Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)

The Southeast Asian Security Complex

Author(s): BARRY BUZAN
Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 10, No. 1 (June 1988), pp. 1-16
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25797984
Accessed: 08-10-2015 08:00 UTC
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Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 10, Number

The

Southeast

Security

1, June 1988

Asian

Complex

BARRYBUZAN

This paper applies the idea of security complexes to the study of

regional security in Southeast Asia. First, the idea of security
complexes is introduced, followed by a sketch of the pattern of
security relations withm the Southeast Asian complex, and also
sets that pattern into the broader context both of the other local
security complexes inAsia, and of the global pattern of great power
rivalries. The paper concludes by Jinking together the patterns of
security at the globaJ and local levels, with some consideration
given to the continuity and change in the structure of the Southeast

Asian

complex.

Idea of Security Complexes

idea of security complexes arose from the need to find some systematic
framework within which to consider the problem of regional security. The
regional level of analysis iswidely used to address Third World security
issues, but the concept of region invariably amounts to little more than

The
The

an arbitrary geographical designation usually determined by the location

of some current crisis. A classic example of this is the idea of "Southwest
Asia" that became fashionable after 1979 following the onset of the Iranian
revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Southwest Asia defines an area where superpower interests clash. It tells
us very little about the pattern of security relations generated among the
in that regard.
local states themselves, and, indeed, is quite misleading
The most striking feature of the local pattern is the boundary of relative
security indifference between Pakistan on the one hand, and Iran on the
other. The idea of Southwest Asia masks the fact that the local security
1

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Barry

Buzan

one in the Gulf, and the other between India

dynamics have two centres,
and Pakistan. The superpower-derived notion of Southwest Asia thus tries
to impose itself over a boundary between two local patterns of security
interaction that are largely independent of each other, and which stand
virtually back to back right in the middle of Southwest Asia.1
into the re
The idea of security complexes injects some firmmeaning
and
of
self-contained,
level
durable,
relatively
analysis by identifying
gional
patterns of security relations generated by the local states themselves. The
idea of a security complex has been defined as follows:
... we can attempt to define regional security subsystems in terms of
patterns of amity and enmity that are substantially confined within
some particular geographical area. The assumption is that local sets
of states exist whose major security perceptions and concerns link
together sufficientlyclosely that theirnational security problems cannot
... Unlike most
realistically be considered apart from one another.
other attempts to define regional subsystems, security complexes rest,
for themost part, on the interdependence of rivalry rather than on the
interdependence

of

shared

interests.

. . .

Security

complexes

empirical phenomenon with historical and geopolitical

are

characteristic

products

of an

anarchic

international

an

are

roots. They

system,

and

represent durable rather than permanent substructures within such

a

system.2

Security complexes are part of a larger scheme aimed at constructing a

to the analysis of security problems. They
multi-level, holistic approach
are designed to insert a middle level of analysis between the global system

level, which is very often dominated by great power perspectives, and the
is always very narrow, and frequently
individual country level, which
marred by partisan biases. All three levels are necessary to any compre
hensive analysis of security problems. The fact that each has its own

character and dynamic makes it possible to separate them for

purposes of analysis. But each also interacts with the others in important
ways, and it is only by reintegrating the three levels that full understanding
can be achieved.3
distinctive

The identification of security complexes tends to restmore on patterns

of enmity, fear and rivalry, than it does on patterns of amity, trust and
co-operation. On this basis, some have suggested that these regional entities
Since they
could more appropriately be called "insecurity complexes".
are largely based on local manifestations
of the power/security dilemma,4

there is a case for this view. As Ole Waever has suggested, the internal
dynamics of a security complex can, in theory, vary across a broad spec
trum.5 They might, at one extreme, be governed by unrestrained balance

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The Southeast Asian Security Complex

of power rivalries like those in eighteenth century Europe. At the other

extreme, they could have settled into a security community, in which all
the states within the complex had accepted mechanisms
for the peaceful

settlement of disputes with all the other members,

and no member ex
pected, or planned, that any other would resort to military force against
it.Relationships among theWestern European states (excepting Greece and
In between
Turkey) have had this character formore than three decades.

lies Jervis' notion of a security regime,6 exemplifed by the nineteenth

century Concert of Europe, inwhich states observe, and expect others to
observe, certain norms or rules of restraint in their military relations.
Waever also points out that the degree of amity/enmity within a security
complex need not be uniform.7 Both the Nordic group within Europe,
and theAssociation
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) within Southeast
Asia, constitute subsystems that are significantly less conflictual within
themselves than is the norm for the larger regional complex in which
they are embedded.
The key point about a security complex is that it defines a relatively

self-contained pattern of security relationships among a geographically

coherent group of states. In defining the complex, the internal character
is less important than the distinctiveness
of those relationships
of the
local pattern from the surrounding patterns. Thus, South Asia and South
east Asia both contain patterns of local rivalry intense enough to have
generated several large wars. But despite the physical adjacency of the
two complexes, these wars have had virtually no impact across the bound
ary between them. A similar boundary of relative indifference has operated
between South Asia and the Gulf, where wars within one complex make
little difference to security affairs in the other. Given that the security
dynamics of adjacent local complexes are, by definition, largely distinct,
one would not expect the character of security relations within any parti
cular local complex to have much impact on adjacent complexes. If such
influences begin to become
cross-boundary
important, then one would
need to question whether or not a major redefinition of the local patterns

of security is under way.

