LEADs Act Neg

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T
Domestic refers to activity in the 50 states and DC
Energy Dictionary 7 domestic, 113http://www.photius.com/energy/glossaryd.html#domest
Domestic: See United States.
[CONTINUES]
United States: The 50 States and the District of Columbia.
Note: The United States has

varying degrees of jurisdiction over a number of territories and other political entities outside the
50 States and the District of Columbia, including Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, Johnston Atoll, Midway Islands, Wake Island, and the Northern Mariana
Islands. EIA data programs may include data from some or all of these areas in U.S. totals. For
these programs, data products will contain notes explaining the extent of geographic coverage
included under the term "United States."
Violation- The affirmative decreases surivellance on US persons, not Domestic

Surviellance.
Limits---the explode the topic to include all foreign spying and espionage. This makes it
impossible to get negative ground.
Ground- Their limits explode the topic and make it impossible to gain CP ground
Education- They make it so we do not learn about the
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PTX
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1nc
Obamas all in on TPP, but PC key to bring deal itself across the finish line. And the
TPP key to asia pivot.
Vinik, 15 -- Danny Vinik is a staff writer at The New Republic, New Republic, 4/8/15,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121476/trans-pacific-partnership-foundation-all-futuretrade-deals
A theme runs through these four disagreements: They're overrated. The actual effects of the TPP are exaggerated. Labor
unions warn
about mass job losses and the Obama Administration touts the significant labor provisions in the law, but
the academic evidence largely points to small job losses or gains. The left demands a chapter on currency manipulation
while knowing that the 11 other TPP countries will never accept one without significant restrictions on the
Federal Reserve. Even for Washington, a town where every policy decisions
becomes a massive lobbying free-for-all, the TPP seems overblown. Until, that
is, you consider whats really at stake with the TPP. "I think its larger importance is trying
to establish a new framework under which global trade deals will be done, said
Hanson. Now that the [World Trade Organization] seems to be pretty much ineffective as a form for
negotiating new trade deals, we need a new rubric." Looked at through that lens, it makes sense
why both the unions and the Obama administration have spent so much
political capital on the TPP. If the TPP sets the framework for future trade deals,
it could be a long time before unions have the leverage again to push for a
crackdown on currency manipulation. They understand, as the Obama Administration
and many interest groups do, what much of the media doesn't: The TPP isn't just a 12country trade deal. It's much bigger than that. When I shared this theory with Jared Bernstein, he
began to rethink his position. When you put it that way, I kind of feel myself being pulled back into the initial title of my post, he said. In
other words, if this is the last big trade deal, then perhaps the absence of a currency chapter is a
bigger deal than I thought. If the TPP could determine the course of global trade for
decades to come, then each interest group has a huge incentive to fight for
every last policy concession. It explains why labor and business groups are
putting huge amounts of money into this fight. That money and the
accompanying rhetoric has only made it harder for policy journalists to cut through these
complex debates. It may take decades before we really understand the stakes of the TPP.
LEADS Act is controversial lack of support and debates over MLATs

Schultheis 15 (Ned, Summer Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, WARRANTS IN THE
CLOUDS: HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT THREATENS THE UNITED STATES CLOUD STORAGE
INDUSTRY, Volume 9 Issue 2, CMR)
As previously discussed, a clear indication of Congresss extraterritorial intent is worriedly missing from SCA itself.227 The
language of
the SCA is vague at best, and its legislative history does not give insight as to whether Congress intended
the SCA warrant to apply so broadly when it was First drafted in 1986. The LEADS Act seeks to clarify Congresss intention of the
extraterritorial application of the SCA and to limit the judicial warrants international scope and reach. The courts should not be forced to
interpret the SCA as it is currently written with as much discretion as they are forced to use since the statute is dated and presently insufficient.
The reactions from U.S. Technology Companies and nations abroad from the current SCA warrant interpretation shows that clarification and
limitations on the United States extraterritorial warrant powers on electronic data is necessary going forward.228 Whether the LEADS
Act clarifies the SCA enough or whether it will be passed by the Senate and ratified at all remains to be
seen. In addition, the LEADS Act seeks to improve the MLAT process. The U.S. governments decision to seek an SCA
warrant for the e-mails in Ireland, as opposed to following MLAT procedure for production, was largely based on the MLATs inefficiencies,
especially in matters of high security.229 The LEADS Act would require the Department of Justice to create an online intake form through
which foreign governments could request mutual legal assistance, and it would permit the DOJ to give preference to requests made on-line.230
The LEADS Act seeks to modernize the MLAT process so that countries can more easily obtain evidence abroad through their respective
treaties.'31 However, such computerization of the MLAT requires money, and this is subject to the politics
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of obtaining sufficient federal funding.
Impact is multiple scenarios for conflict throughout asia and east asia impact D
and thumpers dont apply TPP is necessary AND sufficient condition, accesses every
structural check 11 reasons
-
Pivot
Institutions and Rules that moderate and constrain Territorial disputes and escalation
US regional leadership
Perception and credibility of US regional commitment
Perception and Regional credibility of US-Japan alliance effectiveness
Economy
Trade
Economic interdependence
Peaceful china rise and transition
Rule of law
Outweighs US military shift
Economist 14. [11-15-14 --- http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21631797america-needs-push-free-trade-pact-pacific-more-vigorously-americas-big-bet]

TPP into a dauntingly ambitious context. He calls it central to Americas
pivot to Asia, a chance to show the countrys commitment to creating
institutions that moderate territorial disputes, and an opportunity to show emerging
economies (meaning China) what economic rules the global economy should follow. At a
time when there is uncertainty about the direction of the global trading system,
TPP can play a central role in setting rules of the road for a critical region in flux,
he says. The flipside of this is that failure becomes an even bigger risk , which Mr Froman
Mr Froman, the trade tsar, puts
acknowledges. Perhaps in an effort to prod a somnolent, introspective Congress into action, he makes the dramatic claim that failure could mean
America would forfeit its seat at the centre of the global economy. Many
pundits in Washington agree that American leadership in Asia is on the table. Michael Green of
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies says TPP failure would undermine the impression of
the United States as a Pacific power and look like an abdication of
leadership. It would also take pressure off Japan and China to reform their economies . Mireya Sols, a
Japan expert at the Brookings Institution, says it would be a devastating blow to the United
States credibility. Those views are echoed in East Asia. Mr Tay in Singapore says TPP failure
would be a disaster: If the domestic issues of these two countries cannot be resolved, there is
no sense that the US-Japan alliance can provide any kind of steerage for
the region. Deborah Elms, head of the Singapore-based Asian Trade Centre, suggests that so far the American pivot has manifested
itself mainly as an extra 1,000 marines stationed in Australia. Without TPP, all the pivot amounts to is a
few extra boots on the ground in Darwin, she says. Even members of Americas armed forces
are worried. As one senior serving officer in the Pacific puts it, the TPP unites countries that are
committed to a trade-based future, transparency and the rule of law. It is the
model that the United States and Europe have advanced versus that advanced by China. It is an opportunity
to move the arc of Chinese development, or identify it as a non-participant.
Nuclear war
Landay 00 (Jonathan S., National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Knight
Ridder/Tribune News Service, 3-10, Lexis)
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight.
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But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and
even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few,
too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for
five decades in Cold War Europe. Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile, said
Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. We see the
convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized
security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the regions tempers,
President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asias capitals this
month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan,
Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against
Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict
between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international
nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia, with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports
and resources, indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on
trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.
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Block Shit
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PoliticsECPA Reform Unpopular

ECPA reform is a huge political fight
Rosenblatt 14 (Senior writer Seth Rosenblatt covered Google and security for CNET News,
with occasional forays into tech and pop culture. Formerly a CNET Reviews senior editor for
software, he has written about nearly every category of software and app available, Google
cheers growing support for ECPA reform, June 18, http://www.cnet.com/news/google-cheersgrowing-support-for-ecpa-reform/, CMR)
still face a long road ahead. While Google says that it agrees with the 2010 federal appeals court
ruling that declared unconstitutional the portions of ECPA that pertain to email storage, and the reform bill now has a slim
bipartisan majority of support in the House, it still must be voted on by a Congress notorious for its
inaction. Furthermore, the bill is likely to face political opposition from the Justice Department, which has
argued against reform.
The ECPA changes
ECPA reform empirically unpopular GOP resistance

Gross 14 (Grant, Republican gains in Congress would have limited impact on big tech issues,
IDG News Service, Oct 30, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2841572/republican-gains-incongress-would-have-limited-impact-on-big-tech-issues.html, CMR)
Anticipated Republican gains in the U.S. Congress after next Tuesdays election have limited implications for techrelated issues like net neutrality and reform of National Security Agency surveillance programs, with some observers
expecting no huge changes. Many pollsters and prognosticators are predicting Republicans will add to their majority in the House of
Representatives and possibly take over majority control of the Senate, allowing Republicans to set the legislative agenda for the next two years.
In recent years, with split party control in the two chambers of Congress, its been difficult for lawmakers to pass any major pieces of legislation,
particularly involving anything controversial. That may not change with Republican majorities, with many in their ranks resisting new
regulations, with a few exceptions. On many tech issues, however, there isnt a clear partisan breakdown and trade groups have worked to court
lawmakers in both parties. Heres how Republican control of Congress could affect several major tech-related issues. Net neutrality Majority
Republicans in the House have attempted several times in recent years to stop the U.S. Federal Communications Commission from creating net
neutrality rules. Those efforts have gone nowhere, partly because of a Democratic majority in the Senate that supports new rules. If Republicans
take control of the Senate, there may be a new push to stop the FCCs current net neutrality rulemaking proceeding. The Democratic minority in
the Senate would have the numbers to filibuster any legislation, however, and President Barack Obama almost certainly would veto any
legislative efforts to sidetrack the FCCs proceeding. Some observers say they dont expect Congress to focus on the issue, because its in the
FCCs hands. If the FCCs rules dont heavily regulate broadband providers, Republicans in Congress may see little benefit to pushing against net
neutrality rules when their efforts would be unlikely to become law, some observers said. Nearly 4 million people filed comments in the FCCs
net neutrality proceeding and it appears that a large majority of those support net neutrality rules, noted Althea Erickson, policy director at Etsy,
an online marketplace that has supported strong rules. On any attempts to overturn FCC net neutrality rules, advocates and members of the public
would have their back and take that fight to the Senate and the House to protect the rules, Erickson said. The people whove filed millions of
comments at the FCC could easily turn their attention to the folks ... who might try to overturn those protections. That said, if Republicans gain
control of both houses of Congress this year, then maintain that majority, and if a Republican president is also elected in 2016, then net neutrality
rules could be in trouble. Surveillance reform NSA reform isnt a partisan issue, with liberal Democrats joining with Tea Party and libertarianleaning Republicans to push for major changes in surveillance programs. Lawmakers are likely to push for a vote on the USA Freedom Act in a
lame-duck session of the current Congress, following Tuesdays elections. Some of the loudest voices against sweeping reform have come from
Republicans, including Representative Mike Rogers of Michigan. But Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, announced earlier
this year hes leaving Congress to become a radio talk show host. On the other side, the Senate may lose one of its loudest voices for surveillance
reform. Senator Mark Udall, a Colorado Democrat, faces a tough re-election fight. Still, Republican gains in Congress could come from the Tea
Party and libertarian wings of the party, with many new lawmakers generally skeptical of government surveillance programs. I think this is
actually an opportunity for the Republican party in a big way, said Chris Calabrese, senior policy director at the Center for Democracy and
Technology (CDT), a digital rights group that supports surveillance reform. Republicans, by passing surveillance reform, can put their stamp on
privacy and become the libertarian privacy party that core parts of the Republican party would like it to become. CDT and several other
tech groups would also like to see Congress update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to give more
privacy protections for stored electronic communications. The Email Privacy Act, an ECPA reform bill
introduced in the House last year , had 270 cosponsors, more than half of all House members, but failed to move
forward. Tech groups have been pushing for ECPA reform since early 2010, but Congress has failed
to pass legislation.
Huge backlash err neg on empirics

Molly 14 (MS, Over Easy: Reform the ECPA, June 20,
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http://firedoglake.com/2014/06/20/over-easy-reform-the-ecpa/, CMR)
The bill is still stalled out, because the SEC and the IRS have scared off the House leadership. Attempts to
update the law including from Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) have been largely supported by law
enforcement agencies but have faced backlash from some agencies, like the SEC, which as a civil agency relies on subpoenas to
obtain information. At a hearing in April, SEC Chairperson Mary Jo White could not explain why they think paper documents require a warrant,
but yet the SEC doesnt bother with the much higher standard (including judicial review) of a warrant for electronic documents. A big collection
of organizations and companies, including the Center for Democracy and Technology, Free Press, EFF, Fight for the Future, Demand Progress,
and the ACLU got together last year to establish VanishingRights.com, committed to working for a long overdue update to ECPAs archaic
rules. The NSA revelations have helped give House bill 1852 extra momentum, but its important to note that this is separate from the NSA
reform issue. ECPA reform is an effort thats been ongoing for more than ten years, and with more than half
the House now backing it, when will the Congressional leadership finally take it up? The
bill still must be voted on by a

Congress infamous for its inaction, and it is likely to face political opposition from the Justice
Department, which has argued against reform. Im hopeful, but Im not holding my breath!
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PoliticsLEADS Act Unpopular

Plan ensures bruising political fights
The introduction
of the LEADS Act into the Senate floor is a start to clarifying and narrowing the scope of the
SCA.241 However, the LEADS Act is only the beginning of what is a long process of
overhauling data privacy statutes written during the Internets mainstream conception in the Regan-Era. Beyond making
congressional statutes more relevant to modern times, however, the U.S. government must also assist U.S. Technology Companies by updating its
own cross-border processes as well. The U.S. government should take advantage of the technological advances available in order to improve the
efficiency of the international exchange of online information and evidence for criminal proceedings. The world will only continue to become
more and more globally dependent. Issues of crossborder conflict over the exchange of online infor mation will be a
continuously heated issue of contention unless steps are taken now to catch up to the realities of the global
infrastructure of electronic information.
LEADS Act is controversial lack of support and debates over MLATs

As previously discussed, a clear indication of Congresss extraterritorial intent is worriedly missing from SCA itself.227 The
language of
the SCA is vague at best, and its legislative history does not give insight as to whether Congress intended
the SCA warrant to apply so broadly when it was First drafted in 1986. The LEADS Act seeks to clarify Congresss intention of the
extraterritorial application of the SCA and to limit the judicial warrants international scope and reach. The courts should not be forced to
interpret the SCA as it is currently written with as much discretion as they are forced to use since the statute is dated and presently insufficient.
The reactions from U.S. Technology Companies and nations abroad from the current SCA warrant interpretation shows that clarification and
limitations on the United States extraterritorial warrant powers on electronic data is necessary going forward.228 Whether the LEADS
Act clarifies the SCA enough or whether it will be passed by the Senate and ratified at all remains to be
seen. In addition, the LEADS Act seeks to improve the MLAT process. The U.S. governments decision to seek an SCA
warrant for the e-mails in Ireland, as opposed to following MLAT procedure for production, was largely based on the MLATs inefficiencies,
especially in matters of high security.229 The LEADS Act would require the Department of Justice to create an online intake form through
which foreign governments could request mutual legal assistance, and it would permit the DOJ to give preference to requests made on-line.230
The LEADS Act seeks to modernize the MLAT process so that countries can more easily obtain evidence abroad through their respective
treaties.'31 However, such computerization of the MLAT requires money, and this is subject to the politics
of obtaining sufficient federal funding.
10
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PoliticsLink Alone Turns Case

Huge opposition to reform ensures watered-down version of the plan, kills
solvency
Stanley 13 (Mark Stanley is currently an Account Supervisor at Edelman, Five Reasons to
Reform ECPA Now, Sept 4, https://cdt.org/blog/five-reasons-to-reform-ecpa-now/, CMR)
After years of inertia, ECPA reform legislation is moving. In the Senate, Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
and Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) have introduced the ECPA Amendments Act, which passed out of the Judiciary Committee this spring with bipartisan
support and is poised to go to a floor vote this fall. In the House, the Email Privacy Act, introduced by Representatives Kevin Yoder (R-KS) and
Sam Graves (R-GA), now has 137 bipartisan co-sponsors. 5. Were close, but opposition is working to derail reform.
Despite all of the progress on ECPA this year, there have been hurdles. The biggest has been an ongoing attempt
by the SEC to attach a provision to the Leahy-Lee bill that would give regulatory agencies authority to access
digital communications without a warrant. As CDT Senior Counsel Greg Nojeim warns, while the Leahy-Lee bill is a crucial and
long overdue reform, the SEC exception would neuter the bill from a privacy standpoint. The attempts by the SEC to hijack
the Senate bill illustrate an important point: If advocates and all of those who care about digital rights stand on the sidelines this fall
without pushing for clean legislation, we could get stuck with a bad bill or no bill at all. Nows not the time
to sit back its time we finally update ECPA.
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Terror
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1nc
Uniqueness Domestic surveillance successfully checks terror incidents now. Prefer
longitudinal studies.
Boot 13
Max Boot is a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2004, he was named by the
World Affairs Councils of America as one of "the 500 most influential people in the United States in the field of foreign policy."
In 2007, he won the Eric Breindel Award for Excellence in Opinion Journalism. From 1992 to 1994 he was an editor and writer at
the Christian Science Monitor. Boot holds a bachelor's degree in history, with high honors, from the University of California,
Berkeley and a master's degree in history from Yale University. Boot has served as an adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan. He is the published author of Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the
Present. From the article: Stay calm and let the NSA carry on - LA Times June 9 th http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/09/opinion/la-oe-boot-nsa-surveillance-20130609
After 9/11, there was a widespread expectation of many more terrorist attacks on the United States. So far that hasn't
happened. We haven't escaped entirely unscathed (see Boston Marathon, bombing of), but on the whole we have been a lot safer than most security
experts, including me, expected. In light of the current controversy over the National Security Agency's monitoring of telephone calls and emails, it is
worthwhile to ask: Why is that? It is certainly not due to any change of heart among our enemies. Radical Islamists
still want to kill American infidels. But the vast majority of the time, they fail. The Heritage Foundation estimated last year that 50 terrorist attacks on the American
homeland had been foiled since 2001. Some, admittedly, failed through sheer incompetence on the part of the would-be terrorists. For instance, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani American
jihadist, planted a car bomb in Times Square in 2010 that started smoking before exploding, thereby alerting two New Yorkers who in turn called police, who were able to defuse it. But it would be naive to adduce all of our security
more attacks would have succeeded absent the ramped-up counter-terror ism efforts
undertaken by the U.S. intelligence community, the military and law enforcement. And a large element of the intelligence community's
success lies in its use of special intelligence that is, communications intercepts. The CIA is notoriously deficient in human intelligence infiltrating spies into terrorist
organizations is hard to do, especially when we have so few spooks who speak Urdu, Arabic, Persian and other relevant languages. But the NSA is the best in the world at intercepting communications. That is
the most important technical advantage we have in the battle against fanatical foes
who will not hesitate to sacrifice their lives to take ours . Which brings us to the current kerfuffle over two NSA monitoring
programs that have been exposed by the Guardian and the Washington Post. One program apparently collects metadata on all telephone calls made in the United States. Another program
provides access to all the emails, videos and other data found on the servers of major Internet firms such
as Google, Apple and Microsoft. At first blush these intelligence-gathering activities raise the specter of Big Brother snooping on ordinary
American citizens who might be cheating on their spouses or bad-mouthing the president. In fact, there are considerable safeguards built into both
programs to ensure that doesn't happen. The phone-monitoring program does not allow the NSA to listen
in on conversations without a court order. All that it can do is to collect information on the time, date and
destination of phone calls. It should go without saying that it would be pretty useful to know if someone in the U.S. is calling a number in Pakistan or Yemen that is used by a terrorist organizer. As for
success to pure serendipity. Surely
the Internet-monitoring program, reportedly known as PRISM, it is apparently limited to "non-U.S. persons" who are abroad and thereby enjoy no constitutional protections. These are hardly rogue operations. Both programs were
initiated by President George W. Bush and continued by President Obama with the full knowledge and support of Congress and continuing oversight from the federal judiciary. That's why the leaders of both the House and Senate
It's possible that, like all government programs, these could be

abused see, for example, the IRS making life tough on tea partiers. But there is no evidence of abuse so far and plenty of
evidence in the lack of successful terrorist attacks that these programs have been effective in disrupting terror ist plots. Granted
intelligence committees, Republicans and Democrats alike, have come to the defense of these activities.
there is something inherently creepy about Uncle Sam scooping up so much information about us. But Google, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Citibank and other companies know at least as much about us, because they use very similar
data-mining programs to track our online movements. They gather that information in order to sell us products, and no one seems to be overly alarmed. The NSA is gathering that information to keep us safe from terrorist attackers. Yet
somehow its actions have become a "scandal," to use a term now loosely being tossed around. The real scandal here is that the Guardian and Washington Post are compromising our national security by telling our enemies about our
intelligence-gathering capabilities. Their news stories reveal, for example, that only nine Internet companies share information with the NSA. This is a virtual invitation to terrorists to use other Internet outlets for searches, email, apps
to stop or scale back the NSA's special intelligence efforts would amount
to unilateral disarmament in a war against terrorism that is far from over.
and all the rest. No intelligence effort can ever keep us 100% safe, but
Relying on MLATs results in lengthy delays compromises responses to terrorism

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is merit to the U.S. governments argument that the current MLAT process is slow and
subject to political objectives that may not conform to time sensitive investigations of
international matters of concern.233 It is evident Microsoft and Ireland denounce the U.S. governments alleged bypass of the U.S.At the same time, there
Irish MLAT.234 Although the U.S.- Irish MLATs purpose is to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement authorities of both countries in
the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crime through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters,235 and,
traditionally, is the process by which the U.S. government would obtain evidence located in Ireland through a domestic warrant, the U.S.
governments arguments for efficiency in relation to criminal investigation has legitimate backing
in todays post-9/11 era. Criminal investigations on high security matters, such as drug
enforcement or terrorism, need to run smoothly and efficiently because time of the
essence. There is no reason to bog down investigations where critical evidence is
located abroad and risk losing valuable intelligence due to another nations potential political
goals that may be in opposition with the ongoing U.S. investigation in sending the evidence in a timely
manner.
Successful acquisition causes nuclear spoofing extinction

Barrett et al. 13PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie
Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows
Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk InstituteAND
Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research
Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive
Director of Global Catastrophic Risk InstituteAND Kelly Hostetler, BS in
Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global
Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, Analyzing and Reducing
the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,
Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control,
Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor &
Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which
are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects
such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to
collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2
Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes,
including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In
an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or
procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a
nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a
deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of
affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches
nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of
the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.
4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through
development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of
For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and

Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces
survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack.
However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the
other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides
development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack
before suffering damage from the first attack . 5 Many people believe that with the
end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the U nited States and Russia,
accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war.
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the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced . 6 However, it also has
been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the U nited States and Russia has
continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not
actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch
nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could
be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of
attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes
terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks

on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by
the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear
bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the U nited States
and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has
sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the U nited
States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or
exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear
war is significantly higher during U.S.Russian crisis conditions , 15 with the Cuban Missile
loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second,
Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the
There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise

tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely
to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
future, increasing nuclear tensions.
Vigilance link - Strong intel gatherings key to discourages initiation of Nuclear

attacks.
Pittenger 14
US Rep. Robert Pittenger, chair of Congressional Task Force on Terrorism, Bipartisan bill on NSA data collection protects both
privacy and national security - Washington Examiner, 6/9/14, http://washingtonexaminer.com/rep.-robert-pittenger-bipartisanbill-on-nsa-data-collection-protects-both-privacy-and-national-security/article/2549456?
custom_click=rss&utm_campaign=Weekly+Standard+Story+Box&utm_source=weeklystandard.com&utm_medium=referral
This February, I took that question to a meeting of European Ambassadors at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe. During the conference, I asked three questions: 1. What is the current worldwide terrorist threat? 2. What is Americas role in addressing and mitigating this
threat? 3. What
role does intelligence data collection play in this process, given the multiple platforms for attack
including physical assets, cyber, chemical, biological, nuclear and the electric grid? Each
ambassador acknowledged the threat was greater today than before 9/11, with al Qaeda and other extreme Islamist
terrorists stronger, more sophisticated, and having a dozen or more training camps throughout the Middle East
and Africa. As to the role of the United States, they felt our efforts were primary and essential
for peace and security around the world. Regarding the intelligence-gathering, their consensus was, We want
privacy, but we must have your intelligence. As a European foreign minister stated to me, Without U.S. intelligence,
we are blind. We cannot yield to those loud but misguided voices who view the world as void of the deadly and
destructive intentions of unrelenting terrorists. The number of terrorism-related deaths worldwide doubled between
2012 and 2013, jumping from 10,000 to 20,000 in just one year. Now is not the time to stand down. Those who embrace an
altruistic worldview should remember that vigilance and strength have deterred our
enemies in the past. That same commitment is required today to defeat those who seek to destroy us and our way
of life. We must make careful, prudent use of all available technology to counter their sophisticated operations if we
are to maintain our freedom and liberties.
The Disad turns the case via rollback and new civil liberty violations. Status Quo
detection is key.
Clarke 13
(et al; This is the Final Report and Recommendations of The Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies. President Obama ordered a blue-ribbon task force to review domestic surveillance. This report releases the findings
15
File Title
of that group. The report was headed by five experts including Richard Alan Clarke, who is the former National Coordinator for
Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States. Other expert contributors include Michael Joseph
Morell, who was the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and served as acting director twice in 2011 and from
2012 to 2013 and Cass Robert Sunstein, who was the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs in the Obama administration and is currently a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. LIBERTY AND SECURITY
IN A CHANGING WORLD December 12th, 2013 Easily obtained via a google search. https://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F2Fwww.whitehouse.gov
%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocs%2F2013-12
12_rg_final_report.pdf&ei=Db0yVdDjKIKdNtTXgZgE&usg=AFQjCNH0S_Fo9dckL9bRarVpi4M6pq6MQ&bvm=bv.91071109
,d.eXY)
The September 11 attacks were a vivid demonstration of the need for detailed information about the activities
of potential terrorists. This was so for several reasons. First, some information, which could have been useful, was not
collected and other information, which could have helped to prevent the attacks, was not shared among departments. Second, the scale of damage that 21st-century terrorists can inflict is far greater than anything that their
predecessors could have imagined. We are no longer dealing with threats from firearms and conventional explosives, but with the possibility of weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear devices and biological and chemical agents. The damage that such attacks could inflict on the nation, measured in terms of loss of
life, economic and social disruption, and the consequent sacrifice of civil liberties, is extraordinary. The events of September 11 brought this home with crystal clarity. Third, 21st-century terrorists operate within a global
communications network that enables them both to hide their existence from outsiders and to communicate with one another across continents at the speed of light. Effective safeguards against terrorist attacks require the technological
capacity to ferret out such communications in an international communications grid. Fourth, many of the international terrorists that the United States and other nations confront today cannot realistically be deterred by the fear of
punishment. The conventional means of preventing criminal conductthe fear of capture and subsequent punishmenthas relatively little role to play in combating some contemporary terrorists. Unlike the situation during the Cold
War, in which the Soviet Union was deterred from launching a nuclear strike against the United States in part by its fear of a retaliatory counterattack, the terrorist enemy in the 21st-century is not a nation state against which the
United States and its allies can retaliate with the same effectiveness. In such circumstances, detection in advance is essential in any effort to provide for the common defence. Fifth, the threat of massive terrorist attacks involving
If Americans came to believe that we are

preventing such attacks is
beyond the capacity of our government, the quality of national life would be greatly
imperiled. Indeed, if a similar or even more devastating attack were to occur in the future, there would almost surely be an
impulse to increase the use of surveillance technology to prevent further strikes, despite the potentially corrosive effects
on individual freedom and self-governance.
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons can generate a chilling and destructive environment of fear and anxiety among our nations citizens.
infiltrated by enemies we cannot identify and who have the power to bring death, destruction, and chaos to our lives on a massive scale, and that
16
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Block Shit
17
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---Laundry List 2NC Link

The plan creates numerous hurdles for law enforcement: weak MLAT process, U.S.
person exception, and evasion from cross-country providers
Nojeim 14 (Greg, Senior Counsel and Director, Freedom, Security and Technology Project,
LEADS Act Extends Important Privacy Protections, Raises Concerns, Sept 18,
https://cdt.org/blog/leads-act-extends-important-privacy-protections-raises-concerns/, CMR)
it is widely admitted that the MLAT process for trans-border access does not work very
well now. Basically, it is under-resourced and too slow. Recognizing that the MLAT process is the best way to
However,
accommodate the interests of two governments when one country seeks data stored in another country, the LEADS Act includes a number of
sensible improvements to the U.S. MLAT process; improvements that the U.S. can hold up as a model for other countries to emulate. The bill
would require the Department of Justice to create an online intake form through which foreign governments could request mutual legal
assistance, and it would permit the DOJ to give preference to requests made on-line. The bill also would require the DOJ to track and report on its
processing of MLAT requests. These requirements are designed to make MLAT processing more efficient and transparent to the foreign
government seeking the disclosures. The Department of Justice had already sought a $25.1 appropriation to hire more lawyers to handle MLAT
requests it receives and makes. CDT supports this funding request and believes that, should the LEADS Act pass, MLAT funding should be
increased to help DOJ implement the improvements in the bill. The LEADS Act creates one exception to the principle that U.S. warrants are not
sufficient to reach content stored abroad. The bill says that a U.S. warrant, served on a company in the U.S. can force that service provider to
disclose email and other content stored outside the U.S. if the holder of the account is a U.S. person a citizen or lawful permanent resident of
the United States, or a company organized under the laws of the United States or of a state. A savings clause permits the service
provider to seek a modification of the warrant if compliance would put the provider in the position of
violating the law in the place where the data is stored. This U.S. person exception gives us pause. One way to look
at it, and at the bill as a whole, is that it extends the warrant protection to all content stored in the U.S., regardless of citizenship of the account
holder, and it extends the warrant requirement to all content of U.S. persons stored by U.S. companies abroad, while disavowing U.S. claims to
unilaterally obtain the content of non-U.S. persons stored abroad.Looked at that way, the U.S. person exception is not an exception it is a further
extension of the warrant requirement. It will reduce the burden the bill would otherwise place on the MLAT process because MLATs would not
be necessary for content stored abroad in an account a U.S. person had established. On the other hand, the exception may be difficult
to administer. Sometimes, the citizenship or residence of the account holder will be unknown, and
when it is, does the warrant reach that stored content, or not? Also, the exception would seem to create some
odd results. Consider, for example, two people working side-by-side in the U.S., one a citizen and one a
foreign national. The LEADS Act would establish one rule (the extraterritorial warrant) for U.S. law enforcement to
access content that a U.S. provider stores abroad on behalf of the American, and a different rule (the MLAT
process) for the person who sits in the cubical next door, but who happens to be a non-citizen working in the U.S. on a
temporary visa. Also, we have to consider how foreign governments will react. Some adverse consequences would be mitigated because the
LEADS Act would make it clear that data stored in the U.S. could be disclosed only with a warrant. Even if foreign governments copied the
LEADS Acts extraterritorial assertion of authority over data regarding their own citizens, those governments could not unilaterally force U.S.
companies to disclose data stored in the U.S. ECPA already protects that data and requires compliance with the MLAT process, and the LEADS
Act enhances that protection. However, all stakeholders need to think carefully about how the LEADS Act would affect the global balance of
privacy versus government power with respect to data U.S. providers store outside the U.S. for account holders who are not Americans. There is
also a risk that the LEADS Act will increase the pressure for data localization mandates. The bill includes language that puts the Senate on record
as opposing data localization, but it may not be enough. Finally, it is not clear how the bill would apply to providers
who move data to different data centers around the globe in order to balance the burden on their network
and better serve their users. If a load-balancing provider stores a users data at one moment in India, the
next in the U.K., and the next in the U.S., will the U.S. warrant reach the data because the data at some
point comes to the U.S.?
18
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---Evasion 2NC Link

