper Collins,

Accessed August 16, 2015, http://www.kritischestudenten.nl/wp-

Hummel, Charles. Aristotle. PROSPECTS: The Quarterly Review of
Comparative Education, Vol. 23, No. , (1993): 39-51. Accessed August 16,
2015. http://www.ibe.unesco.org/publications/ThinkersPdf/aristote.pdf




Ahinpunya Mitra

The present paper will attempt to identify the mode of sublimitys relationship to
morality in its different stages of development in Kants philosophy. In his Observations
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant recognises three forms of
sublimity: the terrifying, the noble, and the splendid The disparate states of enjoyment
with horror, quiet wonder, and splendid all constitute a mode of reverence to powers
which transcend the self. The point of self-transcendence is more vividly realized in
context of sublime as moral (genuine) virtue, which consists in acting in accordance with
universal principles irrespective of our spontaneous emotional impulses. In the
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason,
sublimity is ascribed to wills determined by the moral law, that is, wills that have
transcended determination by any natural impulse. In the Critique of Judgement, Kant
shows that in case of the mathematical sublime, imagination's inadequacy to comprehend
infinity as an absolute measure is first experienced as a frustration, but then gives way to
a pleasure arising from our awareness that this inadequacy in relation to an idea of reason
exemplifies our ultimate vocationto make reason triumph over sensibility.The
experience of the "dynamically sublime" is characterized as a feeling which specifically
represents the dominion of practical reason over ordinary inclinations.

Philosophers who talk of the highest truth and the summum bonum have occasion
to revert to the question of beauty, truth-beauty-goodness being the three facets of human
life. Kants ethical theory in its rigority often looses connection with the warmth of life.
An amalgamation of his aesthetics and morality may help to achieve his ethical theory its
deserved comprehensibility. With this end in view, the present paper will attempt to trace
the development and structure of Kant's theory of the sublime in the different periods of
his philosophy and to identify the mode of sublimitys relationship to morality in these
different stages.


Immanuel Kants theory of the sublime is first articulated in his Observations on
the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, published in 1764. Kant first informs us that
the various feelings of enjoyment or of displeasure rest not so much on the constitution
of the external things that arouse them as on the feeling, intrinsic to every person, of
being touched by them with pleasure or displeasure.1 Accordingly, in order to enjoy the
appropriate states of pleasure associated to the sublime and the beautiful, we must have a
disposition for the sublime and the beautiful. Mountains with peaks above the clouds,
descriptions of raging storms, Milton's portrayal of hell, all arouse enjoyment but with
horror. In order that the enjoyment with horror could occur to us in due strength, we
must have a feeling of the sublime. Again, flower-strewn meadows, valleys with winding
brooks, or descriptions of Elysium occasion a joyful and smiling2 sensation. In order to
enjoy this joyous, smiling sensation well, we must have a feeling of the beautiful. We
experience the sublime and the beautiful as modes of finer feeling, distinct from the
feeling of a stout mans enjoyment of a coarse joke, or of a merchants enjoyment in
calculating his profits, or a mans enjoyment in finding the opposite sex as a mere
object of pleasure.
Our disposition towards the sublime is made occurrent in three characteristic
ways. Its feeling is accompanied either with a certain dread, or with quiet wonder, or with
a beauty completely pervading a sublime plan. Accordingly, there are three forms of
sublimity: the terrifying, the noble, and the splendid.3 The terrifying sublime can be
elicited by a far-reaching depth and profound loneliness, the noble by great heights and
the splendid by great buildings (such as the Pyramids).
Kant also defines the moral feeling in terms of sublimity. He describes true virtue
as sublime.4 The so-called adopted virtues, such as sympathy, pity, complaisance,
benevolence, friendliness, and honour, however amiable and beautiful, are by no means
constitutive of genuine virtue, since they are not based on principles. Being grounded on
principles renders a virtue genuine 5. Sympathy for a needy person's plight may lead us
into an act of charity that makes us forgo the repayment of a debt. Sympathetic response
here is an act of immediate impulse and does not betray genuine virtue. In this case, our



higher obligation to act from impartial principles of conduct has been sacrificed to
spontaneous emotional impulse which Kant calls natural instinct. Hence, according to
Kant, although a feeling of affection for humanity is a presupposition of virtue, true
virtue consists in a special employment of this feelingnamely acting in accordance
with universal principles irrespective of our spontaneous emotional impulses. It is,
indeed, this very subduing of immediate impulse through principle which Kant finds
sublime. In Kants own words, Now as soon as this feeling is raised to its proper
universality, it is sublime, but also colder.6
Although things as precipices, virtue, and pyramids are disparate, they all give rise
to the feeling of sublime in so far as they exercise powers of non-coercive authority over
us. The disparate states of enjoyment with horror, quiet wonder, and splendid all
constitute a mode of reverence to powers which transcend the self. Kant, in other words,
implicitly construes the sublime as occasioned by powers which transcend the self, in
some specifiable way. The point of self-transcendence is more vividly realized in context
of sublime as moral (genuine) virtue. Genuine virtue in its orientation towards the
universal, transcends personal inclination and thus exceeds our normal sensuous mode of
being. By grounding the sublime in such self-transcendence from the sensuous level of
our being to the universal, Kant is moving ahead towards establishing the link between
the aesthetic experience of the sublime the realization of moral ends.
In his Critical philosophy, Kant develops the link between sublimity and
morality broached in the Observations. In the Critical phase, Kant's first formulates his
mature theory of the sublime in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals(1785) and
the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In the Groundwork, Kant suggests that it is
freedom from dependence on interested motives which constitutes the sublimity of a
maxim 7. Sublimity is ascribed to the moral performer not in so far as he is subject to the
moral law, but in so far as, in regard to this very same law, he is at the same time its
author.8 As a predicate, sublimity is ascribed to wills determined by the moral law, that
is, wills that have transcended determination by any natural impulse (including even
sympathy). In the Critique of Practical Reason too, Kant posits sublimity in almost the



same terms. There he says that personality, which involves freedom and independence
from the mechanism of nature and the capacity for being subject to special laws (pure
practical laws given by its own reason)9, places before our eyes the sublimity of our
nature (in its vocation).10 Personality therefore consists in sublime moral consciousness.
In both the treatises on Critical ethics, then, Kant suggests that only moral consciousness
is worthy of the term sublime, for moral consciousness manifests the ultimate authority
and transcendence of our rational over our sensible being.
In the Groundwork and the second Critique, the only occasions on which Kant
uses the term sublime are in relation to the determination of the will by the moral law,
which is taken by him necessarily to involve the feeling of respect. The feeling of respect
has a complex structure. The first stage is negative. The effect which the determination of
our will by the moral law has over our feeling is inhibition. The inhibition consists in a
checking of all those inclinations to self-love and personal interest which are at odds with
the law's universality. Kant says, For all inclination and every sensuous impulse is based
on feeling, and the negative effect on feeling (through the check on the inclinations) is
itself feeling.11 Thwarting of all our inclinations and principles unwarrantably derived
from such inclinations produces a feeling that is akin to pain. The negative feeling is
then followed by a second positive stage. The checking and humiliating of our impulses
and self-conceit removes obstacles to authentic moral decision and makes it easier for
our will to be determined by the moral law on future occasions, which reinforces our
awareness that that which has destroyed our self-conceit is a manifestation of our
wholly rational supersensible self that is beyond space and time and is not subject to
mechanistic determination by natural causality.The feeling akin to pain thus serves to
elevate us with a sense of our ultimate rational vocation. 12
In his Critical ethics, Kant wishes to reserve the term sublime exclusively for the
moral domain and locates it wholly beyond the aesthetic sphere. In the Critique of
Judgement (1790), Kant deals with the sublime as an aesthetic concept and attempts to
show how pure aesthetic judgments of the sublime might contribute to the realization of
the ends of morality in the natural order. Kant extensively deals with the sublime in the



Second Book of Part I of the Critique of Judgement which is called the Analytic of the
Sublime. At the outset, he makes a contrast between the beautiful and the sublime. The
beautiful in nature is associated with the notion of form, which must consist in a kind of
limitation. The experience of sublime, however, is associated with formlessness, in the
sense of absence of limitation, provided that this absence of limits is represented together
with totality. Thus the overpowering grandeur of tempestuous ocean is felt as limitless,
but the absence of limits is also represented as totality. We call an object beautiful
because as regards its form it seems preadapted to our faculty of judgement. The sublime,
however, is ill adapted; it does violence to the imagination. We judge an object to be
sublime for the reason that we are incapable of grasping it as a whole. The sublime
object, devoid of form, contains a greater manifold of parts than our imagination can
comprehend. The sublime, in proportion as it involves absence of limits, is inadequate to
our power of imaginative representation; that is to say, it exceeds and overwhelms it.
And in so far as this absence of limits is associated with totality, the sublime can be
regarded as the exhibition of an indefinite idea of the reason. It is reason's demand for
such a presentation of totality which is operative in relation to formless objects. This
demand launches the imagination into a vain attempt to comprehend the magnitude of the
formless phenomenon in a way that leads ultimately to the suggestion of a superadded
idea of totality. The sublime is then represented as being in accord with reason,
considered as a faculty of indeterminate ideas of totality.
The sublime is not, therefore, the formless object itself, but rather the supersensible
cast of mind which, through ideas of reason, can grasp the totality suggested by such
objects. That is why Kant holds that natural objects are not themselves, strictly speaking,
sublime, but rather express and evoke a kind of sublimity in the human mind. We can
only explain the pleasure we take in the formless object in so far as the object lends
itself to the presentation of a sublimity discoverable in the mind.13 In order to judge a
thing sublime, we must seek a ground merely in ourselves and need not look for any
external ground. It is our own mind that introduces sublimity into the representation of
nature.14 A judgement about the sublime is then an aesthetic judgement. An aesthetic
judgement is one in which the representations, whatever their nature (that is, whether



