Crown Copyright Reserved

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The information given in this document is DOt to be communicated either directly or iodireetJy to the Press, or to aoy persoo not authorized to receive it,;

ARMY Code No.

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A/26/GS Trc Publictztions/3039

LAND OPERATIONS

VOLUME UI-COUNTER REVOLtnUONARY OPERATIONS

PART 3-COUNTER INSURGENCY

This pamphlet (together with Part 1 and Part 2 (Army Code No. 70516» snpersedes Keeping the Peace Part 1 (WO Code No. 9800) and J;_Jart 2 (WO

Code No. 9801). '

By Command of the Defence Council

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MINIsTRY OF DEFENCE 5th January, 1970

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CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

(Applicable to copies supplied with Ministry of Defence approval to Commonwealth and Foreign Governments)

1. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to the recipient Government for Defence purposes only.

2. This information must be accorded the same degree of security protection as that accorded thereto by the United Kingdom Government.

3. This information may be disclosed only within the Defence Department of the recipient Government, except as otherwise authorized by the Ministry of Defence.

AMENDMENTS

Amendment Number By whom amended Date amended


"
- DISTRIBUTION

Regular Army

Services) RAChD,RAPC,RAVC, RAEC, RADC T&AVR ...

Staff College

Joint Services Staff College' RMCS

RMA

Arms Schools

(see Catalogue of Army Publications, Part II) (other than those mentioned below and Women's

, ..

Scale D Scale A Scale C

250 100 100 200 100

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RESTRICTED LAND OPERATIONS

VOLUME ill-COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 3-COUNTER INSURGENCY

CONTENTS

Aim

CHAPTER I-INTRODUCTION

SECTION

1. General The Setting

2. The Basis for Counter Insurgency Action '"

3. Insurgent Threat General

Insurgent Strategy

4. Ingredients of Success for Counter Insurgency

CHAPTER 2-PATTERN OF OPERATIONS

5. The Tactical Concept Basic Tactical Concept Tactical Requirements Methods of Operating

6. Defensive Aspects Aim ...

General Considerations

Defence of Forward Operational Bases Tasks and Responsibilities

7. Offensive Aspects Aim ...

General Considerations Approaching the Objective Withdrawal ...

8. Surprise and Deception Planning

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6 6 7 9

10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 13 15 15

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SECTION

9. Operations Following the Collapse of Local Security Forces

PAGE 16

CHAPTER 3-PACIFICATION OF CONTROLLED AREAS

to. Introduction 17
11. Forward Operational Bases 17
General Requirements 17 e
Occupation ... 18
Defence and Sequence of Build-up 18
12. Establishing Controlled Areas 22
General 22
Securing a New Controlled Area ... 22
Consolidation of a New Controlled Area 24
Defended Villages 24
Battalion and Company Bases 25
Patrols and Ambushes 26
Mobile Reserve 26
Control Measures 27
Records 27
13. Expansion of Controlled Areas 28
14. Cordon and Search 29
15. Search and Clear ... 30
General 30
Sweep Method 31
Fan Patrol Method 31 CHAPTER 4-PATROLS AND AMBUSHES

16. Patrols

General

Infantry Patrols Execution of Patrol Tasks Immediate Support Organization

Patrol Bases

Armoured Patrols

17. Ambushes General Types

32 32 32 33 33 33 34 34

34 34 36

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SECTION

CHAPTER 5-0FFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN DEPTH

18. Introduction

19. Fix and Destroy Operations-Attacking Insurgent Camps or Positions

20. Fix and Destroy Operations-Attacking a Fortified ViUage Setting

The Problem Outline Plan

Preparatory Phase .

Breaching Phase .

Clearing/Searching Phase Withdrawal Phase ... Summary ...

21. Special Operations Border Protection

SAS Squadrons Waterborne Operations

CHAPTER 6-PROTECTION OF MOVEMENT

22. Introduction

23. Protection of Road Convoys

General Considerations .

Precautionary Measures .

Convoy Composition

Possible Sequence of Action Immediate Action if Ambushed Command and Control Summary

24. Picketing Setting

General Considerations Method of Picketing

Use of Other Forces Operating in the Area

25. Protection of Rail Movement General

Command and Control of Individual Trains Communications ...

Precautionary Methods

Follow-up Tactics against Small Insurgent Groups

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52 52 52 53 54 55 57 57 57

58 58 58 58 58

58 58 59 59 59 60

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1. Diagrammatic Illustration of Terminology

2. Assault and Ambush

3. Assault and Block ...

4. Contracting Cordon

5. Encirclement and Attack

6. Fortified Village

7. Clearing a Fortified Village

8. Protection of Convoy from Point A to Point B.

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41
42
44
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VOLUME III-COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 3-COUNTER INSURGENCY

AIM

The aim of Part 3 is to give guidance on the tactics and techniques to be used by security forces when dealing with armed insurgency.

CHAPTER l-INTRODUCfION

SECTION I-GENERAL

1. Before considering the specific doctrine on counter insurgency the reader should have studied Part I of Volume III-Principles and General Aspectswhich covers the doctrine applicable to both internal security and counter insurgency operations.

2. Counter insurgency is the full range of measures-military, para-military, political, economic, psychological and sociological which are undertaken by a government, independently or with the assistance of friendly nations, to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency and restore the authority of the central government. The operations considered in this part are set against the background of revolutionary warfare in its various phases.

3. Terrorism by formed bodies of terrorists or guerillas, an activity which is an integral part of insurgency, is also covered in this pamphlet.

4. When British forces are committed they will probably operate under the

political direction of one of the following:

a. The government of a dependent territory.

b. The national government of the country which has asked for it.

c. The United Nations Organization.

5. It is essential that the legal standing of British troops who are carrying out counter insurgency operations is clearly defined in a directive issued tothe British force commander. This should set out the rights and duties of members of the British forces. Such instructions must be drawn up after consultation with the local government and the Army Legal Services, and if necessary after further reference to the British Government.