As we shall see, however, this criterion of relative insulation does not
hold true for relations between the local security complex and the more
dynamics of rivalries among the great powers. Since the
wide-ranging
higher level of great power relationships impinges on all the local com
plexes, the particular pattern and intensity of amity/enmity relations within
a local complex is crucial to the opportunities
for penetration of great
power interests into the security relations of the local complex. The more
divided the security relations within the local complex, the easier itwill
be for great power rivalries to penetrate the region.

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4
The

Barry

Southeast

Asian

Security

Buzan

Complex

A full exposition of the Southeast Asian security complex would require

and cross linkage of four different levels: 1) the do
detailed examination
mestic level within each of the Southeast Asian states; 2) the patterns of
amity and enmity that define the regional complex; 3) the relationship

the security dynamics of the Southeast Asian complex and its

and 4) the relationship between
the
security complexes;
neighbouring
Southeast Asian
the
and
of
the
pervasive global rivalry
complex
super
powers. Given the limits of space and the fact that most readers of this
journal will already be familiar with domestic politics in the Southeast
Asian states, the discussion
here will be confined to the last three levels.
between

The Regional

Complex

The Southeast Asian security complex is composed of nine states

sharply
divided into two groups: a communist-led, Soviet-aligned, and Vietnamese
dominated group of three (Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea); and a non-communist,
Western-orientated
group of six, organized since 1967, in the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations
Indonesia,
(Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines,
and since 1984, Brunei). Burma is arguably a tenth member,
Thailand,
but in security terms can most accurately be described as a buffer state,
or zone of relative security indifference, between the local
in
complexes
South and Southeast Asia.
The internal structure of the Southeast Asian
security complex is
rather complicated.
It is unlike the simple bipolar structure in South Asia,
where the rivalry between India and Pakistan dominates the local
pattern
of security, leaving only peripheral and subordinate roles for the smaller
states. In Southeast Asia, the structure is defined
by a pattern of relations
several
medium-sized
among
powers. Of the nine states within the local
complex, four have populations ofmore than 50 million, two have between
6 and 20 million, and three have less than 5 million.
Although Singapore
is small in terms of population,
itsGNP is comparable
to that of Vietnam,
three times that of Burma (population: 40.5 million) and
nearly half that
of Thailand
(population: 53 million).8 In addition, especially in Indochina,
there are several national rivalries of long historical
standing, which are
to those in European history. The most notable of these
quite comparable
are among the Burmese, the Thai, the Khmer, and the Vietnamese. Before
the Europeans
imposed their colonial order on the region (except Thailand),
these four nations went through cycles of
greatness, decline and rivalry
in which
their relative territorial domains underwent
many dramatic
changes. Just as in Europe, the echoes of this regional history still in
fluence current security perceptions.

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The Southeast Asian Security Complex

Under these quite evenly divided political conditions, no single coun

can
try
easily threaten to dominate the local security environment. A
multipolar power structure within the complex lends itselfmost easily to
the alignment flexibility of a classical balance of power system, and con
sequently, no rigid, single pattern of relations has dominated the history
of the complex as it has, for example, in South Asia. Only the two most
populous states, Indonesia and Vietnam, actively cultivate images of them
selves as regional great powers, but both have economies much too weak

to support any bid for regional hegemony.

The internal history of the Southeast Asian security complex, par
ticularly in its first decades, was marked by a variety of disputes and
conflicts, many ofwhich reflected a difficult process not only of decolon
ization, but also of the new post-colonial states coming to terms with each

other. The

tortured history of Vietnam, marked by unusually

intense and
extended great power intervention, was the biggest, and longest running,
of these problems. Others, such as the territorial disputes between Malaysia
on the one hand, and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other, were
facilitated
largely settled by the mid-1960s. The formation of ASEAN
the development
of a major security community incorporating three of

the region's four most populous

countries. As a result of various wars
and agreements, the Southeast Asian security complex is now polarized
between capitalist ASEAN
communist empire. As
and the Vietnamese
and Paribatra have observed, this pattern represents a trans
Samudavanija
formation from an earlier situation inwhich most of the Southeast Asian
states had severe ideological divisions within themselves, to one inwhich

