Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 5

Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.

122079, June 27, 1997, 274 SCRA


614.
FACTS:
Home Savings Bank and Trust Company (now Insular Life) granted to the Concepcions
a P1,400,000.00 loan. The latter executed in favor of the bank a promissory note and a
real estate mortgage over their property in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thereafter, the bank
unilaterally increased the interest rate from 16% to 21% effective 17 February 1980;
from 21% to 30% effective 17 October 1984; and from 30% to 38% effective 17
November 1984. In 1985, the bank's President demanded from the Concepcions
payment of the arrearages, but the latter failed to pay. The bank finally filed with the
Sheriff of Pasig City a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
that they executed. A notice of sale was issued on 15 May 1986. The Concepcions,
unable to exercise their right of redemption, lost the property to the bank which
consolidated the title over the property and had a new certificate of title issued in the
name of Home Savings Bank and Trust Company. In 1987, the bank executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of Asaje Realty Corporation and a new certificate of title was
issued. Meanwhile, on 29 July 1987, the Concepcions filed an action against Home
Savings Bank, for the cancellation of the foreclosure sale, the declaration of nullity of
the consolidation of title in favor of the bank, and the declaration of nullity of the
unilateral increases of the interest rates on their loan.
ISSUE:
WON the escalation clause in their mortgage contract valid?
HELD:
Some contracts contain what is known as an `escalator clause,' which is defined as one
in which the contract fixes a base price but contains a provision that in the event of
specified cost increases, the seller or contractor may raise the price up to a fixed
percentage of the base. Attacks on such a clause have usually been based on the claim
that, because of the open price-provision, the contract was too indefinite to be
enforceable and did not evidence an actual meeting of the minds of the parties, or that
the arrangement left the price to be determined arbitrarily by one party so that the
contract lacked mutuality. However, the SC generally upheld its validity. Nonetheless,
an escalation clause at bench which gives the bank unbridled right
to unilaterally upwardly adjust the interest on private respondents' loan is
unconscionable, as it would completely take away from mortgagees the right to assent
to an important modification in their agreement, and would negate the element of
mutuality in contracts.
BancoFilipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Hon. Navarro and Del Valle, G.R.
No. L-46591, 28 July 1987, 152 SCRA 346.
FACTS:

Del Valle, the borrower, obtained a loan secured by a real estate mortgage from Banco
Filipino amounting to P41,300.00. Said loan still had more than 730 days to run by
January 2, 1976, the date when CIRCULAR No. 494 was issued by the Central Bank.
Stamped on the promissory note is an Escalation Clause based upon above mentioned
Central Bank circular. In lieu of the said circular, Banco Filipino gave notice to Del Valle
of the increase of interest rate on the loan from 12% to 17% per annum effective on
March 1, 1976. Answering Del Valles query as to why was there an increase in the
interest rate, Banco Filipino wrote a letter in September 24, 1976, stating that it was
increased by virtue of the escalation clause attached to their contract and in lieu of
CIRCULAR No. 494.
ISSUE:
WON Banco Filipino may validly increase the rate of its interest pursuant to the
escalation clause in the contract and in light of Central Bank Circular No. 494, which
was given a retroactive effect in this case?
HELD:
The substantial question in this case is not really whether the Escalation Clause is a
valid or void stipulation, but whether the bank can increase the interest rate on the
LOAN from 12% to 17% per annum under the Escalation Clause. The SC held in the
negative. The escalation clause in the contract provides that the interest rate may be
increased "in the event a lawshould be enacted increasing the lawful rate of interest that
may be charged on this particular kind of loan." Said clause was dependent on an
increase of rate made by "law" alone. Circular No. 494 of the Monetary Board was not
the "law" contemplated by the parties, nor should said Circular be held as applicable to
loans secured by registered real estate in the absence of any such specific indication
and in contravention of the policy behind the Usury Law.
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals and Ambrosio Padilla, G.R. No.
88880, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 536.
FACTS:
In July 1982, Padilla applied for and was granted by PNB, a credit line of 321.8 million,
secured by a real estate mortgage, for a term of two (2) years, with 18% interest per
annum. However, in a span of four months, PNB increased the interest rate, from 18%
to 48%. Padilla, albeit complying with the banks conditions, registered his protests as
regards the increase in the rates. PN insists that said increases are valid and in
pursuant to the escalation clause in the contract which was acceded to by Padilla.
ISSUE:
Whether the bank, within the term of the loan which it granted to the private respondent,
may unilaterally change or increase the interest rate stipulated therein at will and as
often as it pleased?
HELD:

The SC held in the negative. Although Section 2 of PD. No. 116 authorizes the
Monetary Board to prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for loans or renewal
thereof and to change such rate or rates whenever warranted by prevailing economic
and social conditions, it expressly provides that "such changes shall not be made
oftener than once every twelve months." In this case, PNB, over the objection of the
private respondent, and without authority from the Monetary Board, within a period of
only four (4) months, increased the 18% interest rate on the private respondents loan
obligation three (3) times. As pointed out by CA, while Padilla did agree that the interest
rate may be increased during the life of the contract, such increase must be within the
rate allowed by law, but, no law was ever passed in July to November 1984 increasing
the interest rates on loans or renewals thereof. Hence, the subsequent increases from
the 18% interest rate benchmark is held invalid.
BPI v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97178, January 10, 1994, 299 SCRA 223
FACTS:
BPI filed with RTC Pasig a complaint against Ruby Industrial Corporation (RUBY), for
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. RUBY submitted to the trial court a motion for
suspension of the proceedings on the ground that on 1984, SEC issued an Order
placing RUBY under a rehabilitation plan. On 19 December 1984, the trial court issued
an order granting the motion of RUBY and suspended the proceedings. On 31 July
1990, petitioner BPI filed a motion for reopening of the proceedings. However, on 22
August 1990, the trial court denied the motion of BPI, holding that the suspension of
payment applies to all creditors, whether secured or unsecured, in order to place them
on equal footing. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner, which is a secured creditor of respondent RUBY, may still judicially
enforce its claim against the latter which has already been placed by SEC under
rehabilitation?
HELD:
The SC held in the negative. It was already established under existing jurisprudences
that whenever a distressed corporation asks SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but shall stand on
equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so as not to prejudice
other creditors or cause discrimination among them. The rationale behind PD 902-A, as
amended, is to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one
creditor is preferred over the others.

Quintos vs. Beck G.R. No. L-46240, Nov. 3, 1939, 69 Phil 108
FACTS:

Beck is a tenant of Quintos. In their contract of lease renewal, it was stipulated therein
that Quintos gratuitously granted Beck the use of furniture that were specified, provided
that the latter would return it to him once the former required him to do so. In 1936,
Quintos sold the property to the Lopezes. When Quintos was demanding the furniture
back, Beck stated that he could not return the three gas heaters and 4 electric lamps to
Quintos until the end of their lease contract. Before vacating the house, Beck consigned
the furniture to the sheriff when Quintos refused to receive all the furniture on the
premise that they werent complete.
ISSUE:
What kind of contract exists and what are Becks obligations in relation to the said
contract?
HELD:
A contract of commodatumparticulary, that of precariumexists. In precarium, the
permissive use of a movable was granted by the bailor to the bailee on the condition
that the bailor may demand the property loaned at will. IN this case, the baliees
obligation is to return the property loaned.
In this case, Beck was ordered to deliver to the residence of Quintos all the furniture. All
expenses in relation to the safekeeping and delivery of the furniture shall be borne by
defendant.
Emata vs. Intermediate Appellate Court et. Al.G.R. No. L-72714, June 29, 1989, 174
SCRA 464
FACTS:
Emata purchased a car on installment from Violago Motor with a down payment of P
14,982.00 and executed in favor of the seller a promissory note and a chattel mortgage
over the car as security for the payment of the note. The total amount that the petitioner
was supposed to pay was P 72,186.00, with P 57,204.00 as the balance after deducting
the down payment. The total amount payable was P 22,246.00 more than the "list cash
price" of P 49,940.00 for said vehicle. Violago endorsed the promissory note and
assigned the chattel mortgage to Filinvest Credit Corp. upon its payment of the unpaid
balance of the cars list price. Three years later, Filinvest assigned to private respondent
Servicewide Specialists, Inc. the remaining installment balance. Alleging non-payment
of five (5) consecutive installments, Servicewide initiated said case in the RTC for a writ
of replevin or for the payment by petitioner of the remaining balance plus 14% interest
per annum until fully paid. Emata disputes the veracity of the promissory note, stating
that the same was made through fraud, deceit, trickery and misrepresentation; said
chattel mortgage was executed to secure his remaining balance with Filinvest, and that
he had already paid, albeit overpaid, his balance. He avers that the exorbitant rates
given by Filnvest is violative of the Usury Law.
ISSUS:
WON the Law in Usury is still in effect?

HELD:
Usury Law, Act No. 2655, is not applicable thereto. The amount added to the cash price
of the car is what is commonly known as the "time price differential" and not interest
within the meaning of the Usury Law. The law is applicable only in case of a loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credit which is not the case here. The transaction
involved here being admittedly a conditional sale based on an installment plan and not a
loan, it has been held that the alleged increase in the price of the article sold cannot be
considered a mere pretext to cover a usurious loan