The Setting

6. When outside assistance is required by a national government the tendency is for the request for assistance to be delayed in the hope that the situation will improve and that assistance will not in the end be necessary. It is therefore likely that the revolution may even have reached the insurgency stage before British forces are called in. The later they arrive the more difficult will be their task.

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7. On arrival the commander will normally find that he is required to:

a. Provide for the security of his own base.

b. Guard key installations.

c. Control the population, perhaps by curfew, check points, patrols, etc.

d. Provide protection for movement of all kinds.

e. Take offensive action against insurgents in areas adjacent to his base.

f. Take offensive action against insurgents in depth.

g. Maintain a reserve to meet minor contingencies throughout his area and also to react to any larger force such as an insurgent field army from either within or outside the country concerned.

h. Support the national economic and commercial life.

8. A list of priorities must therefore be established. It is most important that a reverse should not be inflicted on the British forces soon after their arrival, not least because of the serious effect it would have on civilian morale.

9. The desire to do everything at once with minimum resources must be balanced against the risk of defeat. The problem for the security force commander will be to decide what proportion of his resources he can afford to allot to the various tasks confronting him. He must decide his priority tasks and allocate his forces accordingly, although as operations develop he will need to revise his priorities.

10. All ranks must understand the political background. Often purely military aims become subservient to political requirements.

11. The outstanding lesson from recent revolutionary wars is that no single programme-political, social, psychological, economic or military-will in itself succeed. It is a combination of all these elements together with a joint government/ police/military approach to the problem, which will counter the efforts of the insurgents, and restore lawful authority.

SECTION 2-THE BASIS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY ACTION

12. A revolutionary war starts if a rebellious minority plans to overthrow the legal government. It can only thrive if the movement in the end gains popular support. It will only succeed if the government and security forces fail to take effective and timely measures.

13. The leaven of revolutionary war is discontent, and whilst the purely _

military operations required to kill or capture the insurgents may well succeed, it .,

is not until the sources of that discontent are removed or rectified that a revolu-

tionary war can be brought to a successful conclusion.

14. Thus counter measures are certain to fail unless there exists a working harmony between the government, indigenous security forces and any friendly forces that come from outside to assist.

15. The aim of our forces is therefore to re-establish stable civil government, which at local level means the normal civil/police system. Unless the police system has already collapsed it is likely to provide the main source of intelligence required both for local and general operations by the security forces. It may happen that the police in their anti-crime role are still efficient but that their intelligence collecting agencies have been penetrated by insurgent sympathizers. Every effort must be made to build up the stability, reliability and effectiveness of the police

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especially their intelligence collecting role. The major task is the re-establishment of a cohesive system of local government rather than the defeat of an enemy.

16. Individual operations must be not only directed to clearing away insurgents to allow the normal civil machinery to operate, but carefully co-ordinated to ensure that the results of military action are fully exploited. In this respect the armed forces must be prepared to give positive help on the civil front to fill any vacuum that may have been created.

SECTION 3-INSURGENT THREAT

General

17. The general points in the make-up of an insurgent were considered in Part 1 and this section gives some additional aspects related to the insurgency and open offensive phases of revolutionary warfare.

18. The insurgent is usually careless of death. He has no mental doubts, is little troubled by humanitarian sentiments, and is not moved by slaughter and mutilation. His upbringing and standard of living make him well fitted to hardship. He requires little sustenance and comfort, and can look after himself. The insurgent has a keen practised eye for country and has the ability to move across it, at speed, on his feet. He is capable of being trained to use modern and complicated weapons to good effect.

Insurgent Strategy

19. Characteristics. The fundamental characteristics of all insurgent planning

are normally that:

a. The campaign will last for many years.

b. The aim is to gain civilian support and to dominate the population area by area.

c. The overall plan will normally be based on three phases: (1) The penetration of government and civil organizations. (2) Intimidation and disruption by terrorism.

(3) Guerilla warfare.

20. Tactics. Insurgent tactics are based on:

a. Flexible, imaginative and unorthodox operations, relying above all on surprise.

b. Offensive action, even when temporarily on the defensive.

c. A high degree of foot mobility.

d. An emphasis on night operations.

e. Detailed preparation before any attack, superior strength and favourable conditions being assured.

f. Frequent use of all types of ambush.

g. Extensive use of booby traps, mines, improvised obstacles, pits, panjis (sharpened, barbed bamboo stakes), caltraps (camouflaged holes containing spikes), zarebas (thorn fences) and field works using locally available material, ie, bunkers, weapon pits with overhead cover, and tunnel systems.

h. Well constructed and defended fortified villages, which usually combine artificial with natural obstacles.

21. The pre-requisites for successful insurgent operations generally are:

a. Popular Support. The movement must gain the support of the civil popula-

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tion because the insurgents depend on the civilians for food, shelter, medical care, informants and recruits. If the government is weak and there are real grievances among the people, skilful propaganda can exploit these to win such support. If support is not forthcoming voluntarily, the insurgents are likely to coerce the population by terrorism and other drastic measures.

b. Strong Leadership. The effective leader must not only be highly trained but a fanatic about his cause. He must be brave, tough, politically astute, cold blooded and ruthless.

c. Good Intelligence. Good intelligence is fundamental for the survival of insurgency. An efficient organization must be established amongst the civil population, the government and the security forces, for only thus will the insurgents obtain the necessary details for their planning, propaganda and A security. .,

d. Suitable Terrain. Bases must be established to provide refuge, administra-

tive, training and production areas. It is likely that these will be in remote

areas such as jungle, bush, swamp or mountains which hamper the full poten-

tial of regular troops and provide good cover from air and ground observa-

tion. In contrast, comparable cover is provided by densely populated areas

which the insurgents may use initially.

e. Outside Support. Revolutionary movements normally require outside support in the form of training facilities, funds, equipment and military supplies. In the insurgency phase troops from other countries friendly to the insurgents may be committed.

SECTION 4-INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY 22. General. This section emphasizes those factors which have a special application to counter insurgency operations.