The plan sets a precedent for manipulation and evasion by criminals crushes law
enforcement effectiveness
Bharara 14 (Preet, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, GOVERNMENTS
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES DECISION TO UPHOLD A
WARRANT ORDERING MICROSOFT TO DISCLOSE RECORDS WITHIN ITS CUSTODY
AND CONTROL, July 9, http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/federalbriefmicrosoftcase.pdf, CMR)
4. Policy Considerations Weigh Decisively Against Microsofts Position The policy consequences of Microsofts position further demonstrate that it cannot reflect the
intent of Congress. 14 In
todays digital environment, email and other electronic communications are used
extensively by criminals of all types in the United States and abroad, from fraudsters to hackers to drug
dealers, in furthera nce of violations of U.S. law. The ability to obtain electronically stored information from domestic
service providerspursuant to judi cial authorizat ion as required by the SCAis a fundamental component of
effective modern law enforcement. Yet such information, like the data sought by the Warrant here , can be maintained in any location and moved
around the world easily, at any time and for any reason. Were Microsofts position adopted, the Governments ability to obtain
such information from a provider would turn entirely on whether it happens to be stored here or abroad, even
though the provider, based in the United States, maintains control over the data wherever it is . Such a regime
would be rife with potential for arbitrary outcomes and criminal abuse. Microsofts own
data storage policy provides but one illustration. According to Microsoft, where a users data is stored depends entirely on which country the user selects when signing
a criminal
user can easily manipulate such a policy to evade the reach of U.S. law enforcement by th e
up for the account. Microsoft does not re quire or verify any actual conn ection between the user and the selected country. As Judge Francis noted,
simple expedient of giving false residence information, thereby causing the [p rovider] to assign his account to a server outside the United States. In re Warrant , 2014
WL 1661004, at *8. 15 Of course, a provider need not base the location where it stores a users data on the users location at allwhether se lf-reported or verified. A
provider may choose to st ore user data abroad, for example, simply to take advantage of lowe r costs associated with foreign server-hosting facilities. Or, on any
given day, a provider might move a particular users data from a U.S.-based server to a foreign server, and perhaps back again, for network maintenance or loadbalancing reasons, which is an increasingly common pr actice with the growth of cloud computing. See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud , 161 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1623, 1629 (May 2013) ([C]loud computing is most freque ntly based on a complete lack of any stable location of data within the cloud providers
network. Data can be in one data cent re at 2pm and on the other side of he world at 4pm. (quoti ng Article 29 Data Prot. Work ing Party, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud
Computing 17, (EC) No. 01037/12, WP 196 (Jul. 1, 2012))). A
provider may even choose to store user data abroad with the
specific intent to place it out of the Governments reach, based, for example, on a desire to avoid the
inconvenience of responding to legal process. Indeed, some providers less scrupulous than Mi crosoft may do so with the specific
intent to accommodate criminal users. See, e.g., United States v. Paunescu , No. 13 Cr. 41 (RPP), Indictment (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2013)
(bringing charges under 18 U.S.C. 1030(b) against operator of bulletproof hosting service, who, in exchange for fees, . . . provided cyber criminals with Internet
Protocol . . . addresses an d servers in a manner designed to enable them to preserve their anonymity and evade detection by law enforcement).
19
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---Delay 2NC Link

Existing policy key to expedience any risk of delay is catastrophic
Another prominent issue of contention was whether Congress intended for the SCA warrant to reach or apply extratcrritorially.76 When Congress
enacted the SCA as part of the ECPA, it did not expressly cover the issue of its extraterritorial application.77 However, even though the
Senate report did not address the specific issue of extraterritoriality, the court felt there reflected an
understanding that information was being maintained remotely by third-party entities.7^ Microsoft argued that the
U.S. Supreme Court previously held that a presumption against extraterritoriality exists when Congress has not given clear indication of an
extraterritorial application within the language of the statute or explicitly noted otherwise.79 However, the court rejected Microsofts
argument. The court stated that the existence of the nationality principle, which recognizes that American criminal laws can apply outside
the United States to legal entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, may require U.S. companies, such as Microsoft, to obtain
evidence located aboard in connection with an ongoing domestic criminal investigation.80 To help its argument on the ambiguity
of Congresss extraterritorial intent for the SCA, the court used other pieces of Congressional legislation
to fill in the holes left by Congress within the SCA statute itself .8' The court looked to the legislative history of the
Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the Patriot Act)
for guidance and found that Section 108 of the Patriot Act allows nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence.82 Specifically,
the House Committee stated the incredible time sensitivity of suspected terrorists criminal proceedings
rationalized the expansion of national search warrants .83 The House Committee was focused on the
potentially devastating investigative delays caused by the cross-jurisdictional nature of the
Internet.84 The Patriot Act allows a warrant under 2703 to reach throughout the United States, so long as the ISP was located within the
United States.88 Therefore, it does not matter where the actual server that stored the electronic information (emails, etc.) was located.86 The
court interpreted the focus on the location of the ISP as opposed to the location of the actual server as evidence that Congress had anticipated
that an ISP located in the United States would be obligated to respond to a warrant issued pursuant to section 2703(a) by producing information
within its control, regardless of where that information was stored.87 Based on the courts interpretation of congressional
legislative history, the court ultimately upheld the SCA warrant forcing Microsoft to disclose the e-mails
located in Dublin, Ireland.
20
File Title
---MLATs 2NC Link

No precedent for reliance on MLATs only results in delays and resource
overstretch
Microsoft contends that extraterritorial application of the SCA allows the United States to bypass its MLAT obligation to Ireland and to obtain
emails without going through the proper request channels.132 According to Microsoft, the United States avoided asking for permission to obtain
emails held within Irish borders altogether and instead, demanded Microsoft to produce the e-mails without Irish consent.133 In response, the
U.S. government claimed that nowhere is there a law that mandates the U.S. government to obtain evidence
located in foreign nations through the MLAT process when other legal measures exist to appropriately
obtain that evidence.134 More importantly, the U.S. government argued that the MLAT process was, if anything, an
impractical method of obtaining the pertinent evidence in the ongoing investigation.135 Ultimately, the court
affirmed the Magistrate Judges opinion that it made little sense to require the U.S. government go
through the U.S.-Irish MLAT process.136 Chief Judge Prcska agreed with Magistrate Judge Francis that in drafting the
SCA, Congress likely did not intend the U.S. government go through the time consuming and
inefficient MLAT process to obtain overseas documents and information located on domestic ISPs .137
The court found reliance on MLAT process alone was not necessary, as the process is excessively dependent
on mutual cooperation between nations who could have varying political and judicial agendas, which runs
counter to the time sensitive nature of ongoing criminal investigations.138
MLATs dont work results in excessive delays and to much political variability
Microsofts cavalier retort to these practical concernsthat the Government can simply use an MLAT whenever
records are unavailable through the SCA (Br. 27- 30)hardly suggests a satisfactory alternative . As an initial matter,
Microsofts rosy view of the efficacy of the MLAT process bears little resemblance to reality.
In contrast to an SCA warrant, which can be served upon a provider immediately upon issuance by a
judge, an MLAT request typically takes months to process, with the turnaround time varying
widely based on the foreign countrys willingness to cooperate, the law enforcement resources it has to
spare for outside requests for assistance, and the procedural idiosyncrasies of the countrys legal system .
See, e.g. , In re Grand Jury Subpoenas , 318 F.3d 379, 381-82 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that foreign countrys response to MLAT request was still
incomplete after two years); United States v. Safavian , 644 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 n.5 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting the long length of time that frequently is
required to acquire evidence by way of an MLAT). It is no accident that federal law specifi cally provides for an ex clusion of time under the
Speedy Trial Act (for up to a year), as well as the suspension of a crim inal statute of limitations (for up to three years), while the Government is
waiting to receive foreign evidence in response to an MLAT request. See 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(8) & 3292.
Providers will evade MLATs by exceeding territorial jurisdiction direct disclosure

is best
21
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are many countries in the world that do not even have MLATs with the United States. A U.S.
provider could easily choose to locate its user data in such a country, either for business reasons or for the specific
purpose of evading the reach of U.S. law enforcement . By the same token, a U.S. provider couldagain, for
legitimate or illegitimate reasonsdistribute the contents of a single user account across computers maintained in
dozens of countries, making it practically impossible for the Government to collect the account data
through international channels, regardless of whether the countries involved have MLATs or not. As Judge Francis observed,
it is even conceivable that a provider could establish server locations at sea or otherwise beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of any nation. In re Warrant , 2014 WL 1661004, at *9. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended
for su ch obstacles to thwart the Government from obtaining evidence of criminal activity, particular ly when the providers involved
often can, like Microsoft, easily disclose the relevant data thr ough their info rmation systems in the United
States, no matter where the original copy happens to reside.
Moreover, there
MLATs weak and beyond repair risks years of delay, compromising law
enforcement response
Hill 15 (Jonah Force, writes on Internet policy and cybersecurity issues, and formerly served in
the White House Office of the Cybersecurity Coordinator and as a Cybersecurity Teaching
Fellow at Harvard, Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age, Jan 28,
http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/, CMR)
But the MLAT system has struggled to keep pace with globalized data. The number of MLAT requests has
skyrocketed and the matters they concern have grown vastly more complex. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) estimates that over
the past decade the number of MLAT requests for assistance from foreign authorities has increased by nearly 60 percent, and the number of
requests for computer records has increased ten-fold. Many of todays MLATs were drafted before globalized data and
therefore do
not address core questions of data jurisdiction, like how to treat data held overseas by a
subsidiary of a domestic parent company. Perhaps most significantly, many MLATs do not effectively address fundamental issues
like notions of privacy versus law enforcements need for evidence. For example, MLATs frequently do not specify what
constitutes protected data or under what conditions content differs from metadata for the purposes
of information sharing. This hinders cooperation between states with differing domestic
understanding of these terms. The increase in MLAT requests and legal uncertainty surrounding privacy and data
protection regulations have significantly delayed the MLAT process. The Presidents Review Group on Intelligence and
Communication Technologies (the independent review board tasked with assessing U.S. intelligence collection practices following Snowden)
estimates that it takes an average of ten months for DOJ to process MLAT requests, and can take
years. Foreign countries MLAT requests are similarly drawn out, and can take far longer. Such delays
are unacceptable to law enforcement officials who urgently need information. Unsurprisingly, impatient
prosecutors are looking for MLAT alternatives. However, those prosecutors and their governments must be mindful of the potential long-term
consequences of those alternatives, particularly adverse consequences to the functioning of the Internet itself.
MLATs bad Months of delay and whims of foreign governments

Kerr 14 (Orin, Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor at The George Washington University
Law School, where he has taught since 2001, What legal protections apply to e-mail stored
outside the U.S.?, July 7, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/07/07/what-legal-protections-apply-to-e-mail-stored-outside-the-u-s/, CMR)
I gather that is the same reason why DOJ doesnt want to go through the alternative of Mutual Legal Assistance . Its
not that Irish law is more privacy protective. My understanding is that in Ireland, where the e-mails are stored, e-mails are disclosed to law
enforcement when the e-mails will likely . . . be of substantial value to the investigation and it must be in the public interest that they be
produced, having regard to the likely benefit to the investigation and the circumstances under which the person in possession of the documents
holds them. Some folks who work in this area have suggested to me that this is actually somewhat lower than the U.S. probable cause standard. I
gather the problem from DOJs perspective is that mutual legal assistance takes a really long time from what
the order of several months and it often gives the foreign governments various
discretionary calls as to whether they will go agree to hand over the data. Given that time is often
critical in criminal investigations, that kind of delay and uncertainty presumably is a big problem from
the governments perspective.
I hear, on
22
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MLATs fails squo is preferable

DOJ made a policy choice to seek a warrant rather than using the MLAT process, based in large part on
concerns about the efficacy of the MLAT system and the potential for a drawn-out waiting period . In its brief
to the District Court supporting the warrant, the government argued, [i]n contrast to an SCA warrant [the statutory form of warrant issued],
which can be served upon a provider immediately upon issuance by a judge, an MLAT request typically takes months to process, with the
turnaround time varying widely based on the foreign countrys willingness to cooperate, the law enforcement resources it has to spare for outside
requests for assistance, and the procedural idiosyncrasies of the countrys legal system. The Federal Magistrate ruling in support of the
governments issuance of the warrant likewise noted that the slow and laborious MLAT procedures placed such a
substantial burden on the government as to necessitate other means of retrieval . In other words, the
government, the Federal Magistrate, and the District Court all rejected Microsofts contentions and
accepted the view that MLAT did not offer a satisfactory means of obtaining evidence and a warrant was
a necessary alternative, notwithstanding extraterritoriality concerns.
23
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CP
Text: The United States federal government should pass comprehensive reforms to
MLATs including a substantial increasing in funding and establishing online request
forms.
The counterplan institutes key reforms to streamline MLATs dramatically
improves law enforcement cooperation
V. Policy Recommendations These MLAT alternatives
are potentially harmful to a robust and free Internet, and could

be rendered unnecessary by appropriate MLAT reforms like the following. A. Increase MLAT funding
Insufficient resources are a primary cause of MLAT backlogs . The United States must spend more money to
make MLATs work for foreign law enforcement. Americas recent $24 million in new funding was
necessary but insufficient. More MLAT requests will come in as criminal prosecutions increasingly focus
on digital evidence. The United States is also entitled to expect other countries to spend more to expedite
responses to American requests. Realistically, other nations must recognize that American prosecutors will turn to warrants like in
Microsoft if their MLAT requests gather dust in foreign justice ministries. B. Issue unilateral guidelines for direct data requests Governments
should issue unilateral, self-binding guidelines to limit prosecutors authority to bypass an applicable MLAT and compel production of electronic
records stored outside their own jurisdiction. For instance, when the information sought is particularly sensitive (perhaps political or financial
information) governments should unilaterally require that prosecutors use MLAT procedures. Further, once increased resources (recommendation
#1) speed up the MLAT process, governments ought to consider instituting a first use constraint, requiring that law enforcement agencies try in
good faith to use to the MLAT process prior to pursuing direct access. A first use constraint, of course, is likely to be politically palatable only
among nations that adopt parallel reciprocal procedures. C. Streamline the MLAT process The MLAT review process should be
reformed and streamlined. There are no online submission forms for MLAT requests today.
MLATs must either be submitted by paper or by email to relevant authorities in a slow and cumbersome
process. All nations with MLATs should create an online submission form and guide. As the Presidents Review Group has noted, the
current MLAT process also contains multiple, often redundant, request reviews. For instance, the U.S. DOJs Office of
International Affairs and the U.S. Attorneys Office must conduct separate, independent reviews. Such redundancies should be
reevaluated for efficacy and necessity. D. Adopt industry-wide legal interpretations for data requests Major technology and Internet
firms should seek industry-wide consensus on how to interpret national and international law on data collection from law enforcement authorities.
This industry-wide statement will not necessarily alter the way in which governments seek to access data, but it will give law enforcement a sense
of the types of requests that will be challenged versus the types of requests that are broadly seen as appropriate. This could help avoid
unnecessary legal and political confrontations.[2] E. Renegotiate existing MLATs Tech sector innovation and data globalization has complicated
former notions of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, agreement can be reached on key terms and principles in a sufficiently broad way as to avoid
bottlenecks in the MLAT process. These key terms and principles must be incorporated into updated MLAT agreements. To ensure that MLATs
keep pace with changing technologies, provisions dealing with data issues should be revisited frequently within multi-national working groups.
[3] V. Conclusion Reforming the MLAT system is tremendously important to inter-state law enforcement
cooperation and the future of the global Internet more generally. If left unreformed, or reformed poorly, law enforcement and
jurisdictional battles among and between governments and tech nology firms could place yet another strain
on the already stressed global Internet system. By contrast, developing updated and efficient MLATs could
pay enormous dividends, not only for law enforcement as it faces enormous international challenges, but also by serving as
confidence-building measures as sovereign nations take on the task of resolution of other, even more difficult,
global Internet policy challenges. The question is whether or not governments will take the steps necessary to expedite and modernize the MLAT
system before alternatives do irreversible damage to the international system.
24
File Title
Solvecy/Inherency
25
File Title
Squo Solves
No retaliation or risk to competitiveness its exaggeration that glosses over existing
protections
Microsoft asserts that, unless the Government is required to use MLATs to obtain data stored abroad, U.S. foreign
relations will be damaged and other countries will retaliate by asserting jurisdiction over electronic data
stored here. (Br. 29). Aside from being purely speculative, such concerns are exclusively for the consideration
of the political br anches and do not provide a sound basis to graft extra-statutory restrictions on duly enacted legislation.
See generally Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co. , 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by
the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or d ecision.). They do not provide a basis for challenging enforcement of a
warrant validly issued under the SCA. Microsoft also argues that, unless its position is adopted, the U.S. tech nology
sector stands to lose overseas customers who fear the U.S. Governments extraterritorial access to their user information. (Br.
30). However, an SCA warrant permits the Government to access user info rmationwherever it may be
storedonly after a neutral magistrate judge has found probable cause to believe that the info rmation
contains evidence of criminal activity. This is a time-tested manner by which the Government obtains
evidence in criminal prosecutions, and nothing could be farther from an unchecked exercise of power . The
form of legal process at issue is specifically designed to protect legitimate privacy interests , by requiring that a
ny intrusion on those interests be properly justified by the need to uncover evidence of a crime.
Existing protections solve

Additionally, the
current extraterritorial application of the SCA warrant does not allow the U.S. government
to obtain electronic information from anyone for any reason. There are constitutional measures in place , in
particular the Fourth Amendment that requires the U.S. government to show before a judge probable cause for
issuing the SCA warrant. To establish probable cause, the U.S. government must establish the individual
in question is suspected of illegal activity and that obtaining the e-mails located abroad is vital to the
ongoing investigation.236 The extraterritorial application of the SCA would not unduly expand the power
of the U.S. government to freely obtain any electronic info rmation from anybody it so chooses. However, there
are serious problems with allowing the U.S. government to bypass the MLAT process altogether. Instead, the U.S. government has chosen to take
an expansive interpretation of a dated statute to allow the U.S. government to obtain electronic evidence without the consent or even request of
the foreign nation where the electronic evidence is stored."37 It was able to do this because the SCA is so vague to begin with and therefore can
be construed widely. The courts had little choice but to uphold the extraterritorial application of the SCA warrant based on current legislation.
26
File Title
No SolvencyCircumvention
DOJ will circumvent the plan
Rash 15 (Wayne, U.S. Bill Would Ban DoJ Warrant for Email in Overseas Microsoft Server,
2-14, http://www.eweek.com/cloud/u.s.-bill-would-ban-doj-warrant-for-email-in-oversearsmicrosoft-server-2.html, CMR)
However, if the LEADS Act were to be passed and signed by President Obama, there would be little choice. But of course that's the issue for
not hesitated to carry out actions of questionable legality, such

as ignoring existing treaties to gain access to foreign emails . Would President Barack Obama sign the LEADS Act?
the current administration, which so far has
Considering the level of support in both houses of Congress, he might realize that he has no choice, but the president might also dare Congress to
override his veto. However, I don't think a veto for this bill is likely. It has strong bipartisan support in both houses. It's also presented as a way to
update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to reflect current technology, which the Obama administration has consistently said it favors.
The act is also presented as a way to keep U.S. companies from breaking the law, which is pretty difficult for the president to oppose. "Law
enforcement agencies wishing to access Americans' data in the cloud ought to get a warrant," Coons explained when the act was introduced, "and
just like warrants for physical evidence, warrants for content under ECPA shouldn't authorize seizure of communications that are located in a
foreign country. "The government's position that ECPA warrants do apply abroad puts U.S. cloud providers in the position of having to break the
privacy laws of foreign countries in which they do business in order to comply with U.S. law. This not only hurts our businesses' competitiveness
and costs American jobs, but it also invites reciprocal treatment by our international trading partners," Coons said. While there's every reason to
believe that eventually federal prosecutors' demands that Microsoft disgorge emails stored abroad will be found contrary to existing law, the
LEADS Act removes all doubt. Attempting to extend the reach of U.S. domestic laws to apply anywhere in the world is one of the worst
types of overreach. This law would
rein in the DoJ's excesses. Assuming, of course, the DoJ didn't decide to
ignore that law as well.
27
File Title
Competitiveness
28
File Title
Generic 1nc
Competitiveness inevitable U.S. can absorb innovation from anywhere
Beckley, Harvard International Security Program research fellow, 2012
(Michael, Chinas Century? Why Americas Edge Will Endure, International Security 36.3,
lexis)
In theory, globalization should help developing countries obtain and absorb advanced technology. In practice, however, this may not occur because some of the
knowledge and infrastructure necessary to absorb certain technologies cannot be specified in a blueprint or contained within a machine. Instead they exist in peoples
minds and can be obtained only through hands-on experience. The World Bank recently calculated that 80 percent of the wealth of the United States is made up of
intangible assets, most notably, its system of property rights, its efficient judicial system, and the skills, knowledge, and trust embedded within its society. If this is the
case, then a huge chunk of what separates the United States from China is not for sale and cannot be copied. Economies and militaries used to consist primarily of
physical goods (e.g., conveyor belts and tanks), but today they are composed of systems that link physical goods to networks, research clusters, and command
Developing countries may be able to purchase or steal certain aspects of these systems from
abroad, but many lack the supporting infrastructure, or absorptive capacity, necessary to integrate them
into functioning wholes. 73 For example, in the 1960s, Cummins Engine Company, a U.S. technological leader, formed joint ventures with a Japanese
centers. 72
company and an Indian company to produce the same truck engine. The Japanese plant quickly reached U.S. quality and cost levels while the Indian plant turned out
second-rate engines at three to four times the cost. The reason, according to Jack Baranson, was the high degree of technical skill . . . required to convert techniques
skill can lead to

significant productivity differences even when two countries have access to identical hardware.
Compared to developing countries such as China, the U nited States is primed for technological
absorption. Its property rights, social networks, capital markets, flexible labor laws, and legions of
multinational companies not only help it innovate, but also absorb innovations created elsewhere . Declinists liken the
and produce new technical drawings and manufacturing specifications. 74 This case illustrates how an intangible factor such as
U.S. economic system to a leaky bucket oozing innovations out into the international system. But in the alternative perspective ,
the United States is more

like a sponge, steadily increasing its mass by soaking up ideas, technology, and people from the rest of the
world. If this is the case, then the spread of technology around the globe may paradoxically favor a
concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States.
STEM shortage means US competitiveness is unsustainable

Waldron 12 [Travis, reporter for ThinkProgress.org at the Center for American Progress Action
Fund, REPORT: How Americas Falling Share Of Global College Graduates Threatens Future
Economic Competitiveness, http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/08/21/722571/report-usshare-of-college-graduates-dropped-over-last-decade-compared-to-china-india/]
The United States share
of global college graduates fell substantially in the first decade of the 21st century and
stands to drop even more by 2020 as developing economies in China and India have graduated more college students,
presenting challenges for American workers ability to remain competitive in a global economy in
the future. The U.S. share of college graduates fell from nearly one-in-four to just more than one-in-five from 2000 to 2010, according to The
Competition That Really Matters, a report from the Center for American Progress and The Center for the Next Generation: From 2000 to 2010,
the U.S. share of college graduates fell to 21% of the worlds total from 24%, while Chinas share climbed to 11% from 9%. Indias rose more
than half a percentage point to 7%. Based on current demographic and college enrollment trends, we can project where each country will be by
2020: the U.S. share of the worlds college graduates will fall below 18% while
and nearly 8% respectively.
Chinas and Indias will rise to more than 13%
No impact to US competitiveness- its all hype

Krugman 11 [Paul, Nobel Prize-winning economist, professor of Economics and International
Affairs at Princeton University, received his B.A. from Yale University in 1974 and his Ph.D.
from MIT in 1977. He has taught at Yale, MIT and Stanford. At MIT he became the Ford
International Professor of Economics, The Competition Myth, 1-24-11,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/opinion/24krugman.html?_r=0]
Meet the new buzzword, same as the old buzzword. In advance of the State of the Union, President Obama has telegraphed his main theme:
competitiveness. The Presidents Economic Recovery Advisory Board has been renamed the Presidents Council on Jobs and Competitiveness.
And in his Saturday radio address, the president declared that We can out-compete any other nation on Earth. This may be smart politics.
Arguably, Mr. Obama has enlisted an old clich on behalf of a good cause, as a way to sell a much-needed increase in public investment to a
public thoroughly indoctrinated in the view that government spending is a bad thing. But lets not kid ourselves: talking about
competitiveness as a goal is fundamentally misleading. At best, its
a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it
29
File Title
could lead to policies based on the false idea that whats good for corporations is good for
America. About that misdiagnosis: What sense does it make to view our current woes as stemming from lack of competitiveness? Its
true that wed have more jobs if we exported more and imported less. But the same is true of Europe
and Japan, which also have depressed economies. And we cant all export more while importing less, unless we can find another planet to
sell to. Yes, we could demand that China shrink its trade surplus but if confronting China is what Mr. Obama is proposing, he should say that
plainly. Furthermore, while America is running a trade deficit, this deficit is smaller than it was before the Great Recession began. It would help
if we could make it smaller still. But ultimately, were
in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because

American companies have lost their ability to compete with foreign rivals. But isnt it at least somewhat useful to
think of our nation as if it were America Inc., competing in the global marketplace? No. Consider: A corporate leader who increases profits by
slashing his work force is thought to be successful. Well, thats more or less what has happened in America recently: employment is way down,
but profits are hitting new records. Who, exactly, considers this economic success? Still, you might say that talk of competitiveness helps Mr.
Obama quiet claims that hes anti-business. Thats fine, as long as he realizes that the
interests of nominally American

corporations and the interests of the nation, which were never the same, are now less aligned than ever before.
Take the case of General Electric, whose chief executive, Jeffrey Immelt, has just been appointed to head that renamed advisory board. I have
nothing against either G.E. or Mr. Immelt. But with fewer than half its workers based in the United States and less than half its revenues coming
from U.S. operations, G.E.s fortunes have very little to do with U.S. prosperity. By the way, some have praised Mr.
Immelts appointment on the grounds that at least he represents a company that actually makes things, rather than being yet another financial
wheeler-dealer. Sorry to burst this bubble, but these days G.E. derives more revenue from its financial operations than it does from manufacturing
indeed, GE Capital, which received a government guarantee for its debt, was a major beneficiary of the Wall Street bailout. So what
the administrations embrace of the rhetoric of competitiveness
does
mean for economic policy? The favorable interpretation, as
I said, is that its just packaging for an economic strategy centered on public investment, investment thats actually about
creating jobs now while promoting longer-term growth. The unfavorable interpretation is that Mr. Obama and his advisers really believe that the
economy is ailing because theyve been too tough on business, and that what America needs now is corporate tax cuts and across-the-board
deregulation. My guess is that were mainly talking about packaging here. And if the president does propose a serious increase in spending on
infrastructure and education, Ill be pleased. But even if he proposes good policies, the fact that Mr. Obama feels the need to wrap these policies
in bad metaphors is a sad commentary on the state of our discourse. The financial crisis of 2008 was a teachable moment, an object lesson in
what can go wrong if you trust a market economy to regulate itself. Nor should we forget that highly regulated economies, like Germany, did a
much better job than we did at sustaining employment after the crisis hit. For whatever reason, however, the teachable moment came and went
with nothing learned. Mr. Obama himself may do all right: his approval rating is up, the economy is showing signs of life, and his chances of reelection look pretty good. But the ideology that brought economic disaster in 2008 is back on top and seems likely to stay there until it brings
disaster again.
Competitiveness not key to heg

Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he
teaches International Relations theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political
Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge
University Press) April 2014 p. 14-17
At the same time, the debate on unipolar durability is almost exclusively focused on
differential rates of economic growth and their determinants. Will China continue to grow faster
than the United States, or will its economic development slow down or even stall? When
will China's economy overtake that of the United States? What can the United States do to
boost its own pace of economic growth? Although these are important questions in their
own right, they are nearly irrelevant for the durability of U.S. military power
preponderance. The reason is simple: military power is not a side product of
economic development. Rather, military power is the result of purposeful state
action. Specifically, it is the product of a decision by a state to invest a fraction of the
country's wealth into the production of military capabilities over time. As such, military
power does not necessarily follow from economic growth. Put in the
context of a unipolar world in the nuclear age, this means that - independently from
recurrent arguments about U.S. economic decline - the power preponderance of
the United States is not set to end. But, again, nowhere in the literature do
we have an argument laying out the conditions under which a unipolar distribution of
military power is likely to end - or, on the contrary, to endure for a long time even in the
30
File Title
presence of a shifting distribution of economic power. This book sets out to provide one
such theory, refocusing the debate on unipolar durability from differential rates of
economic growth to political decisions to invest in additional military capabilities.
31
File Title
Block Stuff
32
File Title
AT: CompetitivenessHigh/Resilient
Competitiveness durable and free riding solves
Fallows 10 correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, studied economics at Oxford University
as a Rhodes Scholar. He has been an editor of The Washington Monthly and of Texas Monthly,
and from 1977 to 1979 he served as President Jimmy Carter's chief speechwriter. His first book,
National Defense, won the American Book Award in 1981; he has written seven others (James.
How America Can Rise Again, Jan/Feb edition,
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/201001/american-decline)
This is new. Only with Americas emergence as a global power after World War II did the idea of
American decline routinely involve falling behind someone else . Before that, it meant falling
short of expectationsGods, the Founders, posteritysor of the previous virtues of

America in its lost, great days. The new element in the 50s was the constant
comparison with the Soviets, Michael Kazin told me. Since then, external falling-behind
comparisons have become not just a staple of American self-assessment but often a crutch.
If we are concerned about our schools, it is because children are learning more in
Singapore or India; about the development of clean-tech jobs, because its happening
faster in China. Having often lived outside the United States since the 1970s, I have
offered my share of falling-behind analyses, including a book-length comparison of
Japanese and American strengths (More Like Us) 20 years ago. But at this point in
Americas national life cycle, I think the exercise is largely a distraction, and that
Americans should concentrate on what are, finally, our own internal issues to resolve or
ignore. Naturally there are lessons to draw from other countries practices and
innovations; the more we know about the outside world the better, as long as were
collecting information calmly rather than glancing nervously at our reflected foreign
image. For instance, if you have spent any time in places where tipping is frowned on or
rare, like Japan or Australia, you view the American model of day-long small bribes,
rather than one built-in full price, as something similar to baksheesh, undignified for all
concerned. Naturally, too, its easier to draw attention to a domestic problem and build
support for a solution if you cast the issue in us-versus-them terms, as a response to an
outside threat. In If We Can Put a Man on the Moon , their new book about making
government programs more effective, William Eggers and John OLeary emphasize the
military and Cold War imperatives behind Americas space program. The race to the
moon was a contest between two systems of government, they wrote, and the
question would be settled not by debate but by who could best execute on this
endeavor. Falling-behind arguments have proved convenient and powerful in other
countries, too. But whatever their popularity or utility in other places at other times, fallingbehind concerns seem too common in America now. As I have thought about why
overreliance on this device increasingly bothers me, I have realized that its because my
latest stretch out of the country has left me less and less interested in whether China or some other
country is overtaking America. The question that matters is not whether America is falling
behind but instead something like John Winthrops original question of whether it is falling
shortor even falling apart. This is not the mainstream American position now, so let
me explain. First is the simple reality that one kind of decline is inevitable and therefore
not worth worrying about. China has about four times as many people as America does. Someday
its economy will be larger than ours. Fine! A generation ago, its people produced, on
33
File Title
average, about one-sixteenth as much as Americans did; now they produce about
one-sixth. That change is a huge achievement for Chinaand a plus rather than a minus
for everyone else, because a business-minded China is more benign than a miserable or
rebellious one. When the Chinese produce one-quarter as much as Americans per capita,
as will happen barring catastrophe, their economy will become the worlds largest. This
will be good for them but will not mean falling behind for us. We know that for more than a
century, the consciousness of decline has been a blight on British politics, though it has inspired
some memorable, melancholy literature. There is no reason for America to feel depressed about the
natural emergence of China, India, and others as world powers. But second, and more important,
America may have reasons to feel actively optimistic about its prospects in purely relative terms .
The crucial american advantage Lets start with the more modest claim, that China has
ample reason to worry about its own future. Will the long-dreaded day of reckoning for
Chinese development finally arrive because of environmental disaster? Or via the
demographic legacy of the one-child policy, which will leave so many parents and
grandparents dependent on so relatively few young workers? Minxin Pei, who grew up
in Shanghai and now works at Claremont McKenna College, in California, has
predicted in Chinas Trapped Transition that within the next few years, tension between
an open economy and a closed political system will become unendurable, and an
unreformed Communist bureaucracy will finally drag down economic performance.
America will be better off if China does well than if it flounders. A prospering China will mean a
bigger world economy with more opportunities and probably less turmoiland a China likely to be
more cooperative on environmental matters. But whatever happens to China, prospects could
soon brighten for America. The American cultures particular strengths could conceivably be
about to assume new importance and give our economy new pep. International networks will
matter more with each passing year. As the one truly universal nation, the United States
continually refreshes its connections with the rest of the worldthrough languages, family,
education, businessin a way no other nation does, or will. The countries that are
comparably openCanada, Australiaarent nearly as large; those whose economies

are comparably largeJapan, unified Europe, eventually China or Indiaarent nearly
as open. The simplest measure of whether a culture is dominant is whether outsiders
want to be part of it. At the height of the British Empire, colonial subjects from the Raj
to Malaya to the Caribbean modeled themselves in part on Englishmen: Nehru and Lee
Kuan Yew went to Cambridge, Gandhi, to University College, London. Ho Chi Minh
wrote in French for magazines in Paris. These days the world is full of businesspeople,
bureaucrats, and scientists who have trained in the United States. Todays China attracts
outsiders too, but in a particular way. Many go for business opportunities; or because of
cultural fascination; or, as my wife and I did, to be on the scene where something truly
exciting was under way. The Haidian area of Beijing, seat of its universities, is dotted
with the faces of foreigners who have come to master the language and learn the
system. But true immigrants? People who want their children and grandchildren to grow
up within this system? Although I met many foreigners who hope to stay in China
indefinitely, in three years I encountered only two people who aspired to citizenship in
the Peoples Republic. From the physical rigors of a badly polluted and still-developing
country, to the constraints on free expression and dissent, to the likely ongoing
mediocrity of a university system that emphasizes volume of output over independence
or excellence of research, the realities of China heavily limit the appeal of becoming
Chinese. Because of its scale and internal diversity, China (like India) is a more racially
34
File Title
open society than, say, Japan or Korea. But China has come nowhere near the feats of
absorption and opportunity that make up much of Americas story, and it is very difficult to
imagine that it could do sowell, ever. Everything we know
Were lightyears ahead in key sectors