the ideological polarization

is along regional lines.9 This local pattern looks
stable, and seems likely to define the internal dynamics of the Southeast
Asian
security complex for the foreseeable future.
Within this pattern, the principal unresolved security issue concerns
the status of Kampuchea
and, to a lesser extent, Laos, as buffers between
Vietnam and Thailand. Thailand, with the support of itsASEAN
partners,
is unsettled by the prospect of immediate adjacency
com
to Vietnamese

munist

current domination
of Laos
power that results from Vietnam's
seems to be pursuing its own vision of an
and Kampuchea.10
Vietnam
Indochina "federation", and also faces the problem that an independent
seems likely to be hostile to it,whether communist ruled or
Kampuchea
not. Thai desires for a more neutral Kampuchea,
free of Vietnamese
troops,
are difficult to reconcile with Vietnam's hegemonic aspirations. The whole
is consequently
clashes
alive with tension, from Thai-Laotian
boundary
over disputed territory in the north, to volatile juxtapositions of Vietnamese,
Thai and Khmer military forces along the Thai-Kampuchean
border.
is also
its serious conflict, the Southeast Asian
Despite
complex

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Barry

Buzan

unusual, and fortunate, in having many of its internal and external bound
in a nuclear
aries moderated bywater. The analogy of the water moderator
? a water
state
boundaries
land
reactor is not inappropriate
gap between
across them inmuch the same
interactions
down
security
potential
damps
a
reactor
absorbs neutrons thatwould
way as the heavy water in nuclear
otherwise generate fission chain reactions. At its crudest, the reasoning
here is simply that it is much more difficult to mount major military
attacks across water than it is across land. Water also tends to provide

clear boundaries, or if it does not, to arouse much less passion than dis
that the
significance
putes over land territories.11 It cannot be without
areas
are
in
the
most intense and intractable conflicts within the region
six
members
where states share long land boundaries, while many of the
of the ASEAN
"quasi-security community"12 are separated by water.

The Regional

Complex

and

its Neighbours

Southeast Asian
security complex borders on three neighbouring
two
complexes: South Asia, South Pacific, and Northeast Asia. The first
states
of
of these, like Southeast Asia, are local complexes
composed
whose power is very largely confined to their own regions. The Northeast
Asian complex, however, contains several great powers, and is therefore
The

an entity of a "higher" type in the global pattern of security.

To the west, Burma acts as a buffer between the South Asian and
Southeast Asian complexes by being neutral in orientation, politically
and militarily weak, and relatively peripheral to the security dynamics on

there has been relatively little direct

either side of it. Since independence,
Burma
and
interaction
between
any of its neighbours when com
security
the groups of states lying east
interaction
of
with
the
levels
among
pared
in South and Southeast
the local dynamics
and west of it. Consequently,
Asia are almost completely separated from each other. If Burma were
stronger, its traditional rivalry with Thailand might come into play, but
so long as it remains economically
stagnant, politically introverted, and

absorbed in its several domestic rebellions against the central government,

there is no reason to expect any change in its role. The only faint hint of
interaction across the Burmese buffer is the diplomatic
support given by
India to Vietnam, which arises from their common hostility to China, and

their shared alliance with the Soviet Union.

To the south lie themembers of the South Pacific Forum, a group of
insulated by generous expanses
of water both from
mostly micro-states
each other and from the Southeast Asian complex. The group is dominated
by Australia and New Zealand, has low levels of inter-state friction among
its members,
and poses no threat to the Southeast Asian
states. A few

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The Southeast Asian Security Complex

residual security links to Southeast Asia remain from the heyday of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), but these mostly reflect
common ASEAN
and antipodean
ties to the United States, rather than
durable local security patterns. Australia might feel some long-term unease
about the juxtaposition of itshuge open spaces with the teeming migration
of Indonesia, but this is a long way from defining any
minded masses
immediate security concern.
To the north, the Southeast Asian complex borders on the great power
complex inNortheast Asia. In part, these two complexes are also insulated
from each other by water, but the major factor for the Southeast Asian
complex is its long land and sea boundary with China. China is a regional
great power whose presence is a major independent factor in Southeast

security, but which for the purposes of the analytical scheme used
here is not counted as part of the Southeast Asian complex. The clearest
way to define the security relationship between China and the South
east Asian security complex is to look at the 4'super-regional'' pattern of
security in thewhole of Asia.13 In that context, China's principal security
rivalry is with the Soviet Union, and both are part of the higher level
Asian