23. Joint Control. The conduct of counter insurgency operations should be a joint operation and the overall direction should be by joint civil/military operations committees. The military must never lose sight of the paramount importance of a close understanding and co-operation with their civilian counterparts. Although military and political aims often clash, military commanders at all levels must appreciate the necessity at times of subordinating purely military aims to other considerations so that political ends can be achieved.

24. Hearts and Minds. Unless the trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by the government and the security forces the chance of success is greatly reduced. If the people support the government and the security forces the insurgents become isolated and cut off from their supplies, shelter and intelligence.

25. Intelligence. Successful counter insurgency operations depend upon an efficient integrated intelligence organization, planned and controlled on a national basis. Good intelligence is the key to successful operations and is considered in detail in Volume III, Part 1, Chapter 5. Very little of value will be achieved without timely and accurate intelligence, and commanders will often have to plan special operations and take considerable risks to obtain valuable intelligence. Before undertaking military operations against insurgents the district in which they are operating should be thoroughly studied and a dossier prepared by the police intelligence service.

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26. Security of Bases. It is fundamental to the success of counter insurgency operations that all bases are secure, whether it be a major port, installation, airfield, police post or patrol base. All members of the security forces, whatever their tasks, must be trained to take an effective and active part in the defence of installations.

27. Planned Pattern of Operations. Counter insurgency operations must be planned on the basis of systematically regaining control of the country, by the establishment and constant expansion of controlled areas. In many cases a revolutionary movement may deploy a considerable field army in addition to its guerilla forces. This situation creates problems for the security forces; if they disperse to deal with the guerillas they become vulnerable to attack and defeat in detail by the insurgent field army, if they concentrate against the field army they may lose control of the countryside.

28. Seizing and Holding the Initiative. A clear-cut political policy, and offensive action by the security forces, are essential for seizing and holding the initiative. Security forces must be imbued with an aggressive spirit. Every effort must be made to dominate any area in which the security forces are operating.

29. Speed, Mobility and Flexibility. Security forces must be equipped, trained and accustomed to operate for long periods under the same conditions as the insurgents, while full use must be made of air support to provide additional mobility, speed of action, reconnaissance capability and a flexible administrative system.

30. Surprise and Security. The strictest security in planning is essential if surprise is to be achieved. Loss of surprise probably means an unsuccessful operation and at least a temporary loss of initiative.

31-40. Reserved.

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CHAPTER 2-PATTERN OF OPERATIONS SECTION 5-THE TACTICAL CONCEPT

Basic Tactical Concept

41. General. As outlined in Volume III, Part I, Section 24, the basic tactical concept in counter insurgency operations is to regain control systematically of all areas of a country. The methods outlined below, which are enlarged upon in succeeding chapters, are employed to achieve that aim.

42. Use of a Base Area. A base area should initially be secured which is com- a pact, easily defended, virtually free from insurgent interference and based on a • port and/or strategic transport terminal airfield, with all the facilities required to support a campaign. In some circumstances, a tactical transport medium range

(Tac T(MR)) airfield may have to be used initially, but it should be developed to strategic transport specifications as soon as possible.

43. Composition of the Force. The size of British forces committed to any counter insurgency operation will vary; depending on the size there may be a joint force HQ at two star level or above. The main tactical formation, however, will be the brigade. A brigade, or brigades, will be given a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) which may be sub-divided into battalion TAORs. It is unlikely that any brigade could operate successfully without air support.

44. Command. The brigade commander is in overall command of his TAOR, and non-organic helicopters allotted for the tactical support of his ground operations should normally be placed under his operational control. To advise on air problems, the brigade air support officer (BASO), will usually be established at brigade HQ. The BASO will act as the air commander's representative and, when required, as forward air commander.

45. Pacification Operations. The subsequent deployment, outside the base area, described in greater detail in Chapter 3, should be based upon the following outline:

a. Establishment of a Forward Operational Base. Bases should be set up with the aim of regaining control of insurgent dominated areas; these are normally

established at brigade level and if possible located at or adjacent to a seat of local _

government. They should be close to a Tac T (MR) air strip. •

b. TAOR. The TAOR of a brigade should be clearly defined and if possible coincide with a civil district or province. Initially all operations tend to emanate from the base area or forward operational base but, depending on the size of the TAOR, they may ultimately require the establishment of battalion or company bases in order to expand the controlled area or to reach the area for operations in depth.

c. Expansion of Controlled Areas. As soon as the consolidation by the security forces and the civil administration of a controlled area is well under way regular military forces should be launched to undertake operations designed to expand out from the area initially selected. This phase should not be undertaken until it is clear that the area selected for expansion can in its turn be effectively secured, governed and protected by the civilian administration, supported by the security forces.

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d. Battalion/Company Bases. Such bases if needed may be located alongside civil/police HQs, near defended villages, or in the open countryside. Defence arrangements should allow for a large proportion of the force to be out of the base on offensive operations.

e. Close Co-operation with the Civil Administration. The civil administration, which may require reconstruction, will probably need assistance from military forces to develop the controlled areas. Maximum use should be made of local para-military forces for this purpose.

46. Offensive Operations in Depth. While pacification operations are in progress long range penetration operations should be launched to locate, disrupt and destroy hard core insurgents and their bases outside cleared areas. This aspect is considered in Chapter 5.

47. Border Protection. As part of the campaign to win control over an increasing area of the country and to deny outside help to the insurgents it may be necessary to establish some form of control over a land frontier with a foreign power. Depending upon the nature of the threat, border protection may be carried out by locally recruited frontier guards, or it may be necessary to deploy regular forces with the locally recruited frontier guards providing information and early warning. Should the threat be really strong it may be necessary to deploy a high proportion of all the security forces available in a counter penetration role or even, in suitable terrain, to establish a physical obstacle such as wire and minefields supported by surveillance devices and covered by fire.