Zakaria 8 (Fareed, Newsweek Editor, International Relations Expert, Host of Fareed Zakaria:
GPS (on CNN), The Future of American Power, Foreign Affairs, May/June)
This difference between the United States and Britain is reflected in the burden of their
military budgets. Britannia ruled the seas but never the land. The British army was sufficiently
small that Otto von Bismarck once quipped that were the British ever to invade Germany, he
would simply have the local police force arrest them. Meanwhile, London's advantage over
the seas -- it had more tonnage than the next two navies put together -- came at ruinous cost.
The U.S. military, in contrast, dominates at every level -- land, sea, air, space -- and spends
more than the next 14 countries combined, accounting for almost 50 percent of global defense
spending. The United States also spends more on defense research and development than the
rest of the world put together. And crucially, it does all this without breaking the bank. U.S.
defense expenditure as a percent of GDP is now 4.1 percent, lower than it was for most of the
Cold War (under Dwight Eisenhower, it rose to ten percent). As U.S. GDP has grown larger
and larger, expenditures that would have been backbreaking have become affordable. The Iraq
war may be a tragedy or a noble endeavor, but either way, it will not bankrupt the United
States. The price tag for Iraq and Afghanistan together -- $125 billion a year -- represents less
than one percent of GDP. The war in Vietnam, by comparison, cost the equivalent of 1.6
percent of U.S. GDP in 1970, a large difference. (Neither of these percentages includes
second- or third-order costs of war, which allows for a fair comparison even if one disputes
the exact figures.) U.S. military power is not the cause of its strength but the consequence.
The fuel is the United States' economic and technological base, which remains extremely
strong. The United States does face larger, deeper, and broader challenges than it has ever
faced in its history, and it will undoubtedly lose some share of global GDP. But the process
will look nothing like Britain's slide in the twentieth century, when the country lost the lead in
innovation, energy, and entrepreneurship. The United States will remain a vital, vibrant
economy, at the forefront of the next revolutions in science, technology, and industry. In
trying to understand how the United States will fare in the new world, the first thing to do is
simply look around: the future is already here. Over the last 20 years, globalization has been
gaining breadth and depth. More countries are making goods, communications technology has
been leveling the playing field, capital has been free to move across the world -- and the
United States has benefited massively from these trends. Its economy has received hundreds
of billions of dollars in investment, and its companies have entered new countries and
industries with great success. Despite two decades of a very expensive dollar, U.S. exports
have held ground, and the World Economic Forum currently ranks the United States as the
world's most competitive economy. GDP growth, the bottom line, has averaged just over three
percent in the United States for 25 years, significantly higher than in Europe or Japan.
Productivity growth, the elixir of modern economics, has been over 2.5 percent for a decade
now, a full percentage point higher than the European average. This superior growth trajectory
might be petering out, and perhaps U.S. growth will be more typical for an advanced
industrialized country for the next few years. But the general point -- that the United States is
a highly dynamic economy at the cutting edge, despite its enormous size -- holds. Consider
35
File Title
the industries of the future. Nanotechnology (applied science dealing with the control of
matter at the atomic or molecular scale) is likely to lead to fundamental breakthroughs over
the next 50 years, and the United States dominates the field. It has more dedicated
"nanocenters" than the next three nations (Germany, Britain, and China) combined and has
issued more patents for nanotechnology than the rest of the world combined, highlighting its
unusual strength in turning abstract theory into practical products. Biotechnology (a broad
category that describes the use of biological systems to create medical, agricultural, and
industrial products) is also dominated by the United States.
36
File Title
AT: CompetitivenessResilient
Competitiveness inevitable U.S. can absorb innovation from anywhere
Beckley, Harvard International Security Program research fellow, 2012
(Michael, Chinas Century? Why Americas Edge Will Endure, International Security 36.3,
lexis)
In theory, globalization should help developing countries obtain and absorb advanced technology. In practice, however, this may not occur because some of the
knowledge and infrastructure necessary to absorb certain technologies cannot be specified in a blueprint or contained within a machine. Instead they exist in peoples
minds and can be obtained only through hands-on experience. The World Bank recently calculated that 80 percent of the wealth of the United States is made up of
intangible assets, most notably, its system of property rights, its efficient judicial system, and the skills, knowledge, and trust embedded within its society. If this is the
case, then a huge chunk of what separates the United States from China is not for sale and cannot be copied. Economies and militaries used to consist primarily of
physical goods (e.g., conveyor belts and tanks), but today they are composed of systems that link physical goods to networks, research clusters, and command
Developing countries may be able to purchase or steal certain aspects of these systems from
abroad, but many lack the supporting infrastructure, or absorptive capacity, necessary to integrate them
into functioning wholes. 73 For example, in the 1960s, Cummins Engine Company, a U.S. technological leader, formed joint ventures with a Japanese
centers. 72
company and an Indian company to produce the same truck engine. The Japanese plant quickly reached U.S. quality and cost levels while the Indian plant turned out
second-rate engines at three to four times the cost. The reason, according to Jack Baranson, was the high degree of technical skill . . . required to convert techniques
skill can lead to

significant productivity differences even when two countries have access to identical hardware.
Compared to developing countries such as China, the U nited States is primed for technological
absorption. Its property rights, social networks, capital markets, flexible labor laws, and legions of
multinational companies not only help it innovate, but also absorb innovations created elsewhere . Declinists liken the
and produce new technical drawings and manufacturing specifications. 74 This case illustrates how an intangible factor such as
U.S. economic system to a leaky bucket oozing innovations out into the international system. But in the alternative perspective ,
the United States is more

like a sponge, steadily increasing its mass by soaking up ideas, technology, and people from the rest of the
world. If this is the case, then the spread of technology around the globe may paradoxically favor a
concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States.
37
File Title
AT: CompetitivenessAlt Cause: STEM

STEM shortage means US competitiveness is unsustainable
Waldron 12 [Travis, reporter for ThinkProgress.org at the Center for American Progress Action
Fund, REPORT: How Americas Falling Share Of Global College Graduates Threatens Future
Economic Competitiveness, http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/08/21/722571/report-usshare-of-college-graduates-dropped-over-last-decade-compared-to-china-india/]
The United States share
of global college graduates fell substantially in the first decade of the 21st century and
stands to drop even more by 2020 as developing economies in China and India have graduated more college students,
presenting challenges for American workers ability to remain competitive in a global economy in
the future. The U.S. share of college graduates fell from nearly one-in-four to just more than one-in-five from 2000 to 2010, according to The
Competition That Really Matters, a report from the Center for American Progress and The Center for the Next Generation: From 2000 to 2010,
the U.S. share of college graduates fell to 21% of the worlds total from 24%, while Chinas share climbed to 11% from 9%. Indias rose more
than half a percentage point to 7%. Based on current demographic and college enrollment trends, we can project where each country will be by
2020: the U.S. share of the worlds college graduates will fall below 18% while
and nearly 8% respectively.
Chinas and Indias will rise to more than 13%
38
File Title
AT: CompetitivenessNo Impact

No impact to US competitiveness- its all hype
Krugman 11 [Paul, Nobel Prize-winning economist, professor of Economics and International
Affairs at Princeton University, received his B.A. from Yale University in 1974 and his Ph.D.
from MIT in 1977. He has taught at Yale, MIT and Stanford. At MIT he became the Ford
International Professor of Economics, The Competition Myth, 1-24-11,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/opinion/24krugman.html?_r=0]
Meet the new buzzword, same as the old buzzword. In advance of the State of the Union, President Obama has telegraphed his main theme:
competitiveness. The Presidents Economic Recovery Advisory Board has been renamed the Presidents Council on Jobs and Competitiveness.
And in his Saturday radio address, the president declared that We can out-compete any other nation on Earth. This may be smart politics.
Arguably, Mr. Obama has enlisted an old clich on behalf of a good cause, as a way to sell a much-needed increase in public investment to a
public thoroughly indoctrinated in the view that government spending is a bad thing. But lets not kid ourselves: talking about
competitiveness as a goal is fundamentally misleading. At best, its
a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it

could lead to policies based on the false idea that whats good for corporations is good for
America. About that misdiagnosis: What sense does it make to view our current woes as stemming from lack of competitiveness? Its
true that wed have more jobs if we exported more and imported less. But the same is true of Europe
and Japan, which also have depressed economies. And we cant all export more while importing less, unless we can find another planet to
sell to. Yes, we could demand that China shrink its trade surplus but if confronting China is what Mr. Obama is proposing, he should say that
plainly. Furthermore, while America is running a trade deficit, this deficit is smaller than it was before the Great Recession began. It would help
if we could make it smaller still. But ultimately, were
in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because

American companies have lost their ability to compete with foreign rivals. But isnt it at least somewhat useful to
think of our nation as if it were America Inc., competing in the global marketplace? No. Consider: A corporate leader who increases profits by
slashing his work force is thought to be successful. Well, thats more or less what has happened in America recently: employment is way down,
but profits are hitting new records. Who, exactly, considers this economic success? Still, you might say that talk of competitiveness helps Mr.
Obama quiet claims that hes anti-business. Thats fine, as long as he realizes that the
interests of nominally American

corporations and the interests of the nation, which were never the same, are now less aligned than ever before.
Take the case of General Electric, whose chief executive, Jeffrey Immelt, has just been appointed to head that renamed advisory board. I have
nothing against either G.E. or Mr. Immelt. But with fewer than half its workers based in the United States and less than half its revenues coming
from U.S. operations, G.E.s fortunes have very little to do with U.S. prosperity. By the way, some have praised Mr.
Immelts appointment on the grounds that at least he represents a company that actually makes things, rather than being yet another financial
wheeler-dealer. Sorry to burst this bubble, but these days G.E. derives more revenue from its financial operations than it does from manufacturing
indeed, GE Capital, which received a government guarantee for its debt, was a major beneficiary of the Wall Street bailout. So what
the administrations embrace of the rhetoric of competitiveness
does
mean for economic policy? The favorable interpretation, as
I said, is that its just packaging for an economic strategy centered on public investment, investment thats actually about
creating jobs now while promoting longer-term growth. The unfavorable interpretation is that Mr. Obama and his advisers really believe that the
economy is ailing because theyve been too tough on business, and that what America needs now is corporate tax cuts and across-the-board
deregulation. My guess is that were mainly talking about packaging here. And if the president does propose a serious increase in spending on
infrastructure and education, Ill be pleased. But even if he proposes good policies, the fact that Mr. Obama feels the need to wrap these policies
in bad metaphors is a sad commentary on the state of our discourse. The financial crisis of 2008 was a teachable moment, an object lesson in
what can go wrong if you trust a market economy to regulate itself. Nor should we forget that highly regulated economies, like Germany, did a
much better job than we did at sustaining employment after the crisis hit. For whatever reason, however, the teachable moment came and went
with nothing learned. Mr. Obama himself may do all right: his approval rating is up, the economy is showing signs of life, and his chances of reelection look pretty good. But the ideology that brought economic disaster in 2008 is back on top and seems likely to stay there until it brings
disaster again.
39
File Title
AT: CompetitivenessHeg D
Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he
teaches International Relations theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political
Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge
University Press) April 2014 p. 14-17
At the same time, the debate on unipolar durability is almost exclusively focused on differential rates of
economic growth and their determinants. Will China continue to grow faster than the United States , or
will its economic development slow down or even stall? When will China's economy overtake
that of the United States? What can the United States do to boost its own pace of economic growth?
Although these are important questions in their own right, they are nearly irrelevant for the
durability of U.S. military power preponderance. The reason is simple: military power is not a
side product of economic development. Rather, military power is the result of
purposeful state action. Specifically, it is the product of a decision by a state to invest a
fraction of the country's wealth into the production of military capabilities over time. As such, military
power does not necessarily follow from economic growth. Put in the context of a
unipolar world in the nuclear age, this means that - independently from recurrent arguments
about U.S. economic decline - the power preponderance of the United States is
not set to end. But, again, nowhere in the literature do we have an argument laying out the
conditions under which a unipolar distribution of military power is likely to end - or, on the
contrary, to endure for a long time even in the presence of a shifting distribution of economic
power. This book sets out to provide one such theory, refocusing the debate on unipolar
durability from differential rates of economic growth to political decisions to invest in additional
military capabilities.
Competitiveness doesnt threaten heg-US leads in R&D, innovation and

corporations.
Cox, London School of Economics IR professor, 2012
(Michael, Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?, International
Relations, December, SAGE)
We also have to judge economic power not only in terms of the size of an economy but also by the
qualitative criteria of competitiveness . Economies like China, India and Brazil are undoubtedly large and will no doubt get larger over time.
But this does not necessarily make them competitive in relationship to most Western countries or the United States. In a 2011 survey, in fact, the
United States came fourth in the world in a group of 15 countries . Moreover, 11 within the 15 were definably Western, while the
other 4 included Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore countries all closely tied to the West and to the United States. As for the BRICs, they came well down the
list. Thus, China came in at 27, India at 51, Brazil at 58 and Russia at 63.66 Other
studies have arrived at not dissimilar conclusions

concerning the qualitative gap that continues to exist between a number of the rising economies and
many of the more established ones, the United States, in particular. In terms of cutting-edge research in science and
technology, for example, the United States continues to hold a clear lead. Indeed in 2008, the United States accounted for 40
per cent of total world research and development (R&D) spending and 38 per cent of patented new technology inventions. More significantly, scientific research
produced in the United States accounted for 49 per cent of total world citations and 63 per cent of the most highly cited articles. The United States also continued to
employ around 70 of the worlds Nobel Prize winners and could lay claim to twothirds of its most cited individual researchers in science and technology.67
Innovation is also an American strength.68 Other countries are clearly beginning to catch up. The United States, however, is still a country that
continues to innovate across the board. Critics would no doubt point to the fact that the United States is slipping down the league table. However, it still ranks fourth in
the world. China meanwhile only came in at 54th in 2009, India at 56th and Brazil and Russia even further behind. Of course, this does not take account of change
over the longer term, or of the fact that a country like China is making a concerted effort to build a more innovative economy.69 But as even the Chinese would
accept, it still has very long way to go. Indeed, in spite of official efforts to encourage what is termed in China a capacity for independent innovation, there remain
several weaknesses in the Chinese political economy. Among the most significant, it has been noted, are poor enforcement of intellectual property rights, an
educational system that emphasizes rote learning over critical thinking, and a shortage of independent organizations that can evaluate scientific progress.70 There is
40
File Title
also wider political restraint as well. Innovation
usually requires open debate, a capacity to challenge established truths

and incentives to think the unthinkable; and none of these, to be blunt, are much in evidence in modern
China today.71 Finally, in terms of global economic power, the United States is still well ahead in one
other vital respect: corporate strength.72 Some of the emerging economies are beginning to catch up, and some of Americas closest allies in
Europe and Asia run it a good second.73 But the United States clearly remains in poll position with American companies in 2011 constituting 4 of the top 10
corporations in the world, 14 of the top 30 and 25 of the top 50. Western companies more generally still outperform all others, with
the United States and the EU together representing 6 out of the top 10 global corporations, 22 out of the top 30 and 37 out of the top 50. Some of the BRIC economies
do have some very large companies with China, unsurprisingly, leading the way with 4 out of the top 10, 8 out of the top 50 and 61 out of the top 500, a remarkable
achievement for a country that only 25 years ago was virtually irrelevant in the world economy. 74 Still, as a recent Brookings study has shown, it does not follow that
these companies are internationally active or should even be regarded as multinationals in the true sense of that word. Indeed,
49 of the top 57
mainland companies in China remain under state control; and with a very few exceptions, the
overwhelming majority all operate predominantly within the country and for several good reasons
including a shortage of managers with the necessary linguistic skills and experience of working abroad, a
lack of transparency, poor global brand presence, and a very real difficulty in adapting easily to foreign
legal, tax and political environments.75

Brooks and Wohlforth, 8
[Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the
Department of Government at Dartmouth College, World out of Balance, International
Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy, p. 32-35]
American primacy is also rooted in the county's position as the world's leading technological power. The United States remains dominant
globally in overall R&D investments, high-technology production, commercial innovation, and higher education (table 2.3). Despite the weight of
this evidence, elite perceptions of U.S. power had shifted toward pessimism by the middle of the first decade of this century. As we noted in
chapter 1, this was partly the result of an Iraq-induced doubt about the utility of material predominance, a doubt redolent of the post-Vietnam
mood. In retrospect, many assessments of U.S. economic and technological prowess from the 1990s were
overly optimistic; by the next decade important potential vulnerabilities were evident . In particular, chronically
imbalanced domestic finances and accelerating public debt convinced some analysts that the United
States once again confronted a competitiveness crisis.23 If concerns continue to mount, this will count as the fourth
such crisis since 1945; the first three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s (the Soviet
threat and Japan's challenge). None of these crises, however, shifted the international system's structure:
multipolarity did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each scare over competitiveness ended with the
American position of primacy retained or strengthened.24
Our review of the evidence of U.S. predominance is not meant to suggest that the United States lacks vulnerabilities or causes for concern. In
fact, it confronts a number of significant vulnerabilities; of course, this is also true of the other major powers.25 The point is that adverse
trends for the United States will not cause a polarity shift in the near future. If we take a long view of U.S.
competitiveness and the prospects for relative declines in economic and technological dominance, one
takeaway stands out: relative power shifts slowly. The United States has accounted for a quarter to a third of global output for
over a century. No other economy will match its combination of wealth, size , technological capacity, and
productivity in the foreseeable future (tables 2.2 and 2.3).
The depth, scale, and projected longevity of the U.S. lead in each critical dimension of power are
noteworthy. But what truly distinguishes the current distribution of capabilities is American dominance in
all of them simultaneously. The chief lesson of Kennedy's 500-year survey of leading powers is that nothing remotely similar ever
occurred in the historical experience that informs modern international relations theory. The implication is both simple and underappreciated: the
counterbalancing constraint is inoperative and will remain so until the distribution of capabilities changes fundamentally. The next section
explains why.
41
File Title
MLATs
42
File Title
Generic 1nc
Reform in the MLAT system wont change government motives
Woods, 15 (Andrew K. Woods is an assistant professor at the University of Kentucky
College of Law. He holds a JD from Harvard Law School and a PhD in Politics from the
University of Cambridge. You should Care About Mutual Legal Assistance More Than You
Do Just Security, 1-28-15, http://justsecurity.org/19449/care-mutual-legal-assistance/ 79-15)
About a year ago, I wrote here that the mutual legal assistance (MLA) regime the legal system that regulates
government-to-government requests for evidence in criminal investigations, including personal data was badly in
need of reform. Today, the Global Network Initiative is releasing my report on the subject. The report outlines some
of the key reforms that can and ought to be implemented by states in the next year to improve the MLA process. (The
report is being launched at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in DC at 1pm EST today and will
be live streamed here.) Many of us live much of our lives online meaning that we store our personal data on
internet-connected servers, which are very often located in far away locations. As a result of our peripatetic lives, our
data is flung across a number of different jurisdictions. When governments seek access to this data perhaps in
connection with a criminal investigation they increasingly find that it is beyond their jurisdictional reach. (This is
the problem raised by the muchdiscussed Microsoft Ireland case.) If you care about privacy, you might think this is
all good because it means that the government has a harder time getting access to the digital goods. But this view
badly misunderstands the tradeoffs associated with the MLA regime. Embracing the fact that MLA tends to
prevent governments from gaining lawful access to personal data is both shortsighted and dangerous.
When governments do not get access to data through MLA, they occasionally try
other tactics that do not have the same built-in due process constraints that MLA
provides (tactics, in other words, that might make those of who care about privacy prefer MLA). When
governments feel they cannot get access to data through the MLA process, they might
assert that their laws apply extraterritorially as the US has done in the Microsoft Ireland case or
they might demand that communications companies store data locally on servers (the easier to raid). Even worse: they
might turn to surveillance. A few months ago, I spoke with a salesman from a company (I will not name) who was
selling a tool that allows states to intercept their citizens communications. I asked him if he had ever heard of the
mutual legal assistance treaties. He grinned and said: MLAT! I love MLAT! States buy my product because MLAT
doesnt work! It is no longer a surprise to learn that
governments turn to surveillance to gain
unwarranted access to citizen data. Here, however, we are talking about data that might be warranted,
but the government does not have the patience or felt the need to go through the
MLA process to prove that their access is in fact justified. For example, an Italian judge may
issue a warrant for data only to discover that the data controller perhaps a foreign company or a domestic company
with data stored abroad will not submit to its jurisdiction. Local law enforcement agencies can then request MLA
from the country with the authority to compel the data and wait 9 or 10 months for the response. Or they can buy offthe-rack software and get the data now. If any of these alternatives bothers you, you should be urging your
government to improve its handling of MLA requests, both outgoing and incoming. That is the thrust of the report
being released today. The report highlights a number of important reforms that ought to be implemented by
governments in the next year. These include: creating an electronic system for making and processing MLA requests
(which are sometimes still done in paper); better training for government officials as to how to file and process MLA
requests; and more staffing at justice departments around the world for the oncoming wave of MLA requests that is
likely to materialize in the next few years. These reforms are low-hanging fruit. The report says little about the much
larger and more intractable problems that arise from an Internet that spans multiple jurisdictions. For example, the
report is silent on how to determine the scope of a states jurisdiction. Needless to say, this is the subject of much
debate. (Again, see the Microsoft Ireland case for evidence of this controversy.) Nor does the report attempt to
resolve the deeper conflict of laws questions that arise when two states do not agree about the legality of the conduct
in question. For example, if France asks the United States for data in connection to speech that constitutes a crime in
France but not in the U.S., what should the U.S. government do? And what if the suspect is French, the harm is felt in
France, and there is no tie to the U.S. but for the location of the data or the location of the company managing the
data?There are some who think that in order to resolve these deeper issues, we need a completely new regime to
regulate government access to personal data. That may be the case. But for now, let us fix the MLA system we have.
43
File Title
(Insert Impact D depending on Scenario)
44
File Title
Block stuff
45
File Title
AT: MLATs
Reform in the MLAT system wont change government motives
Woods, 15 (Andrew K. Woods is an assistant professor at the University of Kentucky
College of Law. He holds a JD from Harvard Law School and a PhD in Politics from the
University of Cambridge. You should Care About Mutual Legal Assistance More Than You
Do Just Security, 1-28-15, http://justsecurity.org/19449/care-mutual-legal-assistance/ 79-15)
About a year ago, I wrote here that the mutual legal assistance (MLA) regime the legal system that regulates
government-to-government requests for evidence in criminal investigations, including personal data was badly in
need of reform. Today, the Global Network Initiative is releasing my report on the subject. The report outlines some
of the key reforms that can and ought to be implemented by states in the next year to improve the MLA process. (The
report is being launched at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in DC at 1pm EST today and will
be live streamed here.) Many of us live much of our lives online meaning that we store our personal data on
internet-connected servers, which are very often located in far away locations. As a result of our peripatetic lives, our
data is flung across a number of different jurisdictions. When governments seek access to this data perhaps in
connection with a criminal investigation they increasingly find that it is beyond their jurisdictional reach. (This is
the problem raised by the muchdiscussed Microsoft Ireland case.) If you care about privacy, you might think this is
all good because it means that the government has a harder time getting access to the digital goods. But this view
badly misunderstands the tradeoffs associated with the MLA regime. Embracing the fact that MLA tends to
prevent governments from gaining lawful access to personal data is both shortsighted and dangerous.
When governments do not get access to data through MLA, they occasionally try
other tactics that do not have the same built-in due process constraints that MLA
provides (tactics, in other words, that might make those of who care about privacy prefer MLA). When
governments feel they cannot get access to data through the MLA process, they might
assert that their laws apply extraterritorially as the US has done in the Microsoft Ireland case or
they might demand that communications companies store data locally on servers (the easier to raid). Even worse: they
might turn to surveillance. A few months ago, I spoke with a salesman from a company (I will not name) who was
selling a tool that allows states to intercept their citizens communications. I asked him if he had ever heard of the
mutual legal assistance treaties. He grinned and said: MLAT! I love MLAT! States buy my product because MLAT
doesnt work! It is no longer a surprise to learn that
governments turn to surveillance to gain
unwarranted access to citizen data. Here, however, we are talking about data that might be warranted,
but the government does not have the patience or felt the need to go through the
MLA process to prove that their access is in fact justified. For example, an Italian judge may
issue a warrant for data only to discover that the data controller perhaps a foreign company or a domestic company
with data stored abroad will not submit to its jurisdiction. Local law enforcement agencies can then request MLA
from the country with the authority to compel the data and wait 9 or 10 months for the response. Or they can buy offthe-rack software and get the data now. If any of these alternatives bothers you, you should be urging your
government to improve its handling of MLA requests, both outgoing and incoming. That is the thrust of the report
being released today. The report highlights a number of important reforms that ought to be implemented by
governments in the next year. These include: creating an electronic system for making and processing MLA requests
(which are sometimes still done in paper); better training for government officials as to how to file and process MLA
requests; and more staffing at justice departments around the world for the oncoming wave of MLA requests that is
likely to materialize in the next few years. These reforms are low-hanging fruit. The report says little about the much
larger and more intractable problems that arise from an Internet that spans multiple jurisdictions. For example, the
report is silent on how to determine the scope of a states jurisdiction. Needless to say, this is the subject of much
debate. (Again, see the Microsoft Ireland case for evidence of this controversy.) Nor does the report attempt to
resolve the deeper conflict of laws questions that arise when two states do not agree about the legality of the conduct
in question. For example, if France asks the United States for data in connection to speech that constitutes a crime in
France but not in the U.S., what should the U.S. government do? And what if the suspect is French, the harm is felt in
France, and there is no tie to the U.S. but for the location of the data or the location of the company managing the
data?There are some who think that in order to resolve these deeper issues, we need a completely new regime to
regulate government access to personal data. That may be the case. But for now, let us fix the MLA system we have.
46
File Title
AT: Organized CrimeInevitable

Organized crime funding inevitable.
GIFT No Date UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, HUMAN TRAFFICKING
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, www.unglobalcompact.org/.../HUMAN_TRAFFICKING__BACKGROUND_BRIEFING_NOTE_-_final.pdf
However, a conservative estimate of the crime puts the number of victims at any one time at 2.5 million. We also know that it
affects every region of the world, ranks as the third largest source of income for
organized crime (exceeded only by arms and drugs trafficking), and is the fastest growing form of
international crime. We also know that it generates tens of billions of dollars in profits each year.
Organized crime resilient.
Adamoli et al, Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime Research Assistant, 1998,
(Sabrina, Organized Crime Around the World, European Institute for Crime Prevention and
Control, Publication Series No. 31, Pg. 17) www.heuni.fi/uploads/mmadzpnix.pdf
Some of the changes in organised crime have been brought about by the altered environment 23 in which criminal organisations operate.
The growing globalisation of financial markets and communications, together with the increased effectiveness of law enforcement
control activities, are provoking a series of changes in the structure of organised crime groups and in their relations with other criminal
groups.24 Evident today, therefore, is the growth of transnational
criminal organisations able to adapt to
changes in this global environment rather than to national changes. Analysis of the transnational operations of
criminal groups in association with multinational organisations is therefore of paramount importance. Since criminal activities are
transnational, the criminal groups engaged in them must be able to deal with different markets, even if this means developing a
structured organisation, like a corporation, with different tasks and sections for every phase from production to marketing. 25 Large,
monolithic and rigidly hierarchical structures have proved relatively easy targets for law enforcement operations. The results of these
operations suggest that criminal
enterprises are now replacing a centralised structure, often without

multinational characteristics, with more flexible and decentralised ones. The current trend seems to
be towards the creation of small organisations based on mutual understandings and agreements, and with relatively
few operating procedures, adjusting them to new market features so that they can maximise the profits deriving from new business
opportunities and minimise their vulnerability to law enforcement (arrest of their members and the seizure of their assets). 26 This reorganisation of criminal enterprises in terms of structure seems to be happening along the lines of more flexibility and more co-operation
with other criminal groups. A flexible
structure allows for the prompt re-organisation of illicit

activities according to demand and to the number of competitors. Occasional businesses or specific targets increasingly require
small sub-units27 of criminal specialists, who work with external individuals to provide services and expertise in fields unknown or not
directly accessible to the criminal organisation, thus enabling their rapid adjustment to new market opportunities. An outstanding
example is provided by the Nigerian networks in the drugs market. Small groups of executives, or even individuals, carry out operational
tasks or missions co-ordinated and instructed by a strategic centre in the country of origin. Further examples are provided by the
fraudulent activities of Belgian or Dutch white-collar criminals and by the car thefts carried out by Polish and Yugoslav organisations,
networks which have acquired specific expertise in the division of labour.
Organized crime resilient.