sensible, aesthetic or rational) are referred or related in the judgement back to the subject
rather than to an object.
Kant calls for a division of the sublime into two kinds: the mathematical sublime
and the dynamical sublime. Kant defines mathematical sublime thus Sublime is the
name given to what is absolutely great.15 Sublime is that what is beyond all
comparison great.16 If we ascertained the quantity of our object by comparision with a
fixed unit, we could not call any object absolutely great. It would be great by comparison
with the unit or with other objects of known size. We judge an object to be absolutely
great because we are incapable of grasping the object in its totality. We are incapable of
comparing our object with others and ascertaining its objective size. We feel that we
cannot imagine that any object could be greater. Mathematically determinant judgements
ascertain objectively how great an object is, by taking other objects as the standard of
measurement. But they never judge any object to be absolutely great. For it is clear that
nothing can be given in nature, however great it may be judged to be by us, which could
not, considered in another relation, be diminished down to the infinitely small. A
mountain, for instance, may be great in comparison with any other mountain, but it will
be judged to be small when it is regarded in some other relation. The concept of the
absolutely great or of that which is great beyond all comparison is an aesthetic concept.
According to Kant, even when we assert that an object is absolutely great, there must be
some standard. However, we do not allow a suitable standard for it to be sought outside
of it, but merely within it. It is a magnitude which is equal only to itself. Kant says, that
is sublime in comparison with which all else is small.17
According to Kant, there are two methods of estimating the magnitude of
objects. The estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or algebraic
symbols) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (measured by eye) is aesthetic.
Mathematical estimation of a magnitude can progress indefinitely by simply adding one
unit to another. However, the estimation must make use of a fundamental unit as a known
quantity, which cannot be further determined. The magnitude of this irreducible
fundamental unit is to be determined by grasping it immediately (without mediation of
numerical concepts) in intuition. This is why Kant says that in the last resort all



estimates of magnitude are aesthetic. Mathematical estimation is merely progressive and

proceeds from one member of the numerical series to another by adding as many
numbers to one another as we please, without being concerned about comprehension of
the manifold. So, mathematical estimation of magnitude can never arrive at the idea of a
greatest possible object. Aesthetic estimation, on the other hand, arrives at the idea of the
absolutely great owing to the fact that it tries to comprehend the given intuitions in one
intuition. Aesthetic estimation has to grasp an object in one intuition, to represent it to
itself as a whole; and this cannot be done without a reference to the fundamental aesthetic
measure, which is to be kept present to the imagination. The greater the object the greater
must be the fundamental measure which we take as the basis of our measurement. In
order to judge the magnitude of an object aesthetically, we have to increase the measure
in accordance with the magnitude of the object. Otherwise we could not represent the
object to ourselves intuitively. Imagination will at first try out easily comprehended
measures such as a foot or a perch, but is then driven to find larger units as a measure for
them, and then still larger units as a measure for these, and so on and so on. Now this
cannot go on indefinitely. The more the measure is increased the more difficult it is for
the imagination to grasp it in one intuition, and a point is soon reached which the
imagination cannot exceed. This is the absolute measure beyond which no greater is
possible subjectively. Imagination arrives at infinity itself as the only appropriate
measure. When the absolute measure is reached by the imagination, we believe that there
is given to us in intuition an object which possesses infinite magnitude. Now from the
first Critique we know that there is only one faculty of the mind which is concerned with
the absolute or infinite, namely, reason. We also know that reason makes every object
subject to its idea of totality. So when we feel that there is an absolutely great object
given to us in its totality, we are reminded of the principle of reason. The mere ability to
think the absolutely great indicates a faculty of the mind transcending every standard of
sense, thereby evidencing the superiority of our rational over our sensible being. We are
thus led to the idea of the sublime. Thus Kant says, The sublime is that, the mere
capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of
sense. 18



According to Kant, our judgement about the sublime is accompanied by a feeling of

respect for our objects. Respect is the feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea that is
a law for us. 19 The feeling of respect is a complex feeling of pain and pleasure. The
feeling of sublime is a feeling of pain when we become conscious of the inadequacy of
our imagination to make aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of certain sensible objects
and our inability to conform to reasons demand that we should recognize as the supreme
measure nothing but the totality of the world, i.e. our inability to conform to the idea of
absolute totality. The judging subject becomes in that way aware of its limitations as a
sensuous being. But in becoming aware of this incompetence of its imagination the
subject refers to its rational faculty, which gives it a standard compared with which every
sensible standard is infinitely small. The subject feels that as a rational being it is
infinitely superior even to the greatest natural object. He takes pleasure in the realization
that every standard of sensibility falls short of the ideas of reason. To become aware of
the incapacity of the imaginations ever conforming to ideas of reason gives pleasure to a
rational being. It makes us alive to our supersensible destiny. We feel raised above the
world of sense. It is not necessary that the subject be conscious or aware of a temporal
passage between the pain and pleasure of sublimity, however. Indeed, Kant elsewhere
suggests that the mental movement is constituted by a simultaneous attraction and
repulsion. This could be described as an upward/downward vibration downward
because of the humiliation of the sensible faculty, and upward because of the pleasant
awareness of the supersensible nature that accompanies this humiliation.
According to Kants Critical philosophy, human beings are defined by their
rational vocation, that is, their capacity to think or act independently of natural causality
and in accordance with their own idea of laws. The pursuit of reason is a law for us, in
so far as we are true to our ultimate vocation. Our feeling of the sublime as the awareness
of the supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side over the greatest faculty
of sensibility


exemplifies our ultimate vocationto make reason triumph over

sensibility. We become aware that we are beings with capacities that transcend the
limitations of our finite phenomenal existence. The mind feels itself empowered to pass
beyond the narrow confines of sensibility. 21 Indeed a judgement of the sublime is able



to induce a temper of mind conformable to that which the influence of definite

(practical) ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord with it. 22 On these
terms the judgement of sublime produces a state of feeling analogous to the effect
produced by morality, and this makes it conducive to morality.
Next we proceed to Kants discussion of the dynamical sublime. The dynamically
sublime is an object which seems to the judging subject to possess infinite power.
According to Kant, nature can count as a power, thus as dynamically sublime, only in so
far as it is considered an object of fear. In representing the object to ourselves we feel that
even to try to offer any resistance to it is quite impossible. The object is thought to be
infinitely superior to ourselves. However, according to Kant, if we are to judge an object
to be dynamically sublime, we must not be in an actual state of fear. For a person in
actual fear can no more play the part of a judge of the sublime of nature than someone
who is captivated by inclination and appetite is able to judge the beautiful. He flees from
the sight of an object filling him with dread, and it is impossible to take delight in terror
that is seriously entertained. To experience the dynamically sublime we must be in a
position of safety. The boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, the high waterfall of
some mighty river, and the like, make our power of resistance of trifling moment in
comparison with their might. But, provided our own position is secure, their aspect is all
the more attractive for its fearfulness.23
The feeling of the sublime arises in us when we judge the object in such a way
that we merely think of the case in which we might wish to resist it and think that in that
case all resistance would be completely futile. We must not actually be in such a
situation. We consider the object as fearful without being afraid of it. Thus the virtuous
man fears God without being afraid of Him, because he does not think of the case of
wishing to resist God and His commands as anything that is worrisome for him. But since
he can imagine a situation where he would be in such a state through some futile attempt
to resist the Divine Will, he recognizes God as one to be feared.
The experience of the dynamical sublime is produced by the experience of vast
forces in nature. Drawing from a traditional eighteenth-century list, Kant mentions some
of these forces: bold, overhanging, threatening cliffs; thunder clouds towering up into the



heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder; violent
volcanoes; devastating hurricanes; the boundless ocean set into a rage; a lofty waterfall
on a mighty river. The irresistibility of these mights of nature forces upon us the
recognition of our physical helplessness as beings of nature. At the same time, however,
the experience of our insignificance in relation to such physical forces also leads us to the
realization that there is another force in us, which gives us the faculty of practical reason
and the freedom of the will. This force gives us a value that cannot be damaged even by
forces which would suffice for our physical destruction. So judgements about the
dynamically sublime, like the judgements about the mathematically sublime, also rest
upon two conditions. The object which we judge sublime, through the irresistibility of its
power makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical powerlessness. But
at the same time the object reveals a capacity for judging ourselves independent of
nature. We feel that there is within us a faculty infinitely superior to nature, whereby the
humanity in our person remains undemeaned even though the mortal men must submit to
that domain. Nature may deprive us of everything (of all our worldly goods, health and
life), but it has no power over our moral personality. The feeling of our physical
inferiority excites a feeling of our moral superiority. To quote Kant, we readily call
these objects sublime, because they raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar
commonplace, and discover within us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which
gives us the courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of
nature.24 Therefore, nature is, here, called sublime merely because it raises the
imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of
the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, even above nature.



once more it becomes clear that sublimity is not contained in anything in nature. It
belongs to the human mind alone. We call things sublime on the ground that they make
us feel the sublimity of our own minds. Sublimity, strictly speaking, is only a state of our
mind brought about by the contemplation of the natural phenomena that we call sublime.
Kant believes that our experience of the dynamically sublime, like our experience
of the mathematically sublime, produces a mixture of pain and pleasure, which is even
closer to the moral feeling of respect. The pain is felt because our imagination presents to



itself the infinite superiority of nature, the pleasure because this makes us think of our
existence as rational beings, of the pre-eminence of our rational nature over physical
nature even in its immeasurability. Thus in the case of the dynamically sublime, it is not
that imagination cannot get a grip, but that we are fearful of destruction and what Kant
thinks redeems the situation is the thought of the power of righteousness, a power which
no natural nor supernatural force can overcome. Again it is an idea of reason, this time of
practical reason, which helps out in the face of something affronting to sensibility and
this time it is practical sensibility. Kants thought here seems to suggest that in
confronting the sublime the noumenal self shows itself competent to the task to which the
phenomenal self profoundly feels itself to be inadequate.
Unlike the mathematical sublime, the dynamical sublime plays a much more
direct role in the context of an awareness of our moral existence. When beholding mighty
natural objects from a position of safety we recognize them to be fearful, we are faced
with the challenge to imagine situations where, even in the face of possible destruction
by the mighty object, we would remain unflinching going against our natural inclinations
to be

overwhelmed by fears pertaining to our physical well-being and safety, and

through our courageous moral bearing, would refute its (and thereby nature's) claim to
dominion over us. We would then be acting on principles of moral conduct which testify
to our true vocation as rational supersensible beings.
The theme of the sublime is a crucial factor in the very constitution of Kant's
ethical philosophy. Kant recognized that moral motivation (doing something simply
because it is right, out of respect for the law prescribed by our own rationality) required
an impulse from feeling in order to be effectual as motivation without linking it to natural
motives. He found this source in the sublime. In feeling the sublime we experience a
feeling that is, like the moral feeling of respect, contrary to sensible interests. The
sublime prepares us to esteem something even against our self-centered interests. Such
habituation can help us act out of moral respect when the right time comes.