48. Conclusion. The overall aim of counter insurgency operations is to bring the whole of a country under control by systematically expanding controlled areas. The aim of operations in depth is to locate, disrupt and destroy hard core insurgents outside controlled areas, thereby giving pacification operations a better chance of success. Operations in depth will normally take place concurrently with pacification operations, and it is essential that a proper balance is struck in the allocation of forces between the two types of operations. If too great a proportion of the available force is devoted to operations in depth, the controlled areas may be penetrated and disrupted by the insurgents. Conversely, the insurgents must not be allowed a free hand in remote areas, from which they can launch offensive operations against controlled areas. Although operations in depth are the quickest way of reducing the hard core insurgents, areas covered in such operations will invariably need clearing again as the controlled areas are ultimately expanded.

Tactical Requirements

49. Ground Forces. If success is to be achieved it is essential that sufficient infantry, together with armoury, artillery and other supporting arms, are deployed on the ground. The infantry must be highly trained, acclimatized and masters of the complex modern techniques of electronic aids, air mobility, weapons, communications and fire support as well as being first class in foot mobility over the terrain concerned. This may require many special skills and operational techniques, as for example in jungle or mountainous areas, and considerable additional training may be required to develop both aspects. The infantryman must be a highly trained specialist if he is to outwit and outfight the insurgent.

50. Air Support. The general aspects of air support are considered in Volume III, Part I, Section 13. Although air power in itself does not guarantee success

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in counter insurgency operations the tactical concept relies primarily on it for strategic and tactical movement, heavy fire support and logistic support, with particular emphasis on the use of helicopters in the reconnaissance, armed and support roles. Counter insurgency operations are therefore essentially a joint army/air operation, demanding the closest co-operation between commanders and staffs at every level. Adequate air support is so important because:

a. By means of air logistic support it enables troops on the ground to move lightly equipped and unencumbered by heavy equipment, reserves of ammunition or supplies.

b. It provides mobility in the form of a rapid means of deployment, reinforce-

ment and withdrawal, and limits the insurgents' ability to interfere with a

operations. ..

c. Its flexibility allows surprise to be exploited to the full.

d. It is invaluable for control and reconnaissance.

e. It is the best, the quickest, and in some cases the only method of evacuating casualties.

51. Naval Support. In any area of operations accessible from the sea, such as coastal areas, and terrain where the main means of communication is by inland waterway, support can be provided by naval forces. The types of support and the characteristics of the ships which can provide this support are considered in Volume III, Part 1, Section 12.

52. Co-ordination between the Services. When a brigade is operating as part of a joint force, as will be the case in a forward operational base, the co-ordination of all forms of air and fire support and the control of the low-level air space will be undertaken by the Fire Support Co-ordination Centre (FSCC) and the Brigade Air Support Operations Centre (BASOC).

53. Offensive Action. The tactical concept is essentially offensive from the beginning. The commander must, however, bear in mind the protracted nature of operations, the great boost to morale of success and the corresponding danger of failure. He must avoid acting on too great a scale prematurely and he must ensure that his initial offensive operations are within the capability of the forces he has available.

54. Training. Success in counter insurgency operations is only possible if troops

are highly trained, supremely fit and sufficiently tough, cunning and skilful to .-

outfight the insurgents on their own ground. While full use must be made of a ..

technical superiority in fire power, mobility and equipment, all troops must never-

theless be trained to such a pitch that they are fully confident that man for man

they are better fighters than the insurgents. Training is considered in detail in

Volume III, Part I, Section 25. The two most important training requirements are supreme physical fitness and the ability to shoot accurately at fleeting targets at

short range.

55. Use 0/ Local Armed Forces. It must be accepted that co-operation of any sort with local inhabitants will always constitute a security risk. However, bearing this in mind, the maximum use should be made of loyal military and para-military local forces, i.e. regular forces, regional forces or militia, and village guards, the latter being organized as the campaign develops. Effective use of local forces is dependent on a close understanding of local commanders, their motives, customs, habits, religious attitudes and superstitions, as well as on the standard of training

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and morale of the men themselves. It may be possible to use them as guides within British units. Local forces can be invaluable for the following:

a. Providing topographical information and guides.

b. Gaining information.

c. Providing local knowledge of the habits and methods of the insurgents.

d. Taking over the defence of controlled areas.

e. Watching and protecting borders.

f. Providing liaison officers to British units.

Methods of Operating

56. The main methods of operating in counter insurgency are normally by:

a. Patrols. This subject is considered more fully in Chapter 4. The main aims of patrolling, in either pacification operations or during operations in depth, are:

(1) Reconnaissance; to locate and report insurgent movement. The method employed is normally to discover if certain routes have been used recently by the insurgents and, if they have, to follow up tracks and report on the insurgents' movements.

(2) Harassing; in the form of small scale offensive operations against insurgents as and when encountered. In particular, the raiding of small bases, arms dumps, food sources, and the disruption of movement by ambushing will force the insurgents on to the defensive.

(3) The provision of security and early warning in both the offensive and defensive roles. This may include the securing of helicopter landing zones and artillery positions for subsequent operations.

b. Ambushes. Successful ambushes by security forces are likely to disrupt and demoralize the insurgents to a greater extent than any other type of operation. Ambushing is the favourite tactic employed by the insurgents themselves, and they usually suffer a severe drop in morale when they find that they are being beaten at their own game. The basis for a successful ambush is good intelligence, training and self-discipline. Ambushes offer more scope than any other type of operation for inflicting casualties on the insurgents, and may be carried out by fighting patrols, standing patrols, or as separate operations by forces of up to battalion strength. Ambush techniques, which are described in Chapter 4, are employed extensively in pacification operations, and can also be used to good effect during operations in depth outside controlled areas.

c. Cordon and Search. This is an operation to isolate, and search systematically, an area in which it is suspected that small parties of insurgents, wanted persons, arms, ammunition, explosives, food, equipment or documents may be concealed. This type of operation is most likely to occur during pacification operations and is therefore considered in Chapter 3, Section 14.

d. Search and Clear. This is an operation conducted in an area where it is suspected that the insurgents may be located, possibly in some strength. The aim of the operation is to locate insurgent elements and installations with the object of destroying them or driving them out of the area. When positive information is available, a fix and destroy operation is preferable,

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as it is easier to co-ordinate and offers a better chance of success. As search and clear techniques are employed extensively during pacification operations they are described in Chapter 3, Section 15.

e. Fix and Destroy. This is an operation based on specific intelligence, with the aim of contacting and destroying enemy units, HQs or other installations. Attacks on enemy camps or fortified villages are typical examples. The techniques to be employed are considered in Chapter 5, although the same techniques may often be employed during pacification operations.

f. Counter Penetration. This is the deployment of the security forces in the defence of a border shared with a country assisting the insurgents. Counter penetration operations to meet such a threat are based mainly on patrol and ambush activities.

g. Special Operations. These are conducted when special circumstances exist, eg, to deal with insurgents known to be located in difficult terrain, such as swamp, deep jungle or bush. Specially trained forces in relatively small numbers, such as SAS squadrons, are often suitable for such tasks, which may include border surveillance and the organization and leadership of friendly irregulars or tribesmen. This subject is covered in Chapter 5, Section 21.