Northeast Asian

security complex, which includes Japan.14The Sino-Soviet

great power rivalry forms the core of an emergent Asian supercomplex in
which the competing security issues of these two regional great powers
increasingly penetrate the two lower level, or local, security complexes on
their southern periphery: South Asia and Southeast Asia. Thus, although
China is a major security concern for the Southeast Asian states, in them
selves, they are only a secondary or even tertiary security concern for
China. It is that disproportion which, for purposes of analysis, justifies
defining a boundary between them as one between a higher level and a
lower level complex, despite the significant security interactions across
the boundary.
is the
The principal security dynamic of the Asian supercomplex
Soviet
Union
of
containment
the
against China,
great game
being played by
and the Chinese attempt to foil it. This dynamic looks set for a long run,
since it is based on both a geographically-rooted
security dilemma and an
The
power struggle.
rising power of China represents
ideologically-based
a long-term security problem for the Soviet Union. Though their relation
ship will doubtless continue to swing from periods of detente to periods
of hostility, the underlying rivalry will continue. The Soviets have already
done well, having acquired as allies India, by far the strongest power in
South Asia, and Vietnam, the major military power in Indochina. China
has breached containment by linking with theweaker power in South Asia,
Pakistan. In Southeast Asia, it hangs on to the discredited Khmer Rouge
and enjoys only a rather tenuous friendship with
resistance inKampuchea,

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Barry

Buzan

It is this game of containment that explains China's sensitivity

Thailand.
control of
to both the Soviet position inAfghanistan, and the Vietnamese
reveals
of
level
This higher
strong parallels
analysis, therefore,
Kampuchea.
between external linkages in South Asia and those in Southeast Asia, even
though the internal security dynamics of the local complexes themselves
are quite independent of each other.
from an
Since the transformation of the Sino-Soviet
relationship
Asian
of
a
the
the
alliance to
dynamics
rivalry during the early 1960s,
in
Asia
in
within
compar
importance
supercomplex have gained steadily

ison to the influence of the global superpower rivalry between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This process has all the hallmarks of classic
balance of power behaviour, and represents an early stage in a systemic
shift from bipolarity tomultipolarity as American
power slowly declines
its importance in
As
has
increased
China
from its early post-war peak.
common
in opposing
It
is
interest
their
Asia, the United States has waned.
a
in the
kind of half-superpower
Soviet influence that has made China
a
at
States
retains
the global level. The United
strong
pattern of security
position
Pakistan,
mainland

to
in Northeast Asia, and still has a significant commitment
since
its defeat in Indochina, has largely withdrawn
from
but
Southeast Asia. Although the United States is still an important

its involvement in
states, especially the Philippines,
has largely been supplanted by the Sino-Soviet
rivalry. China
provides the United States with a major opportunity to pursue the ideals
of the Nixon Doctrine, whereby the United States would pursue its own
local
(usually anti-Soviet) security interests by supporting sympathetic
powers rather than by asserting its own military power directly. China's

backer of the ASEAN

Indochina

local strength as a counter to Soviet influence thus complements America's

desire to focus on a maritime strategy, and avoid further direct engagements
on the Asian mainland. The increase in Chinese
is
support for Thailand
a significant marker in this respect. In effect, the United States is at long
last beginning to learn how to base its own security interests more on the
favourable operation of the local balance
imposition of its own military forces.

of power, and

less on the direct

Even with the broader view provided by the Asian

supercomplex,
however, the boundary between China and Southeast Asia remains an awk
ward element m the analytical scheme. The problem is that it is crossed
not only by the Sino-Soviet rivalry, but also by direct
disputes and security
tensions between China and some states within Southeast Asia. The same
is true of the Chinese border with the South Asian
security complex.15
In both cases, locally rooted territorial and political disputes have given
rise to short wars and long-lasting tensions between China and a major
local state (India and Vietnam). Many of the states in Southeast Asia, in

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The Southeast Asian Security Complex

addition to Vietnam, also have strong historical reasons for seeing China
as a threat. China's historical suzerainty over Indochina, and sometimes
occupation of it, is feltparticularly strongly by Vietnam, but is not insigni
ficant elsewhere, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia.16
Beijing's claim
(echoed by Taiwan) to the Spratly Islands, which lie in the southern part
of the South China Sea, is a potent reminder of how far China's historical

and security interests penetrate into Southeast Asia.

In addition, most
of Chinese, which
Southeast Asian states contain significant populations
at worst gives rise to fears of fifth-column treason.17 These latter fears are
links between local Chinese
amplified by the history of post-independence
on the one hand, and communist parties supported, and/or
populations
inspired by Beijing on the other.18 This combined fear is present inmost
and Indo
of the ASEAN
countries, but is particularly strong inMalaysia

nesia, where the fusion of the local Chinese and communism precipitated
domestic conflicts during the period following independence.
For all these reasons, the looming presence of China is an important
independent element in any assessment of security in Southeast Asia. The
existence of significant security issues between China and the Southeast
Asian states makes the boundary of the local complex somewhat messy.
For the purpose of analysis, however, one gets a much less distorted picture

major

by placing China outside the Southeast Asian complex, than by trying to

fit it into the local pattern. This approach
requires careful handling of
the China issue at the system level of analysis.