1. Immanuel Kant, Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime, trans.
Patrik Frierson & Paul Guyer (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 13
2. Ibid., 16
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 22
5. Ibid., 24
6. Ibid., 23
7. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton
(New York, Harper & Row, 1964), 106
8. Ibid., 107
9. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1949), 193
10. Ibid., 194
11. Ibid., 181
12. Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime: from Morality to Art, ( Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1989) , 23
13. Immanuel Kant,, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith,
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952), 92
14. Ibid., 93
15. Ibid., 94
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. 97
18. Ibid. 98
19. Ibid., 105
20. Ibid., 106
21. Ibid., 103
22. Ibid., 104
23. Ibid., 110-11
24. Ibid., 111
25. Ibid.

Ahinpunya Mitra, Aesthetics :East and West: A Comparative Study of
Anandavardhana and Kant, ( New Delhi, Readworthy Publications, 2014



Immanuel Kant, Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime, trans.
Patrik Frierson & Paul Guyer (Cambridge University Press, 2011)
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton
(New York, Harper & Row, 1964)
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1949)
Immanuel Kant,, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith,
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952)
Jeffrey Barnouw, The Morality of the Sublime: Kant and Schiller , Studies in
Romanticism, Vol. 19, No. 4, , 1980.
Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime: from Morality to Art, ( Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1989)
Paul Guyer, Feeling and Freedom: Kant on Aesthetics and Morality, The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1990.
Robert R. Clewis, The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom,
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.




Reni Pal
Environmental ethics and feminism are two hotly debated contemporary issues in the
field of moral philosophy. Just like environmentalism, the womens movement became
established as a worldwide influence since the 1960s. A particular type of feminism is
ecofeminism, which was its origin to the relationship between women and nature.
Ecofeminism is a merger of ecological movement and feminist movement. In 1991 the
World Bank declared that women took significant role in preserving natural resources
like water, soil, forest, energy etc and they had sufficient knowledge about their
surrounding environment. In daily life from preparing food to cosmetics, even in case of
treatment women depend on the natural environment much more than men. Both nature
and women are exploited, deprived and dominated by men. During the last two decades,
Indian women have participated prominently in environmental struggles at the grassroots
level. There are several brands of ecofeminism like Liberal Ecofeminism, Radical
Ecofeminism, Social Ecofeminism, and Socialist Ecofeminism. The ultimate goal of
ecofeminism is to restore the natural environment and quality of life for people and other
living and nonliving inhabitants of the planet.

Ethical inquiry is of two kinds theoretical and practical. Applied ethics is that
branch of ethics, which deals directly with questions of moral practice, rather than
questions of ethical theory. It is central to the whole of philosophical thought as it
highlights the practical consequences of ideas about the nature of life and human thought.
Environmental ethics and feminism are two hotly debated contemporary issues in
the field of moral philosophy. The problem of environmental ethics is closely connected
with the relation between man and nature, especially mans relation with the
environment. Awareness of environmental problems gathered momentum since late
1960s. Just like environmentalism, the womens movement became established as a
world-wide influence since the 1960s. The 1960s saw the Womens Liberation
Movement which was a protest against the inequality they faced vis--vis man. It was in
the late nineteenth century that womens movements emerged in the West demanding


greater educational opportunities, rights to income and property, right to employment and
right to vote.
Within the womens movement there is a wide range of groups and ideologies. A
particular type of feminism is ecofeminism which was its origin to the relationship
between women and nature. Ecofeminism is a merger of ecological movement and
feminist movement. Though the term ecofeminism was coined by the French feminist
Francoise d Eaubonne in 1974, it became popular only in the context of numerous
protests and activities against environmental destruction.
The relation between nature and gender, especially women has become an important
issue. Mainly from the beginning of 1970s the very concept of the connection between
gender and nature started to spread among people. In the 1980s this equation demanded
attention of the government and the policy-makers. In 1991 the World Bank declared that
women took significant role in preserving natural resources like water, soil, forest, energy
etc and they had sufficient knowledge about their surrounding environment. The role of
women started to achieve importance regarding the environmental issues. According to
the environmentalists, women have direct links with the natural environment, more so
than men and they realize the nature in a far better way than men. This is possible
because of the following reasons:
1. In daily life from preparing food to cosmetics, even in case of treatment women
depend on the natural environment much more than men. Women are more
conscious about the food value of green vegetables and herbs than men and so
they try to keep those in daily menu. Women like to depend more on herbal
cosmetics and they prefer homeopathy and ayurvedic treatment rather than
2. Instead of regarding the forest as having a commercial value, rural women of
Third World Countries set it as a source of domestic needs. Women are the
gatherers of the three basic Fs fuel, food and fodder. The term fuelwood
means a wide variety of materials used for burning such as twigs, leaves, dry
grass, straw, animal dung etc. A common understanding of fuelwood collection is


that it causes deforestation. However, since women mostly collect dead wood,
their work does not damage the trees. Forest is also a source of food supply.
While men hunt forest animals, women collect a variety of foods such as fruits,
nuts, leaves, bark, roots, fungi, honey etc. The collection of animal fodder is also
usually done by the women. They collect leaves, branches, grass etc. to feed
domestic animals which are kept for their meat and milk. Forest products are also
used by women to make such household items as bowls, spoons, brushes, rope,
mats and baskets. Many plants are also collected for medicinal purposes. Village
women play an important role as both water suppliers and water managers. It is
the women who have knowledge of the location, reliability and quality of the
local water sources.
3. In the developing countries about 90% women are attached with agricultural work
and are dependent on land or any other natural resources for livelihood. Though
mostly men are the owners of land, it is the women who protect and give labour in
that land. Women greatly depend on nature, and their responsibility about the
nature is greater than men. Even the mentality of women about the use of natural
resources is different from that of men. Women always prefer to secure the
natural resources for the use of their future generations while men give stress on
its present monetary value.
4. Mainly in the Third World countries women are not given the right to buy land or
property. But it is mostly the women who are engaged in preservation of nature
and in prevention of the depletion of natural resources.
5. According to the ecofeminists like Carolyn Merchant, Bandana Shiva the most
significant point regarding the relation between nature and women is that both
nature and women are in the marginal positions from the economic perspective.
Both are considered as the exploitable resources and both are the victims of
existing patriarchy.
Over the last two decades ecofeminism as a social issue emerged when feminists got
interested in environmentalism and it is a platform where environmentalism and
feminism become blended with each other. The feminists of the Western countries first


marked the supremacy of men and exclusion of women in the environmental discourse.
Their objectives were as follows:
a. The place of women in the environmental struggle is to be ascertained.
b. The experience of women is to be utilized in the environmental struggle.
c. The traditional gender discrimination is to be eradicated through it.
No particular definition of ecofeminism is built yet. Bandana Shiva and Maria
Mies seek to build a theory from the practical experiences of Third World Women at the
grassroots level. These experiences are two-fold: (a) The impact of marginalization
caused by the depletion of natural resources along with dislocation due to development
project, and

(b) alternative strategies of survival as resistance to development. They

focus on a materialist understanding of society to alter the current exploitative paradigm

which is sustained and legitimized by patriarchy. For them an ecofeminist perspective
propounds the need for a new cosmology and a new anthropology which recognizes that
life in nature (which includes human beings) is maintained by means of co-operative,
mutual love and care.
According to Val Plumwood, it has been stereotyped that nature and women are
theoretically weak and doubtfully liberated. The problem lies in the epistemic concept of
dualism embedded in the masculine knowledge system, which constructs difference
using a hierarchical logic. This dualism views both women and men as damaged or
distorted. With an ecofeminist position, it is possible to recognize human identity as
continuous with nature and not alien to it. All ecofeminist positions reject the assumed
inferiority of women and nature as opposed to the superiority of reason, humanity and
Ecofeminism draws attention regarding two points as follows:
1. Both nature and women are exploited, deprived and dominated by men. Because
development, in the conventional sense, is Eurocentric with its focus on
increasing economic growth which is sought to be secured by large-scale
industrialization and ever-increasing mechanization. This demands ample


geographical space, colonies which are not possible without hampering nature
sacrificing natural resources. On the other hand, women are likely oppressed by
men. Both women and nature are treated as object of enjoyment. So there is a
vertical relationship between nature and women.
2. Women and nature depend on each other. As women depend on the natural
environments to meet most of their material needs much more than men, a
proximity is built between them. The source of power of both women and nature
is productivity. Women have a particular connection to nature through their
experience of the production of life. Women conceived of their own bodies as
being productive in the same way as they conceived of external nature being so.
So here we can see a horizontal relationship between women and nature.
Although ecofeminism emerged in several countries at around the same time, it did not
represent a homogeneous idea. There are several brands of ecofeminism.
Liberal Ecofeminism:
Liberal Ecofeminism has its roots in liberalism. The political theory that
incorporates the scientific analysis that nature is composed of atoms moved by external
forces, with a theory of human nature that views humans as individual rational agents
who maximize their own self-interest, and capitalism as the optimal economic structure
for human progress. [1] Liberal feminists argue that women are as much rational agents
as men are, and given proper educational and economic opportunities they can realize
their own potential for creativity in all spheres of human life. Liberal feminists, having an
ecological perspective, are of the opinion that environmental problems are caused by
overuse and misuse of natural resources on the one hand, and, on the other, by the failure
to regulate environmental pollutants. To solve this problem the liberal ecofeminists
suggest: Given equal educational opportunities to become scientists, natural resource
managers, regulators, lawyers, and legislators, women like men can contribute to the
improvement of the environment, the conservation of natural resources, and the higher
quality of human life. Women, therefore, can transcend the social stigma of their biology
and join men in the cultural project of environmental conservation. [2]