SECTION 6--DEFENSIVE ASPECTS

Aim

57. Insurgents will invariably attempt to infiltrate as deeply as possible into government held territory to collect information, dominate the civilian population and interfere with the communications, supplies and movements of the government forces. The aims of defensive operations in counter insurgency must therefore be to:

a. Ensure the security of all base areas.

b. Secure forward operational bases from which offensive operations can be conducted.

c. Secure controlled areas against guerilla interference.

d. Secure the lines of communication within the controlled areas.

e. Prevent reinforcement or assistance from outside getting through to the insurgents.

f. Maintain the economic life of the country.

General Considerations

58. Mobile and Positional Defence. The concept of defensive operations is a combination of mobile and positional defence. This means that what is necessarily static, be it an administrative installation or a friendly village, is put in the best state of positional defence possible, thus freeing regular forces and their supporting arms for mobile aggressive action.

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59. Reserves. Reserves must be maintained at short notice at every level of command and must at all times be prepared to react rapidly to any unexpected insurgent activity.

60. The Threat. In counter insurgency there is no front line or safe rear area and all units must be trained as fighting units. Administrative installations can best be protected by offensive patrolling designed to dominate the area, and to forestall insurgent activity against forward operational bases. All arms and services in forward operational bases must be prepared to contribute to this patrol programme. Reliance on passive security measures will only result in ever increasing commitments.

Defence of Forward Operational Bases

61. Forward operational bases are considered in detail in Chapter 3, Section 11.

Because it will not always be possible to site forward operational bases on easily defensible ground, it may be necessary to move them to a more secure area in the event of a dangerously strong insurgent build-up. This factor should be taken into account during planning.

Tasks and Responsibilities

62. The following is a guide to defensive tasks and responsibilities:

a. Defence of Base Area and Forward Operational Bases. This is primarily the responsibility of regular military forces. Local para-military and militia forces of proven loyalty can be employed to assist the regular forces when the threat has decreased.

b. Security of Controlled Areas. This is normally the responsibility of the established government and local para-military forces, supported by regular military forces acting in a mobile role.

c. Operations in Depth. Operations in depth will normally be undertaken by regular military forces. There will be few occasions when such forces take up a positional defensive attitude in such operations, ie, for the purpose of holding ground. Security must be based on mobility combined with bold offensive action. This subject is considered further in Chapter 5.

63. Whatever the nature of the defensive requirement, operations must be aggressive both by day and by night. This can be achieved by mobility, ambushes, patrols and a high standard of training and individual morale.

SECTION 7-0FFENSIVE ASPECTS

Aim

64. The aims of offensive counter insurgency operations are to destroy the insurgents and to gain the support of the people for the government.

General Considerations

65. Basis for Success. The aims can be achieved by operations designed to keep the insurgents on the move, disrupt their organization, threaten their security, cut off their supplies, weaken them physically, deny them the political support upon which they depend and so throw them on the defensive. Above all it will

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be necessary to separate the insurgents from their civilian supporters, who must be won over from the side of the insurgents to the side of the legal government. As has been repeatedly stressed, this latter aim can be achieved only by the combined effort of the military forces and government agencies working together to a common national plan; nevertheless, successful military operations against the insurgents will have a marked effect on the attitude of the civilian population.

66. Intelligence. Offensive operations will not be successful unless they are

based on reliable information and sound intelligence. A highly efficient integrated civil/military intelligence organization is therefore of paramount importance-this subject is considered in Volume III, Part I, Chapter 5. All troops

must realize the importance of reporting, as accurately as possible, every piece of information which they obtain, both about the insurgent forces and the topo- _ graphy of the country. Within controlled areas, information will come from the _ principal intelligence sources listed in Volume III, Part 1, Section 20. Outside controlled areas the above sources of information can be supplemented by long

range patrolling by SAS, specially trained clandestine forces and by regular

forces.

67. Surprise. When operating amongst a population who may be sympathetic to the insurgents the ability of the security forces to achieve surprise is severely limited. For this reason special measures are necessary to ensure the attainment of surprise. This matter is dealt with in more detail in Section 8.

68. Mobility. Tactical mobility is all important and is achieved mainly by the use of air transport, in particular helicopters. The advantages so obtained are listed in paragraph 50. Too many wheeled vehicles inhibit mobility, and troops must not rely on road movement. They must be trained to move across all types of terrain on foot at speed, taking full advantage of re-supply by air and thus being able to move lightly equipped. In certain areas use can be made of coastal or rivercraft and hovercraft. Inland waterborne movement, however, is always susceptible to ambush. The maintenance of tactical mobility will be one of the priority tasks for engineer units who are likely to be used in the construction and maintenance of airfields, forward air strips, VTOL sites and the opening of land routes.

69. Mobile Reserves. The retention of a highly mobile reserve in the hands of a commander, at any level, is particularly important because it will enable him to react immediately to changing circumstances, and thus maintain the initiative and security of his force. At battalion or higher level such a reserve will normally be air transported. Likely tasks for a mobile reserve are:

a. To maintain the momentum of an attack by dealing with unexpected opposition.

b. To establish an ambush on the insurgents' lines of escape.

c. To pursue or mop-up.

d. To thicken up a cordon at any threatened point.

e. To counter attack if the main body is ambushed, or to help to extricate it.

f. To reinforce the forward operational base.

