BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI) vs. OBIAS, et al.

Facts:
Sometime in 1972, BISUDECO constructed a road which was used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting
sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations.
On October 30, 1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. acquired the assets of
BISUDECO. On April 19, 1993, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents alleging that on March 27, 1993
and April 3, 1993, respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards
and stones across it, preventing petitioners and the other sugar planters vehicles from passing through the
disputed road, thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners of
the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives
of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner contends that
through prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the
properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECOs assets.
Petitioner prayed that respondents be permanently ordered to restrain from barricading the disputed road and
from obstructing its free passage.
RTC ordered respondents, their agents and representatives to cease and desist from placing barricades on the
disputed road.
In their Answer, respondents denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the
construction and the use of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their
knowledge and consent, constructed the disputed road on their properties and has since then intermittently and
discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated protests. Respondents
claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a
government-owned and controlled corporation, and the entire country was then under Martial Law.
Respondents likewise denied that the road has become a public road, since no public funds were used for its
construction and maintenance. Moreover, respondents alleged that with the exception of Edmundo and
Perfecto Obias, they are actual tillers of the ricelands, having acquired their rights over said lands under PD 27.
Edmundo and Perfecto Obias are the owners of the eastern portion of the property on which a portion of the
road going to BISUDECO was constructed. Respondents denied that they barricaded the road.
Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint and with leave of court a Re-Amended Complaint, where it averred, as
an alternative cause of action in the event the lower court does not find merit in its causes of action, that it will
avail of the benefits provided for under Article 649 of the New Civil Code. Petitioner thus demanded from
respondents a right of way over the disputed road for its use.
Respondents filed an Answer to refute petitioners alternative cause of action. Respondents claimed that the
road from the sugarmill to the Maharlika Highway which exits at the Rural Bank of Bula site, had a distance of
only about 15 kilometers; hence, respondents asserted that said road was shorter and was a more appropriate
right of way than the disputed road.
On July 21, 1993, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction ordering the respondents to desist from
constructing barricades across the road.
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was an agreement
between BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, it held that petitioner
did not acquire the same by prescription. The RTC, however, also held that petitioner was entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way as provided for under Article 649 of the New Civil Code upon payment of
proper indemnity to respondents.
Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision. Petitioner contended that: (1) the value of
the land is excessive; (2) the evidence is insufficient to justify the award; (3) the decision is contrary to law and
jurisprudence. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that: (1) the trial court erred in declaring the persons
mentioned in the decisions dispositive portion to be entitled to indemnity for the construction and the use of
the disputed road; (2) BAPCI should not be declared the absolute owner of the disputed road upon full payment
of the indemnity due to the defendants; and (3) the decision failed to award damages.
On September 24, 1997, the RTC denied both motions for reconsideration. The parties then appealed to the CA.

The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the existence
of an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents regarding the construction of the disputed road.
Moreover, the CA also declared that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be
acquired by prescription. The CA likewise affirmed the finding of the RTC that petitioner was entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way upon payment of proper indemnity to respondents. The CA, however,
declared that ownership over the disputed road should remain with respondents, despite the grant of a
compulsory easement. Lastly, the CA deleted the awards to Prudencio Benosa (Benosa) and Clara Padua
(Padua), since the former never claimed ownership of any portion of the lands affected by the disputed road and
the latter was not a party to the proceedings below.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging among others that the CA Decision failed to rule on
the issue of estoppel and laches. Moreover, Benosa and Padua filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
portion of the CA Decision deleting the award of indemnity to them. On March 28, 2006, the CA issued a
Resolution denying the same.

Issue:
1. Whether or not there is an existing agreement between BISUDECO and Respondents
2. Whether or not the principles of prescription, laches and estoppels is applicable in this case
Held:
1. No.
In order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an easement of right-of-way, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to show its right by title or by an agreement with the owners of the lands that said road traversed.
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is established either by law (in which case it is a legal
easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be continuous
or discontinuous. The easement of right of way the privilege of persons or a particular class of persons to
pass over anothers land, usually through one particular path or linen is characterized as a discontinuous
easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Because of this character, an
easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of a title.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.
It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was such an agreement
between BISUDECO and defendants.
The lower court correctly disbelieved the plaintiffs-appellants contention that an agreement existed because
there is simply no direct evidence to support this allegation. BAPCI submitted purely circumstantial evidence
that are not sufficiently adequate as basis for the inference than an agreement existed. By themselves, the
circumstances the plaintiffs-appellants cited i.e., the employment of sixteen (16) relatives of the defendantsappellants; the defendants-appellants unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of the agreement is known
to everyone, etc. are events susceptible of diverse interpretations and do not necessarily lead to BAPCIs
desired conclusion.
2. No.
"It is already well-established that a right of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot be acquired by
prescription."
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the
manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the
existence of such easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the
intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and
depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets
foot on somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of
railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person

passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road
(which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent
easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.
It has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make the right of way a continuous one; it is
only apparent. Therefore, it cannot be acquired by prescription. It was also been held that a right of passage
over another's land cannot be claimed by prescription because this easement is discontinuous and can be
established only by title.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioners trains denotes the existence of an
apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never
acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation, testamentary succession or
contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement because,
under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by title and not by
prescription.
Easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to
the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the
road in dispute has been improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not change its discontinuous
nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code states that
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each case must be decided
according to its particular circumstances.
Philippines, which provides: Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
The eminent jurist, former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, opines that this provision seeks to prevent the
imposition of a burden on a tenement based purely on the generosity, tolerance and spirit of neighborliness of
the owners thereof.
We applied the cited provision to the case in ruling that no easement of right of way was acquired; based on
the evidence presented, the plaintiff-appellant failed to satisfactorily prove the existence of an agreement
evidencing any right or title to use the disputed road. We additionally rejected the plaintiff-appellants
position that it had acquired the easement of right of way through acquisitive prescription, as settled
jurisprudence states that an easement of right of way cannot be acquired by prescription.
We find that the positive mandate of Article 622 of the Civil Code the statutory provision requiring title as
basis for the acquisition of an easement of a right of way precludes the application of the equitable principle
of laches.
This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be
acquired by prescription militates against petitioners claim of laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can
only be acquired by title. On the other hand, as to the issue of estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with the
finding of the CA that petitioner did not present any evidence that would show an admission, representation or
conduct by respondents that will give rise to estoppel.

Goldcrest Realty Corporation v. Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation

Facts:
Petitioner Goldcrest is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Makati City. On April
26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens
into a condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress to manage the condominium project and to
hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which the condominium stands was transferred to
Cypress under Transfer Certificate of Title. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on
the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium registered under Condominium Certificate of Title of the Register
of Deeds of Makati City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled the management
and administration of the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium to the board of directors of
Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and
encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before
the HLURB, seeking to compel the latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove
the structures it built thereon. Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway
between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal
of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress likewise prayed that Goldcrest pay damages for its
occupation of the said areas and for its refusal to remove the questioned structures.
For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the roof decks limited common area by
Section 4(c) of the condominiums Master Deed. It likewise argued that it constructed the contested doors for
privacy and security purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable and
inaccessible to other condominium unit owners.
Upon the directive of HLURB Arbiter San Vicente, two ocular inspections were conducted on the condominium
project. During the first inspection, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the common area fronting the
two elevators on the ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise discovered that Goldcrest constructed a
permanent structure which encroached 68.01 square meters of the roof decks common area.
During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure an alteration approval for the said
permanent structure.
In his Decision, Arbiter San Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. He required Goldcrest, among other things, to: (1)
remove the questioned structures, including all other structures which inhibit the free ingress to and egress
from the condominiums limited and unlimited common areas; (2) vacate the roof decks common areas and to
pay actual damages for occupying the same; and (3) pay an administrative fine for constructing a second
penthouse and for making an unauthorized alteration of the condominium plan.
On review, the HLURB Special Division modified the decision of Arbiter San Vicente. It deleted the award for
actual damages after finding that the encroached areas were not actually measured and that there was no
evidentiary basis for the rate of compensation fixed by Arbiter San Vicente. It likewise held that Cypress has no
cause of action regarding the use of the roof decks limited common area because only Goldcrest has the right
to use the same.
Aggrieved, Cypress appealed to the Office of the President. It questioned the deletion of the award for actual
damages and argued that the HLURB Special Division in effect ruled that Goldcrest could erect structures on the
roof decks limited common area and lease the same to third persons.
The Office of the President dismissed the appeal. It ruled that the deletion of the award for actual damages was
proper because the exact area encroached by Goldcrest was not determined. It likewise held that, contrary to
the submissions of Cypress, the assailed decision did not favor the building of structures on either the
condominiums limited or unlimited common areas. The Office of the President stressed that the decision did
not only order Goldcrest to remove the structures impeding the use of the unlimited common areas, but also
fined it for making unauthorized alteration and construction of structures on the condominiums roof deck.
Cypress thereafter elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which partly granted its appeal. The appellate
court noted that the right of Goldcrest under Section 4(c) of the Master Deed for the exclusive use of the
easement covering the portion of the roof deck appurtenant to the penthouse did not include the unrestricted
right to build structures thereon or to lease such area to third persons. Thus the appellate court ordered the
removal of the permanent structures constructed on the limited common area of the roof deck.
The parties separately moved for partial reconsideration but both motions were denied.