Radical Ecofeminism:
Radical Ecofeminism developed in the late 1960s, with the second wave of
feminism. It is a response to the view that women and nature are mutually associated and
deprived in Western culture. Here the assertion is that women have a biological affinity
with nature by virtue of their nurturant energies. However, the scientific revolution of the
seventeenth century degraded nature by regarding the nurturing Earth as a machine to be
mastered and dominated by male-developed and controlled technology, science and
industry. Radical feminists are of the opinion that an emerging patriarchal culture in
prehistory had dethroned the mother Goddesses and made female deities subservient to
male gods. As a protest against this, radical ecofeminists are strongly of the opinion that
if men have sky or sun gods, why should women not have their moon or earth goddesses?
Goddess worship and rituals are attempts to treat nature and women as powerful forces.
From historical and cultural perspective women seem to be closer to nature because of
their physiology, psychology and social roles. Physiologically women bring forth life like
nature undergoing the pleasure and pain of pregnancy, childbirth and nursing. Although
men are viewed as more rational with greater capacity for abstract thinking, women are
really seen to have greater emotional capacities than men with greater ties to the
particular. Socially men take the responsibility of child rearing and domestic jobs which
make them closer to the hearth and out of the workplace. Some ecologists call radical
ecofeminism as cultural ecofeminism.
According to cultural feminists, human nature is grounded in human biology.
These ecofeminists opine that the perceived connection between women and biological
reproduction is cited as a source of womens empowerment and ecological activism. [3]
The activities of the cultural ecofeminists are implicitly motivated by the connection
between womens reproductive biology (nature) and the male-designed and produced
technology (culture). In this ground cultural ecofeminism is criticized by other feminists
having the defect of essentializing the sexual identity of both women and men. It also
lacks a serious analysis of capitalism. So it can not be an effective strategy for change.



Carolyn Merchant describes aptly the environmentalism of radical ecofeminists.

These ecofeminists argue that male-designed and produced technologies neglect the
effects of nuclear radiation, pesticides, hazardous waste sites near schools and homes as
permeating soil and drinking water and contributing to miscarriage, birth defects, and
leukemia. They object to pesticides and herbicides being sprayed on crops and forests as
potentially affecting children and child-bearing women living near them. Women
frequently spearhead local actions against spraying and power plant siting and organize
others to demand toxic cleanups. When coupled with an environmental ethic that values
rather than degrades nature, such actions have the potential both for raising womens
consciousness of their own oppression and for the liberation of nature from the polluting
effects of industrialization.[4]
Social Ecofeminism:
Social ecofeminism admits that the idea of dominating nature stems from the
domination of humans by humans. It aims to liberate women by overturning economic
and social hierarchies. It envisions a society of decentralized communities which
transcend the public private dichotomy essential to capitalist production and the
bureaucratic state. Women emerge as free participants in public life and in local
municipal workplaces. Social ecofeminists criticize cultural or radical ecofeminism for
the following reasons. According to social feminists, radical feminism rejects rationality
by worshipping Mother Goddesses. Moreover social feminists claim that radical
feminists wrongly biologize and essentialize the caretaking and nurturing traits assigned
by patriarchy by women.
Socialist Ecofeminism:
In socialist ecofeminism environmental problems are regarded as the cause of
capitalist patriarchy and the ideology that nature can be exploited for human progress
through technology. Historically, the growth of capitalism has destroyed subsistencebased agriculture and cottage industries in which production was made mainly for
consumption instead of market and men and women were economic partners. The rise of



capitalist economy with its mills and factories paved for the men to get jobs in these mills
and womens labour got confined to household chores. Thus womens home keeping
labour remains in the market place. In capitalism, both women and nature are exploited
by men.
Socialist ecofeminists in general and Marxist ecofeminists in particular, regard
nature as the material basis of human life, supplying the basic necessities, i.e., food,
clothing, shelter and energy. They give stress on the materialism instead of spiritualism
as the driving force of social change. Socialist ecofeminism regards society-nature
relationship as dynamic, interactive and dialectical.
Socialist ecofeminists are actively involved in ecological struggles of workingclass women and all subaltern classes and castes. Their ultimate goal is the establishment
of a socialist state which would provide everybody a high quality of life by developing
sustainable, non-dominating relations with nature.
Socialist ecofeminists focus on the reproduction of life which is both biological
and social. They define reproductive freedom according to the demands of Third World
Womens groups (i.e., equal access to employment, equal pay, child care centers, social
security etc.) so that women can choose whether to have children, when to have children
and in what number to have children. Socialist feminist environmental theory gives both
reproduction and production central places.
Relevance of Ecofeminism in India:
While ecofeminism emerged among white women in the North in 1970s, it
emerged in the South a decade later. During the last two decades, Indian women have
participated prominently in environmental struggles at the grassroots level. The
ecofeminist movement has been a convergence of feminist and environmental
movements. In India the most prominent ecofeminist is Vandana Shiva, who in one of her
most influential work Staying Alive (1989) wrote: Third World women are bringing the
concern with living and survival back to center-stage in human history. In recovering the
chances for the survival of all life, they are laying the foundation for the recovery of the


feminine principle in nature and society, and through it the recovery of the earth as
sustainer and provider.[5]
Ecofeminism challenges the concept of development and Enlightenment and thus
finds itself closer to a Gandhian legacy than the Nehruvian passion for modernization.
The modern agricultural technologies with their focus on high-yielding variety crops
have given rise to monocultures which destroy biodiversity. Monoculture is also
practiced in animal and plant breeding through genetic engineering with a consequent
loss of diversity of animal and plant life. All this is done on the name of development
and modern science which is Euro-centric, growth-oriented and ecologically
unsustainable. This development (Vandana Shiva prefers to call it maldevelopment) and
science are the twin pillars of the model of modernity imposed by the North on the whole
globe. This Eurocentric development is actually maldevelopment because at the heart of
this development is violence, a violation of both nature and women.
As against the patriarchal world-view on which rests the process of
maldevelopment, Shiva upholds the feminine world-view, as presented by the Chipko
movement which was initiated in 1960s and became popular in 1970s. She worked with
Gandhian activists when she took part in the Chipko Andolan in Garhwal. Following
Maria Mies, Shiva argues that women have a special relationship with nature through
their experience of the production of life. The interaction of women with nature is a
reciprocal process.
As demands for community participation in sustainable development gathered
widespread support through popular movements in 1970s, many governments in the
South made laws to encourage peoples participation in specific areas and sectors. Since
1980s a good number of womens organizations, in various parts of the world,
particularly in the South, have taken a leading role in regenerating natural resources
land, water and forests. Today, various case studies on womens proactive role in ecoregeneration are available. Let us take, for example, the womens Samitis of Bankura
district of West Bengal.



In May 1980, the government of West Bengal organized a Reorientation Camp

for Migrant Women Agricultural Labourers at Jhilimili, a village in Ranibandh Block of
Bankura District. Ranibandh is one of the least developed areas of Bankura with a large
concentration of tribal population which depended for centuries on the forest for their
livelihood. As per the forest policy of the government, merchants and contractors has
access to the forest which caused widespread tree-felling and soil erosion destroying the
natural hydrology of the forest. At the same time the tribals were deprived from their
customary rights to collect the forest produce. As a result of the wide deforestation
droughts became a frequent phenomenon. Thousands of men, women and children had to
take recourse to seasonal migration to the nearby districts. As seasonal labourers women
had to work under horrible conditions with very low wages. They were often subject to
sexual molestation by the employer or his recruiting agents.
At the Reorientation Camp, the women put demands for restoration of their right
of access to forest produce and for employment in their own area. West Bengals
Minister for Land Revenue and Land Reform was present there and he regarded these
demands as quite legitimate. Finding a favourable response from the government, about
30 women who had joined the Jhilimili Camp, formed an organization of their own,
namely the mahila samiti. Within nine months, three such samitis were formed. With the
help of co-operative state officials at the district level and the local Panchayat Samiti,
three different types of activities were initiated for these mahila samitis. The samiti of
Jhilimili was given an agency by the local Forest Cooperative to organize the collection
of kendu leaves (used for making bidis) and sal seeds. The samiti at Chendapathar started
producing plates and cups from sal leaves. The third group at Bhurkura was given seven
acres of wasteland which is to be converted into a plantation of Asan and Arjun trees on
which tussar silk worms could be reared. The Bankura Samitis, thus, have evolved from
spontaneous group activity to a widespread movement of wasteland reclamation and ecogeneration.



Similar examples can be given not only from other parts of this country but also
from various other countries of the South to show that women are as capable as men in
acting as proactive agents of social change and sustainable development.
In the conclusion it can be said that the ultimate goals of several brands of
ecofeminism differ in various issues. But there is perhaps more unity than diversity in
womens common goal of restoring the natural environment and quality of life for people
and other living and nonliving inhabitants of the planet.
1. Merchant, Carolyn (1990).

Ecofeminism and Feminist theory.

In Irene

Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (Eds.), Reweaving the World. San
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 100.
2. Merchant, Carolyn (1990).

Ecofeminism and Feminist theory.

In Irene

Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (Eds.), Reweaving the World. San
Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 101.
3. Datar, Chhaya (2011). Ecofeminism Revisited: Introduction to the Discourse.
New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 11.
4. Merchant, Carolyn (1990).

Ecofeminism and Feminist theory.

In Irene

Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (Eds.), Reweaving the World. San
Francisco: Sierra Club Books,102.
5. Shiva, Vandana (1989). Staying Alive. London: Zed Books Ltd., 224.




Desh Raj Sirswal
The title of the present paper might arouse some curiosity among the minds of the
readers. The very first question that arises in this respect is whether India produced any
logic in the real sense of the term as has been used in the West. This paper is centered
only on the three systems of Indian philosophy namely Nyya, Buddhism and Jainism.
We have been talking of Indian philosophy, Indian religion, Indian culture and Indian
spirituality, but not that which are of more fundamental concepts for any branch of
knowledge whether it is social sciences or humanities. No aspect of human life and the
universe has been left unexamined by Indian philosophers, and this leads to a totality of
vision in both philosophical and psychological fields. In this paper we will discuss the
main thinkers, sources and main concepts related to Indian Logic.