Ayling 9 - Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Regulatory
Institutions, Julie, Criminal organizations and resilience, International Journal of Law, Crime
and Justice
37 (2009) 182e196
Criminal organizations inhabit dynamic environments where the pressures of competition and state opposition constantly
challenge their very existence. To survive and prosper, they must be sufciently resilient to adapt to changing
conditions arising from new competition, alterations in laws, policies and law
enforcement practices, expansion or contraction of illegal markets and the availability
of new technologies. Change may also result from internal conicts: the organization may splinter,
merge with other groups or reorganize (Weisel, 2002a). While the study of criminal organizations has not entirely overlooked resilience
(see, for example, Williams, 2001; Kenney, 2006, 2007; Jackson, 2006; Bouchard, 2007), little attention has been paid to how resilience
in criminal organizations develops. What is it about criminal organizations that have survived and ourished amid constant threat and
frequent confrontation that has given them the resilience to do so?
47
File Title
Shift
Adamoli et al, Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime Research Assistant, 1998,
(Sabrina, Organized Crime Around the World, European Institute for Crime Prevention and
Control, Publication Series No. 31, Pg. 17) www.heuni.fi/uploads/mmadzpnix.pdf
Turning to the trafficking of migrants and their exploitation (especially of migrant women and
children) in the prostitution markets of host countries, the same pattern of vertical
interdependence among offences emerges. In fact, in order to perpetrate these crimes, a criminal organisation
involved in alien smuggling activities (also with the further purpose of sexually exploiting migrants or of placing them on black labour
markets) must usually plan the commission of further offences, such as deception, illegal immigration, corruption of public officials and
theft and counterfeiting of documents for use in their trafficking operations. Once it is realised that the activities of organised criminal
groups are increasingly interdependent, it becomes easier to understand the way in which transnational organised crime shifts from one
activity to another. The more a criminal organisation develops horizontal interdependencies, the more it is characterised by opportunism.
The horizontal
interdependencies, distinctive of opportunistic criminal organisations, display a pattern of

diversification rather than one of specialisation. The concept of horizontal interdependencies among activities refers, in fact, to
the connections established among different activities by the same criminal organisation. A criminal enterprise usually relies on the
particular expertise, skills and means acquired in a specific illicit sector to expand its criminal activities, changing into new criminal
circuits. In practice, a
criminal group with already-trained personnel, already-acquired means, already-tested trafficking

routes, already-developed corruption networks, and already-existing contacts in different countries of the world, will move
into new illicit markets (adding new activities to the ones in which it already specialises). Examples of these horizontal
interdependencies are readily available. One thinks, for example, of the connections established between
drug trafficking and alien smuggling operations by the Albanian groups which transport both nationals and drugs
across the Adriatic Sea. The same applies to the organised crime groups of Asiatic origin which move illegal immigrants across the
Canada-US border, utilising the routes, means and methods already developed for the smuggling of cigarettes. Generally speaking,
when activities of this kind involve diverse forms of trafficking (in drugs, arms, humans, toxic waste, stolen vehicles), it is not difficult
for criminals to shift from one form to another, exploiting the knowledge that they have already acquired.
48
File Title
AT: Organized CrimeNo Violence

Organized crime doesnt cause violence
Igor V. Dubinsky, 2007, B.A.: Integrated Science, Advanced Physics, and Molecular/Genetic
Biology, 2004, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate, May 2007: DePaul University College
of Law Winter, 2007, (DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, 5 DePaul Bus. & Comm.
L.J. 379, COMMENT: How Bad Boys Turn Good: The Role of Law in Transforming Criminal
Organizations Into Legitimate Entities by Making Rehabilitation An Economic Necessity, p.
Lexis)
Yet even an underground business must still operate as close as possible to the guidelines of the law - the further it deviates, the higher
its costs. Destruction
and gang wars may look like fun in movies, but they are generally unprofitable and
cause increased prosecutions. n33 In both legal and illegal markets, "the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life." n34
Instead of attempting competition in the same area, criminal organizations split up territories establishing cartels and geographic
monopolies. n35 For example, it may be easier to kill a rival-drug selling mafia than to engage in product competition (manufacturing
higher quality and cheaper drugs), but if this will lead to government prosecutions, rival mafia wars, or increased police enforcement, it
may be cheaper to instead cartelize the industry or divide up the territory between the various suppliers. n36 The
more
murders the mafia commits, the more police and judges it has to bribe, and the more
witnesses it has to kill. For example, when a Chicago drug ring leader was asked by one of his subordinates why he could
not just shoot and kill competitors, he explained: "you've got to belong to a serious organization - you can't just tear [things] up. It's bad
for business." n37 Thus a
mafia behaves just like any other profit maximizing organization seeking to minimize its costs and maximize its profits. However, unlike a legal organization, the mafia
will use illegal means if the expected profits from those means are more than the expected profits from their legal counterparts. n38 As
one Mafioso eloquently said in [*386] Mario Puzo's Godfather, "I don't like violence ... I'm a businessman; blood is a big expense." n39
49
File Title
AT: Biodiversity/Ecosystems
No impact to biodiversity
Sagoff 97 Mark, Senior Research Scholar Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, INSTITUTE OF
BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH?
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N
Note Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of
Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other
positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.
Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of
Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed
Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent
Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc PhD
Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive
extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as
science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of
the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often
out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that
humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed
that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the
material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than
unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 " The human species could survive just as
well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the
appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346 [*906] The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with
respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the
functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if
any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists
rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall
biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant

in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in
general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and
millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350
consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349 Other
Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic
and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species
interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the
balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352 [*907] To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of
bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem
What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example,
serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any
ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they? Ecosystems and the species that
compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity,
for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In
view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have
not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes
processes are concerned.
constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic
the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any

ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to
colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United
States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been
increasing dramatically , not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the
hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the
disappearance of the heath hen. One might argue that
50
File Title
number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United
States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants
grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have
established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi,
creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few
of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native
species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place;
others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation
or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over"
at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for
a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and
often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date?
Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds
The Ecological Society

of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in
strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the
detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem
properties." n361 [*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only
up to a point; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little
difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity
foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the
Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide
of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359
ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it
difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli
and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual
plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers
ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but
Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these

half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate
would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant?
rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does
The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally

occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to
survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the
agriculture really require? [*911]
natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that
ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There
is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words,
not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow
protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is

largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care
about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for [*912] the marsh may be good in itself even
if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless .
sense of promoting human welfare,
Biodiversity is resilient and inevitable

Sagoff 8 Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy @ School of Public Policy @ U. Maryland, Environmental Values, On the Economic Value of
Ecosystem Services, 17:2, 239-257, EBSCO
Biodiversity represents nature's greatest largess or excess since species

appear nearly as numerous as the stars the Drifters admired, except that "scientists have a better
understanding of how many stars there are in the galaxy than how many species there arc
on Earth."70 Worldwide the variety of biodiversity is effectively infinite ; the myriad species of
plants and animals, not to mention microbes that arc probably more important, apparently exceed our ability to
count or identify them. The "next" or "incremental" thousand species taken at random
would not fetch a market price because another thousand are immediately available, and
another thousand after that. No one has suggested an economic application, moreover, for any of the thousand species listed as threatened in the United
What about the economic value of biodiversity?
States.77 To defend these species - or the next thousand or the thousand after that - on economic grounds is to trade convincing spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical arguments for bogus,
pretextual, and disingenuous economic ones.78 As David Ehrenfeld has written,
We do not know how many [plant] species are needed lo keep the planet green and healthy,
but it seems very unlikely to be anywhere near the more than quarter of a million we have
now. Even a mighty dominant like the American chestnut, extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bringing the eastern deciduous forest down with it. And if
we turn to the invertebrates, the source of nearly all biological diversity, what biologist is willing to find a value - conventional or ecological -
51
File Title
for all 600,000-plus species of beetles?7*
The disappearance in the wild even of agriculturally useful species appears to have no
effect on production. The last wild aurochs, the progenitor of dairy and beef cattle, went
extinct in Poland in 1742, yet no one believes the beef industry is threatened. The genetic
material of crop species is contained in tens of thousands of landraces and cultivars in use - rice is an example - and
does not depend on the persistence of wild ancestral types. Genetic engineering can
introduce DNA from virtually any species into virtually any other - which allows for the
unlimited creation of biodiversity.
A neighbor of mine has collected about 4,000 different species of insects on his two-acre property in Silver Spring, Maryland. These include 500 kinds of Lepidoptera (mostly moths)
- half the number another entomologist found at his residence.80 When you factor in plants and animals, the amount of "backyard biodiversity" in suburbs is astounding and far
Biodiversity has no value "at the margin" because nature provides far
more of it than anyone could possibly administer. If one kind of moth flies off, you can
easily attract hundreds of others.
greater than you can imagine.8'
52
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AT: Disease
No extinction
Gladwell, 95
Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32
Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a
corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it
relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt
endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential
rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its
point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses
are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any
microbe capable of wiping us all out would have

to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as
stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the
course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything
at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of
human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.
No risk of pandemics new advances

Economist, 10
(11 22, http://www.economist.com/node/17493456)
globalisation will
speed the flow of health data
Fortunately,
also
. In 2011 the growing field of digital epidemiology will attract more students, health
officials and resources than ever before. People in viral hotspots around the world will report suspicious human and animal deaths (often a warning sign of a coming plague) by mobile phones.
These data will be posted to the web, instantly enriching the data that came from traditional surveillance systems and electronic medical records. Organisations like Google.org will scour search
patterns around the world, expanding their search-based predictions of influenza to other infectious diseases. Still more creative early-detection systems will begin to pull together illness
allowing us to see changing disease patterns before they

make the morning news. Novel laboratory approaches to the discovery of new viruses will
emerge. The long-awaited era of single-molecule DNA sequencing will begin in earnest with new machines from companies like Pacific Biosciences, and with a bit of luck this will
information present in social-networking sites like Facebook and Twitter,
improve the speed at which we can recognise unknown bugs. At the cutting edge, new studies of virus evolution and chips housing tiny cell cultures will improve our capacity to sort through the
viral chatter and determine if a newly identified outbreak has the potential to spread globally or is likely to fade away. The discovery of new viruses will make the move from universities to
laboratories around the world, helping to facilitate international scientific collaboration and decrease fears of biopiracy. Towards a global immune system In 2011 you may be among those who
will watch Contagion, a forthcoming movie about a frightening fictional pandemic. But whether you are a head of state wary of the political and economic costs of a disease catastrophe, a CEO
concerned by supply-chain and staff disruption associated with the next pandemic or a citizen worried about your family, in 2011 you will have access to better, more accurate and rapidly
In the increasingly popular Silicon Valley model, organisations like ours will mash up
multiple data sourcescombining lab results in far-flung viral listening-posts with international
news feeds, text messages, social-networking and search patterns to create a new form of
epidemic intelligence. The past ten years have seen noteworthy progress in the development of truly global systems. In the world of outbreaks,
2011 will mark the beginning of the development of a worldwide immune system that will detect
and respond to biological threats before they go global. Although this will take years to build fully, if successful it could make
pandemic anniversaries a thing of the past.
available data on actual outbreaks.
53
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AT: US-China War

No China war---leaders are pragmatic
Goldstein 11professor emeritus of IR, American U. PhD in pol sci from MIT. Former
visiting professor emeritus at Yale (Sept 2011, Joshua, Think Again: War, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war)
What about China, the most ballyhooed rising military threat of the current era? Beijing is indeed modernizing its armed forces, racking up doubledigit rates of growth in military spending, now about $100 billion a year. That is second only to the United States, but it is a distant second: The Pentagon spends nearly $700 billion.
Not only is China a very long way from being able to go toe-to-toe with the United States; it's
not clear why it would want to. A military conflict (particularly with its biggest customer and debtor)
would impede China's global trading posture and endanger its prosperity. Since Chairman Mao's
death, China has been hands down the most peaceful great power of its time . For all the
recent concern about a newly assertive Chinese navy in disputed international waters, China's
military hasn't fired a single shot in battle in 25 years.
"A More Democratic World Will Be a More Peaceful One."
Not necessarily. The well-worn observation that real democracies almost never fight each other is historically correct, but it's also true that democracies have always been perfectly willing
to fight non-democracies. In fact, democracy can heighten conflict by amplifying ethnic and nationalist forces, pushing leaders to appease belligerent sentiment in order to stay in power.
Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant both believed that selfish autocrats caused wars, whereas the common people, who bear the costs, would be loath to fight. But try telling that to
the
leaders of authoritarian China, who are struggling to hold in check, not inflame, a popular
undercurrent of nationalism against Japanese and American historical enemies. Public opinion in tentatively democratic Egypt is far more hostile toward Israel
than the authoritarian government of Hosni Mubarak ever was (though being hostile and actually going to war are quite different things).
Economic interdependence checks war

Doctoroff 10MBA at the University of Chicago, North Asia Area Director of JWT advertising firm (Tom, 28 November 2010, Standing Up to China, the Obama Way,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-doctoroff/standing-up-to-china-the_b_788704.html)
China knows its ascent will not continue without Western complicity. No matter how successful the
exports to Western markets, which have fueled more
than 60% of economic expansion since 1990, will determine growth rates for decades to come.
Even the military acknowledges armed conflict with the United States would strike a fatal blow to
China's "peaceful rise." Importantly, China has always productively engaged with other societies -- from
Indian Buddhism to American capital markets, absorbing new influences and applying them in Chinese contexts. After
the Great Leap Backwards -- thirty years of economic and social disaster triggered by post-Liberation isolation -- it knows walls, at least
outside cyberspace, are counterproductive. As one street smart sixty-year-old confided, "We're afraid of not having any
friends." In China, there is no desire, even amongst reactionary military factions, to become
divorced from global forces of progress.
Third, and fortunately,
central government is in rebalancing the economy toward domestic consumption,
54
File Title
AT: TerrorismAdaptation/Resilience
Terrorists adapt---cutting funding makes them stronger
Santos 11 Major David N Santos, Active Duty Army Intelligence Officer Currently Attending
the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, What Constitutes Terrorist Network
Resiliency?, Small Wars Journal, 5-31, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-constitutesterrorist-network-resiliency
As important as ideology and social networking are, their benefits will only carry a terrorist
organization to a certain extent. As with virtually any other organization or activity around the
world, money, is the lifeblood of any organization or movement. Without a reliable source of
funding a terrorist organization loses its ability to be proactive in conducting operations as well
as procure needed support services and material items. Since acquiring and maintaining sources
of financing is vital to the existence of a terrorist organization, security for those sources of
funding along with the methods of transferring and storing funds is equally vital. As a result,
terrorist organizations have proved to be exceptionally agile in identifying and implementing
numerous methods of funding and transferring money in order to prevent effective
countermeasures by state governments (Williams, 2005).
The process of globalization has created unprecedented levels of interconnectivity among not only
state governments but also among domestic and international financial institutions. As such, vast
sums of money can be transferred from one part of the world to another nearly instantaneously. The
sheer pace and vastness of the globalization process with developments in information and
telecommunications technology has created a nearly impossible task to monitor effectively
daily financial transactions to ensure there is no link to terrorist activity. Previous attempts to counter
terrorist financing, such as in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, has been to freeze known or suspected
terrorist financial assets. Yet this countermeasure has only yielded limited success. As
Williams (2005) notes, current attempts to identify and attack terrorist financing has only served to
increase the capacity of terrorist organizations to adapt quickly to new regulations by adopting
novel methods of circumventing rules and regulations (pp. 6).
If Williams (2005) is correct in his analysis that current efforts to target terrorist funding are only
resulting in making smarter and more efficient fiscally minded terrorist organizations than
what is enabling this trend? One of the key issues is current international law is lacking in
specificity and applicability to the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorist
organizations like al Qaeda. One of the main deficiencies with international law is with the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which had been created in 1989 by the G-7 states to counter
money laundering activities conducted by international criminal and drug trafficking
organizations (Williams, 2005). The FATF identified 40 recommendations to be implemented to
counter money laundering activities. However, no formal binding convention or treaty was
created therefore consistent implementation of the FATF recommendations did not occur thus
leaving loop holes in international law for use by terrorist organizations to circumvent the FATF.
Efforts like the FATF can only be successful if they receive the full support of the international
community. Limited or no support provides opportunities for terrorist organizations to continue
their financing operations relatively unmolested. The FATF was a lackluster effort to combat
terrorist financing due to inefficiency in the manner in which it operated resulting in money
laundering not being truly deterred but rather shifted to other areas around the globe where these
activities could be conducted more freely (Williams, 2005). The FATF is only one example of
inconsistencies in international economic law (as well as with state domestic law) which have
inhibited effective terrorist financing countermeasures. The ineffectiveness of the FATF and other
55
File Title
counter drug and organized crime measures which have been used to target terrorist financing has
only served to actually create more experienced and smarter terrorist financing practices. Instead of
preventing terrorist financing, efforts such as the FATF have only facilitated it to expand.
Theyll move to other areas

Vaknin 5 Sam Vaknin, Ph.D., Editor in Chief of Global Politician and Investment Politics,
Money Laundering in A Changed World, May, http://samvak.tripod.com/pp96.html
Quo Vadis, Money Laundering? Crime is resilient and fast adapting to new realities. Organized crime is in
the process of establishing an alternative banking system, only tangentially connected to the West's, in the fringes, and by
proxy. This is done by purchasing defunct banks or banking licences in territories with lax regulation, cash
economies, corrupt politicians, no tax collection, but reasonable infrastructure. The countries of Eastern
Europe - Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia), Macedonia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Albania, to mention a few - are natural
targets. In some cases, organized crime is so all-pervasive and local politicians so corrupt that the distinction between criminal and politician
is spurious. Gradually, money laundering rings move their operations to these new, accommodating territories. The laundered funds are used to
purchase assets in intentionally botched privatizations, real estate, existing businesses, and to finance trading operations. The wasteland that is
Eastern Europe craves private capital and no questions are asked by investor and recipient alike. The next frontier is cyberspace. Internet
banking, Internet gambling, day trading, foreign exchange cyber transactions, e-cash, ecommerce, fictitious invoicing of the launderer's genuine credit cards - hold the promise of the
future. Impossible to track and monitor, ex-territorial, totally digital, amenable to identity theft and fake identities - this is the ideal vehicle for
money launderers. This nascent platform is way too small to accommodate the enormous amounts of cash laundered daily - but in ten years time,
it may. The problem is likely to be exacerbated by the introduction of smart cards, electronic purses, and payment-enabled mobile phones.
Shifts to hawala---makes detection impossible

Gouvin 3 Eric J. Gouvin, Professor of Law at the Western New England College School of
Law, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, and the War on
Terrorism, Baylor Law Review, Fall, 55 Baylor L. Rev. 955, Lexis
C. Terrorists Move Money Through Hard-to-Regulate Non-Bank Channels Even if the reporting requirements of the Patriot Act
work perfectly, the new law still will not be effective to intercept terrorist financing because
terrorists do not have to use banks to move money. The lynchpin of our existing money laundering scheme is the
conventional banking system. We count on bankers to file CTRs and SARs because bankers are subject to a rigorous regulatory scheme and they
know they will get into trouble if they do not comply with the law. Terrorists, however, do
not necessarily rely on the

banking system to move money because they have access to other reliable ways to transfer funds
around the world. The Islamic world is tied together financially by a traditional banking system known as the
hawala. n104 These ancient networks of settling [*978] payments have deep roots in Islamic culture. They are essentially based on
trust, and involve no physical transfer of funds. For example, a hawala broker in one country instructed by his client
arranges for a broker in another country to make a payment to the intended beneficiary. n105 Such informal systems are not designed to deal with
official transactions; instead, they
provide complete confidentiality and no paper trail. Given the pervasiveness of the
enforcement officials find it difficult to use the hawala network to
hawala system and its informality, law
fight crime. In India, Pakistan, and the Middle East where these systems are common, they create significant money laundering problems.
One big problem they present is the difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate transactions and those involving money laundering. n106 In
the aftermath of September 11, the
United States and other nations froze a Dubai based hawala called "Al Barakaat." n107 This
headlines and significant sums were impounded, but one wonders what effect it had on terrorist
operations. n108 These networks are highly adaptive entities and if currency transfers are targeted
by law enforcement, they may very well change tactics. If need be, the funds to be transferred
are paid in jewelry to the brokers, who later rationalize their own inter-banking levels and fund flows amongst
themselves. n109 The Patriot Act ostensibly applies to hawala banking, n110 but enforcement will be difficult. FinCEN has identified a
action made
strategy for dealing with hawalas: [*979] Our strategy is (1) to force terrorist financiers to reduce reliance on hawala and similar systems and to
channel their money into more transparent, formal financial transactions; (2) to regulate hawaladars so that legitimate hawaladars comply with
financial reporting structures; and (3) to target the illegal use of hawala for intensive investigation. n111 Although this approach is laudable, it
sounds like a true clash of cultures. Given
the long history of hawala banking, its informality, its secrecy, and
its deep roots in Islam, it seems unlikely that hawala bankers will be enthusiastic in their compliance
56
File Title
with the new law. More importantly, the law might never be enforced against the hawala because the identities of the hawala bankers are
difficult to establish. Without knowing who is participating in the hawala, the regulatory scheme will be ineffective. n112
Or, charities
Perhaps one of the most widely used methods of rising, moving and storing funds by terrorist
organizations is through the use of charities. The concept of charity is an integral part of the
Islamic faith and the responsibility of every Muslim to perform. According to Islamic law each
Muslim is expected to donate a percentage of their own personal wealth (a process known as
zakat) as well as provide assistance to charitable efforts through personal service of some kind
(Comras, 2005). These donations are quite often collected by local religious centers or mosques
and later distributed to other charitable organizations to support various social programs.
However, terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, Hizbollah and Jemaah Islamiyah have gained
access to these donations through their support of the religious centers and mosques where these
donations are made. To complicate matters these donations, viewed as individual religious
obligations, have little to no oversight by state governments, particularly within the Middle East
(Comras, 2005). Therefore these donation sites provide in many ways a secure and continuous
form of access to funds for terrorist organizations. Unfortunately, many of the individuals
providing these donations do not know their funds will ultimately end up supporting terrorist
violence.
Terror fundings resilient and adaptable

Since the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001 there have been numerous discussions on the issue of terrorism and terrorist networks, such
as al Qaeda, within the media and the intelligence community. At times these discussions have created an image of the terrorist phenomenon as
one of a monolithic and unstoppable menace continuing to spread around the world unabated. Lost in these discussions is a basic understanding
of what any organization needs to continue to exist. What are its basic needs? What
are its sources of strength and

resiliency? Most organizations, whether terrorist or not, rely on some basic essential elements that are used to help define, guide
and maintain the organization. These elements allow an organization to develop strength in its structure as well as its
cause in order to maintain a resilient mindset. These elements of strength and resiliency enable the
organization to experience periods of adversity, look critically at the outcomes of those experiences and take the
lessons learned to improve the organizations performance. Every successful organization, to include terrorist organizations,
has to identify what their most essential elements for survival are. These basic elements will vary to some degree based on an organizations
unique qualities. However, there are some elements that are almost universal to all organizations and those identified as terrorist organizations in
particular. Some of the more universal elements
that can contribute to a terrorist networks strength, longevity and

maintain a source
resiliency involve the organizations ideology, social network apparatus and capability as well as the ability to
of funding for its operations. These are the key basic elements needed by any terrorist network to maintain and further a viable long lasting
organization. If a terrorist organization were to fail to maintain a high level of proficiency in each of these elements, either individually or
collectively, the organization could experience a degraded ability to achieve its desired objectives.
57
File Title
EU relations
58
File Title
Generic 1nc
No impact to US/European relations
Haas 11president of the CFR Lecturer in public policy, Harvard. DPhill,
Oxford (17 June 2011, Richard, Why Europe No Longer Matters,
http://www.cfr.org/europerussia/why-europe-no-longer-matters/p25308)
Gates sounded a pessimistic note, warning of "the real possibility for a dim if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance." Yet, the outgoing
The U.S.-European partnership that proved so central to managing

will inevitably play a diminished role in the years to come
Pentagon chief may not have been pessimistic enough.
and winning the Cold War

far
. To some
extent, we're already there: If NATO didn't exist today, would anyone feel compelled to create it? The honest, if awkward, answer is no. In the coming
Europe's influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited
decades,
, and it is in
other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined. Certainly, one reason for NATO's increasing marginalization
stems from the behavior of its European members. The problem is not the number of European troops (there are 2 million) nor what Europeans
With NATO,
the whole is far less than the sum of its parts . Critical decisions are still made
nationally; much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just that -- talk.
There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical
and intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. The alliance's effort in Libya -collectively spend on defense ($300 billion a year), but rather how those troops are organized and how that money is spent.
the poorly conceived intervention, the widespread refusal or inability to participate in actual strike missions, the obvious difficulties in sustaining
intense operations -- is a daily reminder of what the world's most powerful military organization cannot accomplish.
With the Cold War
a distant memory, there is little political willingness, on a country-by-country basis,

to provide adequate public funds to the military. (Britain and France, which each spend more than 2 percent
and the Soviet threat
of their gross domestic products on defense, are two of the exceptions here.) Even where a willingness to intervene with military force exists, such as
in Afghanistan, where upward of 35,000 European troops are deployed, there are severe constraints. Some governments, such as Germany, have
historically limited their participation in combat operations, while
in
the cultural acceptance of casualties is fading
European nations
many
. But it would be wrong, not to mention fruitless, to blame the Europeans and their choices alone. There are
larger historical forces contributing to the continent's increasing irrelevance to world affairs. Ironically, Europe's own notable successes are an
important reason that transatlantic ties will matter less in the future. The current euro zone financial crisis should not obscure the historic
accomplishment that was the building of an integrated Europe over the past half-century. The continent is largely whole and free and stable. Europe,
the principal arena of much 20th-century geopolitical competition, will be spared such a role in the new century -- and this is a good thing. The
contrast with Asia could hardly be more dramatic. Asia is increasingly the center of gravity of the world economy; the historic question is whether this
dynamism can be managed peacefully. The major powers of Europe -- Germany, France and Great Britain -- have reconciled, and the regional
arrangements there are broad and deep. In Asia, however, China, Japan, India, Vietnam, the two Koreas, Indonesia and others eye one another warily.
Regional pacts and arrangements, especially in the political and security realms, are thin. Political and economic competition is unavoidable; military
conflict cannot be ruled out. Europeans will play a modest role, at best, in influencing these developments. If Asia, with its dynamism and power
struggles, in some ways resembles the Europe of 100 years ago, the Middle East is more reminiscent of the Europe of several centuries before: a
patchwork of top-heavy monarchies, internal turbulence, unresolved conflicts, and nationalities that cross and contest boundaries. Europe's ability to
Political and demographic changes within

Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose
prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in southern
Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes
precedence. No doubt, Europe's security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less immediate to the population than
influence the course of this region, too, will be sharply limited.
its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their
ties across the Atlantic were forged at a time when American political and
power was largely in the hands of Northeastern elites, many of whom traced their ancestry to Europe
and who were most interested in developments there. Today's United States -- featuring the rise of the South
and the West, along with an increasing percentage of Americans who trace their
roots to Africa, Latin America or Asia -- could hardly be more different. American
and European preferences will increasingly diverge as a result. Finally, the very nature of
continent. Moreover, intimate
economic
international relations has also undergone a transformation. Alliances, whether NATO during the Cold War or the U.S.-South Korean partnership now,
do best in settings that are highly inflexible and predictable, where foes and friends are easily identified, potential battlefields are obvious, and
contingencies can be anticipated. Almost none of this is true in our current historical moment. Threats are many and diffuse. Relationships seem
situational, increasingly dependent on evolving and unpredictable circumstances. Countries can be friends, foes or both, depending on the day of the
week -- just look at the United States and Pakistan. Alliances tend to require shared assessments and explicit obligations; they are much more difficult
to operate when worldviews diverge and commitments are discretionary. But as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya all demonstrate, this
no amount of harping on what

European governments are failing to do will push them toward what some in
Washington want them to do. They have changed. We have changed. The world has changed. Second, NATO as a whole will
is precisely the world we inhabit. For the United States, the conclusions are simple. First,
count for much less. Instead, the United States will need to maintain or build bilateral relations with those few countries in Europe willing and able to
other allies are likely to become more relevant

partners in the regions that present the greatest potential challenges . In Asia, this might
act in the world, including with military force. Third,
mean Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, especially if U.S.-China relations were to deteriorate; in the greater Middle East, it could again
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be India in addition to Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others.
Relations will stay low, but cooperation is inevitable

Walt 11, IR Harvard, [The coming erosion of the European Union Posted
By Stephen M. Walt Thursday, August 18, 2011 - 11:19 AM
Share
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/18/the_coming_erosion_of_the_e
uropean_union]
we will see less cooperative
and intimate security partnership between Europe and America in the future. Why do I think so? One obvious
reason is the lack of common external enemy. Historically, that is the only reason why the United States was
Third, I argued that the glory days of transatlantic security cooperation also lie in the past, and
willing to commit troops to Europe, and it is therefore no surprise that America's military presence in Europe has declined steadily ever since the
Soviet Union broke up. Simply put: there is no threat to Europe that the Europeans cannot cope with on their own, and thus little role for Americans
to play. In addition, the various imperial adventures that NATO has engaged in since 1992 haven't worked out that well. It was said in the 1990s
that NATO had to "go out of area or out of business," which is one reason it started planning for these operations, but most of the missions NATO
has taken on since then have been something of a bust. Intervention in the Balkans eventually ended the fighting there, but it took longer and cost
more than anyone expected and it's not even clear that it really worked (i.e., if NATO peacekeepers withdrew from Kosovo tomorrow, fighting might
start up again quite soon). NATO was divided over the war in Iraq, and ISAF's disjointed effort in Afghanistan just reminds us why Napoleon always
said he liked to fight against coalitions. The war in Libya could produce another disappointing result, depending on how it plays out. Transatlantic
security cooperation might have received a new lease on life if all these adventures had gone swimmingly; unfortunately, that did not prove to be
the case. But this raises the obvious question: If the United States isn't needed to protect Europe and there's little positive that the alliance can
cooperation will decline because the

United States will be shifting its strategic focus to Asia. The central goal of US grand strategy is to maintain
accomplish anywhere else, then what's it for? Lastly, transatlantic security
hegemony in the Western hemisphere and to prevent other great powers from achieving hegemony in their regions. For the foreseeable future, the
only potential regional hegemon is China. There will probably be an intense security competition there, and the United States will therefore be
deepening its security ties with a variety of Asian partners. Europe has little role to play in this competition, however, and little or no incentive to
get involved. Over time, Asia will get more and more attention from the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and Europe will get less. This trend will
as the percentage of Americans

with strong ancestral connections to Europe declines and as the generation that waged the Cold War leaves the
stage. So in addition to shifting strategic interests, some of the social glue that held Europe and America together is likely to
weaken as well. It is important not to overstate this trend -- Europe and America won't become
enemies, and I don't think intense security competition is going to break out within Europe anytime soon. Europe and the
United States will continue to trade and invest with each other, and we will continue to collaborate on a
number of security issues (counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, counterproliferation, etc.). But Europe won't be America's "go-to" partner in the decades ahead, at least
be reinforced by demographic and generational changes on both sides of the Atlantic,
not the way it once was. This will be a rather different world than the one we've been accustomed to for the past 60 years, but that's not
because it reflects powerful structural forces, there's probably

little we can do to prevent it. Instead, the smart response -- for both Americans and Europeans -- is to acknowledge these
necessarily a bad thing. Moreover,
tendencies and adapt to them, instead of engaging in a futile effort to hold back the tides of history
Expanding economic and trade ties are the only way to sustain
the relationship
Brattberg 13 (By Erik Brattberg. Published 8 November 2013. Erik
Brattberg is Analyst at The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and
currently Visiting Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States and a
Non-Resident Fellow at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC.
If so, this could be the start of a recreated and re-invented transatlantic relationship. The
development of a more strategic EU-US relationship could also help allay fears
regarding the US abandonment of Europe. While US strategic thinking is
changing and fast (the so-called Asian pivot is only the beginning) a more strategic
transatlantic relationship would still serve a critical function for Washington, and not just on
the security side of things. The drawdown of the military mission in Afghanistan means that
the US will have less need for Europe in coming years. Focusing more on global economic
and trade issues could constitute a new strategic imperative for closer
EU-US ties.
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US-EU relations kill EU unity

Marquand 9 By Robert Marquand | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor from the April
2, 2009 edition
Strasbourg, France - As Barack Obama leaves London and heads to a key NATO gathering here
Friday, he steps onto the European continent as new, fresh an urban guy, a 21st century American,
someone Europeans understand and admire. Yet that may be part of the problem. President Obama,
the new US face and policy, represents an inherent challenge to Europe: It is not just
that Obama drips soft power from every pore, is a listener, a Democrat, "sympathetique,"
and a hero for immigrant populations in Europe's suburbs that have yet to achieve
political power. More deeply, the popular young American president is stirring basic
questions here over how to coordinate and respond to a chief ally that is suddenly
sending all the signals Europe asked for. In London, in a last-minute
compromise that many called historic, the White House got far more stimulus to relight the global
trade economy than many thought possible. However, at NATO's 60th anniversary here in Strasbourg,
he may not get more troops for Afghanistan though the new "Afpak" review indicates such troops
are needed even for the civil building that Europeans say will aid in "mission accomplished" there.
But the "Obama in Europe" storyline runs deeper than a difficult diplomatic checklist that includes
Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the global crisis, say political thinkers here. It has to do with a
Europe that, for 40 years, and in significant strides, has sought to speak with one voice. For
almost a decade, Europe and America, tied by history, drifted apart in terms of
stated values and policy. But with an avowedly liberal internationalist at
the US helm, Europe has less to complain about. Ahead of his visit, in inconclusive
meetings in Brussels, there was uncertainty and bickering. What's causing stress in
the European Union is not US badgering and unilateralism,
but the Obama dynamic of moving toward agreement,
consensus, and multilateralism, say some economists and political scientists.
"President Bush was an extraordinary catalyst for Europe, a bogeyman.
Even people with diverging views on economic and foreign policy were united against the US
policy," says Karim Bitar, a Paris consultant and scholar at the Institute for International and Strategic
Relations. "But now the US can no longer be accused of all the world's ills. The truth
is, Europeans now think more about America than about Europe. There is no
European consensus on the most basic questions of our future, what we should
be. Under Bush, we could evade them. Not now." Europe's internal conflict over the
Russian war in Georgia last summer, and the crisis over interrupted oil and gas supplies to
Europe this winter, were indicators of division in what is still an economic union
struggling to achieve political solidarity. The question is whether Europe can find
its voice when there is basic agreement with Washington. " When the Europeans
agree with the US, they often disagree with each other ," as a European diplomat puts it.
Unified Europe solves hotspots, growth and global war