70. Support helicopters. The advantages of holding support helicopters in forward operational bases are that it reduces the reaction time and thus increases

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the offensive capability of the units supported. The main disadvantages are the loss of flexibility in the use of helicopters and the risk of their loss or damage from enemy ground action. When support helicopters form an essential part of an immediate tactical plan, operational control will be delegated to the ground force commander and tactical control will be exercised by a qualified aviator.

71. Supporting Fire. The following points need consideration:

a. No operations should be undertaken without fire support. Although considerable reliance is placed on air support, the maximum use must also be made of infantry support weapons, armour and artillery within the limitations imposed by the going and the amount of air-lift available.

b. It may be necessary to establish forward mortar and/or artillery gun positions with their own local infantry protection to support operations in depth. In many instances the only way to do this will be to air-lift the equipment into position. Where helicopters or suitable landing sites are not available, mortars and guns may have to be moved using either vehicles or animal transport, or manhandling by troops, possibly assisted by local porters. These methods may prejudice surprise and security.

c. Air support, including FGA and/or armed helicopters, should be on call to support the establishment of the gun or mortar positions, and be available for the subsequent offensive operations.

d. The advantages gained from preparation fire by FGA, armed helicopters, support weapons and armour are the neutralization of the insurgent positions and the reduced risk to our helicopters. The disadvantage may be the loss of surprise.

Approaching the Objective

72. General. One of the main problems associated with mounting offensive operations against insurgents is to introduce a force into the area of operations without giving away the commander's intention. This can usually be overcome by a deception plan and by using one or more of the following:

a. Parachute troops for limited tasks.

b. Helicopters.

c. An indirect land approach by day or by night.

d. Water transport.

73. Parachute Troops. Although parachute troops (possibly using free-fall techniques) can be used for limited tasks or in combination with a land or helicopter approach, the most effective means of achieving tactical mobility and surprise will normally be by the use of helicopters.

74. Helicopters. The following factors on the use of helicopters should be

considered:

a. They are vulnerable to small arms fire particularly at landing sites. When an enemy threat exists at a landing site, the landing site must be secured before helicopters land. This may be achieved by preliminary patrolling by infantry, SAS or local forces. If physical clearance of the landing sites by ground forces is not possible or is undesirable because surprise may be lost, support by air (FGA or armed helicopters) or by guns and mortars must be provided to deal with any enemy attempting to interfere with the landing.

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b. The vulnerability of helicopters may affect the choice of their approach route and flying height.

c. They can operate at night providing that the landing sites are prepared, marked and defended by ground forces.

d. Their use may prejudice surprise in subsequent operations. Any previous reconnaissance and securing of landing sites may also prejudice surprise.

e. An effective initial assault must be made simultaneously at each landing site, otherwise the enemy will disperse, or the landing element will be vulnerable to insurgent counter attack.

f. In large scale' operations where a simultaneous landing at each site is not possible the initial landings must provide a sufficiently strong force to contain the enemy. Subsequent landings must follow quickly. Suitable landing sites of sufficient size for several helicopters to land simultaneously must be available and alternative landing sites or roping areas selected and reconnoitred to give flexibility to the plan.

g. When a unit is given responsibility for an area, the Commander should prepare a large number of landing points and sites for likely future operations and must ensure that these sites are visited by patrols at irregular intervals. h. Helicopter-borne operations should be supported by all available fire support. This includes FGA aircraft, armed helicopters, artillery and mortars. Some mortars or light artillery should be included in the early waves of the assaulting force.

75. Indirect Land Approach. The following must be considered when deciding

on a land approach:

a. An approach by indirect routes is normally necessary in order to avoid the insurgents' protective screen of passive or fortified villages, or chance encounters with locals sympathetic to the insurgents.

b. The assault forces may move on converging axes to the point of concentration for the allotted task, and after completing the mission return to their base by different routes from those previously taken, in order to avoid enemy ambushes. As an example, a battalion might split down into companies or platoons each moving along different routes, provided plans are made to avoid defeat in detail and clashes between each other.

c. Local guides, in addition to reconnaissance elements or SAS, may prove invaluable if their reliability and loyalty can be guaranteed.

d. A night approach is desirable, but if through thick jungle, it is normally essential for success to have:

(1) A broad, clearly defined track, such as a game track or forest boundary, to follow. The danger of ambush or loss of surprise in using such an obvious approach must be weighed against the possible advantages.

(2) Reconnaissance elements or guides who have intimate knowledge of the route.

(3) Night aids.

(4) A high standard of training in movement by night.

76. Water Transport. There may be occasions when a waterborne approach is the best, if not the only, method of approach. Waterborne operations may range from a platoon or company size force using small local rivercraft, to a large

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battalion or brigade force supported by a river assault group, including various types of landing ship, hovercraft and landing craft. This subject is considered in Chapter 5, Section 21.

Withdrawal

77. After an offensive action the assault force withdrawing must expect to be ambushed, as insurgents are particularly quick to react in such circumstances. Furthermore, at this stage of an operation the assault force will be at its most vulnerable, when men are tired and casualties may have been suffered. The following measures should be taken to achieve an orderly withdrawal:

a. The plan for withdrawal must be made as an integral part of the overall plan for the operation.

b. After the assault there must be prompt reorganization, and no subsequent lingering on the objective once prisoners have been rounded up and enemy equipment collected or destroyed.

c. The best method of withdrawal is by helicopter, but the unit routes to the landing zone and the landing zone itself must be secured. Air support cover is normally essential for a helicopter withdrawal and armed helicopters can best provide this.

d. In general, withdrawal routes should be different to those used for the approach.

e. A mobile reserve must be maintained.