Philosophy in India has been called Darsana, which means vision, insight, intuition,
and these words itself signifies that Indian philosophers pursued the quest of having a
total vision of life and universe, based on personal experience, and not on a limited place
of modern methodology.1 There have been a good number of divergent philosophical
systems (six Aastika systems, Buddhist, Jains & Carvaka). But there is a common current
of idealism and spiritualism running through all of these. Wemost of the discussions on
Indian philosophy leave the Carvaka system (Indian Materialism) which does not survive
and of which only references are traceable. In the Nasadiya Sukta of the Rigveda contains
ontological speculation in terms of various logical divisions that were later recast
formally as the four circles of catuskoti: A, not A, A and not A, and not A and not
not A. This is the most ancient expression of Indian Logic.
The development of Indian logic can be said to date back to the anviksiki of Medhatithi
Gautama (c. 6th century BCE); the Sanskrit grammar rules of Pnini (c. 5th century
BCE); the Vaisheshika schools analysis of atomism (c. 2nd century BCE); the analysis



of inference by Gotama (c. 2nd century BCE), founder of the Nyya school of Indian
philosophy; and the Tetralemma of Ngrjuna (c. 2nd century CE). Indian logic stands as
one of the three original traditions of logic, alongside the Greek and Chinese traditions.
According to Matilal, logic as the study of the form of correct arguments and inference
patterns, develop in India from the methodology of philosophical debate. The art of
conducting a philosophical debate was prevalent probably as the time of the Buddha and
the Mahvir, but it became more systematic and methodological a few hundred years
later.2 He defines Indian logic as the systematic study of informal inference-patterns, the
rules of debate, the identification of sound inference via-a-vis sophistical argument and
similar topics. 3
Medhatithi Gautama

founded the anviksiki school of logic. The Mahabharata

(12.173.45), around the 5th century BCE, refers to the anviksiki and tarka schools of
logic. Pnini developed a form of logic which had some similarities to Boolean logic for
his formulation of Sanskrit grammar. Logic is described by Chanakya (c. 350-283 BCE)
in his Arthashastra as an independent field of inquiry anviksiki. Now we will discuss the
above mentioned philosophies in reference to their sources, logicians and logical
speculations. These are as follows:
The principal interests of the philosophers of the Nyya school are epistemology and
philosophical method. These are the philosophers who most forcefully advocate the socalled pramana method as a method for rational inquiry. The main philosophers and texts
in early Nyya are Nyyasutr by Gautama Akaspad (c. AD 150); Nyyabhasya
commentary on Nyyasutr by Vatsyayana (c. AD 450) ; Nyyavrttika commentary on
Nyayabhasya by Uddyotakara (c. AD 600); Nyyamajari an independent work on
Nyya by

Jayanta (c. AD 875); Nyyavarttikatatparyatika commentary on







Nyyakusumajali, and other treatises by Udayana (AD. 9751050).




Navya-Nyya, the new Nyya is a philosophical system inve nted by Gangesa
Upadhyaya (c. AD 1325). It tries to find solutions to many of the criticisms that the early
Nyaya conception of rational inquiry were confronted with by the sceptics. Raghunatha
Siromani (c. AD 1500) revolutionised the teachings and methods of the school. Both he
and his great follower, Gadadhara Bhattacharya (c. AD 1650) wrote short independent
tracts on particular philosophical problems and concepts.
Gangeas book Tattvacintmani dealt with all the important aspects of Indian
philosophy, logic, set theory, and especially epistemology, which Gangea examined
rigorously, developing and improving the Nyya scheme, and offering examples. The
results, especially his analysis of cognition, were taken up and used by other daranas.
Navya-Nyya developed a sophisticated language and conceptual scheme that allowed it
to raise, analyse, and solve problems in logic and epistemology. It systematized all the
Nyya concepts into four main categories: sense or perception (pratyaka), inference
(anumna), comparison or similarity (upamna), and testimony (sound or word; abda).
Jainism made its own unique contribution to this mainstream development of logic by
also occupying itself with the basic epistemological issues, namely, with those
concerning the nature of knowledge, how knowledge is derived, and in what way
knowledge can be said to be reliable. Jain logic developed and flourished from 6th
Century BCE to 17th Century CE. Important Jaina philosophers include Siddhasena
Divkara (c. AD 700) Haribhadra Suri (c. AD 750) Hemacandra (c. AD 1150), Mallisena
(c. AD 1290), Yasovijaya (c. AD 1624-88), Kundakund (2nd century AD). Their belief in
the principles of tolerance, harmony and rapprochement lead them to a philosophy of
pluralism in metaphysics and ethics and to perspectivalism in epistemology and
semantics. Jainas main texts include: Pacstikyasra (Essence of the Five Existents),
the Pravacanasra (Essence of the Scripture) and the Samayasra (Essence of the


Doctrine) by Kundakunda; Tattvrthastra by Umsvti or Umasvami ;Nyyvatra (on

Logic) and Sanmatistra (dealing with the seven Jaina standpoints, knowledge and the
objects of knowledge) by Siddhasena Divkara;addaranasamuccaya and Yogabindu by
Haribhadra; Yogastra and Trishashthishalakapurushacharitra by Hemacandra.
Indian Buddhist logic (called Pramana) flourished from about 500 CE up to 1300 CE.
Ngrjunas of Madhyamik school (c. AD 150) interpretation of the teachings of the
Buddha was called the Doctrine of the Middle Way. He argues that all philosophical and
scientific theories are empty of content. He is a severe critic of the Pramanamethod for
conducting rational inquiry, and he claims instead that the only way to reason is by
exposing incoherences within the fabric of ones conceptions. Candrakirti (c. AD 600) is
an influential exponent and interpreter of Ngrjuna.
The three main authors of Buddhist logic are Vasubandhu (c. AD 400 - 800), Dignga (c.
AD 480 - 540), and Dharmakrti (c. AD 600 - 660). The most important theoretical
achievements are the doctrine of Trairpya

and the highly formal scheme of the

Hetucakra (Wheel of Reasons) given by Dignga. He is form Yogacra Buddhism and

his great follower Dharmakirti (c. AD 625) interpreted the teachings of the Buddha in a
very different directions, as a kind of idealism. There is a still living tradition of Buddhist
logic in the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, where logic is an important part of the education
of monks.
The members of this school were brilliant logicians and made many important advances
in philosophical theory. Although they are idealists, they are also advocates of the
pramna method as the correct way of investigating and resolving philosophical
problems. They disagree with the Nyya about almost every matter of philosophical
substance, but because they share a common approach to the rational resolution of
philosophical dilemmas, the encounter between the two schools is fascinating and is an
important axis in the evolution of Indian philosophical thought. The main text of
Buddhist logic include:Mulamadhyamakakrik (The Middle Stanzas) by Ngrjuna;


Vigrahavyvartani (Reply to Critics) by Ngrjuna; Prasannapad by Candrakirti;

Pramnasamuccaya (Collection on Knowing) by Dignga

; Alambanapariks

(Examination of Supports) by Dignga; Hetucakradamaru (Chart of Reasons) by

Dignga; Pramavrttika (Commentary on Knowing), by Dharmakirti;Nyyabindu by
Dharmakirti ; Vdanyya, by Dharmakirti.
Main Concepts of Indian Logic
Logic developed in ancient India from the tradition of Vdavidy, a discipline dealing
with the categories of debate over various religious, philosophical, moral, and doctrinal
issues. There are so many concepts that are the central to Indian systems of logic. But
mainly it is concerned with pramanas as we said earlier. Nyya deals with inference.
Inference is a form of mediate knowledge of knowing something by knowing something
else. The Nyya school of thought is better known for its extensive works in logic and on
argumentation. The widely used terminology for inference is anumna. Anumna
literally means after knowledge. Nyya tradition calssifies different types of anumna.
First of all, it is said that anumna can be of two types:

1. Svarthanumna (For the sake of oneself): In this, inference drawn in ones own
mind as a result of repeated observation earlier. You see the smoke on the
mountain top and in your own mind you draw the conclusion that there must be
fire at the top. It is rather causal process.

Pararthanumna (For the sake of others): When in a dialectical or debate

situation where you have to prove what you inferred and also show how you have
inferred it. It is not an informal matter. It requires demonstration of the inferential
process as well as the evidence or ground for making the inference.4

The Nyya system holds that true cognition (pram, yathrthnubhava) is of four kinds:
(1) perceptual (pratyaksa), (2) inferential (anumiti), (3) analogical (upamiti), and verbal
(sabda). According to the Nyya logic, the proper formulation of your inference should
have five parts.



The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by

moving from particular to particular via generality. (1) the statement of the thesis of
inference, (2) stating the reason or evidence for this thesis, (3) citing an example is such
that it is well accepted by others, (4) application of the present observation to the
generalization, and (5) conclusion or assertion that the statement of the thesis has been
proven.5 It has five steps, as in the example shown:
There is fire on the hill (called Pratij, required to be proved)
Because there is smoke there (called Hetu, reason)
Wherever there is fire, there is smoke (called Udaharana, ie, example) as in a
There is smoke on the hill (called Upanaya, reaffirmation)
Therefore there is fire on the hill (called Nigamana, conclusion)
In Nyya terminology for this example, the hill would be called as paksha (minor term),
the fire is called as sadhya (major term), the smoke is called as hetu, and the relationship
between the smoke and the fire is called as Vyapti(middle term). The concern clearly was
to promote the notion and practice of a good debate, and to differenticate it from the
pointless, destructive debates. In Nyyasutra, three kinds of debtates were identified by

Good debate or Vda in which the proof and refutation of thesis and
antithesis are based on proper evidence (pramna) and with contradicting
any background or already established assumptions (siddhnta).


