A.

1987 Constitutional Provisions: Article VIII, Section 5 (5)

1. Sec 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
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Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Judicial
Department).
The case in point is Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, G.R. No. L-12426, (Feb. 16, 1959), 105 Phil. 173, wherein
the Supreme Court held that The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere
and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
The summary of the case are as follows:
FACTS: This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio
Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to
the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are
qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar
examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their
being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
HELD: The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office
involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be
rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law
of evidence and procedure
Other cases:
Catu vs. Atty. Rellosa
In the case of Wilfredo Catu vs. Atty. Vicente Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008, respondent who took part in the
conciliation proceedings as punong barangay thereafter appeared as counsels for the defendants in that case. The
Supreme Court held that respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or

employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. As worded, that Rule applies only to
a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
The Supreme Court also made several discussions on the practice of the profession of elective local officials. Section 7 (b)
(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of
their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law
with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7 (b)
(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex
specialibus derogat generalibus.
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the
vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays. jurcda
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their
official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they
may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors,
city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. Since the law itself grants them the authority to
practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need
for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation,
no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est

exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, thesangguniang barangay is
supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government
can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to
the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not
take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to
society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined
as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the
legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his
oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly
WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. (Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, [February 19,
2008], 569 PHIL 539-551)
Marcos vs. Chief of Staff
In the case of Marcos vs. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-4663, L-4671, May 30, 1951, the contention of petitioners was that
respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the former from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the
accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys duly admitted to
practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by Section 17, Article 17 of the
Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows:

"SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any
contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court
in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal
case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. . . .."
The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether the prohibition contained in the above quoted
section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners.
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General CourtMartial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any criminal case
in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not
only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as
established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over
the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended."
Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in courts-martial, the respondents did
not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions for mandamus in these two cases are
denied with costs against the petitioners.

IN RE: MAQUERA
The summary of the case of In re Atty. Leon G. Maquera, B.M. No. 793, (July 30, 2004), are as follows:
FACTS: The District Court of Guam informed the SC of the 2-year suspension of Atty. Maquera from the practice of law in
Guam. The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline
but the notice was returned unserved because Maqueras current address was unknown. The IBP found that Maquera was
admitted to practice law in the Philippines in 1958 and in Guam in 1974.He was suspended in Guam for misconduct, as he
acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an
unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case. Based on the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP
concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that
[Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines. However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his
failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977,
ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a
foreign jurisdiction may likewise be disbarred or suspended in this country for the same infraction?
HELD: Yes.As Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf, the SC required him to show cause why
he should not be suspended or disbarred for said acts. In the meantime, Atty. Maquera was SUSPENDED for 1 YEAR or
until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client's property by exercising the right of redemption
previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492
in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the
client's property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492 the prohibition extends to
sales in legal redemption.
This is also a valid ground for his suspension from the practice of law here as it is violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful
the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found
in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992,
which states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis
of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in
Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in
this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence
of Maquera's unethical acts as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to
defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in
accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases
be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to
appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.
Rule 116, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the
questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason
of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not
available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the
accused.
This must be read in connection with the duties of a lawyer to his client under Canon 14 specifically on Rule 14.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that: A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause,
an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of
its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.