STABILITY, GROWTH AND PROSPECT A REVIEW OF CHINA-EU RELATIONS IN 2010
Ambassador SONG Zhe December Mr SONG Zhe is the Ambassador of the Peoples Republic of
Chinas Mission to the European Union. Issue 6, December 2010 2010 eu china observer
Europe is a major power in the international community. Europe
plays an important role in

upholding world peace, promoting common development, tackling
global challenges, and resolving regional and hotspot issues. Europe
is a strong force in building a fair and just international political and
economic order. The EUs integration process is the most viable choice for
European countries in order to develop strength through unity. For decades, the
European Union has demonstrated admirable determination and resolve in
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overcoming all difficulties and hardships and in establishing from scratch an
otherwise highly integrated union today. We firmly believe that the
European integration process will continue to enjoy a promising prospect in the
future. Europe is the worlds most important economy. As the worlds
largest bloc of developed countries, the EU is a leading player in terms of
foreign trade, innovation, brand marketing, and economy of scale. We have full
Issue 6, 2010 4 confidence that the euro will emerge from the current crisis and
contribute to the stability and diversity of the international
monetary regime. Europe enjoy
s strong influence over international public opinion and agenda-setting. Europe is the birthplace of
Western civilization and modern philosophy and a supporter and practitioner of multilateralism,
global governance, and of peaceful resolutions to international disputes. We believe that thanks to
the many active minds present in Europe and thanks to the strength of its media,
Europe is in a position to contribute more forcefully to the prosperous
development of a more diverse world.
(Insert Impact D depending on Scenario)
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Block Shit
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2NC Resilient
EU/US relations resilient
Joyner 11editor of the Atlantic Council. PhD in pol sci (James, Death of
Transatlantic Relationship Wildly Exaggerated, 14 June 2011,
www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/death-transatlantic-relationship-wildlyexaggerated)
The blistering farewell speech to NATO by U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates warning of a "dim, if not dismal" future for the Alliance drew the Western public's attention to a
longstanding debate about the state of the transatlantic relationship. With prominent commenters voicing concern about much more than just a two-tiered defensive alliance,
questioning whether the U.S.-Europe relationship itself is past its prime, doubts that the Western alliance that has dominated the post-Cold War world are reaching a new high. But
fears are overblown, and may be mistaking short-term bumps in the

relationship for proof of a long-term decline that isn't there. Gates' frustration with the
those
fact that only five of the 28 NATO allies are living up to their commitment to devote 2 percent of GDP to defense, which has hindered their ability to take on even the likes of
the U.S.-Europe partnership may not be

is not worthless, and that relationship continues to be one of the
strongest and most important in the world. Gates is an Atlanticist whose speech was, as he put it, "in the spirit of solidarity and friendship, with the
Muammar Qaddafi's puny force without American assistance is certainly legitimate and worrying. Though
living up to its potential, it
understanding that true friends occasionally must speak bluntly with one another for the sake of those greater interests and values that bind us together." He wants the Europeans,
Europeans don't see their security as being in jeopardy and political

are hard pressed to divert scarce resources away from social spending -- especially in
the current economic climate -- a dynamic that has weakened NATO but, despite fears to the
contrary, not the greater Transatlantic partnership. It would obviously have been a great relief to the
Germany in particular, to understand what a tragedy it would be if NATO were to go away. Most
leaders
U.S. if European governments had shouldered more of the burden in Afghanistan. This disparity, which has only increased as the war has dragged on and the European economies
suffered, is driving both Gates' warning and broader fears about the declining relationship. But it was our fight, not theirs; they were there, in most cases against the strong wishes
of the people who elected them to office, because we asked. We'd have fought it exactly the same way in their absence. In that light, every European and Canadian soldier was a
bonus. Libya, however, is a different story. The Obama administration clearly had limited interest in entering that fight - Gates himself warned against it -- and our involvement is
due in part to coaxing by our French and British allies. The hope was to take the lead in the early days, providing "unique assets" at America's disposal, and then turn the fight over
to the Europeans. But, as Gates' predecessor noted not long after the ill-fated 2003 invasion of Iraq, you go to war with the army you have, not the one you wish you had. The
diminished capabilities of European militaries, spent by nearly a decade in Afghanistan, should be of no surprise. NATO entered into Libya with no real plan for an end game beyond
hoping the rebels would somehow win or that Qaddafi would somehow fall. That failure, to be fair, is a collective responsibility, not the fault of European militaries alone. But the
concern goes deeper than different defensive priorities. Many Europeans worry that the United States takes the relationship for granted, and that the Obama administration in
particular puts a much higher priority on the Pacific and on the emerging BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economies. New York Times columist Roger Cohen
recently wrote that this is as it should be: "In so far as the United States is interested in Europe it is interested in what can be done together in the rest of the world." In Der Spiegel,
Roland Nelles and Gregor Peter Schmitz lamented, "we live in a G-20 world instead of one led by a G-2." It's certainly true that, if it ever existed, the Unipolar Moment that Charles
Krauthammer and others saw in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse is over. But that multipolar dynamic actually makes transatlantic cooperation more, not less, important. A
hegemon needs much less help than one of many great powers, even if it remains the biggest. Take the G-20. Seven of the members are NATO Allies: the US, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, the UK, and Turkey. Toss in the EU, and you have 40 percent of the delegation. If they can form a united front at G-20 summits, they are much more powerful than if
each stands alone. Add in four NATO Partner countries (Russia, Japan, Australia, and South Korea) and you're up to 60 percent of the delegation -- a comfortable majority for the
U.S.-European partnership and its circle of closest allies. Granted, it's unlikely that we'll achieve consensus among all 12 states on any one issue, let alone most issues. But
constantly working together toward shared goals and values expands a sense of commonality. And, like so many things, projects end. Indeed, that's generally the goal. The
NATO
outlasted the demise of its raison d'tre, the Soviet threat, and went on to fight
together --along with many of its former adversaries -- in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Libya. Is there seriously any doubt that other challenges will
emerge in the future in which the Americans and its European allies might benefit
from working together?
transatlantic military alliance that formed to defeat fascism remained intact after victory; indeed, it expanded to include its former German and Italian adversaries.
Conflicts over surveillance wont collapse relations its all for

show, strategic interests prevail
Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, The United States and
Europe: Current Issues, Feb 3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf,
DAH)
U.S. surveillance operations remain a point of friction
but that tensions have proven manageable and do not pose a sustained threat
to the overall transatlantic relationship. Those holding this view contend that much of the
outrage expressed by European leaders has been for domestic public consumption .
They also note that while senior European officials may not have been familiar with the
details of U.S. surveillance activities, many were well aware that their own security
services conduct various surveillance operations and often work closely with U.S.
intelligence services to help prevent terrorist attacks and other serious crimes in Europe. In
addition, especially given the potential threat posed by the Islamic State and returning
foreign fighters, officials indicate that cooperation between U.S. and European intelligence
Other analysts argue that the purported
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and security services has continued uninterrupted despite any loss of trust at the
political level. 35
Relations resilient any conflict is self-correcting

DAH)
Polls show
European perceptions of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama

remain relatively favorable, and considerably more positive compared to the
years of the George W. Bush Administration. 3 The overall tone of transatlantic relations has
been mostly constructive over the past six years, and many of the broad global
challenges faced by the United States and Europe have pushed the two sides toward
common or cooperative approaches. In attempting to deal jointly with the daunting list
of challenges they face, however, both sides have also encountered frustrations and reality
checks that have reminded each side to be realistic about what it can expect from the other.
that
Administration
Prefer consensus
DAH)
some observers assert that
the global influence of the Euro-Atlantic partnership is in decline. In addition, the Obama
As the United States and Europe face a changing geopolitical environment,
Administrations announced intention of re-balancing U.S. foreign policy toward Asia has caused some anxiety
Overall, however, most analysts maintain that the United States and Europe
are likely to remain one anothers closest partner, and that U.S.-European
cooperation is likely to remain the foundation of international action on a wide
range of critical issues.
among Europeans.
Cooperation is resilient- shared values, economic ties, and

issue specific cooperation
McCormick 6 (The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations James M. McCormick 1 1
Iowa State University ABSTRACT
AU: James M. McCormick TI: The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.European Relations SO: Politics & Policy VL: 34 NO: 2 PG: 426-450 YR: 2006
Even if the conceptual gap were to narrow only slightly over U.S. foreign policy generally and terrorism particularly,
powerful international and domestic constraints remain, which may motivate

both the United States and Europe to close the action gap. In other words, certain existing constraints
may actually serve as incentives to close the action gap between these two global actors in the near term. Some of
these constraints result from the common ties that already exist, but others are unique to the United States and
still bound together by a set of

underlying common values and beliefs that brought them together during
the Cold War after World War II, albeit no longer with the Soviet Union acting as a lone star guiding policy
formulation. Those common values and beliefs are hardly empty notions to the vast majority
of Europeans and Americans, particularly not to the new European states that have
escaped communist rule since the fall of the Berlin Wall. How those values should be advanced will
surely remain as a source of disagreement both within and between Europe and America, but those values
will undoubtedly continue to serve as incentives for all parties to seek some
Europe.First, of course, the United States and Europe are
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policy accommodations. Second, Europe and America are fundamentally tied by the
significant economic links that serve as the "sticky power" (Mead 2004, 46-53; Mead
2005, 29-36) between them. Indeed, economic ties remain very strong, despite recent
political differences and lingering disputes over access to both participants' markets (Drozdiak 2005).
Third, the often unspoken levels of cooperation on terrorismfor example, in the
areas of law enforcement, intelligence matters, or the tracking of financial
mattersremain in place, even in the face of more visible political
differences over Iraq and the wider war on terrorism. Moreover, the events of 3/11/04 in
Madrid and 7/7/05 in London continue to provide very powerful incentives for this kind of transatlantic cooperation .
In this sense, these different kinds of "ties that bind"and continue to bind
should not be forgotten as important sources of momentum to seek common ground
between America and Europe.
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2NC Alt Cause Energy

Renewable energy is the cornerstone to the transatlantic
alliance
Stori 14 (January 27, 2014 | by Val Stori, OWAP Project Director Trade
Missions Critical in Building an Offshore Wind Industry
one of the most cost-effective measures US developers can take to
reduce project risk and installation costs is partnership with experienced
developers. Reducing risks and construction time can have a significant
impact on overall project costs. In Europe, growing professionalism in the
industrymainly market entry by large construction companies and major
utilities, has led to faster installation times and improved methods. These major players have
Perhaps
developed and improved techniques and equipment specific to offshore wind development, which has led to
speedier installations and thus, reduced costs. In fact, leading utility and major offshore wind developer DONG
Energy predicts that a cost reduction of 10-20% by 2017 is realistic; companies like these are focused on
Through
partnerships, a US developer can gain valuable experience and tap the wealth of
knowledge that European developers have already amassed. To spur the development of
streamlining, improving efficiencies, and incentivizing OEMs and suppliers to reduce costs.
offshore wind in the US and to gain public acceptance through more acceptable power
prices, the US must take advantage not only of European know-how, but also of the
European supply chain. State renewable energy agencies and local economic development councils who
already are heavily invested in offshore wind-related infrastructure and who are looking to position themselves as
leading US offshore wind players, are engaging with key European developers and
political leaders through international trade missions. In 2013, two CESA
members travelled to Germany and Denmark along with a contingent from economic
development councils and port authorities as part of international trade missions. Both
contingents returned to the US cognizant of the major challenges that lie ahead in building a domestic industry, yet
aware of the tremendous opportunities for growth. After touring some of the worlds largest wind farms, visiting
offshore wind-dedicated ports, and speaking with turbine OEMs, the US representatives returned home to champion
for offshore wind. In the words of New Bedford Mayor Jon Mitchell, who travelled to Europe with the Massachusetts
Clean Energy Center, it is hard to avoid the adage that seeing is believing. But what other than awe at the
industrys huge potential is to be gleaned from these international missions? Beyond the fact finding and
knowledge sharing lies an integral component of these trade missionsthe

opportunity to build relationships and establish joint ventures . Dedicated
matchmaking sessions and networking opportunities are critical to kick-starting efficient development off US shores.
The opportunity to partnerwhether a US contractor partners to operate in Europe and

brings the experience back or a US project partners with an experienced European
contractorenables us to benefit from Europes learning curve . We do not have to reinvent the
wheel every step of the way. In fact, to do so would likely be cost prohibitive at this point in the game. The US
currently does not have the volume or the guaranteed market to develop a robust supply chain or to justify
investment in domestic ventures that would support the nascent-at-best industry. Even in Germany, where nearly
400MW of offshore wind were installed in 2013, factories sit idle when demand is low despite investment of an
estimated $1.3 billion for specialized ports and factories. Even though economic development and job creation are
key goals for the states interested in building an offshore wind industry, until a sufficient pipeline of projects is
established along the US Atlantic coast, the first few projects will be supplied by European manufacturers.
European developers and manufacturers are eager to work on this side of

the Atlantic. Recently, the Maryland Energy Administration was invited to attend the annual European Wind
Energy Associations conference at the request of European turbine manufacturers who recognize that Maryland
may be the first state to deploy a large-scale project in the US. And in late December, Cape Wind contracted with
Siemens to supply the project with Siemens 3.6MW turbines and an electrical services platform. The platform, in
fact, has been contracted out by Siemens to Cianbro Corp.a Massachusetts-based company, that will construct
the offshore substation at its manufacturing facility in Brewer, Maine. While it may be too early for European
developers to establish significant facilities in the US at this stage, they are looking for project partners
and prime locations to investespecially if states set offshore wind targets. It could be a win-win
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situation. Local content is lacking and would be a substantial hurdle causing major
bottlenecks if US offshore developers chose to go local only. Overseas cooperation with
local industry will be key in getting the US offshore wind industry up and running, while
providing a large opportunity for the established European players to get involved in US
developments.
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2NC NATO Collapse

Heightened US-EU cooperation will tradeoff with NATO and
other regional alliances
John Van Oudenaren 2005, Chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress, Summer
[National Interest]
Two elements are important for a new U.S. strategy. First, a renewed attention to liberal multilateralism should make
clear the direction that U.S. policy should not take . The United States should not pursue with the EU
the kinds of charters, compacts, partnerships and other bilateral arrangements currently
being promoted in Atlanticist circles. However well intentioned, this kind of U.S.-EU
bilateralism moves away from a more plural and open international order. Within Europe, it
cannot help but promote the further centralization of policymaking in and through Brussels that
shifts power to the European Commission and member states such as France and Germany, even as it
helps to marginalize the contributions of more liberal outliers such as the UK, the Scandinavian countries and the
new member states to the east. In the wider world, it increases the likelihood that U.S.-EU
understandings will be imposed worldwide, thereby marginalizing the influence of third

countries that tend to be closer to U.S. positions . The result is a double loss for international pluralism,
both within Europe and at the global level. For the United States, such a loss might be worth paying if it meant
"pinning the EU down", both with regard to substantive principles (concerning regulation, global governance and so
forth) and procedural norms to ensure that these principles would be universalized in a cooperative rather than
competitive manner. This is unlikely to happen, however. Any bilateral U.S.-EU understanding is certain
to be ambiguous enough to preserve both the EU's internal autonomy and external freedom
of action, even as it diminishes the importance of other mechanisms (such as NATO or the
U.S.-Japanese relationship) that are valuable in their own right and that give the United States levers of influence
over the EU.
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70
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Uniqueness
71
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Rels High Now

US-EU united on foreign policy with M.E and Russian
Mason 15
(Jeff Mason covers the White House for Reuters. He was the lead correspondent for President Barack Obama's 2012
campaign and has been posted in Washington since 2008, when he covered the historic race between Obama, Hillary
Clinton and John McCain, traveling with all three candidates. Jeff has also been posted in Frankfurt, Germany, where he
covered the airline industry and Brussels, Belgium, where he covered climate change and the European Union. He has
appeared on MSNBC, CNN, BBC, and NPR. Jeff is a graduate of Northwestern University and a former Fulbright scholar,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/06/us-g7-summit-obama-idUSKBN0OM0OJ20150606
When President Barack Obama attends the Group of Seven summit in Germany on Sunday, he will join fellow
leaders who are growing accustomed to a new dynamic in the

transatlantic relationship: less direction from Washington, more demands
on Europe. In responding to Russia's intervention in Ukraine, the crisis in Libya and efforts to advance Middle East
peace, European leaders have stepped up their role after a real or perceived sense that the United States was drawing back.
The shift has created both annoyance and satisfaction among European officials. Some privately express frustration at
what they view as reluctance by the Obama administration to get involved. They contrast a "leading from behind" strategy
in the Middle East and Europe with the more proactive U.S. stance in Asia, where Obama is acting diplomatically and
militarily to counter growing Chinese influence. France has publicly berated the U.S. administration for not launching air
strikes in 2013 against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It said that the decision caused irreparable damage to the Syrian
opposition on the ground and emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin on the international scene. "At the heart of
whats going on is that the Americans themselves dont want to be on the front line in this region" a senior French official
said. The phrase "leading from behind" grew out of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya when Washington let France and
Britain do most of the heavy military lifting. DIVISION OF LABOR Other diplomats and U.S. officials say
France and Germany's leading role in talks between Moscow and Kiev , which
led to a shaky ceasefire deal in eastern Ukraine, was appropriate for a crisis that hits them
closer to home. "It's not a question of ceding responsibility, it's the natural division of labor between us," said
David O'Sullivan, the European Union's ambassador to the United States. Other areas, however, have been hurt by a lack
of U.S. leadership, foreign policy analysts said. Stephen Hadley, Republican President George W. Bush's national security
adviser, said it was very attractive to Russia not to have the United States at the table in the Ukraine ceasefire talks. He
noted that Europeans were eyeing a new approach to peace between Israelis and Palestinians by potentially backing a U.N.
resolution for a Palestinian state. "Overhanging this, of course, is this perception of American disengagement and stepping
back from leadership on a lot of problems in the world, which is a perception that our Arab friends and allies have in the
Middle East and, you know, I think is very much prevalent in Europe," he said. "STRONG ALIGNMENT" The White
House rejects that charge, which is voiced by many Republican critics. It points to U.S.-European unity
on Iran's nuclear program, global climate change negotiations, strikes

against Islamic State militants, and sanctions against Russia. "If you look at the
presidents key foreign policy priorities, every single one of them, just about, is supported by these key European
partners," Obama's deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes said. "I think
this is a moment of very strong alignment with Europe." That alignment has not
translated into pro-American sentiment in Germany, which is hosting the G7 summit. Germans remain angry at U.S.
spying practices, an issue German Chancellor Angela Merkel has raised repeatedly with Obama. In an effort to set a more
positive tone, Obama and Merkel will spend some public time together before the summit on Sunday, walking around a
small village and sampling local food. The United States has openly talked about the need for Europe to step up militarily
and has recently reiterated a long-standing message that its NATO partners must boost their military spending.
US-EU Relations strong for the future

Hughes 14
US,EUandtradehttp://thehill.com/opinion/oped/238633useuandtrade
(JuliaK.Hughs,PresidentofInternationalDevelopmentSystems,Inc.,whichhasaproveninternationalreputationasthe
resourceforcompanies,tradeassociationsandcountrieswhentheyneedthelatestinformationregardingtradestatistics
andgovernmentregulationoftextileandapparelproducts.Additionally,Ms.HughesservesasVicePresident,
InternationalTradeandGovernmentRelationsfortheUnitedStatesAssociationofTextilesandApparel(USAITA),
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wheresheleadsthedevelopmentofnewstrategiestoliberalizetradeintextilesandapparel.PriortojoiningIDS,Ms.
HugheswasDivisionalVicePresidentofGovernmentRelationsfortheAssociatedMerchandisingCorporation(AMC),
thelargestretailmerchandising,marketingandconsultingorganizationintheworld.)
TPA,TPP,AGOA,andTESAarejustafewofthetradepolicyacronymsweveheardonCapitolHilllately,butthis
week,thetradecommunityisfocusingonyetanotheracronymthatcouldhaveanenormousbenefitforbothcompanies
andconsumers:TTIP,ortheTransatlanticTrade&InvestmentPartnership.Trade negotiators from the
United States and European Union are currently meetinginNewYorkCityforthe
ninthroundofTTIPnegotiationsinhopesofstrengthening the important partnership
between the United States and Europe, which already supports 13 million
jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. WhiletheU.S.-EU relationship is already
quite strong,manyobstaclestotraderemaininplace.ThisiswhyourorganizationsrepresentingAmericanand
Europeanbrands,retailers,andimportersinavarietyofindustries,includingthefashionindustryurgethenegotiationof
anambitious,highstandardagreementthatrecognizesthewaycompaniesdobusinessinthe21 stcentury.Thismeansthat
theagreementshouldincludetheeliminationofalltariffsaswellasthereductionandharmonizationofproductrelated
regulations.Forcompanies,thebenefitsareclear.TheUnitedStatesandEuropeanUnionhavehighertariffsandmore
restrictivepracticesontextile,leather,andfashionproductsthanmostconsumergoods. By eliminating tariffs
and reducing technical barriers, companieswouldexperience greater
efficiencies and reduced costs of doing business, allowing them to sell

more products globally, expand their operations, and create more high
quality jobs,includingdesign,compliance,retail,andmarketingjobsinthefashionindustry.Suchanagreement
wouldalsobenefittheconsumersthosecompaniesserve.Studiesshowanambitiousagreementcouldcreateasmanyas
750,000newjobsintheUnitedStates,whiletheexpansionoftransatlanticcommercewouldaddapproximately95
billiontotheUnitedStateseconomyandapproximately119billiontoEuropeseconomyandeachyear.Familieswill
reapthebenefits,astheaverageAmericanhouseholdcouldgainapproximately$865annuallywhileEuropeanhouseholds
couldgainapproximately$720annually.Anambitiousagreementwouldalsohaveapositiveimpactonglobaltrade.By
institutinguniform,highstandardregulationsoneverythingfromproductlabelingandtesting,tosustainabilityandsafety
intheglobalvaluechain,theUnitedStatesandEuropecouldsettheglobalstandard.TTIPwouldserveasamodelfor
futuretradeagreementswhenothernationsseethewidespreadbenefitsofanambitiouseliminationoftariffsandreduction
oftradebarriersaswellasthecostsavingsandefficienciesthatresultwhentheyneedtofollowonlyonesetof
regulationsforexportingtotheUnitedStatesandEurope.Westronglyurgethenegotiatorstotakeafreshlookatthe
proposals,andtakeanew,21stcenturyapproachtotradepolicy.Iftheydo,TTIPwontjustbeanotheracronymbutwill
bealandmarkagreementthatchangesthefutureofbusinessandtradeforthebetter.
US-EU Communication never been higher

EU 2006
(http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/infopack_06_en.pdf)
Enhanced EUUS communication has been essential in developing a closer
understanding of respective policy positions and a better coordination of
activities.The1990TransatlanticDeclarationintroducedstructuredpoliticaldialoguestoallowforEUUS
discussiononagreatvarietyofregionalandhorizontalthemes.TheNewTransatlanticAgenda(NTA)whichfollowedin
1995nowgovernstherelationship.Thisambitiousagendaof cooperation between the EU and the
USA inalargenumberofareasrequiresintensivedialogue.Theyearly summits between the
Presidents of the European Commissionand theEuropeanCouncilandthe President
of the United Statesaretheapexofanintensivedialogue.Thesummitsarepreparedbyseniorlevel
representativesfromtheEEAS,theEuropeanCommission,theCouncilSecretariatandtheUSStateDepartment.
Implementationofsummitdecisionsistakenforwardviaregularworkinglevelcontacts.UndertheEUsIndustrialised
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CountriesInstrumentfor20072013,over20millionareearmarkedforcooperationwiththeUnitedStatesunderthree
focalareas:dialogues,peopletopeopleandcooperation.FollowinganAnnualWorkProgramme,tendersorcallsfor
proposalsforthevariousinstruments(EUCentresofExcellence,peopletopeopleactions,dialoguesandoutreach
activities)arepublishedonthatsamewebsiteandareopenedtoEUandUSparticipants.Suchactivitiesshouldbeeligible
forsupportasof2014underthenewPartnershipInstrumentproposedbytheEuropeanCommissionundertheMulti
AnnualFinancialframeworkfortheperiod20142020.Inrecentyears,thedevelopmentofmoreinformalandoperational
adhoccontactshaveallowedforamoredetailedunderstandingofourrespectiveprioritiesandpolicies,providedearly
warningofpotentialproblemsandimprovedthecoordinationofpolicyplanningandassistance. The EU and the
US have continued to work together in the field of both civilian and

military crisis management and conflict prevention.InMarch2008,bothsidesconcludeda
workplanoncrisismanagementandconflictprevention,settingouttheconcretestepstooperationalisecooperationina
numberofareas,withspecificelementsonconflictpreventionandearlywarning.InMay2011,theEUandtheUS
formalisedanagreementtoallowUScivilianstoparticipateinEUCSDPoperations . Close cooperation
continues in stabilization efforts, for example in the Balkans,concerningthe
EULEXKosovoruleoflawmission.
French Anger Over NSA Spying Further Strains Europe-U.S. Relations,

Williams 15 BY LAUREN C. WILLIAMS JUN 24, 2015 1:06PM,
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/06/24/3673403/french-anger-nsa-spying-strains-europe-usrelations/, Lauren C. Williams is the tech reporter for ThinkProgress with an affinity for
consumer privacy, cybersecurity, tech culture and the intersection of civil liberties and tech
policy. Before joining the ThinkProgress team, she wrote about health care policy and regulation
for B2B publications, and had a brief stint at The Seattle Times. Lauren is a native
Washingtonian and holds a masters in journalism from the University of Maryland and a
bachelors of science in dietetics from the University of Delaware.
New WikiLeaks documents show the U.S. National Security Agency spied on the private communications of three
French presidents, angering the French government and adding strain to an already
tenuous Europe-American relationship.French news site Mediapart first published the documents Tuesday, which cover NSA activity from 2006 to 2012, and were part of
the original WikiLeaks provided by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. That news quickly drew the ire of French President Franois
Hollande, who called an emergency meeting Wednesday with the U.S. ambassador and
government attorneys. France will not tolerate actions that threaten its security and the
protection of its interests, Hollande said in a statement Wednesday. These are unacceptable facts that have already
been the subject of clarification between the US and France, notably at the end of 2013 when the first revelations were made and during a
state visit by the president of the Republic to the United States in February 2014. Commitments were made by the US authorities. They need to be recalled and strictly
respected.
US-EU relations High NowKey to counteracting terrorism

Archick 14
(U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, Kristin Archick, Specialist in European
Affairs, December 1, 2014, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf
Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS22030)
U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering
dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions with individual EU member states. Despite some frictions , most U.S. policy makers and
analysts view the developing partnership with the EU in these areas as positive. Like its predecessor, the Obama
Administration has supported U.S. cooperation with the EU in the fields of counterterrorism,
border controls, and transport security. At the November 2009 U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, DC, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to work together to
combat terrorism and enhance cooperation in the broader JHA field. In June 2010, the United States and the EU adopted a Declaration on Counterterrorism aimed at deepening the already close U.S.-EU relationship and highlighting
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the commitment of both sides to combat terrorism within the rule of law. In June 2011, President Obamas National Strategy for Counterterrorism asserted that in addition to working with European allies bilaterally,
the
United States will continue to partner with the European Parliament and European Union to maintain and advance CT efforts that provide
mutual security and protection to citizens of all nations while also upholding individual
rights. The EU has also been a key U.S. partner in the 30-member Global
Counterterrorism Forum, founded in September 2011 as a multilateral body aimed at mobilizing resources and expertise to counter violent extremism, strengthen criminal justice and rule of
law capacities, and enhance international counterterrorism cooperation.
US EU Relations Tense- Asia risks souring relations

Esther Brimmer, 2015, 6-22-15"Why rising Asia risks souring U.S.-EU relations,"
Europes World, http://europesworld.org/2015/06/22/why-rising-asia-risks-souringu-s-eu-relations/#.VZ7SuvlVgaB
Asias rise is going to need careful management by the U.S. and the EU, The U.S. and EU must manage
their reactions to the rise of Asia because this transition for it has the potential to deepen existing strains in the
transatlantic relationship. The need for America and Europe to manage cope with such external influences is hardly new. Transatlantic
relations have been buffeted over the years by trends ranging from Europes process of de-colonisation to Americas Vietnam War, and
from conflict in the Middle East to war in Afghanistan. Global changes affect North America and Europe differently, and
so can lead to misunderstandings because the long-term rise of Asia will change the world. Europeans and Americans need to build a more nuanced
understanding of their shared interests. There are different interpretations of the rise of Asia, but five aspects are particularly interesting. It can be seen as an economic phenomenon, a strategic
challenge, a global power shift, a recognition of the re-emergence of China and India, and an acknowledgement of the many middle powers in the region. All five interpretations are likely to
influence the views from North America and Europe. The biggest transatlantic divergence over Asias rise is the strategic outlook now that many Asian countries are greatly increasing their
military spending Asia contains a number of the largest economies in the world. China last year accounted for over 16% of global GNP, as measured by purchasing power parity. Japan for 5.4%,
India 5.8% and the U.S. 16.3%. Although trade is important, investment flows show a more complex relationship. International capital is taking a renewed interest in stable, established markets
now the sparkle of emerging ones is being dimmed by slower growth. For European countries, Asia and especially China has become a source of investment income. The economic crisis has
ushered in an era of inadequate intra-European investment, creating a profound need for investment in Europe just at a time when China wanted to invest its huge surpluses internationally.
Chinese investors and others found bargains in Europe. The result is that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into the EU grew a whopping 338% between 2010-2012. UNCTAD reports that
Chinese investment in the United Kingdom doubled from $1.4bn, it was $2.8bn during that period, and the overall value of Chinese investment stock in the EU rose to $31.5bn from a mere
$1.3bn in 2006. Chinese investment in the U.S. reached $17bn in 2012, up from a similarly low level of $1.2bn in 2006. Yet, despite this dramatic increase in Chinese investment, the U.S. and
Europe are still by far each others most significant economic partners. In 2012, the U.S. accounted for about a quarter of the EUs foreign investments, with China trailing far behind at 6.1%,
Hong Kong at 5.9% and India only 2.1%. As to U.S. foreign investment, Europe received $2.7 trillion in 2013, almost a fifth of which went to the UK alone. Asia as a whole was of far less
interest than Europe to American investors, getting $695bn in 2013, of which $61.5bn went to China. The rise of Asia is creating opportunities, but is also opening new areas for politically
charged debate The transatlantic partners know well that increased investment brings deeper social engagement. But cCorporate investors decisions canalso affect local labour conditions, and
now some of the most difficult negotiations over TTIP relate to investment disputes. The perception that other countries standards are not as high as your own creates a politically charged
climate for negotiations. Europe has agreed investment provisions with Canada, but is still debating them with the U.S. in the TTIP negotiations. Europeans worry that American companies will
use the investor state dispute mechanisms to circumvent the EUs labour, health and safety standards. For their part, the Europeans want such mechanisms to be included in the pending EU-China
bilateral investment treaty precisely to protect them from local actions in the less transparent Chinese dispute resolution system. Different types of investors in China enjoy different degrees of
market access, with the state-owned enterprises there controlling an important segment of Chinese international investment., although tThey are less transparent than many commercial investors
yet wield political clout. Europe arguably needs this investment agreement more than China as it wants greater access to Chinese markets, while China already benefits from access to Europes
open economies. One possible source of transatlantic tension is that the U.S., and but only some EU countries, requires a security review of investments by foreign government entities. This
raises questions about whether NATO-member the EU countries will be able to develop acceptable investment rules with some Asian countries from a security perspective. The rise of Asia is
creating opportunities, but is also opening new areas for politically charged debate. The biggest transatlantic divergence over Asias rise is the strategic outlook now that many Asian countries are
greatly increasing their military spending. China last year spent $216.4bn, triple its 2006 defence budget of $71.4bn. While the U.S. accounts for over a third of global military spending, Chinas
share has risen to 12.25%. Part of the heralded U.S. rebalance to Asia reflects Washingtons efforts to revitalise transpacific political and security relationships as Asia raises strategic and
political issues for America as well as economic ones. Europeans may speak of Asia as a neighbouring region, but for many Americans the U.S. is part of the Asia/Pacific region. Fifty million
Americans live in the five states that border the Pacific Ocean. The United States is not alone among the countries of the Asia/Pacific region to have been alarmed by Chinas adventurism in the
East China and the South China Seas. Yet from a U.S perspective the rise of Asia in strategic terms means not only the challenge of a more assertive China but also the benefit of more capable
regional partners for Washington. America and Japan have been allies for over 60 years, and Australia and New Zealand have been bound by the ANZUS treaty for as long. The U.S. and India
have moved closer together over the past decade in a stronger security relationship, with their 2008 agreement and subsequent work to bring India closer to international nuclear weapons control
The re-emergence of Asia is

likely
to have a particular impact on Europe, whose leaders may feel they need to ingratiate themselves
with the emerging Asian powers to stay in the game. While the United States will be a large and powerful country for decades to come,
Europe may feel disadvantaged in its relations with Asia, and that could cause tensions with the U.S.
regimes having removed barriers to more widespread co-operation.
recalibrating global power balances. These changes are
US-EU will continue to work together

OSullivan 15 (22 June 2015, HENRY GRATTAN LECTURE: EU-US RELATIONS IN A
CHANGING WORLD SPEECH BY DAVID OSULLIVAN EU AMBASSADOR TO THE
UNITED STATES, http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/henry-grattan-lecture-eu-us-relationsin-a-changing-world-speech-by-david-osullivan-eu-ambassador-to-the-united-states/, David
O'Sullivan is an Irish civil servant who serves as the Ambassador of the European Union to the
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United States and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United States. Prior
to arriving to the United States, he was the chief operating officer of the European Union's
diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS). He has held a number of high
level positions including Head of Cabinet to Romano Prodi and Secretary-General of the
European Commission)
Working increasingly with what I call institutional Europe has rendered the EU-US relationship much more effective. Without a program of
joint EU-US wide sanctions, we would not have brought Iran back to the table and we would
certainly have had a lot less leverage on Mr. Putin. So far, despite the drag of these sanctions on the European economy, we have managed to maintain unity, and as long as attempts to
divide us fail, the EU will continue to work hand-in- glove with the United States on these
complicated issues. Washington increasingly sees Europe as having an important role to
play also in our southern neighbourhood and Federica Mogherini has been tireless in her attempts to contribute to
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Rels Low Now

U.S- E.U. relations are becoming increasingly strained as the U.S. continues with
international spying
Gramer, 14
(Robert Gramer, Gramer staffs the Atlantic Councils Transatlantic Security Initiative, Collateral damage: US spy
scandals endanger the world's largest trade deal, 7/22/14, URL, LJG)
After two German officials were arrested on charges of spying for the United States, Germany ordered the CIA
station chief in Berlin to leave the country. This story ripped open painful wounds from the NSA-spying scandal that
had barely begun to scab over, when leaked documents revealed that the United States had spied on German
citizens and tapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel's personal phone. According to U.S. officials, this scandal is
simply a crisis du jour spurred primarily by naivety and hypocrisy from an ally who spies right back on the United
States. But to German officials, it's the latest example of overreaching U.S. intelligence practices that irrevocably
damage the U.S.-German relationship and deeply undermine the sanctity of allies' trust to the point where the
In this politically charged

climate, German and EU leaders may find a new political lightning rod for rising frustration toward the
U.S. in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), an ambitious trade deal between the
German committee investigating the NSA has considered switching to typewriters.
United States and the European Union slated to add $280 billion and 13 million jobs to the transatlantic economy.
Germany is the EU's economic center of gravity, making it the United States' most important bilateral partner in the
TTIP negotiations. German and EU politicians will have to sell TTIP to their people for it to pass. This will be much
more difficult with citizens furious at the country on the other side of the negotiating table. As one German official
told The New York Times, the latest scandal "overshadows everything we do," including TTIP negotiations
(complicated by the fact that the next round of TTIP negotiations started this week with the spy scandal still
saturating headlines). Indeed, the chair of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Elmar Brok,
hinted in an interview after the Edward Snowden scandal first broke that TTIP could be leveraged against the United
States: "the European Union is in charge of all the trade negotiations, all the rules and regulations on data
protection, on the new transatlantic marketplace agreement. ... I think the Americans should see that it is in their
interests to find a solution to this question." While few European officials have explicitly stated that the spy scandal
will slow TTIP talks, it will undoubtedly be the elephant in the negotiating room. How can the United States salvage
American officials
need to acknowledge the full scale of damage to U.S.-German relations. Right now, American officials
appear to be more annoyed than concerned, neither comprehending how deeply the multiple spy scandals
scarred the German public nor how it could hinder TTIP negotiations. White House Press Secretary Josh
TTIP's prospects before political pressures grind the trade negotiators' efforts to a halt? First,
Earnest said Germany should understand what allies' "intelligence relationships and activities entail" and Rep. Mike
Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Intelligence, accused Germany of throwing a "political
temper tantrum." Intelligence, especially surveillance, is a deeply personal and contentious subject for the German
people, inextricably rooted in the country's painful and infamous past. That makes this scandal disastrous for U.S.German relations, but this fact falls on deaf ears in the White House. Second, the U.S. government must
demonstrate that it will exert additional oversight on overly broad intelligence collection practices. Even if the
government didn't substantially alter U.S. intelligence policy (something even Angela Merkel conceded is tough), it
would demonstrate to allies that at least publicly elected bodies were sufficiently "watching the watchmen." Lastly,
the United States should include language in TTIP that explicitly signals a commitment to agreeable civil liberty
protection for both American and EU citizens, while still effectively protecting national security interests. European
officials can brandish this as a victory, and the United States can link TTIP's success with policies on curbing broad
The NSA spy scandal unleashed a political firestorm

in Europe, and this most recent scandal further fanned the flames . American policymakers must realize that
this will not simply blow over with the right mixture of time, a few quotes about being "great friends," or a nice
photo-op. This is a disastrous turning point for U.S.-German relations, and potentially TTIP, but few
Americans seem to notice. The United States has shown it's more than capable of eavesdropping on allies, but
surveillance it should have implemented in the first place.
now it's time to listen to them.
U.S. - E.U. relations are becoming increasingly strained as businesses in the E.U.
realize that U.S. privacy policies are mostly false.
Bernard, 14
(Doug Bernard, Bernard covers cyber issues for Voice of America News, EU Data Retention Ruling May Roil USEuropean Relations, 4/8/14, http://www.voanews.com/content/eu-data-retention-ruling-may-roil-us-europeanrelations/1888781.html, LJG)
Before any data can leave an EU member nation, U.S. telecommunications firms must certify they follow privacy
policies and programs similar to the more stringent EU protections, creating a "safe harbor" for data privacy.
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However, Kelley said,
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have long known that many U.S. safe harbor
certifications are actually false, creating a serious potential problem for U.S. companies doing business in
the EU. This week's court ruling, he said, will only make commerce more difficult. "Even before Snowden, there
were concerns about the EU Safe Harbor," Kelley said. "There's already skepticism in Europe because of that,
and then you throw in Snowden, it creates more distrust. Having one more element of differentiation
between the U.S. and EU is just not helpful."
Rise of Asia is likely to deepen problems with U.S. E.U. relations

Brimmer, 6/22/15
(Esther Brimmer, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs (2009-2013) and
Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, Why
rising Asia risks souring U.S.-EU relations, 6/22/15, http://europesworld.org/2015/06/22/why-rising-asia-riskssouring-u-s-eu-relations/#.VZ06wflVikp, LJG)
Asias rise is going to need careful management by the U.S. and the EU ,
The U.S. and EU must manage their

reactions to the rise of Asia because this transition for it has the potential to deepen existing strains in the
transatlantic relationship. The need for America and Europe to manage cope with such external influences is
hardly new. Transatlantic relations have been buffeted over the years by trends ranging from Europes process of
Global
changes affect North America and Europe differently, and so can lead to misunderstandings because the
long-term rise of Asia will change the world. Europeans and Americans need to build a more nuanced
de-colonisation to Americas Vietnam War, and from conflict in the Middle East to war in Afghanistan.
understanding of their shared interests. There are different interpretations of the rise of Asia, but five aspects are
particularly interesting. It can be seen as an economic phenomenon, a strategic challenge, a global power shift, a
recognition of the re-emergence of China and India, and an acknowledgement of the many middle powers in the
region. All five interpretations are likely to influence the views from North America and Europe.
EU US Relations Falling Apart- Obama Administration to Blame

Sputnik, 4-2-15, By, 7-9-2015, "What transatlantic renaissance? US-EU relations falling apart at the seams," SOTT.net,
http://www.sott.net/article/294681-What-transatlantic-renaissance-US-EU-relations-falling-apart-at-the-seams
While the US President urges his Western allies to rally support for Washington's stance on the
most burning international issues, he should not be surprised that consensus is hard to come by,
notes David J. Karl, pointing to the fact Barack Obama has repeatedly snubbed the continent's
leaders. The "continuing ructions" in the US relations with its Western allies caused by Obama's
failure to develop strong ties with European leaders have ultimately overshadowed Washington's
plan of a "transatlantic renaissance," David J. Karl, president of the Asia Strategy Initiative, an
analysis and advisory firm, pointed out. "[In 2008] speaking before a massive crowd assembled
in Berlin's "Tiergarten", [President Obama] grandly vowed to "remake the world once again,"
this time in a way that allies would "listen to each other, learn from each other and, most of all,
trust each other." That pledge is now so yesterday that Mrs. Merkel is reportedly longing for the
days of George W. Bush," the expert emphasized. Barack Obama has repeatedly snubbed the
European leaders, Mr. Karl pointed out. Instead of taking a chance to demonstrate to the world
US-NATO solidarity, Barack Obama "in fact deliberately" missed an opportunity to meet with
the new NATO Chief, Jens Stoltenberg, in Washington last week. Stoltenberg requested a
meeting with the US President "well in advance," the expert underscored. Obama's move could
only be considered as an obvious slight to Jens Stoltenberg: the US President is one of a few
Western leaders who have yet to with the NATO chief, who assumed the position almost six
months ago. However, Obama has demonstrated disinterest in the US' European allies many
times before. For instance, in November 2009, Barack Obama opted out of holding a meeting
with European Union leaders at the White House sparking speculations that British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, one of the most pro-American
French leaders, felt like they were being ignored. Remarkably, a year later the American
President once again missed a summit with the EU leaders. In September 2009, during a so-
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called "reset" of relations with Moscow, Barack Obama changed his plans of deploying a missile
defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, but did not bother to inform his eastern
European counterparts about his decision. David J. Karl cited a top Polish security official who
said that Warsaw heard Obama had shifted the plan though the media. Another European security
official complained that US President Obama "does not do consultation, and he doesn't do
discussion with allies. He reports, and he describes his analytical process," as quoted by the
expert. Curiously, the members of the Obama administration also demonstrated little if any
respect to the US' continental allies. A senior German official close to Chancellor Angela Merkel
remarked that Susan Rice, the US National Security Adviser, in 2013, pressed the German team
to adopt the US approach to the Syrian crisis openly demonstrating that she was not interested in
the EU view, David J. Karl noted. The expert added that Rice even used the hardly diplomatic
term "mother**ker," causing outrage among German politicians. The leaked phone conversation
of Victoria Nuland, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who graphically cursed
the EU, once again demonstrated the Obama cabinet's attitude towards its European allies. While
Obama is urging the EU to rally common Western positions on such issues as the Ukrainian
conflict, Iran's nuclear program and the rise of China, he should not be surprised that consensus
is hard to come by, the expert underscored. Instead of repairing ties with Europe, Barack Obama
has evidently mismanaged relations with the continent, David J. Karl stated.
Despite Stress over Surveillance- US EU Relations Still High

John Curran,, 6-16-2014, "EU AMBASSADOR NOTES EU-U.S. 'STRESS' OVER SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY," No Publication,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/docview/1541351319?pq-origsite=summon
Joao Vale de Almeida, the European Union ambassador to the U.S., this week called for a
renewal of a more trusting relationship between the EU and the U.S. following the past year's
discord between the two over disclosures of National Security Agency surveillance programs,
which he said have constituted a "stress test" of the relationship. Speaking at a cloud computing
policy conference organized by Forum Global, Mr. de Almeida said the EU and the U.S. need to
"cultivate, nurture, protect, and promote" a more trusted relationship. "In Europe, this is a serious
issue," he said. "We should not underestimate the importance of trust." "If trust does not
exist...then the whole concept is not sustainable," he said, speaking of agreements on crossborder data flows that are involved in cloud computing and other communications services.
Along those lines, he said the future may hold "severe weather alerts" over security and policy
differences. "Some clouds bring storms . . some storms can be linked to cybersecurity - this is the
most obvious problem," he said. On the policy front, he said NSA program revelations constitute
a "political" storm, with the "capacity to pollute policy making. He said, for example, that
transatlantic trade talks now underway between the EU and U.S. do not involve surveillance
issues, but that those issues "are having an impact on the negotiations. I don't think we should
ignore this." Mr. de Almeida offered that it was difficult to find the right balance between
security and privacy, but that the EU and the U.S. nonetheless have to attempt to "square the
circle" on that issue. At the same event, Federal Trade Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen
emphasized the importance of cross-border data flows to economic growth, and said they
constitute "the purest form of a broadband bonus - nobody loses, and everybody wins." She also
offered that the relationship between the U.S. and the EU has been improving in recent times
following the NSA surveillance program disclosures. "Despite some of the storms, it's getting
stronger because it needs to get stronger," she said. "It triggered a discussion, but I think we'll
come out stronger." Cameron Kerry, a former Department of Commerce general counsel and
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now a fellow at the Brookings Institution, said that NSA surveillance "revelations have fueled the
worst fears" that some Europeans have about U.S. policy," and that some European institutions
have tried to move forward on their own with data privacy reforms as a result. "But at the end of
the day, I don't think either side of the Atlantic can afford that," he said. "Trade is too important,
and the Internet is too important." He said the U.S. and the EU need to affirm the continuing
validity of their existing Safe Harbor framework for cross-border data flows, and improve the
"interoperability" of the exchange. "We need to dial back some of the regulatory friction so we
can focus on regulatory outcomes, not process." - John Curran, john.curran@wolterskluwer.com
US Spying on French Presidents Strain Relations

Khabar.Eu, 6-24-2015, "US must work to repair relations after spy claims, says French PM," Khabar.eu, http://www.khabar.eu/francesummons-us-ambassador-over-spying-claims-diplomatic-source/
PARIS: The United States must do everything in its power to repair relations after reports emerged that
it spied on French President Francois Hollande and two of his predecessors, Prime Minister Manuel Valls
said Wednesday. The US should recognise not only the danger that such actions represent for our
freedom, but should also do everything in its power and quickly to repair the damage they have done
to relations between the United States and France, Valls told parliament. France earlier summoned
the US ambassador to complain about the unacceptable spying that was apparently revealed in leaked
documents. Hollande was due to discuss the documents released by WikiLeaks with US President
Barack Obama in the coming hours. France will not tolerate any acts that threaten its security the
presidency said, after a meeting between Hollande and his top intelligence officials and cabinet
ministers. US Ambassador Jane Hartley has also been summoned to meet French Foreign
Minister Laurent Fabius, diplomatic sources told AFP. The United States wiretapped France's
former presidents Jacques Chirac (L) and Nicolas Sarkozy (C), as well as current leader Francois
Hollande (R), French media report - AFP/File The United States wiretapped Frances former
presidents Jacques Chirac (L) and Nicolas Sarkozy (C), as well as current leader Francois
Hollande (R), French media report AFP/File The documents labelled Top Secret and
appearing to reveal spying on Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and Hollande from 2006 to 2012
were published by WikiLeaks in partnership with French newspaper Liberation and the
Mediapart website. The leak coincides with a vote later on Wednesday in the French parliament
on a controversial new law granting the state sweeping powers to spy on its citizens. The White
House said it was not targeting Hollandes communications and will not do so in the future, but it
did not comment on past activities. We are not targeting and will not target the communications
of President Hollande, said National Security Council spokesman Ned Price late Tuesday,
calling the US partnership with France indispensable. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius
(pictured) on Wednesday summoned the US ambassador over leaked documents that suggest her
government spied on President Francois Hollande and two predecessors - AFP/File / Francois
Guillot French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (pictured) on Wednesday summoned the US
ambassador over leaked documents that suggest her government spied on President Francois
Hollande and two predecessors AFP/File / Francois Guillot Hollandes office recalled US promises
in late 2013 not to spy on French leaders following accusations that the US National Security Agency
(NSA) had wiretapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel . Commitments were made by the US
authorities, the Elysee Palace said in a statement. They must be remembered and strictly respected.
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New Leaks show US Surveillance of German Officials- Further Strains Relations

Guardian, 7-1-2015, "WikiLeaks: US spied on Angela Merkel's ministers too, says German newspaper,"
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jul/02/wikileaks-us-spied-on-angela-merkels-ministers-too-says-german-newspaper
The United States did not just tap chancellor Angela Merkels phone but also eavesdropped on several of
her ministers, the German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung has reported, citing documents from
WikiLeaks. German-US relations were badly strained after fugitive US intelligence contractor Edward
Snowden in 2013 revealed widespread US foreign surveillance, although a probe into the alleged
tapping of Merkels mobile phone was dropped in June over a lack of evidence. But according to
the latest revelations the US National Security Agency did not limit its snooping activities to Merkel
and showed particular interest in the activities of the ministries of finance, economy and agriculture,
Sueddeutsche Zeitung reported. It said WikiLeaks had shown it a list of 69 phone numbers
belonging to ministers and senior officials that were reportedly targeted. The list appears to date back
to between 2010 and 2012. The current economy minister and vice-chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel,
was among those spied on by the NSA, the report said, although it noted he had been in the
opposition at the time. The list also features the number of former finance minister Oskar
Lafontaine, who left the job in 1999. But the number was still active according to
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, ringing through to the secretariat of the current finance minister,
Wolfgang Schaeuble. While Snowden alleged US spying on many European governments, his
disclosures triggered particular anger in Germany where bitterness lingers over mass state spying on
citizens by the Stasi secret police in former communist East Germany where Merkel grew up. Merkel
herself phoned the US president, Barack Obama, over the revelations and in public told Germanys
traditional post-war ally and Nato partner that spying between friends just isnt on. Washington
appeared to confirm her phone had previously been tapped when US officials said the cellphone
was no longer a target.
NSA Foreign Surveillance Strains European-US Relations

Lauren C. Williams, 6-24-2015, "French Anger Over NSA Spying Further Strains Europe-U.S. Relations," ThinkProgress,
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/06/24/3673403/french-anger-nsa-spying-strains-europe-us-relations/
New WikiLeaks documents show the U.S. National Security Agency spied on the private communications
of three French presidents, angering the French government and adding strain to an already tenuous
Europe-American relationship. French news site Mediapart first published the documents Tuesday,
which cover NSA activity from 2006 to 2012, and were part of the original WikiLeaks provided
by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. That news quickly drew the ire of French President
Franois Hollande, who called an emergency meeting Wednesday with the U.S. ambassador and
government attorneys. France will not tolerate actions that threaten its security and the protection of its
interests, Hollande said in a statement Wednesday. These are unacceptable facts that have already
been the subject of clarification between the US and France, notably at the end of 2013 when the
first revelations were made and during a state visit by the president of the Republic to the United
States in February 2014. Commitments were made by the US authorities. They need to be
recalled and strictly respected. The White House has denied the spying allegations, saying via a
statement Wednesday: We are not targeting and will not target the communications of President
Hollande. Indeed, as we have said previously, we do not conduct any foreign intelligence
surveillance activities unless there is a specific and validated national security purpose. This
applies to ordinary citizens and world leaders alike. We work closely with France on all matters of
international concern, and the French are indispensable partners. Spying on friendly and enemy
governments alike isnt a new occurrence and is widely practiced, the U.S. is generally more
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File Title
brazen about it. German lawmakers accused its own intelligence agencies earlier this year of
violating German regulations and gathering information in European targets for the NSA. The
new Snowden-derived information comes as trust in U.S. government wanes domestically and
overseas. Only a quarter of Americans trust the government always or most of the time,
according to a 2014 Pew Research survey. When it comes to foreign relations, only 43 percent
are at least fairly confident in how the U.S. handles international matters, Gallup found. This
weeks WikiLeaks also follows news that Germany folded its investigation into the NSAs spying
practices after documents surfaced in 2013 indicating the agency spied on Chanecellor Angela
Merkels personal communications. But public disclosing of what should be clandestine movements
fuels international sentiment of American governments disregard for civilian privacy . We find it hard
to understand or imagine what motivates an ally to spy on allies who are often on the same
strategic positions in world affairs, Stphane Le Foll, a French government spokesman told
iTELE television. Negative global perception of the NSAs actions could also affect how the U.S. does
business overseas. European regulators have already begun investigating tech companies potential
wrongdoing by participating in NSA surveillance programs. The Court of Justice of the European
Union is hearing a case involving Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Yahoo, for potential privacy law
violations. The decision could seriously damage the U.S.-European relationship by deterring companies
from doing business through stricter regulations. Facebooks European public policy director Richard
Allan warned legislators in April that imposing stringent regulations on tech companies would be
bad for business stateside and abroad: National regulators in a number of countries, including
Belgium and the Netherlands, appear to be initiating multiple, overlapping investigations of
Facebook, revisiting basic questions about how our services work. In effect, this would mark a
return to national regulation. If it is allowed to stand, complying with EU law will no longer be
enough; businesses will instead have to comply with 28 independently shifting national variants.
They would have to predict the enforcement agenda in each country Facebooks costs would
increase, and people in Europe would notice new features arriving more slowly, or not at all. The
biggest victims would be smaller European companies. The next big thing might never see the
light of day.
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EU Impact Defense
83
File Title
A2: Afghanistan
84
File Title
1NC Stable Now

Afghanistan stability now
PressTV, US withdrawal brings stability to Afghanistan: Officials, Feb 14,
2015, http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/02/14/397602/US-pullout-bringspeace-to-Afghanistan
The security situation across Afghanistan is gradually improving following the
partial withdrawal of US-led forces from the war-ravaged country, officials say, Press TV reports.
Local residents and security officials in Afghanistan say order has significantly improved in
the volatile southern and eastern provinces, which were once the epicenters
of the Taliban militancy. US-led forces have closed most of their military facilities in the southern,
eastern and central regions of the violence-torn country. Thousands of Afghan troops have
assumed full responsibility for the security of several provinces. Maidan Wardak
Police Chief Khalil Andarab has recently said attacks have decreased drastically in the past few
months. Attacks and insecurities in Maidan Wardak Province, especially on KabulKandahar highway, have decreased by around 95 percent in the past 8
months, he told Press TV.
Even if they win that Afghan is unstable now --Solving Afghan Instability requires increasing ground forces --they dont do that
Faizi and Roufi 15 (Abdul Rashid Faizi graduated from the United Arab
Emirates University, in the UAE. Abdul is a researcher at the UAE University
focusing on political economy, international economic, economics of
development, and foreign direct investment. Shahabuddin Roufi is a research
assistant at the College of Business and Economics, UAE University. His
research interests include economics and political economy focusing in
Islamic countries. Three Factors Contributing to Afghanistans Instability
January 13 2015 accessed 7/9/15 http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/ruralpopulation-afghanistan-476/) DAH
Political scientists believe that higher population size and concentration raises the risk of civil conflict. It could also
lead to higher probability of revolutions to overthrow governing elites in non-democratic countries. This claim,
supported by political scientists, does not refer to the number of people that eventually join an insurgency, but only
In Afghanistan
the rural population is an important determinant of political stability. Now and in the
past, the political stability in Afghanistan has been threatened mainly by rural
residents. Currently almost all insurgent groups such as the Taliban are based in
rural areas. From those safe heavens they recruit insurgents and manage all of their destructive activities
the number of people that start one. They constitute enough rebels to pose a serious threat.
against the government. As a footnote in history, most resistance groups were based in rural areas during
Afghanistans fight against the Soviet Union. In 1996 when the Taliban conquered Kabul, almost all of their fighters
The reasons are very obvious: rural areas are safe

havens where insurgents could easily and freely plan their destructive activities.
Moreover, the threat of rural populations to political stability of Afghanistan results
from the interconnection of the following well-known facts: Geography Insurgency is
closely related to the geography of the country. The presence of rough terrain, poorly served by
roads and at a distance from the centers of state power, favors insurgents. This is fostered by the
availability of cross-border sanctuaries inhabited by people that can be easily
were recruited from rural communities.
85
File Title
manipulated by local insurgents.
In this scenario it is not uncommon that these local populations get

trapped between their responsibilities as citizens of the country and their cultural loyalty to the local insurgent
Moreover, the government does not have a permanent control over these
areas, which nurtures a decent atmosphere for insurgent groups. Poverty People feel
that their government has abandoned them and failed to provide financial means to
elevate their living standards. This problem is enhanced by the fact that the country
has a large percentage of young men who cannot find enough employment
opportunities. Their contribution to economic development and their participation in the political process is
groups.
highly underexploited. Afghan young men tend to participate in activities that are either economically unproductive,
such as joining gangs and drug cartels or politically destructive, such as organizing resistance groups under
leadership of insurgents. Extremism It
is a well known fact that religious extremism has

become the core of much of Afghanistans violence. Extremists justify their version
of Islam to force people to accept their Islamic interpretation. This problem is further
exacerbated by the fact that almost all of the rural residents are uneducated. The presence of madrasas (Islamic
schools) works in their favor. In these schools they mainly spread their radical political thinking to the public. The
Recently, there has

been a dramatic increase in insurgent attacks in the country. Security handovers
from NATO to Afghan forces, and the American pullout have motivated the Taliban to
increase their destructive activities. The threat might strongly resurface yet again .
Based on these three reasons, the rural population has a strong impact on the political
stability of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it seems that the government is not taking this problem very
seriously. This threat is becoming very grave by the reduction and withdrawal of
American and NATO forces from the country. History might repeat itself again if the government
products of madrasas are radical Muslims who play key roles in destabilizing activities.
fails to tackle the challenges.
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File Title
1NC No Spillover
Afghanistan wont spillover
Kazemi, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2012
(S. Reza, A Potential Afghan Spill-Over: How Real Are Central Asian Fears?,
http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=3152, ldg)
A spill-over of the Afghan conflict or aspects of it like the drug trade into Central
Asia is realistic, but it need not be as threatening and disastrous as the regions
governmental officials depict it. It also may differ for particular Central Asian countries. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
of Afghanistans three direct Central Asian neighbours (with the third being Turkmenistan) are likely to continue to be most
A spill-over of Islamist terrorism from Afghanistan seems unlikely,

however, at least for the time being. The leadership of the IMU, regarded as the most serious
militant threat against the region, has been largely dismantled. Although a 2011 AAN report
affected.
identified some IMU presence in Afghanistans Balkh, Faryab and Kunduz provinces bordering Central Asia, the bulk of the IMU
fighters are based in Pakistans Waziristan, far away from any shared Afghanistan-Central Asia frontier. It is unclear, therefore, if the
movement can re-group to organise and carry out attacks in Central Asian territory, apart from causing localised instability and
violence on Afghan soil.(9) And even if so, terrorist and extremist threats facing Central Asia (and particularly Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan) are more home-grown than what would originate from Afghanistan, as, for example, Christian Bleuer argues (read, for
example, here), although others like Ahmed Rashid have, both in the past and recently, talked about larger regional networks of
If there is any actual spill-over of the Afghan conflict into Central Asia, it is
more likely to continue to be drug trafficking. Afghanistan is by far the largest global producer of poppy
militants.
and hashish and increasingly of derivates produced from them. As the recent fighting in Tajikistans Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous
there are cross-border networks functioning and corrupt

government officials both in Afghanistan and Central Asia can hugely benefit from
their trafficking (for a UN report on drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia and onwards, see here). In a
Oblast (GBAO) has shown,
reverse way, Uzbekistan has engaged to influence Afghanistans socio-political developments more seriously than any other Central
Asian government. It has supported the Uzbek commander-turned-politician Abdul Rashid Dostum and his party Jombesh-e Melli-ye
Islami-ye Afghanistan (Afghanistans National Islamic Movement) (for latest developments in the party, read a recent AAN paper).
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also have large numbers of co-ethnics inside Afghanistan, but Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks are very different
from their ethnic kin in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, mainly because of Central Asias Sovietisation, despite speaking almost similar
languages (see, for example, here).(10) It also needs to be recalled that conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan have had mutual spillover effects. During the 1992-97 Tajik civil war, parts of the Tajik opposition fled to Afghanistan, were supported by Afghan
mujahedin and used Afghanistan as a safe haven and base to carry out attacks in Tajikistan. During the conflict between the
Northern Alliance and the Taleban, Tajikistan had provided, among other things, an airbase to the Northern Alliance in Kulyab in
southern Tajikistan for them to use to mobilise and organise the resistance against the Talebans advance towards northern
Afghanistan (read, for example, here). In addition, the civil war in Tajikistan drove tens of thousands of people out of Tajikistan to the
Judging by recent contemporary

precedents, an American Central Asia researcher, who requested not to be named,
wrote to AAN that the previous experience in the mid- to late 1990s of having a
civil war in northern Afghanistan and a Taleban government controlling much of the north was not
particularly traumatic. Whatever the speculations about the Afghan
conflict going northwards may be, Central Asia plus Afghanistan is one of
the worlds least integrated regions. To subsume the five former Central Asian
Soviet republics under one term the -stans reflects an un-informed and
superficial look at this region. Considering the growing number of bilateral and intra-regional conflicts and
northern Afghan provinces of Balkh, Kunduz and Takhar (read here).
competing attempts to achieve regional leadership, this perception is everything but justified.
87
File Title
A2: Asian
88
File Title
1NC No Asia War

No Asia war
Nick Bisley 14, Professor of IR @ La Trobe University (Australia) and
Executive Director of La Trobe Asia, Its not 1914 all over again: Asia is
preparing to avoid war, 3/10, http://theconversation.com/its-not-1914-allover-again-asia-is-preparing-to-avoid-war-22875
Asia is cast as a region as complacent about the risks of war as Europe was in its belle poque. Analogies are an understandable way of trying to make
the historical parallel is deeply misleading.
sense of unfamiliar circumstances. In this case, however,

Asia is
experiencing a period of uncertainty and strategic risk unseen since the US and China reconciled their differences in the mid-1970s. Tensions among key
there are very good

reasons, notwithstanding these issues, why Asia is not about to tumble into a
great power war. China is Americas second most important trading partner.
Conversely, the US is by far the most important country with which China trades.
Trade and investments golden straitjacket is a basic reason to be optimistic. Why should this
powers are at very high levels: Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe recently invoked the 1914 analogy. But
be seen as being more effective than the high levels of interdependence between Britain and Germany before World War One? Because Beijing and
They are acutely aware of how much

they have at stake. Diplomatic infrastructure for peace The two powers have established a wide
range of institutional links to manage their relations. These are designed to
improve the level and quality of their communication, to lower the risks of
misunderstanding spiralling out of control and to manage the trajectory of their
relationship. Every year, around 1000 officials from all ministries led by the top political figures in each country meet under the auspices of the
Washington are not content to rely on markets alone to keep the peace.
Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The dialogue has demonstrably improved US-China relations across the policy spectrum, leading to collaboration in a
wide range of areas. These range from disaster relief to humanitarian aid exercises, from joint training of Afghan diplomats to marine conservation efforts,
Unlike the near total

absence of diplomatic engagement by Germany and Britain in the lead-up to 1914,
todays two would-be combatants have a deep level of interaction and practical co-operation.
Just as the extensive array of common interests has led Beijing and Washington to do
a lot of bilateral work, Asian states have been busy the past 15 years. These nations
have created a broad range of multilateral institutions and mechanisms
intended to improve trust, generate a sense of common cause and promote regional prosperity. Some
in which Chinese law enforcement officials are hosted on US Coast Guard vessels to enforce maritime legal regimes.
organisations, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), have a high profile with its annual leaders meeting involving, as it often does, the
common embarrassment of heads of government dressing up in national garb. Others like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers
there are more than 15 separate multilateral bodies

that have a focus on regional security concerns. All these organisations are trying to build what
might be described as an infrastructure for peace in the region. While these
mechanisms are not flawless, and many have rightly been criticised for being long on dialogue and short on action, they have been
crucial in managing specific crises and allowing countries to clearly state their commitments and priorities.
Meeting Plus Process are less in the public eye. But
89
File Title
A2: Asia Pivot
90
File Title
1NC Fails/False
Asia pivot fails
Auslin, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2012
(Michael, and columnist at wsj America Doesn't Need a Pivot to Asia, 8/27,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904445060045776149411009
74630.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)
It is time to bury the Obama administration's pivot to Asia. This reallocation of military and
diplomatic resources was supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to
balance China's rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less than it appears. It won't solve
Asia's problems and may even add to the region's uncertainty by over-promising and
under-delivering. Everything wrong with the pivot can be summed up by Four R's: rhetoric; reality;
resourcing; and raising expectations and then doubts. So far, the first and perhaps biggest problem with
the idea of the pivotor, as the Defense Department calls it, the rebalancing is that it remains largely
rhetorical, vague and aspirational. True, there are some laudable moves, such as
basing U.S. Marines in northern Australia and agreeing to port new U.S. warships in
Singapore. These, however, hardly add up to a breakthrough . The world still
wonders what the purpose is: to contain China, to promote democracy, to make the United States the de facto
hegemon of Asia, or simply to reassure nervous nations about China's rise? The reality is that not much will change
The pivot says nothing about taking on new commitments, for

example toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or to countries with whom America does not
in America's actions.
currently have formal alliances. Just as importantly, Washington has made clear in recent months that it will not
take sides in the territorial disputes that have roiled the East and South China Seas, even when allies like Tokyo and
Manila are involved. Further evidence for this reality comes from the resource constraints imposed on this grand
project. The Obama administration is trying to do it on the cheap. Pivot funding is in danger from sequestration
forced budget cuts resulting from larger budget politicking in Washingtonthat, if allowed to proceed, will cut
another $500 billion from a defense budget already reduced by $900 billion since 2009. The administration claims
that America's military presence in Asia will not be affected by these budget cuts. If that is so, then U.S. military
posture in the rest of the world will be cut back. More likely, any buildup will be difficult to sustain. The shifting of
more planes and ships to the Pacific will soon slow down, as the size of the Air Force and Navy shrink, and as other
world problems such as Iran and Syria continue to dominate the attention of American policy makers. This, in turn,
is raising doubts about the pivot in Asia, so soon after the rhetoric from Washington had raised expectations.
Countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines led themselves to believe that the pivot would have concrete results,
such as quickly increasing American presence in the region and perhaps even American support in their maritime
territorial disputes with China. Both accordingly reached out to Washington, holding new military exercises or
discussing greater security cooperation. Yet this enthusiasm makes it all the worse when those hopes turn out to be
dashed by Washington's failure to act. As one Philippines senator asked during his country's standoff this spring
with China over the Scarborough Shoal, what good is the alliance with the U.S. if America refuses to back up its
unrealistic promises, the Obama administration

has created new diplomatic headaches for itself in managing the fall-out from its failure to
deliver. What then is the point of the pivot? By not getting involved in maritime disputes, other than
rhetorically, Washington is actually taking the most realistic approach possible. No administration,
Republican or Democratic, is going to risk a crisis with China short of any overt attempt by Beijing
to take over territory clearly controlled by other nations. Building up U.S. forces in Asia, were it even
partners in times of need? By appearing to make
possible, would not change that political calculation. The current American military posture can be diversified to a
few more countries, but essentially, Washington has had the right balance for the past several decades. While it
would be a mistake to shrink the U.S. air and naval presence in Asia, all Washington could do is slightly increase it,
and that
will change nothing in the region . Moreover, there are few realistic options for new
partners in Asia, especially ones such as Japan and Australia that can provide some level of regional security
cooperation. That means America's current grouping of allies and partners is right-sized for the political and security
realities of the Asia-Pacific for the foreseeable future.
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Asia pivot is inflated- the status quo solves literally every

impact
Innocent, foreign policy analyst at Cato, 2012
(Malou Innocent, Talk of a U.S.-Asia 'Pivot' Is Overblown,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/12/13/talk-of-a-usasia-pivot-is-overblown)
The greatest misperception surrounding Washington's "pivot" to Asia is that
America's dominant presence is not already felt there on a regular basis. It is.
The United States plays a considerable role in the Far East, despite the Obama
administration's proclamations last autumn that it would "pivot" or "rebalance" there in the
future. For one, the United States maintains forward-deployed forces in South Korea,
with 28,500 U.S. troops; Guam, with 4,500 U.S. troops; and Japan, with 40,000 U.S. troops. Guam, of course, is
part of America as a non-self-governing, unincorporated tervritory. South Korea and Japan, however, after decades
of proven internal stability and peaceful democratic transitions, are equipped to defend themselves. [See a
collection of political cartoons on defense spending.] Once upon a time, South Korea was incapable of surviving
without America's support. That began to change in the 1980s. Today, its economy ranks around 13th in the world,
it has twice the North's population, and, if South Korea's leaders chose to, could be spending on defense the
equivalent of the North's entire annual GDP. As for Japan, despite its recent economic woes, it had the fifth highest
defense budget in the world in 2011, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Japan surpassed
Russia, India, and Brazil, and fell only behind the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and France. Moreover,
as scholars Shinichi Ogawa and Michael Schiffer have pointed out, in criticism of its policy, Japan possesses a
nuclear "breakout'' capacity, meaning its civilian nuclear fuel cycle is so advanced "that, at the flip of the switch, [it]
could be militarized." Save for a planned contingent of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Australia, four littoral combat ships
stationed in Singapore, and rotating troops and surveillance aircraft in the Philippines, it is unclear whether U.S.
troop deployments will grow more robust in Japan and South Korea. They should not. Such prosperous allies can live
without the generous welfare of American taxpayers. [Read the U.S. News Debate: Should Cuts Be Made to
the Far
East feels Washington's constant presence with the United States Pacific Command.
This regional unified military structure consists of about one-fifth of total U.S. military
strength. It includes six aircraft carrier strike groups, about two-thirds of U.S.
Marine Corps combat strength, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which goes on
frequent patrols conducting joint, military-training exercises with America's
allies and partners. Talking about partners, Uncle Sam has a lot of them in a region home to over 50
percent of the world's population. The United States has been cultivating warmer relations
with India, most especially after accommodating New Delhi's nuclear
expansion with a symbolic, 2008 agreement facilitating civilian nuclear cooperation between
Domestic Social Programs to Protect the Defense Budget?] Aside from these forward-deployed forces,
them. Moreover, despite recent hand wringing over U.S.-Russia relations, Washington's so-called "reset" has
rebounded ties from their 2008 low, particularly with regard to Moscow's help supplying NATO's war effort in
the United
States has forged better relations with Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia,
Singapore, and the Philippines, and has embraced existing multilateral
organizations and trade agreements, like the East Asia Summit, the TransPacific Partnership, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In the end,
Afghanistan. [Read the U.S. News Debate: Are Cuts to the Defense Budget Necessary?] Elsewhere,
Washington's obsessive fixation on the Middle East and North Africa should warrant serious reconsideration. More of
America's attention should be paid to the future of the Asia-Pacific, since maintaining peace in that region will be
the challenge of the 21st century. However, what foreign policy planners in Washington should be asking
themselves is what the United States should be willing to defend in this region, and at what cost? What implicit
commitments should Washington make to prosperous, populous countries eminently capable of defending
themselves? Allies are intended to supplement a nation-state's power, not hinder or jeopardize it. [See a collection
of political cartoons on the Middle East.] Primarily, America's deepening involvement in Asia is meant to reassure
allies nervous over China's growing assertiveness and increased military spending. However, the United States can
both value being a strong military power and allow other countries in the Far East to assert a greater leadership
role. These policies are neither zero-sum nor mutually exclusive. For more than half a century, the United States has
played a prominent military and economic role in the Asia-Pacific. The American people should not be led to believe
92
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the biggest tale proponents
of U.S. prominence in Asia ever sold was the intimation that we do not
already have it.
that their country was a never a force to be reckoned with there. Indeed,
93
File Title
A2: Bioweapons
94
File Title
1NC I/L D
EU is not willing to upgrade security to help bioterrorism
Stokes, 15- Director of Global Economic Attitudes
5 key takeaways about the U.S.-German relationship http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/05/07/5-key-takeaways-about-the-u-s-german-relationship/
Half (50%) of both Germans and Americans say their country should deal with its own problems
and let other countries deal with their own challenges. Roughly comparable proportions of
Germans (43%) and Americans (39%) believe their nation should help other countries deal with
their difficulties. Younger Germans and Americans in particular are more inward-looking than
their older counterparts. More than half of Americans (57%) and Germans (54%) ages 18 to 29
hold the view that their country should deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs.
And only 36% of that age group in Germany and 31% in the U.S. believe that their country
should assist other nations. This stands in sharp contrast with the attitudes of their older
countrymen: 46% of both Americans and Germans ages 65 and older say their countries should
do more to help others.
95
File Title
1NC No Bioweapons
No risk of bioterror
Rebecca Keller 13, Analyst at Stratfor, 7 March 2013, Bioterrorism and the
Pandemic Potential, Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorismand-pandemic-potential)
The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious
pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and
experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed,
balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level
three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure
environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm
scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted
must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities.
The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely

eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The
use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of
whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent
strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist
organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological
weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the
laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a
contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state
actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then
aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be
infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are
severe constraints that make success using either of these methods
unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological
attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able
to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can
render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method,
but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to
infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the
infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful
with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because
that would limit the necessary human contact.
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A2: European War
97
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1NC Europe War

European war is impossible
Karaganov 11 et al head of the Russian Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Dean of the School of the World Economy
and International Affairs at the National Research UniversityHigher School of Economics (NRU-HSE); Chairman of the Presidium, the Council on Foreign
and Defense Policy (CFDP); Chairman of the Editorial Board, Russia in Global Affairs journal. -- Report by the Russian Participants of the Working Group on
the Future of the RussianU.S. Relations, The U.S.Russia Relations after the Reset: Building a New Agenda. A View from Russia, http://vid1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/US-Russia%20relations_eng.pdf
This short list of challenges shows that the main threats to Russia and the U.S. in the world of today and tomorrow stem not from each others
policies but from external global and regional factors. Russia and the U.S. do not pose direct military threats to each other, either in the field of
A conventional big war in Europe is physically

impossible . The preservation by Russia and the U.S. of their ability to physically
destroy each other, while maintaining appropriate confidence-building measures
and strategic stability, has a stabilizing effect both on their own policies and the
policies of other nuclear and nonnuclear countries.
conventional forces in Europe, or in the strategic sphere.
No European war and no escalation

John J. Mearsheimer 10, PROF OF POLITICAL SCIENCE --- University of Chicago, why is europe
peaceful today?, ECPR KEYNOTE LECTURE, european political science: 9 2010, http://www.palgravejournals.com/eps/journal/v9/n3/pdf/eps201024a.pdf
Much has happened since then, including the dire economic crisis that we are now experiencing. It promises to have farreaching effects on European
the most important development of the past two decades is the fact that Europe
remains at peace. Of course, there were a handful of small wars in the Balkans during the 1990s, but the major
life. Nevertheless, I think that
European powers did not start them, did not exploit them for national gain, and with the help of the United States
ultimately managed to shut them down. Very importantly there has been no war
between any of the major powers. Indeed, there has been little security
competition among them. Given Europes tumultuous history, this is quite remarkable. Remember that from 1900 to 1990
Europe was the site of two of the deadliest wars in recorded history followed by the Cold War. The broad sweep of European history certainly looks
very different from the past two decades.
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A2: Institutions
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1NC Coop Fails

Cooperation internationally is terminally ineffective and small
measures like the aff cant save it
Hellmann, 13 (Gunther Hellmann is a senior fellow at the Transatlantic
Academy, an initiative of the German Marshall Fund, The Decline of
Multilateralism, May 2, German Marshall Fund Blog,
http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/05/02/the-decline-of-multilateralism/)
It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue against retrenchment in Europe

and North America. Economic crises and domestic political stagnation absorb
energy and consume financial resources. Global military engagements in faraway places cost lives
and treasure and often yield limited success. There is growing disillusionment with
democracy promotion. Coalitions of sovereign state defenders like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) make life for
the guardians of the liberal world order ever more challenging. The upshot is multilateral fatigue in both
Europe and North America. This is a perilous state of affairs because state-transcending global problems are proliferating. Global
WASHINGTON
Trends 2030, a study published by the U.S. National Intelligence Council last December, predicts that the current, largely Western dominance of global
structures will have been transformed by 2030 to be more in line with the changing hierarchy of new economic players. Yet even if this were to
it remains unclear to what degree new or reformed institutions will

have tackled growing global challenges. One might be forgiven for taking this to be an overly optimistic projection.
Based on current trends, the outlook is much gloomier, due mainly to the political
contagion effects of sovereigntism, the fixation on state sovereignty as an
absolute value, and minilateralism. Moiss Nam, who initially coined the term, defined minilateralism as getting together
happen, the report argues,
the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem. The problem is that the smallest
possible number may quickly grow very large; Nams own book, The End of Power, provides ample evidence that this is so. Consider, for instance, the
number and political weight of countries needed to address the problems in the aftermath of a military escalation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The
minimum number of countries required to effectively regulate global warming does not look any more encouraging. In other words, sovereigntism and
minilateralism are symptoms of the crisis of liberal world order manifestations of The Democratic Disconnect and not a recipe for curing its ills. In the
old days when multilateralism was not yet qualified politically with such adjectives as assertive (Madeleine Albright) or effective (EU), it served as a
descriptor for a fundamental transformation of interstate collaboration in the second half of the 20th century. In an influential article, John Ruggie, a
Harvard professor and former high-ranking UN official, showed that the actual practice of multilateralism by the liberal democracies of North America and
Europe after World War II was based on a set of generalized principles of conduct. These principles rendered segments of the post-war international order
into more reliable cooperative settings, such as the United Nations, or islands of peaceful change, such as the zone of European integration. A readiness to
the
liberal world order. This liberal order is under strain today because its creators and
guardians have themselves strayed from these principles. In the security field, coalitions of
the willing have undermined multilateralism not only in the UN context, but also in
NATO. In economic and financial matters, the politics of European sovereign debt
crisis management illustrates both the dangers of executive federalism and the
limits of diffuse reciprocity among Europes nation states in the worlds most
integrated region. Responsible stakeholders, the former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once said, do more than merely
give up sovereignty or, at least to cooperate on the basis of reciprocity, were characteristic elements of multilateralism and what came to be called
conduct diplomacy to promote their national interestsThey recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to
sustain that system. What was meant as advice to China when Zoellick gave that speech in 2005 can easily be redirected at the liberal democracies of
There are no easy ways out. Even if the slide toward

retrenchment can be stopped, the prospects do not seem bright for the kind of
bold new initiatives for global institutional reform that are required. It is
debatable whether calls for democratic internationalism or a new alignment
among like-minded democracies can do the trick, but Europe and North America need to realize that their
North America and Europe today.
stakes in the liberal order are much higher than those of relative newcomers. Indeed, overcoming crises at home hinges at least in part on sustaining a
conducive global environment. Readjusting the balance between minilateralism and multilateralism will help.
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A2: Iran Prolif
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1NC I/L
US would prefer more EU involvement than there is in the squo
Adebahr, 6/8 (Cornelius, Adebahr is an associate in the Europe Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. His research focuses on European
foreign policy, Leave It to Europe: Why Iran Is Not (Solely) Americas Responsibility,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/08/leave-it-to-europe-why-iran-is-not-solely-america-sresponsibility/i9l7)
Even before a nuclear deal with Iran has been signed, the debate in Washington has shifted to the
regional implications of a possible accord. But lessons learned from the success of the nuclear
negotiations so far help explain why the United States should not lead international efforts to
bring about regional cooperation with Iran. Instead, Washington should let its European allies
take the initiative. After all, it was the European Unionparticularly France, Germany and
Britainthat laid the diplomatic groundwork since 2003. They brought China, Russia and the
United States on board and, in close transatlantic coordination, pursued a two-track approach of
sanctions and diplomacy that led to the current nuclear talks. Secondly, both sides have accepted
the others domestic discourse. For Iran, the narrative is about how the international community
is ready to accept its demands to keep what Tehran insists is a peaceful nuclear program, while
dropping its sanctions and also helping to modernize this program. In the United States, the
narrative is that considerable concessions have been extracted from Iran, which agreed to
substantial program limitations, both of proportions and duration. The third success factor of the
talks lies in compartmentalization and de-politicization. By focusing on the nuclear issueand
excluding everything from human rights to terrorism from the negotiationsthe aim is to find
creative, but sustainable technical solutions that dodge the broader political questions. However,
certainly the first two ingredients are not yet there when it comes to regional cooperation.
Washingtons major accommodation would be to accept that Iran has a (legitimate) role to play
in the region, while Iran would have to overcome its refusal even to talk to Saudi Arabiaits
regional rivalbased on sectarian as much as on geopolitical grounds. Both sides would have to
be ready to ignore fundamentally different viewpoints on regional order, not least because the
power competition between themwith Israel and the Arab Gulf states each playing their part
does not lend itself to the (comparatively easy) no bomb compromise in the nuclear field.
Moreover, simply getting the nuclear deal through will likely exhaust the necessary willingness
both in Tehran and Washingtonto accommodate the other side.
EU Unilateralism supported by the US

Adebahr, 6/8 (Cornelius, Adebahr is an associate in the Europe Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. His research focuses on European
foreign policy, Leave It to Europe: Why Iran Is Not (Solely) Americas Responsibility,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/08/leave-it-to-europe-why-iran-is-not-solely-america-sresponsibility/i9l7)
This is where the EU comes in. Establishing a multilateral framework, the EUs focus
should be on the third ingredient, i.e. to de-politicize and compartmentalize possible areas
of cooperation. Maritime security in the Gulf and the situation in Gaza are two such practical
issues on which the European Union could engage Iran. A regional maritime-security regime
would broadly be based on the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (which neither
Iran nor the United States have ratified) that regulates nonmilitary fields of cooperation such as
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maritime safety, fisheries protection, marine-environment protection and port security. Such an
approach would also dovetail with the G7 declaration last month to strengthen maritime
governance in a cooperative, rules-based approach at the regional and global level. Addressing
the Gaza conflicts means involving Iran in the international efforts to implement the unity
government that the Palestinians agreed on, but so far failed to put in place. Even such narrow
and technical cooperation can be a difficult hurdle to jump, even before one could start thinking
about conflict resolution in Yemen or Syria. Given the Old Continents internal and external
woes, it may seem nave to expect Brussels to provide a framework for regional cooperation with
Iran. However, with clear signals from Washington that it would support such a European lead in
the aftermath of a nuclear agreement, the EU and its member states should be happy to oblige.
Previous European initiatives with strong U.S. backing include the Helsinki Accords of 1975,
which helped establish security cooperation between the Cold War superpowers (the United
States and the Soviet Union) and the Madrid and Oslo talks leading to the Israeli-Palestinian
accords of the early 1990s. While these cases also show that agreement cannot guarantee lasting
success, the diplomatic opening that a deal can create in its wake is what counts. Such
momentum, however, needs to be given a direction. A single nuclear deal cannot bring
fundamental change to a region torn by religious strife, sectarian rivalry and weak governance.
Add to this the fact that the United States has now entered the pre-election season, and it
becomes clear that it is up to the European Union as the often-overlooked mediator of the nuclear
talks to make a push for regional cooperation after a possible deal. The United States, happy to
direct its top-level diplomatic resources to other burning crises, should welcome and support
such an initiative of its European partners.
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1NC No Escalation
No prolif and long timeframe
Kahl 12 (Colin H. Kahl 12, security studies prof at Georgetown, senior
fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Not Time to Attack Iran, January
17, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-toattack-iran?page=show
Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce
its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented Iranian efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons
there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah

Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a sixat some point, but
month horizon,Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with
the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice
chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence
and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six
months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear deviceand
considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and
International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse
that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a
bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because
there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment
plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009,
respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weaponsgrade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The IAEA
would thus detect such activity with sufficient time for the international community to
mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they
can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.
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A2: ISIS
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1NC I/L D
ISIS distinct from terrorist organizations--- traditional EU-US coop is insufficient
Cronin 15 (AUDREY KURTH CRONIN is Distinguished Professor and Director of the
International Security Program at George Mason University and the author of How Terrorism
Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. ISIS Is Not a Terrorist
Group: Why Counterterrorism Won't Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat Foreign Affairs94.2
(Mar/Apr 2015): 87-98.)
After 9/11, many within the U.S. national security establishment worried that, following decades
of preparation for confronting conventional enemies, Washington was unready for the challenge
posed by an unconventional adversary such as al Qaeda. So over the next decade, the United
States built an elaborate bureaucratic structure to fight the jihadist organization, adapting its
military and its intelligence and law enforcement agencies to the tasks of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency. Now, however, a different group, the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (isis),
which also calls itself the Islamic State, has supplanted al Qaeda as the jihadist threat of greatest concern.
Isis' ideology, rhetoric, and long-term goals are similar to al Qaeda's, and the two groups were once
formally allied. So many observers assume that the current challenge is simply to refocus Washington's
now-formidable counterterrorism apparatus on a new target. But isis is not al Qaeda. It is not an
outgrowth or a part of the older radical Islamist organization, nor does it represent the next phase
in its evolution. Although al Qaeda remains dangerous-especially its affiliates in North Africa
and Yemen-isis is its successor. Isis represents the post-al Qaeda jihadist threat. In a nationally
televised speech last September explaining his plan to " degrade and ultimately destroy" isis, U.S.
President Barack Obama drew a straight line between the group and al Qaeda and claimed that isis is " a
terrorist organization, pure and simple." This was mistaken; isis hardly fits that description, and indeed,
although it uses terrorism as a tactic, it is not really a terrorist organization at all. Terrorist networks,
such as al Qaeda, generally have only dozens or hundreds of members, attack civilians, do not
hold territory, and cannot directly confront military forces. Isis, on the other hand, boasts some
30,000 fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities, controls
lines of communication, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military
operations. If isis is purely and simply anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. And that
is why the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies that greatly diminished the threat from al
Qaeda will not work against isis. Washington has been slow to adapt its policies in Iraq and Syria to
the true nature of the threat from isis. In Syria, U.S. counterterrorism has mostly prioritized the
bombing of al Qaeda affiliates, which has given an edge to isis and has also provided the Assad regime
with the opportunity to crush U.S.-allied moderate Syrian rebels. In Iraq, Washington continues to rely
on a form of counterinsurgency, depending on the central government in Baghdad to regain its

lost legitimacy, unite the country, and build indigenous forces to defeat isis. These approaches were
developed to meet a different threat, and they have been overtaken by events. What's needed now is a
strategy of " offensive containment": a combination of limited military tactics and a broad diplomatic
strategy to halt isis' expansion, isolate the group, and degrade its capabilities.
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1NC Not a Threat

ISIS isnt a threatthey cant execute outside attacks or kill
more than a dozen people
Benjamin 8/17 (Daniel, Hawks exaggerate Islamic State threat to the
United States, Boston Globe,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/08/17/hawks-exaggerate-isisthreat-united-states/yICJ0bpzRhoK88GtauyHLO/story.html)
To judge by the doom-laden prophecies cascading in from
Washington, the United States faces a towering and imminent
threat in the form of the militant group calling itself the Islamic
State, or ISIS. They are coming here, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina intoned on
Fox News Sunday. I think of an American city in flames because of the terrorists ability to operate in Syria and
Iraq. Senator Grahams friend Senator John McCain is no less alarmist. Calling for immediate air strikes in Iraq and
Syria, he declared, They are getting stronger all the time . . . And their goal . . . is destruction of the United States
of America. Stoking the panic has been a very excitable press. On CNN last week, I was asked if Islamic State
Set aside that absurdity; no

terrorist group threatens our existence. (America has faced one existential threat in
modern times the Soviet nuclear arsenal and that is it.) But is the Islamic State (IS) a
huge and menacing terrorist threat? Certainly not to the United
States today. The danger to Iraq and its neighbors is real. The Islamic State has shown itself to be a
fighters represented an existential threat to the United States.
formidable insurgency. Its focus is on ripping apart Iraq and Syria, sowing sectarian conflict, and creating in its midst
a new jihadist state or caliphate. (That very word seems to incite fearmongers: Every day that goes by, ISIS builds
up its caliphate, and it becomes a direct threat to the United States, said New York Representative Peter King,
conjuring an image of a new Golden Horde with nuclear-tipped scimitars.) If the insurgency grows, and the threat to
even if
marauding operatives in Land Cruisers may be humiliating Iraqs
hollowed-out military, that doesnt mean they have genuine
terrorist skills. Consider the details: The Islamic State has never carried out a
significant attack outside of its neighborhood. In 2005, when its operatives were still
Jordan or Lebanon increases, we may have to act. But, for now, its important to understand that
part of Al Qaeda in Iraq, operatives carried out hotel bombings in Jordan and tried and failed to attack an American
warship in the Red Sea. More recently, four people were killed in an apparent lone-wolf attack at the Jewish museum
weve seen no demonstrated

ability to carry out the kind of complex international strike that kills
dozens or hundreds, let alone engulfs a US city in flames.
in Brussels by a young man trained in Syria. In other words,
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A2: Middle East War
108
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1NC I/L D
Alliance doesnt solve foreign policy challenges
Techau 2011
(Jan, director of Carnegie Europe, the European centre of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 10/6/11, The Dirty Secret of US
European relations http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/06/dirty-secretof-u-s-european-relations/8l1h)
whether all this new
love translates into a more meaningful partnership on shared foreign-policy challenges.
Here the answer is less clear. While cooperation on issues such as the Middle East, Iran and terrorism was and is constructive, one of the most crucial items on
the Euro-American agenda remains untouched by the improved atmosphere: transatlantic burden sharing in the
field of security and defense. Here, Europeans have for the last sixty years been in a position of utter
dependence on the Washingtons willingness and ability to guarantee their security. And even though the global strategic framework has drastically changed since the
For the internal psychology of the transatlantic relationship, this is undoubtedly good news. The more interesting question, however, seems to be
beginning of this transatlantic bargain in the 1950s, Europeans still conduct their defense planning as if American generosity were the most naturally abundant and easily accessible
political commodity. By doing so, they increase their reliance on U.S. guarantees, and they become less and less interesting as an ally for their American counterparts. All attempts to
wake Europeans up and make them rethink their priorities have died away without much impact. It would be easy to blame President Obama for not using his popularity with allies
intelligently enough to induce them to get their act together. But the European passivity on security and defense issues goes far beyond the reach of even the most popular American
president. By and large, Europeans are unaware of their utter dependency; they dont feel particularly threatened, they hold a deep mistrust in all things military, and they have learned
to look at the world without regard to strategic considerations. Despite Libya, their willingness for an active approach to the world around them and for intervention on behalf of values
Their political leadersto the extent that they are aware of todays realitiesshy away from the
enormous budgetary and political costs that a realistic security and defense posture would
create.The dirty little secret of transatlantic relations is that, under these circumstances, they will undoubtedly become a whole lot less boring very soon. Both
America and Europe are broke. Their ability to shape the world around them is
getting weaker. The global center of gravity is shifting towards the Pacific. Americans are ultimately better suited to master this process of relative decline. But it is in
and interests is small.
Washingtons fundamental interest to keep Europe safe and stable, to keep its best allies strong and to defend the enormous economic investments it has placed in the old world.
Obsessing about perceptions and sympathy ratings will soon look like frivolous luxury. The ball is in the European court. For Americans, a Europe with a grown-up strategic culture will be
more important than one that produces high approval ratings for the United States. For Europeans, investing in a relevant and workable transatlantic future will be more important than
an American president they find easy to like.
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1NC No Escalation
No escalation
Fettweis 7, Asst Prof Poli Sci Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs
US Naval War College, (Christopher, On the Consequences of Failure in
Iraq, Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 98)
Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into
A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a

Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight
proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border
warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own
border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has
no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US
every country where the religious divide exists.
withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its
neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their
a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of
these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the
region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most
traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous,
uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes
have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state,
have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt
own, and
Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's
autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the
hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its
neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end
unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks
before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences
very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided
an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with
neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious
civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic
conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil
neighbours will likely not prove eager to

fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an
unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to
intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the
counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable
war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's
military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country
Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate
foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and
understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their
neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If
the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest
is far more likely than outright warfare.
think it could do so?17
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A2: Multilat
111
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1NC I/L D
The EU itself is a terrible model for multilat
Van Schaik and Ter Haar 2013 (Louise van Schaik is Senior Research Fellow at the
Clingendael Institute. She has extensively analysed the EUs international activities in the fields
of health (WHO), climate change (UNFCCC) and food standards (Codex Alimentarius). She has
also worked on related research areas such as EU external affairs and the Lisbon Treaty, EU
development cooperation and trade policy, scarcity of natural resources, global public goods, and
sustainable development, Barend (Bas) ter Haar is Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the
Clingendael Institute. During his career at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs he took
part in many multilateral negotiations, inter alia on chemical weapons and within the EU, NATO,
OSCE, IAEA and UNESCO. At the ministry he served as Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
As Ambassador for International Security Affairs he represented the European Union at the
ASEAN Regional Forum, Why the EU is not promoting effective Multilateralism,
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Why%20the%20EU%20is%20not%20promoting
%20effective%20multilateralism.pdf)
However, in the decade since 2003 the EU has become increasingly quiet about this objective.
Paradoxically (but logical in view of the explanation given below) the only field where the EU
has been partly successful is the field of classic security, a field where feelings of national
sovereignty are usually strongest. In other fields the support of the EU for effective
multilateralism has, for the most part, been fragmented and weak. The experts who represented
EU countries in international talks on issues such as the environment, health, food, water,
education and transport, often seemed hardly aware of the existence of a European strategy to
strengthen an effective multilateral system. And the diplomats who were aware of this strategy
usually rather concentrated on the promotion of their national priorities. This, in combination
with the Eurocrisis and the threat of the UK to leave the EU reinforced the impression that the
EU is a power in decline, better known for its rhetoric than for its action. At the UN Climate
Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 the EU was rudely confronted with a new world order in which
emerging economies use their increased power to further their interests. Despite tenacious efforts
to promote a new international climate treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol and a detailed
leadership by example strategy, the EU found itself sidelined, partly because of its inability to
speak with a strong single voice. The case also illustrates the EUs lack of sensitivity to its
negotiating environment. Promoting effective multilateralism is not the same as simply expecting
others to adopt European views and standards. An ongoing study of the way the EU has operated
in a large number of multilateral forums has led us to the conclusion that the fiasco at
Copenhagen is not an exceptional case, but is symptomatic.1 We were struck by the lack of a
European strategy in most forums. We found some instances where the EU supported a
multilateral approach, e.g. in the G20. However, in most cases the EU did not promote strategic
goals, but concentrated instead on administrative reforms. In larger debates the EU was
sometimes conspicuously absent due to its inability to come to a joint position, or because
nobody felt responsible to cover the topic. Furthermore, many of the representatives of the EU
were unaware of the positions of EU member states and EU institutions in other relevant forums.
This made issue linkage difficult and could lead to contradictory positions (e.g. on intellectual
property rights).
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1NC Multilat Fails

Multilateral coop will always structurally fail regardless of their
internal link
Barma et al., 13 (Naazneen, assistant professor of national-security
affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School; Ely Ratner, a fellow at the Center
for a New American Security; and Steven Weber, professor of political
science and at the School of Information at the University of California,
Berkeley, March/April 2013, The Mythical Liberal Order, The National
Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/the-mythical-liberal-order8146)
the current system is falling progressively further

behind on the most important challenges, including financial stability, the responsibility to protect, and
coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare and maritime security . The
authority, legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions dissolve when the
going gets toughwhen member countries have meaningfully different interests (as in
currency manipulations), when the distribution of costs is large enough to matter (as in humanitarian crises
in sub-Saharan Africa) or when the shadow of future uncertainties looms large (as in carbon reduction). Like a
sports team that perfects exquisite plays during practice but fails to execute against an
actual opponent, global-governance institutions have sputtered precisely when
their supposed skills and multilateral capital are needed most. WHY HAS this
happened? The hopeful liberal notion that these failures of global governance are merely reflections of organizational
dysfunction that can be fixed by reforming or reengineering the institutions themselves, as if this were a job for management consultants
fiddling with organization charts, is a costly distraction from the real challenge . A decade-long effort to revive
Assessed against its ability to solve global problems,
the dead-on-arrival Doha Development Round in international trade is the sharpest example of the cost of such a tinkering-around-the-edges approach
and its ultimate futility. Equally distracting and wrong is the notion held by neoconservatives and others that global governance is inherently a bad idea
The root cause of stalled global

governance is simpler and more straightforward. Multipolarization has come faster and more
forcefully than expected. Relatively authoritarian and postcolonial emerging powers have
become leading voices that undermine anything approaching international consensus and,
and that its institutions are ineffective and undesirable simply by virtue of being supranational.
with that, multilateral institutions. Its not just the reasonable demand for more seats at the table. That might have caused something of a decline in
effectiveness but also an increase in legitimacy that on balance could have rendered it a net positive. Instead, global governance has gotten the worst of
both worlds: a decline in both effectiveness and legitimacy.
The problem is not one of a few rogue states acting
badly in an otherwise coherent system. There has been no real breakdown per se. There just wasnt all that much liberal world order to break down in
the first place. The new voices are more than just numerous and powerful. They are truly
distinct from the voices of an old era, and they approach the global system in a meaningfully
different way.
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A2: NATO
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1NC I/L D
EU doesnt solve NATO is redundant and other international
organizations fill the gap
Hartung 13 (Farina Hartung, Master Thesis International and European
Relations, Linkping University, Case-study of NATO: Is NATO a redundant
international organization or not?,
http://www.liu.se/utbildning/pabyggnad/F7MME/student/courses/733a27mast
erthesis/filarkiv/spring-2013/thesesjune/1.464731/MasterThesisFinalVersionFarinaHartung.pdf)
Just as mentioned above, NATO has gone through a process of changes since it was first established. It can be said
that the changes where necessary or as a matter of fact that they were not - it always depends on the view one
NATO is
redundant and to show proof that it is. As history has shown, it can be argued that the organization is
redundant and has survived much longer passed its due time. From this point of
view, it can be argued that this is what hurts the organization ; they need to
reform before they have a chance to act. It is quite difficult to claim that NATO is not
takes. The position of this paper has been stated before that it is going to investigate the question if
redundant, but as mentioned before, this Thesis will take a look at the opposite side of this claim. Instead of trying
to prove that
NATO is needed, I will try to show that it is not needed and has long
surpassed its duty . That has become clear over the past years. NATO has
reformed itself in order to ensure that it will stay relevant enough in order to play an
impacting role in politics and international relations. Although they have taken the initiative to
stay relevant, they seem to have failed. There have been different voices, such as Theo
Sommer and Kenneth Waltz, who claim and argue that NATO is as a matter of fact redundant. One could always ask
what is redundancy and how can it be measured. Redundancy is not self-evident, and it also cannot really be
defined. Neither can redundancy be measured. Redundancy is what one makes out of it and what others
understand of redundancy is left open for discussion. But in regards to this paper, redundancy is just the fact that
NATO is not really needed any longer. The task it is currently doing, such as
the peacekeeping, can be done by other international organizations,
such as the U nited N ations There is no longer the need for just one
international organization to have its sole focus and propose on collective
security. Security is something that is desired by so many countries and
there is no need that NATO needs to be the one organization that will provide
this to all the countries in the world. And as mentioned before, NATO already goes
outside its territorial borders in order to provide security to the world (NATO in
the 21st Century). NATO is a redundant international organization simply because it
has lost its endeavor . It strives to do so much in order to provide its
member states with the necessary certainty that in case of a threat, there is a whole
community that will act and protect each member state. But how should NATO really do that in reality? The
member states have cut down their size of military they have . In
time of great danger, one country might not want to act because there could
be a conflict of interests. Currently, there is just not such a big threat as the
Soviet Union was that there needs to be a military alliance. In case that such a great threat
rises to the surface again, it is just simply as easy to create a new
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File Title
international military organization
which can then function according to the actual needs,
because it is always during the time of threat that new alliances are created. As mentioned above,
the main
purpose of NATO has vanished when the Cold War was over
and the Soviet
Union ceased to exist. Since the Cold War and the threat that the Soviet Union posed so close to European borders
dissolved in the beginning of the 1990s, NATO just has lost its main function. According to Theo Sommer, NATO has
ever since then been in a constant stage of transformation, never really knowing what it should achieve and what
its goal is (17). In addition to that, one could argue that NATO is facing more problems that seem to have come
NATO is neither necessary to

fulfill a defensive function or that of providing security for its members. NATO is
along with the problem of the lacking threat. This Thesis argues that
an international organization that is in fact no longer permissible. It has surpassed its life expectancy by many
years. Moreover, it can be said that since it has surpassed its reason of existence, it will step down from the position
it holds in regards of an international security organization.
It is no longer the main focus of the
member states. NATO should also no longer be the main focus. Other organizations have emerged over the
past decades that show that they are able to do the necessary work without having to go through a process of
regional international organization, such as the European

Union could take over this task, since most of the members are located on the European continent
transformation. For example
to begin with. Furthermore, it can be claimed that NATO should be able to see that they are no longer fit for modern
times. Before NATO is able to act on any kind of problem or concern, it has to go through a process of transforming
itself; otherwise, it might not be able to act. This point of view may seem a bit exaggerated; however, it is suitable
for NATO since it is pragmatic. NATO is not the same since the end of the Cold War. It can be said that the main
reason why the NATO was established was to be able to encounter the Soviet Union in a time of crisis. According to
Lindley-French, NATO today is a strategic and defensive focal point that can project both military and partnership
power worldwide (89). She continuous her argument by noting that the job the alliance has to done is the same as
ever and has not changed (Ibid). The job of the alliance has always been to safeguard the freedom and security of
its member nations through political and security needs, instituted by the values of democracy, liberty, rule of law
and the peaceful resolution to disputes (Ibid). Yet another point he claims is that NATO provides a strategic forum
for consultation between North Americans and Europeans on security issues of common concern and the facility for
NATO has lost its power and maybe even its

standpoint in the modern day time politics. There are many different international
taking joint action to deal with them (Ibid). To repeat,
organizations that all could take over the work of NATO or even could
continue it in a better manner than NATO is currently doing. Claiming that
NATO is not redundant just does not seem to follow the actual fact of the
position that NATO is currently in. They have missed indeed the point where it was time to either
dissolve the whole international organization or the time to reform which would have actually created positive
outcomes. The latter point, however, seems impossible now.
It just is impossible for NATO to
change yet again . In the time of its existence, NATO has undergone so many
different changes and reforms, altogether a total of six. There is just no logical
reason why NATO is able to successfully undergo another process of changes and
transformation. New reforms always bring changes and if they actually will help NATO is left in the open. As
Theo Sommer puts it, NATO has served its time simply because the world has changed
threats are no longer the same and to some extend may not even exist
anymore. There are of course new threats, such as terrorism, piracy, and cyberattacks, now that have emerged and rose to the surface of international politics. However, those are
not really the same as they were when NATO was created. Hence, NATO is not
(9). The
suitable to tackle new issues and problems . They can try to reform, but it
will never be the same because NATO itself will have to adjust to the new situation.
once great military alliance was intended to do.
But this is not what this
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1NC Collapse Inev

NATO collapse inevno purpose and shrinking force-structure
Granatstein 13 (Jack, has held the Canada Council's Killam senior
fellowship twice, was editor of the Canadian Historical Review, and was a
founder of the Organization for the History of Canada. Fellow of the Royal
Society of Canada, awarded the Societys J.B. Tyrrell Historical Gold Medal.
He has been awarded honorary doctorates by Memorial University of
Newfoundland, the University of Calgary, Ryerson Polytechnic University, the
University of Western Ontario, McMaster University, and Niagara University.
Senior Fellow of Massey College. Officer of the Order of Canada Member of
the Advisory Committee of the Dominion Institute, an adjunct fellow of the
University of Calgarys Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and Chair of
the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. Board member and the
Chair of the Advisory Council of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs
Institute. J.L. Granatstein: The end of NATO? 3/13,
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/03/04/j-l-granatstein-the-end-ofnato/)
NATO had wound itself up at the end of the Cold War. The alliance instead
sought for a new role, a new strategic purpose, and it found it outside the
boundaries of the alliance. Provoked by ethnic slaughter in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it conducted
operations in the former Yugoslavia, involving air attacks against Serbia and the deployment of troops in
Kosovo. Then came 9/11 and a long war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, followed by an air
campaign that brought down the Gaddafi regime in Libya. None of these operations were notable
successes. In June 2011, then U.S. secretary of defence, Robert Gates, stated in public what many
had privately acknowledged: NATO, the linchpin of European security and transatlantic relations, faced
the real possibility [of] a dim, if not dismal future While every alliance member voted
for the Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third
have been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies
sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but
simply because they cant. The military capabilities simply arent there. This
was an affirmation of the ineffectiveness of the alliance after six decades of
existence. Matters have since worsened. NATO members have begun pulling
combat troops out of Afghanistan on their own timetables , and all the troops, except an
undisclosed number of Americans, are scheduled to depart by 2014. The global economic
crisis has led members to cut back on defence spending. And faced with the
increasing power of China, the Obama administration indicated that it was
rebalancing its forces toward Asia. The NATO alliance seemed completely
unprepared for this new uncertainty. As secretary Gates stated, the U.S. share of NATO defence
Perhaps it might have been better if
spending has now risen to more than 75% at a time when politically painful budget and benefit cuts are being
The U.S., in other words, wont pay the bills much longer. We know
Canada wont, and the Europeans dont seem willing to do so, either. If this continues,
NATO may not be long for this world.
considered at home.
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A2: NoKo Prolif
118
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1NC I/L D
Alliance doesnt solve foreign policy challenges
Techau 2011
(Jan, director of Carnegie Europe, the European centre of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 10/6/11, The Dirty Secret of US
European relations http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/06/dirty-secretof-u-s-european-relations/8l1h)
whether all this new
love translates into a more meaningful partnership on shared foreign-policy challenges.
Here the answer is less clear. While cooperation on issues such as the Middle East, Iran and terrorism was and is constructive, one of the most crucial items on
the Euro-American agenda remains untouched by the improved atmosphere: transatlantic burden sharing in the
field of security and defense. Here, Europeans have for the last sixty years been in a position of utter
dependence on the Washingtons willingness and ability to guarantee their security. And even though the global strategic framework has drastically changed since the
For the internal psychology of the transatlantic relationship, this is undoubtedly good news. The more interesting question, however, seems to be
beginning of this transatlantic bargain in the 1950s, Europeans still conduct their defense planning as if American generosity were the most naturally abundant and easily accessible
political commodity. By doing so, they increase their reliance on U.S. guarantees, and they become less and less interesting as an ally for their American counterparts. All attempts to
wake Europeans up and make them rethink their priorities have died away without much impact. It would be easy to blame President Obama for not using his popularity with allies
intelligently enough to induce them to get their act together. But the European passivity on security and defense issues goes far beyond the reach of even the most popular American
president. By and large, Europeans are unaware of their utter dependency; they dont feel particularly threatened, they hold a deep mistrust in all things military, and they have learned
to look at the world without regard to strategic considerations. Despite Libya, their willingness for an active approach to the world around them and for intervention on behalf of values
Their political leadersto the extent that they are aware of todays realitiesshy away from the
enormous budgetary and political costs that a realistic security and defense posture would
create.The dirty little secret of transatlantic relations is that, under these circumstances, they will undoubtedly become a whole lot less boring very soon. Both
America and Europe are broke. Their ability to shape the world around them is
getting weaker. The global center of gravity is shifting towards the Pacific. Americans are ultimately better suited to master this process of relative decline. But it is in
and interests is small.
Washingtons fundamental interest to keep Europe safe and stable, to keep its best allies strong and to defend the enormous economic investments it has placed in the old world.
Obsessing about perceptions and sympathy ratings will soon look like frivolous luxury. The ball is in the European court. For Americans, a Europe with a grown-up strategic culture will be
more important than one that produces high approval ratings for the United States. For Europeans, investing in a relevant and workable transatlantic future will be more important than
an American president they find easy to like.
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1NC No NoKo Prolif

North Korea cant prolif
Hymans 12
[Jacques E. C. Hymans, PhD from Harvard, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of
Southern California, his most recent book is Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation,
Botching the Bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs Often Fail on Their Own-and Why Iran's Might, Too, Foreign
Affairs91. 3 (May/Jun 2012): 44-53, Proquest]
states that poorly manage their nuclear programs can

bungle even the supposedly easy steps of the process. For instance, based on
estimates of the size of North Korea's plutonium stockpile and the presumed
ease of weapons fabrication, U.S. intelligence agencies thought that
by the 1990s, North Korea had built one or two nuclear weapons. But in 2006,
North Korea's first nuclear test essentially fizzled, making it clear that the
"hermit kingdom" did not have any working weapons at all. Even its
second try, in 2009, did not work properly. Similarly, if Iran eventually
does acquire a significant quantity of weapons-grade highly
enriched uranium, this should not be equated with the possession of
a nuclear weapon.
The third lesson is that
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Extra I/L D
The U.S. is known to be unfit to deal with North Korean policies. They have
disagreed with the EU on related policy in the past.
Wagner 01
Alex Wagner is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Global Strategic Affairs, Nonproliferation Reporter/Analyst at the Arms Control Association, and many other professional
occupations involving governmental law affairs. His extensive education includes a degree from the Department of War Studies
at King's College London, U. of London, a B.A. in political science at Brown University, and a law degree from the Georgetown
Law Center in which he had the role as the executive editor of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Bush Puts N. Korea
Negotiations On Hold, Stresses Verification, ACA, April 1, 2001
Adopting a harder line toward North Korea than that of his predecessor, President George W. said March 7 that his administration would not immediately resume
missile negotiations with Pyongyang left unfinished by the Clinton administration. The announcement differed from previous statements by Secretary of State Colin
Powell, who had indicated that the administration planned to pursue what appears to have been a nearly complete deal by the Clinton administration to end North
Korea's missile development and exports. Bush, who made his remarks during a joint press conference with visiting South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, expressed
"skepticism" about North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and said that he has concerns about the ability to verify any agreement with a closed society like North Korea.
Bush said he "look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any potential negotiation would require complete
Bush also said that the United

States is "not certain as to whether or not [the North Koreans]
are keeping all terms of all agreements." The statement
sparked some confusion because the United States has only
one agreement with North Korea: the 1994 Agreed Framework,
which ended Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. In a briefing following the
verification of the terms of a potential agreement." During the press conference
conference, a senior administration official explained that, despite his phrasing, the president was referring to the potential verifiability of a future missile deal with
North Korea. The official said that there are no indications North Korea is violating the Agreed Framework. Bush's decision to put off negotiations contrasted with
statements Powell had previously made on the administration's approach to North Korea. On March 6, Powell told reporters that "we do plan to engage with North
Korea and pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off." Powell went on to say that "some promising elements were left on the table" and that the
emerging from the March 7

meeting between Bush and Kim, Powell shifted gears, emphasizing that there is "no
hurry" to engage Pyongyang. He said that the administration is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward North Korea
United States has "a lot to offer that regime if they will act in ways that we think are constructive." However,
and that it would, "in due course, decide at what pace and when we engage." Amending his remarks from March 6, Powell said that if "there was some suggestion that
imminent negotiations are about to beginthat is not the case." According to a former senior U.S. official, North Korea had been prepared at the end of the Clinton
administration to stop its missile development and missile exports in exchange for international satellite launch services and nonmonetary compensation, respectively.
Writing in The New York Times March 7, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, Clinton's special adviser on North Korea, characterized such an agreement as "tantalizingly
close." The former senior official noted, however, that the problem of how to verify and monitor an agreement, in addition to the status of Pyongyang's current missile
inventory, had remained unresolved. Powell indicated this was one reason the Bush administration was reviewing its options before proceeding. "What was missing in
what had been done was how one would put in place any kind of monitoring or verification regime. And the North Koreans had not engaged on that in any serious
way in the period of the Clinton administration," he said in March 8 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Powell also said that the administration
would consider issues beyond missile negotiations in its policy review, including whether the conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula should be
considered simultaneously with missile talksa course the Clinton administration had avoided. "There's a huge army poised on the demilitarized zone, pointing south,
that is probably as great a threat to South Korea and Seoul and regional stability as are weapons of mass destruction. Should that be included in a negotiation with the
North Koreans?" Powell asked. In what may have been a reaction to Bush's comments, on March 13 Pyongyang canceled cabinet-level discussions with Seoul hours
North Korea threatened to "take thousand-fold revenge" on

the United States "and its black-hearted intention to torpedo the dialogue between
North and South [Korea]." The statement, issued by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, called
Washington's new policies "hostile" and noted that Pyongyang remains "fully
prepared for both dialogue and war." Congress Reacts Following Bush's demand for verification in dealings with North
before they were set to begin. On March 15,
Korea, Republican leaders in the House and Senate urged the administration to reconsider the terms of the Agreed Framework, under which North Korea is
to be provided with two light-water reactors. On March 9, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms (R-NC), along with Senators
Mike DeWine (R-OH) and Bob Smith (R-NH), sent a letter to Bush calling for the administration to abandon the reactor project in favor of "several cleanburning, coal-fired power plants to meet North Korea's civilian energy needs." The letter called into question Pyongyang's "track record" and said that "North
Korea's regime hardly can be trusted with [light-water reactor] technology, or with fissile material." In a March 13 speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Henry
Hyde (R-IL), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, also championed replacing the light-water reactors with conventional power plants while
stressing the need for comprehensive verification in light of past actions by North Korea. Congressional Democrats urged Bush to continue to pursue a negotiated
solution to U.S. concerns over Pyongyang's nuclear and missile capabilities. In a March 6 letter to Bush before his meeting with Kim, the Democratic leadership of the
House and Senate, as well as the ranking members of the International Relations and Foreign Relations committees, encouraged the president to work with South
Korea to address North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and said that, if he does so, they "stand ready to support" him. EU to Send Delegation to Korean
Peninsula Following President George W. Bush's decision to put off missile negotiations with North Korea, the European Union (EU) announced it would send a highlevel delegation to the Korean Peninsula. Speaking at the EU summit in Stockholm, President of the European Council and Swedish Prime Minister Gran Persson
said March 24 that he, EU Secretary-General Javier Solana, and EU External Affairs Commissioner Christopher Patten hope to visit Seoul and Pyongyang before the
121
File Title
end of May. Persson said he planned to broach "a broad agenda" with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, including discussions on missiles. Sweden currently holds the
the EU
six-month rotating presidency of the EU and has had diplomatic relations with Pyongyang for the past 26 years. According to a senior Swedish official,
discussion is intended to be "complementary" to both the North-South peace process and any further U.S.-North Korean security negotiations. The official stressed
said that the dialogue on missile negotiations

"cannot and should not" be taken up without the United States. However, in a March 24
interview on Swedish television, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh reportedly
stated that the unanimous decision by the 15 EU leaders to send the delegation came
about because "it's becoming clear that the new U.S. administration wants to take a
more hard-line approach toward North Korea." Lindh went on to say that such a policy "means that Europe must step in
that it is "important that the U.S.-North Korean discussions resume" and
to help reduce tension between the two Koreas, not least because the outside world is so worried about North Korean missiles." A.W.a
U.S. and EU collaborative sanctions against North Korea dont work

Bajpai 15
Prableen Bajpai is the Founder and Director at FinFix Advisors & Planners Pvt. Ltd., a financial planning and investment
advisory firm. Prableen contributes for The Tribune (India), IndiaNotes.com and has authored a section of the Equity Research
Module by the National Stock Exchange (NSE). She has also taught Investment Analysis and Macroeconomics to business
students at the Royal Thimphu College (RTC), Bhutan. She is a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) from ICFAI, holds a masters
degree in Economics and is pursuing her CFP certification, US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea, Febuary 18, 2015
The dynasty regime in North Korea continues to splurge and squander its resources towards nuclear armament and military expansion, while its people suffer from food deprivation and continue
to be fed by aid. The secretive totalitarian economy has increasingly isolated itself from the world except for a few allies. Its activities and actions have time and again violated international
agreements, thus inviting sanctions against it. However, while the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been repeatedly sanctioned by the United Nations (UN), the US, Japan,
Canada, Australia, and European Union, the regime has shown little inclination to comply with international agreements. (For more, see: How the North Korea Economy Works) Relations: The
European Union & The United States The European Union (EU) and most of its constituent countries have bilateral diplomatic relationships with North Korea and maintain embassies in
Pyongyang, and the EU indulges in annual talks with North Korea. The European Unions stance regarding North Korea is based on a few key issues, including peace and stability in the region,
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, aid (and cooperation), and human rights. According to the European Commission External Action Service, Since 1995, over 366 million in aid has been
provided in the form of food aid, medical, water and sanitation assistance and agricultural support. In 2011, the EU provided 10 million in emergency aid following a severe food crisis. The
total trade between DPRK and the European Union was 144 million or about 2.09 percent of North Koreas trade volume. Though there is no direct involvement by the EU in North Koreas
economic reforms, Brussels is supportive of any initiatives toward reform. The European Union (through a few member countries) provides education and training in economic policy making
and business to North Korean officials. The United Sates does not have any diplomatic relations with DPRK, thus neither has an embassy in the other's country. The US operates through the
Swedish embassy in North Korea for any services for US citizens in DPRK. While economic interaction between the two countries is minimal, the US is concerned with issues like human rights
The US
and EU comply by the UN Resolution 2094 (2013) and earlier resolutions regarding restrictions (and bans) against North Korea on the
following: Travel and asset freezes on certain individuals involved in arms dealing and exports of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles
and other weapons. Asset freezes of certain organizations involved in supporting activities towards arms and weapon dealings, as well as illegal trading
and food deprivation in North Korea. The only form of US economic assistance to North Korea is humanitarian during times of natural calamities or emergencies. Sanctions
activities. Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods, and Technology (nuclear items, missile items, and chemical weapons list). Luxury goods (jewelry, pearls, gems, precious, and semi-precious
stones and precious metal, as well as transportation items like yachts, racing cars, and luxury automobiles). The first EU sanction was imposed in 2006 in reaction to North Koreas first test of a
nuclear device. Currently, the European Union has autonomously banned provision of new DPRK bank notes and coins, any financial support which could be used for nuclear-related or weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) program, and any new commitment towards DPRK in the form of concessional loans and financial assistance. There is a restriction on the issue and trade in certain
bonds, use of EU airports, and establishment of subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks. Moreover, there will be enhanced monitoring of banks in DPRK that work with EU financial
institutions, as well as increased scrutiny of DPRK diplomats. In addition to supporting the UN resolutions, the US has time and again imposed sanctions on North. The US, which has backed
South Korea since the start of the Korean War, first imposed an economic embargo on the North in 1950. Over the years, the US US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea By Prableen Bajpai,
CFA (ICFAI) | February 18, 2015 7/9/2015 US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021815/us-and-eu-sanctions-against-north-korea.asp?
view=print 2/2 2015, Investopedia, LLC. has levied additional sanctions against North Korea, especially in the wake of its nuclear tests and provoking episodes against South Korea. Broadly,
the US prohibits any foreign and military aid, government-backed credits, agricultural credits or financing, US commercial bank financing, export licenses and imports into the US for certain
goods and services, export-import bank financing, any support for energy-related programs, cultural exchanges, and support in international institutions and banks. Under the Bush administration
in 2008 (Executive Order 13466), the US ended the Trading With the Enemy Act but continued with certain restrictions on North Korea and a few individuals. In 2010 (Executive Order 13551),
the US blocked three North Korean entities and one individual from property and interests in property that were under US jurisdiction. In 2011 (Executive Order 13570), direct and indirect
import of goods, services and technology was prohibited. The most recent sanctions (Executive Order 13687) were triggered by the cyber-attacking incident on Sony Pictures Entertainment and
affect three North Korean entities, including including a government intelligence agency and a North Korean arms dealer, as well as 10 individuals employed by those entities or by the North
Korean government. They have been barred from the US financial system; any assets under US jurisdiction have been blocked. (Related reading, see: How US & European Union Sanctions
Impact Russia) Stance From 1988 to 2008, the US designated the DPRK government as state sponsor of terrorism. Though there are many sanctions in place against North Korea, the US has not
levied any travel ban for US citizens, nor is there a ban on trade of basic goods (the trade volume is negligible though). The sanctions imposed by the US on North Korea have resulted in minimal
trade limited to medicines and food. The US also prohibits any cultural exchange with DPRK. The limited engagement of Washington with Pyongyang on the diplomatic, political, and economic
fronts gives it less leverage over North Korea. On the other hand, the European Unions focus on backing any economic reform in DPRK but wanting to put a stop to the proliferation of WMD
has created a quandary over what is the right balance of pressure and support. If the European Union exerts pressure without any economic engagement, the effectiveness could be minimal.
While if there is no constructive pressure while it offers some economic backing, the EU stance on DPRK becomes questionable and opposed to its own stated policies. Thus, the European
Unions sanctions are aimed at blocking any direct or indirect help in North Koreas nuclear armament program, while trying to maintain basic economic engagement in the form of trade, aid,
and assistance that might improve North Koreas economic development, human rights, and its citizens standard of living. (Related reading, see: Socialist Economies: How China, Cuba And
There many opinions about the effectiveness of the

sanctions. It seems that North Korea is able to get access to
almost everything it requires whether it is for a luxury project
or nuclear program through a back channel via its allies from
the time of the Cold War. Another reason for the limited
effectiveness of both EU and US sanctions is the fact that
North Korea does not depend greatly on the West; its main
trading partner and benefactor is China. Strings can be pulled
North Korea Work) Bottom Line
122
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when they are attached.
123
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A2: Prolif
124
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1NC I/L D
EU defenses solve Alliance isnt key
Bandow 2013
(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and
civil liberties, 4-22, "NATO's Lack Of Any Serious Purpose Means It Should
Retire", http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2013/04/22/natos-lack-ofany-serious-purpose-means-it-should-retire/)
Alliances should be based on international circumstance. Rasmussen recently argued that The need for a strong
Neither
continent faces an existential military threat. Neither faces a significant global competitor.
Neither has a compelling interest to meddle in regional conflicts. While there is much about which
the U.S. and Europe should cooperate, there is no need for an American-dominated
military alliance between Europe and North America has never been stronger. That is nonsense.
transatlantic military alliance. Thus, what is needed is U.S. burden-shedding rather than allied
burden-sharing. Europeans could provide forces sufficient to defend themselves,
patrol the Mediterranean, aid the Central Asia states, and protect their
interests in North Africa and the Middle East. If they chose not to do so, no worries for
America. But they shouldnt expect Washington to step in. And U.S. officials then could stop their unproductive
whining about Europes defense choices.
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1NC No Prolif
No impact takes too long and too many disincentives
reversal of the program is more likely
Kahl et al., Georgetown Security Studies professor, 2013
(Colin, If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl
.pdf, ldg)
I I I . LESSONS FROM HISTOR Y Concerns over regional proliferation chains, falling nuclear dominos and nuclear tipping points are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears
date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of rogue
states in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a
nuclear tipping point, where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic. Given the presumed fragility of the
nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar
responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates.16 Nevertheless,
predictions of inevitable
proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six
decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly
countries that have started down the nuclear path have found the
road more difficult than imagined, both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority
rare. Moreover, most
to reverse course.
of nuclear-weapons aspirants
Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable nuclear express,17 William Potter and Gaukhar
Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.18 None
of this means that additional proliferation in response to Irans nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable.
Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization
requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives.
Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for
Analysts predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the

incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives. Yet, as
it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going
down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic
costs that outweigh the potential benefits. 19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving
states to pursue nuclear weapons.
state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a states leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20
Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an enduring rival especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis--vis their opponents or those that face an
adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek,
for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear
weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear
proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time.
In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China
(1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in
1967), India (peaceful nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant
slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial
capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South
Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one
estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before
the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the

number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly declined.26 Furthermore
they produced a bomb. Over time,
especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the
community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has
not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but
Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states
to follow suit.27 In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps
toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israels presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in
1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Irans program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts
primarily as a defensive response to Israels presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions,
including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for
Syrias activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israels alleged development of the bomb and Syrias actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most
likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched
nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The
the average time

required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior
to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970, even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial
base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states
successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans,
with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research
shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to
acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rivals acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive
proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rivals acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both
leaders have to weigh these potential gains

against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or
regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside
directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but
126
File Title
powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear weapons will produce strains in
strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a states leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb,
they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted
the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a countrys relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states
seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or
enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be
especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the
bomb.39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational
costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a countrys leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive
diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the community of nations as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing
nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling
coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more
inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of rogue states
fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military
applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have
started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful
states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their
nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferators vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else
being equal, the more vulnerable a states economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that
have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system especially
those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling
coalitions.43 A states vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leaderships assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose
sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other
instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers economically or geopolitically that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic
Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and
more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states
can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A countrys technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear
program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power
plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some
latent capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium is particularly
important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess
the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak
rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian management

approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines
nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists,
experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of
state institutions that permit, or even encourage,
Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent
without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons
since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpowers protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and
North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland
potential proliferation
candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly
because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the United States
(e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security
assurances have empirically significantly reduced proliferation proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a
and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several
country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival
developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated
to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.
127
File Title
A2: Russian War
128
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1NC I/L D
Alliance fails to deter Russia Europe alone solves
Bandow 2012
(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 8-12, "How NATO Expansion Makes
America Less Safe", http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-natoexpansion-makes-america-less-safe)
With the end of the Cold War the justification for NATO disappeared. The Soviet
Union split, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the global communist menace vanished. There no longer was any there
Putin is no friend of liberty, but he evidences no

design and possesses no capability to recreate a global empire. Under him
Russia has reverted to a pre-World War I great power, focused on winning respect and
protecting its borders. A Russian invasion of Eastern Europe, let alone the core
western members of NATO, is but a paranoid fantasy. Anyway, the Europeans are
able to defend themselves. Today the European Union has ten times the GDP and
three times the population of Russia. Despite their ongoing economic crises, EU
members together still spend far more than Moscow on the military. There is
there, as Gertrude Stein said of Oakland. President
no prospect of Russia dominating Eurasia.
Unfortunately, expanding NATO over the last two

decades has turned what once was a military alliance into an international social club. Other than Poland, the post1989 NATO entrants have been military midgets, security black holes requiring the U.S. to pay to rearm and retrain
militaries which remain too small to do anything useful in a real war. Yes, the new members contributed small
contingents in Americas other conflicts; President Saakashvili similarly sent Georgian troops to Afghanistan and
alliance
advocates claim that NATO could at least protect countries at Europes periphery.
Iraq to win American support. But the U.S. has paid mightily for de minimis benefits. Still,
For instance, had Georgia been a member, they argue, Moscow would not have attacked. Lithuanian Foreign
Minister Petras Vaitiekunas contended that including Tbilisi would clearly show to Russia how unhelpful it is to even
Yet history is full of examples of alliances which failed to

deter powers from acting when they believed their vital interests to be at
stake. In World War I most of the continent plunged into bloody conflict
despite competing military leagues. In World War II Germany ignored British
try flexing its muscles.
and French commitments to Poland. Today Moscow might not believe that Americans and
Europeans with little at stake would be so foolish as to confront a nuclear armed power over interests it viewed as
vital. Moreover, the Russians are not likely to be any more inclined toward appeasement than would the U.S. in a
given the Wests consistent policy of ignoring Russian

interests, Moscow likely would insist even more strongly that concessions not be made and humiliations not be
countenanced. Attempting to establish friendly, democratic regimes along
Russias borders, and turn them into military outposts as members of the historic American-led, anti-Soviet
comparable situation. Indeed,
alliance, is geopolitically aggressive. As America developed, Washington demonstrated little

patience for European meddling in Central and even South America, which it considered to be Americas
backyard. Perhaps U.S. intentions were better, though the Latin Americans might not agree. Nevertheless, European
security guarantees for Americas neighbors would have made Washington less rather than more tractable. Worse,
NATO expansion brings the political and territorial disputes of new members
with each other and Russia into the alliance. The organization then threatens to
act as a transmission belt of rather than firebreak to war. Countries reliant

on their own resources are more likely to compromise. In contrast, having a
superpower in their corner makes them more likely to be intransigent. Although

most of the new NATO members, and especially the most recent additions like Albania and Croatia, are
money pits for American aid, at least these nations are geopolitically irrelevant. Moscow has no
reason to pay them any mind.
129
File Title
1NC No Russian War

No Russia war no motive or capability
Betts, Columbia war and peace studies professor, 2013
(Richard, The Lost Logic of Deterrence, Foreign Affairs, March/April, ebsco,
ldg)
These continuities with the Cold War would make sense only between intense adversaries. Washington and Moscow remain in an
adversarial relationship, but not an intense one. If the Cold War is really over, and the West really won, then continuing implicit
deterrence does less to protect against a negligible threat from Russia than to feed suspicions that aggravate political friction. In
it is now hard to make the case that Russia is more a threat to

NATO than the reverse. First, the East-West balance of military capabilities, which at the
height of the Cold War was favorable to the Warsaw Pact or at best even, has not only shifted to NATO's
advantage; it has become utterly lopsided. Russia is now a lonely fraction of what
the old Warsaw Pact was. It not only lost its old eastern European allies; those allies are now arrayed on the other
side, as members of NATO. By every significant measure of power -- military spending, men
under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory -- NATO enjoys
massive advantages over Russia. The only capability that keeps Russia militarily potent is its nuclear arsenal.
There is no plausible way, however, that Moscow's nuclear weapons could be used for
aggression, except as a backstop for a conventional offensive -- for which NATO's
capabilities are now far greater. Russia's intentions constitute no more of a threat
than its capabilities. Although Moscow's ruling elites push distasteful policies, there
is no plausible way they could think a military attack on the West would serve
their interests. During the twentieth century, there were intense territorial conflicts between the two sides and a titanic
struggle between them over whose ideology would dominate the world. Vladimir Putin's Russia is authoritarian, but unlike
the Soviet Union, it is not the vanguard of a globe-spanning revolutionary ideal .
contrast to during the Cold War,
130
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A2: Terrorism
131
File Title
1NC I/L D
Terror coop is strong and resilient
Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, The United States and Europe: Current
Issues, Feb 3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)
Overall, in the years since the 9/11 attacks, transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism has been strong. U.S. and
European officials from the cabinet level down maintain regular dialogues on issues related to homeland
security and counterterrorism. In 2010, new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance
entered into force. The United States and the EU have also reached agreements on container security and
sharing airline passenger data as part of their efforts to strengthen aviation, transport, and border security .
In addition, the United States and the EU actively work together to track and counter the financing of terrorism,
in forums such as the Financial Action Task Force and through information sharing deals such as the
U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement, which allows U.S. authorities access to financial data held by a Belgium-based consortium of
international banks as part of the U.S. Treasury Departments Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). While the EU has been increasing its
relevance in this area, bilateral intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperat ion between the United States and individual European
countries also remains key to disrupting terrorist plots and apprehending those involved.
132
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1NC No Terror
No risk of nuclear terrorism too many obstacles
Mearsheimer, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at
the University of Chicago, 2014
(John J. America Unhinged, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/americaunhinged-9639?page=show)
Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not
at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no
question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the U nited States in
any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the
foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of
a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major
blow. Terrorismmost of it arising from domestic groups was a much bigger problem in the United States
during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled. What about the possibility that a
terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the
chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to
supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the
recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow
terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans
to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile
material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well :
there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger
obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every
country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear
weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by
the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious
threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear
materials in highly secure custody.
133
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A2: Trade
134
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1NC I/L D
*Read generic take-outs to relations (resiliency, inevitable, alt causes, etc)
135
File Title
1NC No Trade Wars

Trade is strong and resilient
Ikenson, 9 associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the
Cato Institute
[Daniel, A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers
Will Be Short-Lived, March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?
pub_id=10651]
Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the
combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self
interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the
risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy
Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the
maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the
value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would
be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that
7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade
declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of
Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls
"legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO
members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing
countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their
most developing countries that have room to

backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would
not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value. 11 Backsliding
from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not
going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments
are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made
various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic
situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the
"Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to
revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United
most important trade partners. But
States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced
even more promising

than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce
existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment,
that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But
raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices,"
the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce

tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising
20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is
implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13v
the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on

some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital
And Mexico is not alone. In February,
equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January
decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15
Meanwhile,
on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between
136
File Title
Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and
members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist
measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there
is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing
barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited
policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to
engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can
leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices
through policy constraints.

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1

Note: The United States has

Violation- The affirmative decreases surivellance on US persons, not Domestic

Education- They make it so we do not learn about the

LEADS Act is controversial lack of support and debates over MLATs

Economist 14. [11-15-14 --- http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21631797america-needs-push-free-trade-pact-pacific-more-vigorously-americas-big-bet]

PoliticsECPA Reform Unpopular

ECPA reform empirically unpopular GOP resistance

Huge backlash err neg on empirics

bill still must be voted on by a

PoliticsLEADS Act Unpopular

LEADS Act is controversial lack of support and debates over MLATs

of obtaining sufficient federal funding.

PoliticsLink Alone Turns Case

It's possible that, like all government programs, these could be

Relying on MLATs results in lengthy delays compromises responses to terrorism

Successful acquisition causes nuclear spoofing extinction

For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and

terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks

There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise

Vigilance link - Strong intel gatherings key to discourages initiation of Nuclear

If Americans came to believe that we are

---Laundry List 2NC Link

---Evasion 2NC Link

---Delay 2NC Link

---MLATs 2NC Link

Providers will evade MLATs by exceeding territorial jurisdiction direct disclosure

MLATs bad Months of delay and whims of foreign governments

MLATs fails squo is preferable

are potentially harmful to a robust and free Internet, and could

Existing protections solve

not hesitated to carry out actions of questionable legality, such

skill can lead to

the United States is more

STEM shortage means US competitiveness is unsustainable

Chinas and Indias will rise to more than 13%

No impact to US competitiveness- its all hype

a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it

in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because

interests of nominally American

mean for economic policy? The favorable interpretation, as

Competitiveness not key to heg

short of expectationsGods, the Founders, posteritysor of the previous virtues of

comparably openCanada, Australiaarent nearly as large; those whose economies

Were lightyears ahead in key sectors

skill can lead to

the United States is more

AT: CompetitivenessAlt Cause: STEM

Chinas and Indias will rise to more than 13%

AT: CompetitivenessNo Impact

a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it

in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because

interests of nominally American

mean for economic policy? The favorable interpretation, as

Competitiveness doesnt threaten heg-US leads in R&D, innovation and

studies have arrived at not dissimilar conclusions

usually requires open debate, a capacity to challenge established truths

Competitiveness not key to heg

governments turn to surveillance to gain

(Insert Impact D depending on Scenario)

governments turn to surveillance to gain

AT: Organized CrimeInevitable

criminal organisa- tions able to adapt to

enterprises are now replacing a centralised structure, often without