Devious or sly debate , or Jalpa, in which the proof and refutation use unfair,
measures such as hair-splitting empty pedantry (chala), false rejoinders (jati)
and defeat situations (nigrahasthna).


Purely destructive or refutation-only debate or Vitanda, in which no positive

counter thesis is proved.6

Aksapd also classified inference as : Apriori (purvavat, from cause to effect), A

Posteriori (sesavat, from effect to cause) and From analogy (samanyato-drsta, perception
of homogeneousness. A three fold classification of inference also found according to


Navya Nyya. Nyya also deals with Hetabhasas. Hetu further has five characteristics:
(1) It must be present in the Paksha, (2) It must be present in all positive instances, (3) It
must be absent in all negative instances, (4) It must not be incompatible with the minor
term or Paksha and (5) All other contradictions by other means of knowledge should be
absent. The fallacies in Anumana (hetvbhasa) may occur due to the following:
1.Asiddha: It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy. (Paksadharmata):(a)
Ashrayasiddha: If Paksha (minor term) itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the
hetu. e.g. The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus. (b)
Svarupasiddha: Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because it is
visible. (c) Vyapyatvasiddha: Conditional hetu. Wherever there is fire, there is smoke.
The presence of smoke is due to wet fuel.
2. Savyabhichara: This is the fallacy of irregular hetu :(a) Sadharana: The hetu is too
wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. The hill has fire because it is knowable.
(b)Asadharana: The hetu is too narrow. It is present only in the Paksha, it is not present in
the sapaksa and vipaksha. Sound is eternal because it is audible. (c) Anupasamhari:
Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of
sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. All things are non-ternal, because they are knowable.
3. Satpratipaksa: Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force,
then nothing follows. Sound is eternal, because it is audible, and Sound is non-eternal,
because it is produced. Here audible is counter-balanced by produced and both are of
equal force.
4.Badhita: When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves
the middle term (hetu). Fire is cold because it is a substance.
5.Viruddha: Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. Sound is eternal
because it is produced.



The Nyya model of inference was modified and replaced by an influential formulatism
of Dignga, the Buddhist logician. Digngas theory of inference describes a structure of
inference based on the nature of sign (hetu) can properly stand for another. He formulated
the triple nature of sign, three conditions which a sign (hetu) must fulfill in order that it
leads to valid inference:

It should be present in the case (object) under consideration.


It should be present in a similar case or a homologue.


It should not be present in any dissimilar case, any heterologue.

The sign as pointed out above, is also the reason for the inference and is called the hetu.
The inferred property is sdhya and location is paksa.7 It is equivalent to the three terms
of a syllogism, the middle term, minor term and major term respectively. A standard
example of a traditional syllogism is the following:
All men are mortal beings.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal being.
Every syllogism consists of three sentences, and three terms. The sentences must be in
their logical form, i.e. they must exhibit a subject, a predicate and a copula which is not a
part either of the subject or of the predicate. In this tripartite division of a sentence in its
logical form, the copula has the following characteristics:

It must be a form of verb be.


It must be in the present tense.


It may be either affirmative or negative.

We can compare and contrast the Navya-Nyya theory of inference with the traditional
syllogism, Aristotelian syllogism, and sometimes with the theory of modern symbolic
logicians.8 From the 14th century CE, with the Navya-Nyya school, Indian logic


became more formal. Logicians came up with a novel idea of universal qualification,
rules for sentinetial logic etc. The debate between the Buddhists and Nyyikas continued
over the centuries. This fertile interaction catalyzed new concepts as well as refined many
fundamental concepts in logic and epistemology. Logical ideas were sharpened in these
debates, which included proponents of other traditions such as the Vedntins as well. It
has been observed that Navya-Nyya is closer to modern logic.
One another important concept of Indian logic is Vyapti. The Sanskrit term vyapti is
rendered into English in variety of ways as pervasion, law or law like statement etc. In
the present contexts, especially in logic and epistemological contexts vyapti captures the
sense of inductive or empirical generalization. Vyapti or law like statement is one of the
premises, and Indian thinkers have shown considerable interest in the formulation of
vyapti or law like statement.9 We can find a good deal on Vyapti by all main systems of
Indian logic. Nyya system also deal with Vyaptigrahyopaya.
Jains developed a logical formulation that was distinct from the standard account of logic
in ancient and medieval India. The seven-fold method of conditionally valid predication
or the (Saptabhangi-Nayavda) is considered as an important element in the Jain system.
The theory of multiplicity of view points (Anekntavda) is an integral part of Jain logic.
According to Jain logic, the ultimate principle should always be logical and no principle
can be devoid of logic or reason. Thus one finds in the Jain texts, deliberative
exhortations on any subject in all its facts, may they be constructive or obstructive,
inferential or analytical, enlightening or destructive. In the process, the Jains came out
with their doctrines of relativity used for logic and reasoning:
Anekntavda the theory of relative pluralism or manifoldness
Sydvda the theory of conditioned predication and
Nayavda The theory of partial standpoints
These Jain philosophical concepts made most important contributions to the ancient
Indian philosophy, especially in the areas of skepticism and relativity. Jaina theory of
anekntavda can be taken to form the basis of a semantics for a simple propositional


language. The semantics validates the Jaina theory of sevenfold predication both about
the language and within the language. Jaina logic can therefore be given a rigorous
formulation in terms of modern logical techniques. But we have also used these
techniques to interrogate Jaina logic itself, particularly concerning its account of assertion
and its relativism. The techniques not only highlight certain of its problematic features
but also provide possible solutions to some of those problems. The application of
contemporary logical techniques to historical theories in Indian logic can be just as
fruitful as their application to historical theories in European logic.10
Matilal notes that logic in Indian arose out of two different traditions- one, the tradition of
debate and dialectics, and the other, the epistemological, empirical tradition, because of
which the distinction between logic and epistemology, as in Western logic, is not made in
Indian schools of logic. Ganeri, a recent scholar on Indian Logic, has rightly pointed out
that the early European scholars approached Indian logic with little knowledge about
many other complexities and developments in Indian logic such as the Navya-Nyya and
with a presumption of intellectual superiority. It also is a fact that these had namely
Western logic. It is possible that they projected element of their own philosophy legacy
on to the Indian thought systems while trying to understand them.11 Here is a suggestion
made by Sarrukai in regards to Indian logic is, for Indian logic, it seems that the central
concern was to make logic scientific. This implies that logical statements have to respond
to empirical concerns. While this move militates against the very notion of logic in the
western tradition, it is precisely this demand on logic that makes Indian logic essentially
correlated to scientific methodology.12
Here we are going to conclude this article with this statement that Indian logic has a rich
tradition and there are varieties of views and questions related to Indian logic. In the late
18th century, British scholars began to take an interest in Indian philosophy and
discovered the sophistication of Indian study of inference. We should concentrate on this
aspect of Indian philosophy, then we can have a good approach to deal with Indian
philosophy honestly because the very essence of Indian philosophy is its logically



analysis that help us to understand all theories concerning to metaphysics and

Notes & References:
1. Safaya, Raghunath, Indian Psychology, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal
Publishers Pvt. Ltd.; 1976,p.02.
2. Matilal, Bimal Krishna Introducing Indian Logic in Indian Logic: A Reader,
Edi. by Jonardon Ganeri, Surrey Curzon Press,2001, p.184.
3. ibid, p.183.
4. Chakraborti, Chhanda , Logic: Informal, Symbolic & Inductive, New Delhi:
Prentice hall of India Pvt. Ltd.,2007,p.498.
5. Sarrukai, Sundar, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Centre for
Studies in Civilizations, New Delhi, 2005,p.51.
6. Matilal, Bimal Krishna Introducing Indian Logic in Indian Logic: A Reader,
7. Sarrukai, Sundar, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,p.54.
8. Bhattacharya, Sibajiban Some Aspects of the Navya-Nyya Theory of Inference
in Indian Logic: A Reader, Edi. by Jonardon Ganeri, Surrey :Curzon
9. Ingallali, R.I. Inductive Confirmation in Indian Logic in Journal of Bihar
Philosophical Research, Year 2005, p.01.
10. Priest ,Graham Jaina Logic :A Contemporary Perspective in History and
Philosophy of Logic,29 August, 2008, p.277.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340701690233
11. Chakraborti, Chhanda , Logic: Informal, Symbolic & Inductive, p.501.
12. Sarrukai, Sundar, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, p.13.



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nfyr oxZ dh lkekftd o jktuhfrd fLFkfr lq/kjus ds fy, iz;Ru djus okys T;ksfrck Qwys ds
ckn egku nfyr elhgk MkW ch-vkj- vEcsMdj Fks ftUgksaus viuh ph gSlh;r] vPNs dk;ksZa] mPp f'k{kk
vkSj psruk ds fodkl }kjk nfyrksa dks lq/kjus esa cgqr ;ksxnku fn;kA MkW vEcsMdj th rhu egkiq#"kksa ls
cgqr T;knk izHkkfor FksA ftu dks mUgksaus vius vkn'kZ vkSj xq# ekukA og Fks egkRek cq] HkDr dchj
nkl vkSj T;ksfrck Qwys th A muds ekxZ ij pydj vEcsMdj th us nfyrksa dh fLFkr lq/kjus esa viuk
egRoiw.kZ ;ksxnku fn;kA
nfyr oxZ ds mRFkku ds fy, dk;Z
MkW ch-vkj- vEcsMdj th dh egkurk bl ckr esa gS fd mUgksaus viuh egku fon~ork vkSj 'kfDr
dk iz;ksx nfyr oxZ dk mkj djus ds fy, fd;kA muds fy, ns'k] vius O;fDrRo ls Hkh vf/d
egRoiw.kZ Fkk ijUrq nfyr oxZ mudks vius ns'k ls Hkh egRoiw.kZ FkkA muds vius 'kCnksa esa& eSa dgrk gw
fd tc dHkh esjs O;fDrxr fgrksa vkSj esjs ns'k ds fgrksa esa dksbZ la?k"kZ mRiUu gks tkrk gS rks eSa ns'k ds
fgrksa dks vius O;fDrxr fgrksa ls Hkh ij j[krk gw-------- tc dHkh esjs ns'k ds fgrksa vkSj nfyrksa ds fgrksa