Hence this petition, raising the following issues:

Issue:
1. Whether or not Goldcrest built an office structure on a supposed encroached area in the open space of the roof deck.
2. Whether or not the petitioner impaired the easement on the portion of the roof deck designated as a limited common
area.
Ruling:
1.
Anent the first issue, Goldcrest contends that since the areas it allegedly encroached upon were not actually
measured during the previous ocular inspections, the finding of the Court of Appeals that it built an office
structure on the roof decks limited common area is erroneous and that its directive "to remove the permanent
structures constructed on the limited common area of the roof deck" is impossible to implement.
On the other hand, Cypress counters that the Court of Appeals finding is correct. It also argues that the absence
of such measurement does not make the assailed directive impossible to implement because the roof decks
limited common area is specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed, which reads:
Section. 4. The Limited Common Areas. Certain parts of the common areas are to be set aside and reserved for
the exclusive use of certain units and each unit shall have appurtenant thereto as exclusive easement for the use
of such limited areas:
(c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck by the Penthouse unit on the roof deck.

The Court ruled in favor of Cypress. At this stage of the proceedings, the failure to measure the supposed
encroached areas is no longer relevant because the award for actual damages is no longer in issue. Moreover, a
perusal of the records shows that the finding of the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest built an office structure on
the roof decks limited common area is supported by substantial evidence and established facts, to wit: (1) the
ocular inspection reports submitted by HLURB Inspector Edwin D. Aquino; (2) the fact that the second ocular
inspection of the roof deck was intended to measure the actual area encroached upon by Goldcrest; (3) the fact
that Goldcrest had been fined for building a structure on the limited common area; and (4) the fact that
Goldcrest neither denied the structures existence nor its encroachment on the roof decks limited common
area.
Likewise, there is no merit in Goldcrests submission that the failure to conduct an actual measurement on the
roof decks encroached areas makes the assailed directive of the Court of Appeals impossible to implement. As
aptly pointed out by Cypress, the limited common area of the roof deck is specifically identified by Section 4(c)
of the Master Deed.

2.

Anent the second issue, Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof decks common limited area is for its
exclusive use, building structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons do not impair the subject
easement.
For its part, Cypress insists the said acts impair the subject easement because the same are already beyond the
contemplation of the easement granted to Goldcrest.
The question of whether a certain act impairs an easement is undeniably one of fact, considering that its
resolution requires us to determine the acts propriety in relation to the character and purpose of the subject
easement. In this case, we find no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office of the
President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the limited
common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did Goldcrests act impair the
easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No.
957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the
servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the
easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement
in any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not
necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more

burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the
servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to
cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes
impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions.
First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure were neither necessary for the use
or preservation of the roof decks limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on
the condominiums foundation and on the roof decks common limited area, making the easement more
burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of
the said office structure clearly went beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the
approved condominium project plan and violated Section 4 of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.

Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation v. Joseph Chung

Facts:
Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of which contains a
memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement carried over from the OCT of Encarnacion S. Sandico
declaring that Francisco Hidalgo has the right to open doors in the course of his lot and to pass through the land
of Encarnacion Sandico, until the bank of the estero that goes to the Pasig River, and towards the right of a
Callejon. The annotation does not expressly provide that it will be binding to the heirs and assigns of the parties.
Furthermore, the property of Hidalgo was already subdivided.
The memorandum of encumbrance was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering Sandicos
property until it was acquired by the petitioner. Hidalgos property, on the other hand was eventually
transferred to respondents Joseph, Kia and Cleto all surnamed Chung.
Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on the ground that
the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street which was granted but
the trial court but eventually reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1. WON the can be cancelled by the petitioners who owns the servient estate on the ground that that the dominant
estate has an adequate access to a public road.
2. WON the easement is binding only between Hidalgo and Sandico since the annotation did not expressly provides the
intention to bind their heirs and assigns.
Rulings:
An easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must
refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another
person or tenement. These are established either by law (legal easement) or by the will of the owner (voluntary
easement).
(1) Petitioner itself admitted that the existing easement is voluntary. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway
can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an
easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a
property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. This easement of right of way, like any other contract,
could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. (Art. 631,NCC)
(2) A voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract that is generally effective between the parties, their
heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.