The Southeast Asian

Complex

and

the Superpowers

For the reasons

given above, it is difficult to separate the adjacent great

from the global dynamics of superpower
influence
rivalry. The
power
local pattern of security relations in Southeast Asia clearly reflects an
independently rooted regional security dynamic. But the operations of
the larger rivalries between the Soviet Union and China, and the Soviet
Union and the United States, have heavily penetrated and distorted the
local pattern. These two pairs of rivalries are sometimes connected and
of Southeast Asia, Amer
sometimes independent. After the decolonization
the region until the collapse of the United
ican intervention dominated
States position in Vietnam during the early 1970s. The American presence
was part of its containment policy against the Soviet Union and China,
itself in terms of bilateral and multilateral alliances, mili
and manifested
engagement
tary aid, and direct military presence. The long American
and
in Southeast Asia certainly helped to define both the geographical
in the structure of the
the ideological terms of the current polarization
of the United
Southeast Asian security complex. The partial withdrawal

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10

Barry

Buzan

transformation of the Sino-Soviet

States after 1975, and the accompanying
to active rivalry, set the
from
alliance
in
the
reluctant
presence
region
into the region.
terms for the current pattern of great power penetration
The Soviet Union supports Vietnam's position both within the local com
plex, and against China and the United States. In return for this, it gains
an important ally in its containment of China, and limited local basing
in an area previously
facilities for its naval and air force deployments

by American maritime power.19

monopolized
The combined Soviet-Vietnamese position leaves China with a difficult
hand to play. Beijing holds no military trumps, and the outcome of events
in Southeast Asia over the last fifteen years has been strongly against its
preferences. Since 1954, its preference has been for a Southeast Asia kept
weak by its internal divisions. China was perhaps never keen to see its
historic rival Vietnam reunified,20 and certainly opposed the extension of
Vietnamese
hegemony over Laos and Kampuchea.21 China's interests were
thus served by American
policy only to the extent that the war delayed
Vietnam's victory and left itweak. But the outcome of the war was bad
for China, both m terms of Vietnam's victorious position in the region,
of Soviet influence in Vietnam. From this perspec
and the consolidation
was
inasmuch as itmistakenly
tive, American
totally misguided
policy
to
be
the
Chinese
danger
supposed
hegemony over Southeast Asia.

China has also to struggle against the fact that most of its potential
allies in the region view it as a threat for the reasons discussed above. Since
the late 1970s, after the consolidation
of the Soviet-Vietnamese
alliance
and the Vietnamese
of
China's
natural
occupation
security
Kampuchea,
interest has been to identify itself with ASEAN's
fears of both Vietnam

and the Soviet Union.

But the complex interplay of local and great power

makes
this logic far from straightforward. Thailand
is
security dynamics
the most amenable of the ASEAN
states to China's position because
it-is
states to the threat from Vietnam,
by far the most exposed of the ASEAN

and welcomes
the Chinese
and Indonesia, by
counterweight. Malaysia
contrast, focus more on the longer-term threat of Chinese hegemonism
to the region than on the more immediate, but in the long-run, much
is divided, Viet
smaller, threat from Vietnam.22 Because opinion inASEAN
nam can portray itself and the Soviet Union as serving regional interests
by resisting the reassertion of Chinese hegemony over Southeast Asia.23
This

interaction between
local and great power security dynamics
a security community covering the
to
all
create
explains why
attempts
whole region have failed. ASEAN's
promotion of a Zone of Peace, Free
dom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) confronts two difficulties. Firstly, it creates
divisions within ASEAN
about the meanings
of the terms in relation to
the trade and security links that individual members
already have with

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The Southeast Asian Security Complex

11

powers. Secondly, it can make no progress as long as the local

group and Vietnam.24
complex is acutely divided between the ASEAN
The Soviet proposal for Asian Collective
Security first floated in 1969
the problem from a different angle. As in South
attempts to approach
the local security rivalries in order
Asia, the Soviets wish to de-emphasize
outside

tohighlightthecommon threatto the regionposed byChina. The Soviets

want

local conflict resolution in order to strengthen their containment

programme against China.25 The Chinese, in turn, now favour an ASEAN
as a means of excluding the Soviet Union from the region.
style ZOPFAN
Inasmuch as a coherent regional interest exists in excluding all great
power penetration into the local complex, it is thwarted by the stronger
interest in calling in outside support against local rivals. In addition, as