SECTION 8-SURPRISE AND DECEPTION PLANNING

78. Surprise. Some of the methods that can be employed to achieve surprise in counter insurgency operations, in addition to the deception methods listed in the next paragraph are:

a. Speed in planning, mounting and execution.

b. Restricting information on a "need to know" basis to achieve good security during the planning stage.

c. Segregation of security forces from civilians.

d. Control of the civilian population by such measures as curfews.

e. Avoiding obvious changes in daily routine or in dispositions before an operation.

f. Making use of bad weather, difficult terrain or the hours of darkness.

g. Making full use of superior mobility through the use of air transport, hovercraft, river and sea-going craft.

h. Devising unusual and unexpected tactics. Operations should not repeat themselves, nor should they present a stereotyped pattern which the insurgents can anticipate.

79. Deception. Deception measures, which must form an integral part of all

operational and administrative plans, fall roughly into two categories:

a. Cover Plans. Tactical and administrative cover plans subtly exposed to insurgent intelligence may disguise the purpose of preparations and movement. Some examples are:

(I) Feeding incorrect information to known insurgent informers, although this must be done with the utmost care.

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(2) Planning operations in conjunction with local forces known to have been penetrated by the insurgent intelligence organization. Skilfully handled this can deceive the insurgents without the local forces realizing they are being used. The operation needs to be carefully handled and its possible benefits must be balanced against building up confidence with local forces.

(3) Deceptive and unco-ordinated movement by several scattered units, followed by a co-ordinated attack on the main objective.

(4) Propaganda leaflet-dropping in one area, followed by offensive operations in another.

(5) Obvious air reconnaissance, air strikes or helicopter movement over one area, followed by offensive operations in another area.

b. Ruses. Ruses based on the idea of appearing to offer an attractive target a which is actually a trap are a form a deception that can be employed by ,.. insurgents and security forces. All successful ruses require ingenuity, cunning

and imagination. A few examples are as follows:

(1) A defended post is apparently evacuated to the extent that it is left vulnerable to a raid, while the evacuated forces return under cover of darkness to take up ambush positions on the approaches.

(2) A small apparently isolated patrol invites attack while a large force waits in ambush to engage the attackers.

(3) The use of vehicles which appear to be attractive targets, but which are actually protected by armour, or have troops concealed within the vehicles. An airborne reserve on call may be required.

SECTION 9-0PERATIONS FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF LOCAL SECURITY FORCES

80. General. The partial or total collapse of local security forces may not permit the immediate or continued implementation of the concept of joint counter insurgency operations, as set out earlier in this Chapter. The action to be taken by outside friendly forces who are operating in support of the legal government under such circumstances is set out below.

81. Partial Col/apse. It is possible that before the arrival of the force, or even after its arrival, insurgent action has resulted in the demoralization of the police

and local military forces, which may be in danger of disintegration. In such a circumstances the intervening forces may have to adopt a purely military role ,.. while urgent steps are taken to regroup and revitalize the police and local military

forces. As soon as this has been achieved the basic concept of joint operations

should be commenced or resumed, as complete success cannot be ensured without

the full support of all the agencies of the country concerned.

82. Complete Collapse. If the local security forces have completely disintegrated before the arrival ofthe force there may be no secure base available for operations in the country concerned. In this event, military operations will have to be undertaken to establish a base area and forward operational bases from which to develop counter insurgency operations according to the concept. The type of military operation undertaken will depend on the availability of resources and the location and terrain of the country concerned.

83-90. Reserved.

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CHAPTER 3-PACIFICATION OF CONTROLLED AREAS SECTION to-INTRODUCTION

91. A controlled area is "an area, not entirely free of the enemy, in which conditions permit the civil administration and police to work effectively in cooperation with the military forces". Although insurgent infiltration into the controlled area is possible, the civil administration supported by the security forces is capable of limiting the insurgents' activities, thereby isolating them from the local population. Major insurgent activity in controlled areas can only be undertaken by them at the risk of the destruction of their forces.

92. Initially controlled areas will be established in and expanded outwards from the base area. When such operations can no longer be easily supported by Tac T(SR) aircraft (including helicopters) from the base area, it will become necessary to establish forward operational bases further afield, where a part of the helicopter force may be based. Forward operational bases will be sited with a view to securing and expanding further controlled areas, and mounting offensive operations in depth.

93. The remainder of this Chapter deals with the mechanics of occupying and defending a forward operational base followed by the establishment, defence and expansion of controlled areas, including the operational techniques to be employed.

SECTION ll-FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASES General Requirements

94. A forward operational base may be defined as an area providing a firm base from which aggressive action against the insurgents can be developed. Its establishment will be undertaken as a joint operation conducted according to the principles and procedures given in the Manual of Joint Warfare, which includes volumes on Concept, Planning and Control, Joint Tactical Communications, Air Transport Support, Amphibious Operations, Offensive Air Support and Air Defence.

95. The doctrine covered in the Manual of Joint Warfare is not repeated here.

The purpose of this Section is to emphasize counter insurgency aspects.

96. The normal requirements and characteristics of a forward operational base

are:

a. It should be a formation base, usually at brigade level, established at a seat of local government. If this is not possible easy access to the centre of local administration is essential.

b. It should be located in an area from which operations can be successfully developed throughout the formation TAOR. Projected pacification operations and operations in depth must be within convenient helicopter range.

c. It must contain a suitable airfield site. In some circumstances a Tac T(SR) airfield may have to suffice initially, but it must be capable of quick development for use by Tac T(MR) aircraft for which it may be necessary to bring in or to airdrop large quantities of engineer plant or stores.

d. The immediate vicinity of the base should be at least temporarily free from insurgent interference.

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e. It should be easily defensible. If it is surrounded by natural obstacles so much the better; if not, the ground of tactical significance that lies outside the immediate perimeter should be controlled.

f. The area of the base must be large enough to accommodate the logistic units and dumps necessary to support the force being deployed, but as small as possible to facilitate its defence.

g. The base should be accessible by road or track so that tracked vehicles and heavy plant can be brought in, probably by a once-only road convoy. This requirement is not always possible to achieve, and more extensive use of air transport may have to be made for bringing in vehicles and plant. In any case a secure landline of communications will probably be impossible,

and would only be used if the strongest precautions had been taken. e

Occupation

97. The occupation of a forward operational base may be entirely peaceful, but if it has to be achieved in the face of some opposition, careful consideration must be given to the method of approach. If a combined air and land approach is employed, it is important to plan the correct balance and to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of the two forces. As an example, it may be necessary for the airfield site to be secured initially by parachute troops, followed by a rapid build-up of air landed forces with some moving by road. Whatever the precise circumstances, the following factors and possible eventualities must be considered:

a. There can be no question of seizing a forward operational base in the face of a strong opposition-this would be an operation of a different nature and would in any case be contrary to the tactical concept. Whether or not parachute troops are employed, the close defence of the airfield should be established as soon as possible.

b. There must be a rapid build-up and a considerable show of strength. Engineers should be brought in early to clear the area of mines and booby traps and to start the reconnaissance of Tac T(SR) or (MR) strips.

c. It is likely that insurgent sabotage stay-behind and reconnaissance parties will begin to operate against the base within a short space of time.

d. In planning the build-up, careful consideration must be given to possible e threats. Infantry supported by armour and/or artillery are likely to be the first requirements, but if there is an air threat some priority may have to be given

to air defence artillery. Engineer plant and stores may also be needed early

to develop the airstrips rapidly.

e. Both the air and land approach operations will need to be carefully planned and executed.

f. It is possible that civil demonstrations against the appearance of foreign troops may take place during the occupation of the base.

Defence and Sequence of Build-up

98. General. The measures outlined below envisage defence against insurgent sabotage, raids or attacks of up to battalion strength, supported by mortars. The defence commitment of the base will be reduced as the surrounding countryside

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is cleared of insurgents and as the controlled area is enlarged by pacification operations. When planning the defence full use must be made of any available RN/Army/RAF and administrative units. Every man capable of bearing arms must be incorporated into the defence organization, and must be fit and trained for combat duties, including patrolling within the base.

99. All-round Defence. Every unit or staff of an administrative installation must be given a sector to defend with arcs of fire, weapon pits, obstacles and patrol areas. Installations must be protected from sabotage and insurgent attacks, special attention being given to items particularly attractive to the insurgent, eg, weapons, ammunition, explosives and parked aircraft. The maximum use must be made of wire, mines, booby traps, alarm systems, illumination, surveillance devices and guard dogs, together with improvised devices such as caltraps. All main and isolated positions must be organized for all-round defence; guard posts and detachments in isolated positions covering approaches to the base must be dug in, with overhead cover, be protected by wire, mines and improvised obstacles, and have reserves of ammunition, supplies and water. A duplicated system of communication between all posts in the base must be established. The use of booby traps can be a two-edged weapon. In a hot humid climate it is essential that early warning devices are checked regularly to ensure they are in working order and the danger of our own troops initiating booby traps during these checks must be appreciated.

100. Command. If the brigade commander assumes personal command of the forward operational base, he and his staff tend to become immersed in detail and are unable to pay as much attention as they should to operations in depth. Someone else is needed to command the base area, as every component of the brigade or its echelons will be there and the co-ordination of the defence and detailed command is a large task. To nominate an infantry battalion HQ gives the wrong priority to offensive operations and reduces the fighting strength of the brigade. The same almost applies to the support regiment HQ, although not to the same extent, as the HQ battery commander will be in the FSCC at brigade HQ and they will therefore have someone at the centre of communications. There is little doubt that a deputy brigade commander would provide the best solution, but he is not on the establishment; and so a specific commander and HQ for the control of the forward operational base must be nominated by the brigade commander dependent on particular circumstances and personalities.

101. Sequence of Build-up. The build-up of the base may take weeks depending on the distances involved and the resources available. The sequence for land forces might be:

a. An air assault by parachute troops and an infantry battalion group.

b. The assumption of overall control of defence by the assault battalion group.

c. A brigade key plan which directs the deployment of units and installations to selected areas.

d. Reception arrangements by the assault battalion group for the follow-up echelons arriving by air.

e. Offensive patrolling by the assault battalion in areas close to the base.

f. The hand over of sectors of the perimeter to follow-up battalion groups.

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g. Frequent clearance searches of the base area and adjacent country by units.

h. The reception of a one-time road convoy.

i. Follow-up battalions patrol in their TAORs offensively.

j. The opening up of an air strip.

k. The assault battalion group may still be primarily concerned with the defence of the base and the provision of the counter attack force.

1. The establishment of a limited initial controlled area.

m. The expansion of the controlled area.

n. The introduction of local military and para-military forces to assist in the defence of the base, in the patrolling of the controlled area and the establishment of defended villages, etc.

o, Operations in depth start concurrently with the establishment of the controlled area.

p. The progressive reduction of the number of infantry required to ensure the security of the base. Initially this will be high, but as soon as the domination of the immediate surrounding area is successful the numbers can be reduced.

102. Defence Problem. The ideal defensive plan should ensure that no insurgent small arms, rockets or mortar fire can damage anything in the base. This will seldom, if ever, be practicable because of the size of the problem. For example if it is assumed that the forward operational base covers an area of approximately 2000 metres by 2000 metres, has one side totally protected by the sea and the insurgents only have mortars with ranges of up to 6000 metres, this still leaves an area of approximately 100 kilometre map squares from which insurgent mortars could be fired and achieve a hit on a part of the base. This illustrates the size of the area around the base that must be converted into a controlled area as quickly as possible. Insurgent rockets may present an additional problem. They have considerably longer ranges than mortars, but due to their inaccuracy they are mainly a harassing threat. Every effort must be made to prevent insurgent small arms from being able to engage aircraft approaching and leaving the airhead or airstrip.

103. Patrolling. While the area of the base itself should be patrolled by any

units located in the base the infantry battalions should be used for offensive _

patrolling in the TAOR in the following ways: _

a. In general, offensive patrolling should extend from the perimeter of the

base out to the limit of the range of enemy mortars and rockets. This patrol-

ling must of course be tied in with, or be part of, the controlled area patrol programme, as described in Section 12. A comprehensive and detailed random

patrol plan will be needed and maximum use must be made of listening devices, detectors and surveillance equipment.

b. Patrols must operate within the range of artillery support and be adept at laying ambushes.

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