esa dksbZ la?k"kZ mRiUu gks tkrk gS] tgk rd esjk lEcU/ gSa] eSa vNwrksa ds fgrksa dks ns'k ds fgrksa ls Hkh
ij j[kwxkA1
cfg"r fgrdkfj.kh lHkk dh LFkkiuk %
Mk0 vEcsMdj us 20 tqykbZ 1924 dks cfg"r fgrdkfj.kh lHkk dh LFkkiuk dh ftldk
mn~ns'; nfyr oxZ dk fodkl rFkk mudh mUufr dk ekxZ [kksyuk FkkA
nfyr yks x ks a dks fu%'kq Y d dkuw u h lgk;rk miyC/ djuk
1 vDVwcj 1926 bZ0 esa tc iwuk ds dqN mPp oxZ ds ukeh O;fDr;ksa us nfyr oxZ ds rhu
usrkvksa ij eqdnek ntZ djk;k fd mUgksaus czk.kksa dk vieku vkSj fuUnk dh gS rks vEcsMdj th us
muds eqdnes dks vius gkFk esa fy;k vkSj ,slh nyhysa nh fd nfyr usrk eqdnek thr x,A vc os nfyr
oxZ ds laj{kd dgykus yxsA vEcsMdj us R;kx dh ;g Hkkouk vkSj fu%'kqYd lsoko`fk vius vafre fnuksa
rd iznf'kZr dhA
nfyrks a ds fy, jktuhfrd vf/dkjks a ds fy, la ? k"kZ
lu~ 1918&19 bZ- esa MkW ch-vkj vEcsMdj us nfyrksa dks T;knk ls T;knk vf/dkj nsus ds iz;Ru
fd;sA ftlds fy, fnu jkr mUgksaus nfyrksa dk lq/kj djus ds mik; fd;s FksA blhfy, MkW vEcsMdj
lkfgc loZizFke nfyr oxZ ds izfrfuf/ ds :i esa lkFkcksjksa desVh ds lkeus mifLFkr gq,A ;gk mUgksaus
izLrko is'k fd;k fd nfyrksa dh tula[;k ds vuqikr ls vyx&vyx fo/ku ifj"kn~ esa bu yksxksa ds
fy, lhVs lqjf{kr j[kh tk, vkSj nfyrksa ds fy, i`Fkd pquko {ks=kksa dh Hkh O;oLFkk dh tk, ijUrq
lkmFkcksjks desVh us MkW vEcsMdj ds lq>koksa dh vksj dksbZ fo'ks"k ;ku ugha fn;kA mUgksaus izkarksa dh dqy
791 lhVksa esa ls 24 lhVksa ij nfyr oxksZa dk vkj{k.k Lohdkj fd;kA dsUnzh; fo/ku ifj"kn rFkk dkSafly
vkWQ LVsV esa rks ,d Hkh lhV ij vkj{k.k u fn;k x;kA ckn esa 1919 bZ- ds xouZesUV vkWQ bafM;k ,DV
ds v/hu izkarksa esa nfyr oxksZa ds fy, 13 lhVsa vkjf{kr dh xbZA dkykUrj esa dsUnzh; fo|ku ifj"kn~ esa Hkh
,d nfyr lnL; euksuhar fd;kA
nfyr yksxksa ds jktuhfrd vf/dkjksa ds fy, la?k"kZ ds lEcU/ esa VkbEl vkWQ bafM;k us 20 vizSy
1942 ds vad esa bl lEcU/ esa fy[kk jktuhfrd vkSj vkfFkZd 'kfDr ds fcuk nfyr yksx lkekftd



,drk ikus esa dfBukbZ dk lkeuk dj ldrs gS vkSj MkW vEcsMdj us bl ckr dh tkudkjh izkIr djds
cgqr Bhd fd;kA2
MkW Hkhe jko vEcsMdj us vusd ckj vaxzsth ljdkj dks dgk fd og ljdkjh vkSj vZ ljdkjh
ukSdfj;ksa ij nfyr tkfr ds yksxksa ij yxs gq, izfrcU/ gVk ns vkSj mUgsa bu ukSdfj;ksa ij cMh la[;k esa
HkrhZ djsA MkW vEcsMdj th dks cgqr ks/ vk;k tc fczfV'k ljdkj us nfyr yksxksa dks vlSfud oxZ
ekudj mUgsa lsuk esa HkrhZ djus ls oafpr dj fn;kA bl lEcU/ esa vEcsMdj th dk dguk Fkk& ;g
fdlh /ks[ks vkSj fo'okl?kkr ls de ugha fd fczfV'k ljdkj us lsuk esa HkrhZ gksus ds }kj nfyr yksxksa ds
fy, can dj j[ks gSa] fo'ks"kdj tc bUgha nfyr yksxksa us fczfV'k ljdkj dks Hkkjr esa lkezkT; LFkkfir djus
esa lgk;rk dh Fkh vkSj ;g Hkh ,sls le; esa tcfd baxyS.M dh ljdkj Lo;a usiksfy;u ls yMs tkus okys
;qksa esa O;Lr FkhA3 vUr esa vEcsMdj ,sls vuqfpr dkuwuksa dks gVkus esa lQy gq, vkSj lsuk esa HkrhZ ds
}kj nfyr yksxksa ds fy, lnk ds fy, [kksy fn, A
MkW vEcsMdj us nfyrksa ds jktuhfrd vf/dkj ds fy, yUnu 1931 bZ esa vk;ksftr xksyest
lEesyu esa mUgksaus nfyr oxZ ds fy, lhVs vkjf{kr djus o i`Fkd pquko {ks=kksa dh ekx j[khA la;qDr
vFkok i`Fkd fuokZpu iz.kkyh ds lEcU/ esa mUgksaus Lohdkj fd;k la;qDr vFkok i`Fkd fuokZpu iz.kkyh
ds iz'u ij gekjh fLFkfr ;g gS fd ;fn vki gesa lkoZHkkSe O;Ld erkf/dkj nsus dks rS;kj gS rks ge dqN
lhVsa lqjf{kr fd, tkus ij la;qDr pquko iz.kkyh dks ekuuus ds fy, rS;kj gS vkSj ;fn rqe gesa lkoZHkkSe
O;Ld erkf/dkj nsus dks rS;kj ugha rc gesa i`Fkd fuokZpu iz.kkyh }kjk vius izfrfuf/ Hkstus dk
vf/dkj pkfg,A ;g gekjh fLFkfr gSA4
lu~ 1931 bZ esa vk;skftr xksyest lEesyu egkRek xk/h vkSj eqgEen vyh ftUukg ds e;
lkEiznkf;d pquko iz.kkyh ds iz'u ij vlQy gks x;k ijUrq 1932 esa ?kksf"kr dE;wuy vokMZ esa MkW
vEcsMdj dh ekxksa dks dkQh gn rd Lohdkj dj fy;k x;kA nwljh vksj egkRek xk/h us bls ns'k fgr ds
izfrdwy ekuk vkSj blds fo# vkej.k vu'ku j[kkA ifj.kke QyLo:i iwuk iSDV vfLrRo esa vk;kA
blds vuqlkj nfyrksa ds fy, lhVksa dk vkj{k.k rks Lohdkj dj fy;k x;k ijUrq i`Fkd pquko {ks=k dh
O;oLFkk lekIr dj nh xbZA MkW vEcsMdj bl QSlys ds fojks/h Fks D;ksafd blls nfyrksa dk lkekftd
dyad lekIr ugha gksrk FkkA MkW vEcsMdj us ukfld ftys ds ,d xko esa 13 vDVwcj 1935 bZ dks
tulHkk dks lEcksf/r djrs gq, ?kks"k.kk fd og Nwr&Nkr okys bl /eZ dks R;kx dj nwljs /eZ dks
Lohdkj dj ysaxs A og igys flD[k /eZ vkSj ckn esa ckS /eZ dh rjQ >qd x;sA



MkW Hkhejko vEcsMdj ,d mPpdksfV ds laxBudrkZ FksA mUgksaus vDVwcj 1936 bZ dks baf.MisMsaV
yscj ikVhZ vkWQ bafM;k dk laxBu fd;k ftUgksaus 1937 bZ dh fo/ku lHkk dh cEcbZ izSthMsalh dh lHkh
vkjf{kr lhVsa thr yh FkhA bl izdkj MkW lkfgc us 1942 bZ- dks vuqlwfpr tkfr la?k dk fuekZ.k fd;kA
bl izdkj vEcsMdj nfyr tkfr ds jktuhfrd vf/dkjksa dks lqjf{kr j[kus ds fy, lc dqN fd;kA
bl ckr ij xoZ djrs gq, mUgksaus Lo;a dgk os bl ckr dh ?kks"k.kk djrs gq, izlUu gS fd nfyr yksxksa
us cgqr gn rd jktuhfrd psruk izkIr dj yh gS bruh psruk Hkkjr ds dqN gh oxks us izkIr dh gSA
blds lkFk gh mUgksaus nfyrksa dh dkUQzsalksa esa Hkkx ysuk (1920) nfyrksa ds fy, ewduk;d
tSls lekpkj i=kksa dk vkjEHk (1920) lekt lerk la?k dk laxBu (1927) nfyrksa ds lkekftd
vf/dkjksa ds fy, lR;kxzg (1927 28) lafo/ku ds fuekZ.k esa ;ksxnku (1946) esa viuk egRoiw.kZ
;ksxnku fn;kA
okLro esa MkW ch-vkj vEcsMdj nfyrksa ds elhgk fl gq, A iafMr usg: ds 'kCnksa esa& MkW
vEcsMdj mPp dksfV ds egku yksxksa dh fxurh esa vkrs gSA lkFk gh MkW vEcsMdj th dh thouh ys[kd
/Uut; dhj fy[krs gSa lHkh yksx Lohdkj djrs gS fd os ekuo ds lEeku ds egku la?k"kZdrkZ vkSj
nfyrksa ds egku laj{kd FksA bl ns'k vkSj lEHkor;k vU; ns'kksa dk Hkh dksbZ euq"; mudh cjkcjh ugah dj
ldrkA mu tSlk mRlkgiw.kZ fofo/ 'kkunkj vkSj vnHkqr thou pfj=k fdlh dk ugah gks ldrkA5
mila g kj
MkW vEcsMdj th ds iz;Ruksa ds QyLo:i gh nfyr tkfr;ksa dks /hjs&/hjs loksZPp LFkku feykA
vkt fuEu tkfr;ksa ds izR;sd {ks=k esa mPp LFkku izkIr fd;k gS ftuesa ls HksnHkko vkSj tkfrokn lekIr
gksus dh dxkj ij gSA nwljs yksxksa ;k mPp tkfr;ksa ds cjkcj nfyrksa dks lEeku igqapkus okys MkW ch-vkjvEcsMdj gh Fks ftudks vius fny dh xgjkbZ;ksa ls ;kn fd;k tkrk jgsxk A
la n HkZ :