Girling argues, most of the states in the region also seek outside support
states seem to trust each
against domestic threats. Although the ASEAN
other enough to have created a security community among themselves,
"...
if any regime felt gravely threatened itwould be more likely to appeal
for help from outside the region than from fellow members within it".28
In this way, as also in South Asia, the domestic, local and great power

security dynamics reinforce each other to keep the region both divided
within itself, and penetrated by more powerful outside interests.
Conclusion

itself in Southeast Asia

The pattern of security relations that established
now
1970s
in
the
late
looks
that both the local and
durable,
quite
during
the great power alignments that support it have stabilized. This prospect
contrasts notably with the three decades
when
following decolonization,
both local and great power alignments underwent dramatic changes.
their alliance with
The Soviets have every reason to want to maintain
it offers in their rivalries with both
Vietnam because of the advantages
seems unlikely to give up either
the United States and China. Vietnam
over Laos and Kampuchea.
communism or its dominance
Consequently,

will endure, though that still

the general divide between it and ASEAN
the present levels of
variation
leaves considerable
for
between
leeway
some
based on a reduc
and
of
detente
kind
confrontation,
uneasy
military
in Kampuchea.
tion of Vietnamese military presence
Given this general divide, ASEAN will have to endure its uncomfort
reliance on a
able compromises
of half-hearted support for ZOPFAN,
reduced American presence offshore, and mixed feelings about China as
both an asset and a liability to ASEAN's
security. China and the United
States will also have to livewith their uneasy alignment of security inter
ests in Southeast Asia. China wishes to retain an American presence both

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12

Barry

Buzan

its difficult relations with the

to offset Soviet power, and to moderate
states. China and the Soviet Union seem destined to pursue their
ASEAN
rivalry in the region for the foreseeable future. So long as the Soviet Union
is entrenched inVietnam, the United States is unlikely towithdraw further,
and will have a general interest in taking China's side against the Soviet
it can do so without alienating its local friends.
Union wherever
Other things being equal, then, the current pattern of mutual rein
forcement between external and internal security alignments looks quite
firm. The principal variable within the Southeast Asian security complex
is Kampuchea,
where serious domestic divisions add to the regional and
restore enough
rivalries
already in play.27 A solution that would
global
as
a
Vietnam
to
its
buffer
between
revive
role
independence
Kampuchean
and Thailand would certainly ease the security division within the region.
solution could be combined with a Sino-Soviet
If such a Kampuchean

agreement to reduce rivalry in the area, then the prospects for ZOPFAN
would
improve. It is, however, hard to think of reasons why the Soviets
and given their
would
give up their doubly useful position in Vietnam
concerns about China, hard to think why the Vietnamese would want the
Soviets to leave. The only leverage available to theWest is its ability to help
resuscitate its appalling
Vietnam
economy. To the extent that Vietnam
fears losing power because of itsweak economy, itmay be open to such
leverage. For theWest, however, such a strategy has to overcome not only
American
reluctance to deal with a country still seen as an enemy, but
is made stronger
also the classic problem of the risk involved ifVietnam
and therefore more able to pursue its hegemonic
aspirations.
There are only two obvious sources that could contribute towards a

major change in the pattern of security relations in and around Southeast

Asia within the next decade or two. The firsthinges on a major domestic
states. Any such
upheaval either in Burma or in one of the larger ASEAN
attract
intense
intervention
would
from
both
within
and outside
instability

the region, and its outcome could well shift the whole
security equation
states
within
the local complex. Should Burma or one of the ASEAN
look like joining the Soviet-Vietnam camp as a result of such a process,
this would
strengthen the identity of interests among China, the United
in the
States and ASEAN,
and greatly sharpen the degree of polarization
as
As
states
with
weak
structures
domestic
exist,
region.
long
political
such dramatic transformations can never be ruled out.
Paradoxically, however, as Sukhumbhand Paribatra has argued, South
east Asia also derives security benefits from the fact thatmost of the states
within it are weak both as states and as powers. Lack of means prevents
old rivals like Thailand and Burma from pursuing their rivalry. Similarly,
states hang together in part from a common awareness
the ASEAN
that

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The Southeast Asian Security Complex

13

them would be more likely to exacerbate their domestic

political fragilities than to override them. Limited capability plus political
weakness may thus be a formula for non-confrontation
regional politics.
In this way, Southeast Asia may differ from the European model, inwhich
long-term confrontations with neighbours played a major role in forging
conflict among

both the cohesive national identities, and the widely accepted government
structures necessary
for a strong nation-state.28
The second possible source of change is Japan. In general terms,
role in the pattern of global security. Be
Japan still plays an anomalous

cause of the long hangover from World War

II, Japan's vast potential
power plays a limited role in the security affairs of Asia except to underpin
states. The fate of
of the ASEAN
the pro-Western political economies
in
ASEAN
is, however, crucial to Japan's economy, a fact acknowledged
a
resumes
more
once
When
normal
defence
Japanese
Japan
again
policy.29
and

role ("when" rather than "if", leaving very open the

independent
of
how
question
long itwill take), its power and its interests will make
it one of the external forces impinging on Southeast Asia's
security. A
more active Japan would transform the great power security complex in
Northeast Asia, and in the process change the way inwhich that "higher
level" security dynamic now penetrates Southeast Asia.
The form that Japan's role will take is impossible to predict, for any
such development would already have wrought major changes in the global
pattern of security. It is, however, unlikely to have a strong military com
it had
ponent. Japan's role in Southeast Asia would depend on whether
found a way of expressing both its nationalism
and its security interests
that did not trigger memories of its earlier imperialism. There can be no
doubt, however, that Southeast Asia still falls as much within the sphere

of Japanese power and interest as it did during the 1930s and 1940s,
though obviously under wholly different domestic and international cir
cumstances. But even the use of purely economic
instruments is fraught
with problems. Japan, for example, could not use such instruments towoo

Vietnam away from Soviet influence without itself becoming entangled in

the local security dynamics
that affect relations between Vietnam and
China and ASEAN.
On most levels, however, the prospect is more one of stability than
one of change. Neither the power structure nor the pattern of alignment
within the complex seems likely to undergo any sharp transformation.
Similarly, there is little sign that boundaries between the Southeast Asian
complex and any of its neighbours are going to break down. The essen
in the region look
tially self-contained dynamics of the local complexes
durable. Even the messy boundary with China looks unlikely to change
in priority sufficiently to require redefinition. The pattern of great power

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14

Barry

Buzan

that a more inde

penetration also seems stable except for the possibility
set
a
of
rival interests.
more
create
complicated
Japan might
pendent
Even here, however, the greater likelihood is that Japan's influence will
simply grow within the framework of the existing pattern.
The case of Southeast Asia illustrates a relationship among domestic,
can be found throughout the Third World.
regional and global security that
states, will
states, particularly weak
The governments of Third World
often trade a degree of support for one side or the other in great power
rivalries in return for political support and arms in both domestic and
local conflicts. Politically, the effect is one of adding a complicating over
in South
lay of a global pattern of rivalries onto the local pattern. Thus,
the
and
Pakistan
United
the
Soviet
is
Union,
India
Asia,
by
supported by
is supported by the
States and China; and in Southeast Asia, Vietnam
in various ways by the United States, China
Soviet Union, and ASEAN
how local rivalries and conflicts
demonstrate
Such
and Japan.
alignments
means
the
for
of
great powers into the domestic
entry
provide the principal
and regional politics of the Third World. Disputes within and between
Third World countries make it easy for outside great powers to gain access
in order to pursue their own rivalry. By adopting this tactic, Third World
countries connive at the interference in their affairs by the North which

so many of them loudly decry.

The Southeast Asian security complex also demonstrates the destabiliz
ing effect that weak states can have on the international anarchy when
whole regions are dominated by them. Such regions are not only inherently
conflict-prone in themselves, but also draw in and amplify the rivalries
among the great powers. External political and military support for compet
ing sides (either within or between states) within a local complex enables

to be fought on a much larger scale than local resources alone would

permit. But more importantly, it tends tomake local conflicts more difficult
to end. As in Kampuchea,
external arms supply
politically motivated
no
ensures
that
props up the weaker side and
indigenous state or faction
a
dominant
achieves
position simply by being able to marshall
superior
are guided more by their own
local resources. Since the superpowers

wars

rivalry than by concern for local outcomes, and since their access to local
influence usually depends on their taking sides in local conflict, the natural
outcome of their intervention in the Third World
is to perpetuate
local
rivalries. If a local victory would mean
the triumph of a superpower

of the superpower rivalry will tend to ensure

of resources to local opponents.
The simple fact is that the easiest route to influence for great powers
is by taking sides in the disputes within and among the local states. In
most areas of the Third World this process is facilitated by the dominance
client, then the dynamics
compensating movements

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The Southeast Asian Security Complex

15

of local rivalries and conflicts, both domestic and within the local security
complex, over any joint interest in insulating the region from great power
intervention. The fate of ZOPFAN
shows the truth of this statement even
for a subregional grouping like ASEAN, which within itself has made
impressive progress towards the development of a security community.
Partly because of their different domestic vulnerabilities, partly because
and
of their different attitudes towards the polarization between ASEAN
Vietnam within the Southeast Asian security complex, and partly because

of their divergent perceptions of outside powers, particularly China, the

states have been unable to generate a coherent collective view of
ASEAN
what "neutralization
for ASEAN
of the region" might mean, whether
itself, or for the Southeast Asian
security complex as a whole.

NOTES
1. Barry

and Gowher
Rizvi et al., South Asian
Insecurity and the Great Powers
Macmillan,
1986); ch. 1.
2. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
3. A full exposition
of this logic can be found in ibid., ch. 1.
in Internationa]
4. Barry Buzan,
Security Problem
People, States and Fear: the National
Buzan

(London:

1983), ch. 7
(Brighton: Wheatsheaf,
of Security"
"The Interplay of Some Regional
and Subregional
Dynamics
November
Peace
Centre
for
and
Conflict
Research,
paper,
(Conference
Copenhagen,
1987) , pp. 2-8.

Relations

5. Ole Waever,

6. Robert
7 Waever,

Jervis, "Security Regimes",

op. cit., pp. 9-22.

8. Figures

from The Military

Balance

International
1986-87

tegicStudies [IISS], 1986).

Organization

(London:

36, no. 2 (1982):

International

357-78.

Institute

for Stra

9. Chai-Anan

for Security,
and Sukhumbhand
Paribatra,
"Development
Samudavanija
in Durable
for Development:
for Durable Stability in Southeast Asia",
Prospects
Paribatra
and Sukhumbhand
Stability in Southeast Asia, edited by Kusuma
Snitwongse
Asian
Institute of Southeast
Studies,
1987), pp. 22-24.
(Singapore:
10. Sheldon W. Simon, "The Two Southeast Asias and China's
Asian
Security Perspective",
Security

24, no.

5 (1984): 306, 310-11; and Bernard K. Gordon,

Indochina
"The Third
Foreign Affairs 65, no. 1 (1986): 66-85.
in the New Ocean
11. Barry Buzan, A Sea of Troubles? Sources of Dispute
Regime, Adelphi
143 (London:
IISS, 1978).
Paper
in the Third
in Regional
12. Noordin
"ASEAN
and Regional
Security
Security",
Sopiee,
Survey

Conflict",

World:
Ayoob
13. Buzan
14. The

Case

Asia and
Studies from Southeast
(London: Croom Helm,
1986), p. 229.
and Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 17-18, 158.
Asian
has
Northeast
security
complex

beyond
Suzuki,
1988) .

the scope of this paper. There

"Japan and Western
Europe m

the Middle

some

East,

unusual

is a fuller assessment

the Superpower

Security

edited

by Mohammed

that are

characteristics
in Barry
System"

Buzan

and Yuji

(unpublished,

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

16 Barry Buzan
15. Buzan

and

Rizvi,

op. cit, p. 11.

and Goliaths:
"Davids

Power Security Relations

Small Power-Great
and Takashi Tajima, China
Survey 23, no. 3 (1983): 312-13;
and Southeast Asia: Strategic Interests and Policy Prospects, Adelphi Paper 172 (London:
IISS, 1981), pp. 9-10.
W. Simon,

16. Sheldon

in Southeast

Asia",

Asian

Asias
and China's
"The Two Southeast
Simon,
Security
Perspectives",
and Goliaths",
"Davids
Simon,
24, no. 5 (1984): 526-27;
p. 304; Tajima,
Australian
Outlook
Southeast
Asia?",
op. cit., pp. 21-26; and J.L.S. Girling, "A Neutral
27, no. 2 (1973): 127-29.
and Tajima, op. cit., pp. 17-21.
18. Simon, "The Two Southeast Asias",
pp. 523-25, 527-30;
of ASEAN
19. Shee Poon Kim, "A Decade
1967-77", Asian
Survey 17, no. 8 (1977): 92-95.
17

W.

Sheldon

Asian

Survey

R. Keylor, The Twentieth

1984), p. 390.
21. Gordon,
op. cit., pp. 68-69.

20. William

Century

World

(New York: Oxford

Press,

University

"The Two Southeast

Asias",
and Goliaths",
"Davids
Simon,
pp. 310-311;
Peter Calvocoressi,
World Politics Since
1945, 4th edition
(London:
Long
pp. 526-33;
man,
op. cit., p. 15.
1982), pp. 19-20; and Tajima,
23. Simon, "Davids
and Goliaths",
pp. 312-33.

22.

24.

Simon,

Ibid., pp. 309-10; Kim,

Southeast Asias",

Two

and US

Neutrah'sm
Policy
25. Tajima,
26. Girling,
27

1975), pp.
op. cit., p. 30.
op. cit., p. 124.

S. Ross,

Robert

Sukhumbhand

"Indochina's
Paribatra,

Asia"

1987), pp. 4-7

"Davids

Simon,

Barry

Institute
D.C.. American
Enterprise
(Washington
and Girling, op. cit., pp. 125-26.
53-57;

Continuing

Tragedy",

Problems

of Communism

for Public

25, no. 6

87-92.

in Southeast
29.

Policy

Research,

(1986):
28.

"US policy and the

E. Weatherbee,
op. cit., pp. 755, 766; Donald
Asian Survey 18, no. 4 (1978): 411-13; Sheldon W. Simon, Asian

Buzan

University

and Goliaths",

is Senior

ofWarwick,

on
paper, Workshop
Asian
Institute of Southeast

discussant's

(Singapore:

"Leadership
Studies,

and Security
10-12 December

pp. 306-7

Lecturer, Department
United Kingdom.

of International

Studies,

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