Dhananjay Keer, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Life and Mission, Ch. XXII. Page 32.
The Times of India 22/04/1942, p.01.
K.L. Chanchreek- Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, p.158.
Dhananjay Keer, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Life and Mission, Ch. XXVII, p.523.



la n HkZ xz a F k lw p h :
1. Wikipedia, Dalit.Wikipedia
2. Diwakar, D.M. (1999). Dalit Question of Inequality, Exploitation and
Movilization: A Micro View of Ground Realities, Man and Development, Vol.
XXI, No. 3.
3. Census (2011). Census of India, Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs,
4. Dhananjay Keer Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Life and Mission Ch. XXVII, XXII.
5. K.L. Chachreek , Dr. Ambedkar.
6. The Times of India ,22/04/1942.




Report on Teachers Day Celebration-2015

The Positive Philosophy Society of the Department of Philosophy, P. G. Govt. College

for Girls, Sector-11, Chandigarh organized an event on Teachers Day Celebration
cum- Get-Together on 3rd September, 2015. The details of the function are given below:
Ms. Nidhi Semwal and Ms. Roshni coordinated the function. Ms. Nidhi
introduced the Positive Philosophy Society with its objectives and also about the
importance of Teachers Day celebration. She said this programme is dedicated to
Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam ji. Ms. Arnika Yumnam addressed new students by
sharing her experience as well as guides them regarding the college life.
Two posters on Dr. A.P. J. Abdul Kalam were inaugurated by The Positive
Philosophy Society and Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary
Studies (CPPIS) respectively. Ms. Kanika Mehta and Ms. Manisha Joshi shared
the message of Dr. A.P.J.Abdul Kalam for youth and teachers.
The following students were selected for the working committee for the session
2015-16: President: Ms. Arnika Yumnam (BA-III), Vice-President: Nidhi Semwal



(BA-II), Secretary: Ms. Aanya (BA-I). Associate Members: Ms. Bhanu Priya
(BA-I), Ms. Roshni (BA-II), Ms. Sharandeep Kaur (BA-III).
Ms. Shavnam, Ms. Arnika Yumnam, Ms. Manju and Ms. Manisha Joshi honoured
for their excellent score in BA. Final, BA Second and BA First Year examinations
(2014-2015) respectively.
An interactive session with new students also held. Students shared their views
and performed some entertainment activities, as directed by senior students. Some
senior students also performed singing and dancing activities.
Teacher-Incharge, Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal encouraged students to write and explore
their thinking through creative initiatives. He also motivated them for quality
learning and better academic engagements.
On this occasion a welcome party too given to B.A. First year students by senior
students. A special thanks to Ms. Nidhi Semwal, Ms. Roshni, Ms. Arnika
Yumnam and other students for their valuable efforts and contributions to made
this event successful.








National Level Essay Writing Competition on

Dr.B.R.Ambedkar: The Maker of Modern India
19th November, 2015
The Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa
(Kurukshetra) on the occasion of the 125th Birth Anniversary of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar &
World Philosophy Day-2015, going to organize a National Level Essay Writing
Competition on the theme Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: The Maker of Modern India. The
competition aims at giving an opportunity to the youth of country to come across various
aspects of the philosophy of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and focused on generating new ideas
especially from young mind and see how they perceive Dr. B.R. Ambedkars
contribution to modern India.
About Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar is one of the most eminent intellectual figures of modern India. He
appeared on the Indian socio-political scene in early 1920s and remained in the forefront
of all social, economic, political and religious efforts for upliftment of the lowest stratum
of the Indian society known as untouchables, women and other backward classes. He was
a great scholar who made outstanding contributions as an economist, sociologist, legal
luminary, educationist, journalist, parliamentarian and above all, as a social reformer and
champion of human rights. Dr.Ambedkars ideas, writings and outlook could well be
characterized as belonging to that trend of thought called Social Humanism. He
developed a socio-ethical philosophy and steadfastly stood for human dignity and
freedom, socio-economic justice, material prosperity and spiritual discipline. He showed
the enlightening path for Indian society via his ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity
and made India a democratic country.



Theme of Essay Competition : Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: The Maker of Modern India

The Philosophy of Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Indian Society
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Political Philosophy
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Social Philosophy
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Indian Religions
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Buddhism
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Moral Philosophy
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Untouchables
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Educational Philosophy
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Women Empowerment
Dr. B.R. Ambedkars Message to Indian Youth
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Indian Constitution
Dr. B.R. Ambedkars Critique of Hinduism
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Indian Democracy
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Social Justice
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Freedom, Equality and Fraternity
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Spirituality
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Indian Economy
Dr. B.R.Ambedkars Views on Nationalism
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and His Legal Philosophy`
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Indias Freedom Struggle
Any other relevant topic related to main theme.



Eligibility: All students pursuing any Undergraduate or Post Graduate courses from
recognized college/institute/university. Age limit is 25 years or below for this
Prizes: Prizes will be given to top 5 entries and a certificate also provided to those who
follow proper guidelines. Best essays will be published in our journal Milestone
Education Review, October, 2015 issue.
Submission Guidelines:

The essays submitted by the participants must be in English and Hindi language

The essay must be typed in Microsoft Word with Times New Roman, Font size
12, 1.5 linear spacing.

Co-authorship is allowed.

Word Limit: 2000 Maximum words including footnotes.

The participants submitting an entry in this essay contest need to affirm that the
entry is his/her own work. Plagiarism can lead to outright rejection of submission.

Criteria of Evaluation:
The criteria to be applied in evaluating the entries are:
Originality of the content
Creativity and Rationality
Style and Presentation of content
Clarity and proper citations
Registration and Submission:
There is no registration fee for this essay competition. Participants should submit their
essay with 10th class certificate and institutional ID proof along with registration form till


20th October 2015 on the given address. An advance copy of all documents should be









For any details, Contact:
Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Department of Philosophy, P.G.Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11,
Chandigarh-160011. Mobile No.08288883993
For more details of seminars, conferences, jobs and workshops etc. kindly visit to
Philosophy News in India:




Dr. Gaganjot Kaur, Assistant Professor, Kamala Nehru College,
University of Delhi, Delhi.
Dr. Ahinpunya Mitra, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Triveni
Devi Bhalotia College, Raniganj, Dist. Burdwan, West Bengal.
Dr. Reni Pal, Assistant Professor in Philosophy, Surendranath
College, Kolkata.
Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Assistant Professor, Department of
Philosophy, P. G. Govt. College for Girls , Sector-11, Chandigarh.
Dr. Prakash Chandra Badwaya, Assistant Professor, Department of
History, P. G. Govt. College for Girls , Sector-11, Chandigarh.



Instructions to the Contributors

Lokyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN 2249-8389) welcomes
contributions in all areas of research proposed by the Centre. All articles are sent to experts
who evaluate each paper on several dimensions such as originality of the work, scientific
argument, and English style, format of the paper, references, citations and finally they
comment on suitability of the article for the particular Journal. In case of review articles the
importance of the subject and the extent the review is comprehensive are assessed.
Prospective authors are expected that before submitting any article for publication they
should see that it fulfills these criteria. The improvement of article may be achieved in two
ways (i) more attention to language (ii) more attention to the sections of the article.

Format of Submission: The paper should be typewritten preferably in Times New Roman
with 12 font size (English) and Kruti Dev (10) with 14 font size (Hindi) in MS-Word 2003 to
2010 and between 2500 to 3000 words. They should be typed on one side of the paper,
double spaced with ample margins. The authors should submit the hard copy along with a
CD and a copyright form to be sent to the editorial address.

Time Line: The last dates of submission of the manuscript are as follows:
For April to September Issue: 31 August every year.
For October to March Issue: 31 January every year.


Reference Style:
Notes and references should appear at the end of the research paper/chapter. Citations in
the text and references must correspond to each other; do not over reference by giving the
obvious/old classic studies or the irrelevant. CPPIS follows The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th
Edition. The Chicago Manual of Style presents two basic documentation systems: (1) notes
and bibliography and (2) author-date. Choosing between the two often depends on subject
matter and the nature of sources cited, as each system is favored by different groups of
scholars. The notes and bibliography style is preferred by many in the humanities. The
author-date system has long been used by those in the physical, natural, and social sciences.
CPPIS follows the first system i.e. Notes and Bibliography.
You can visit the following link to download our CPPIS Manual for Contributors and
Reviewers for further instuctions:



CPPIS, Pehowa (Kurukshetra)
Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa
is a joint academic venture of Milestone Education Society (Regd.) Pehowa and
Society for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (SPPIS), Haryana
(online) to do fundamental research in the field of Humanities and Social
SPPIS Newsletter
The Centre also circulates a Newsletter which includes new information
related to events, new articles and programme details. One can register
himself on the below given address and will get regular updates from us.
Link for registration:

All contributions to the Journal, other editorial enquiries and books for
review are to be sent to:
Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal,
Chief-Editor, Lokyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy,
Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS),
Pehowa, Distt. Kurukshetra (HARYANA)-136128 (India)
Mobile No.09896848775, 08288883993
E-mail: cppiskkr@gmail.com, mses.02@gmail.com
Website: http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

My objective is to achieve an intellectual detachment from all
philosophical systems, and not to solve specific philosophical problems,
but to become sensitively aware of what it is when we philosophise.
- Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal