Reply to Some Criticisms

Author(s): J. S. Mackenzie
Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Apr., 1894), pp. 380-384
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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380

InternationalYournal of Ethics.

has proclaimedand upheld in Europe the essential differencebetweenChurch

and State,the distinctcharacterof the two powers,of theirrespectivedomains
and of their reciprocal rights. Zn thisfact lie the safetyand the honor of
moderncivilization."*

Catholicity,religion, civilization-all are involved in the

problem which discussion narrows down to Italy and the
Papacy. Whoever realizes its broader importand honestly
seeks its solution must advocate the developmentof Catholic
lifeand a proper respect forthe rightsof the Holy See. In
defendingthese rights the Pope discharges a duty towards
the Church and towards the civilized world.
FRANCIS ARCHBP. SATOLLI,

ApostolicDelegate.

D.C.
WASHINGTON,

[NOTE.-Mgr. Satolli wishes to express his acknowledgmentsto Dr. Th.

throughwhose assistBouquillon and Dr. E. Pace, of the Catholic University,
ance he was able to contributethe above article.-MAN. ED.]

DISCUSSIONS.
REPLY

TO SOME

CRITICISMS.

MR. STOUT'S review of my " Manual of Ethics" has interested me very much; and some of the points that he has
raised seem to me so importantthat I cannot refrainfrom
making a briefreplyt to them.
Two of the chief points appear to me to be very closely
connected with one another,-viz., the criticismof my view of
Hedonism and the criticismof my view of Punishment. In
both cases it seems to me that Mr. Stout raises an imaginary
by supposing it possible to separate feelingfromthe
difficulty
concrete contentto which it belongs. In the case of Hedonism,indeed, he admits that the suppositionwhich he makes
Guizot, " L'Eglise et la Soci&t6chretienne."
the Januarynumber,owingto want
of space.-MAN. ED.
*

t This replywas unavoidablyomittedin

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Discussions.

38i

is made per impossible. I do not see what is gained by such

a supposition. I have neverdenied that what has value forus
has value forus as self-consciousbeings, and consequentlyis
accompanied by a sense of value. If in the end we were not
aware that it is valuable,-i.e., if in the end it were not pleasant to us,-it would not be valuable. This I entirelyadmit.
But what I insist on is that what is valuable is the concrete
content,and thatit is erroneousto say that the only thingthat
has value forus is the consciousnessthatsomethinghas value.*
Moreover,it must be rememberedthat it is only in theend
that the sense of value necessarilycomes,-i.e., it is only when
we have attainedto a perfectlyclear self-consciousness.
Similarly,with regard to Hegel's theoryof Punishment,I
quite admit that punishmentwould be silly and malevolent if
it meant simplythe adding of pain to evil; but what I maintain,and whatI understandHegel to maintain,is that evil is in
its nature painful. It has negative value; and in the end the
consciousnessof thisnegativevaluemustsomewhereand somehow be produced. The object of punishmentis to bring the
consciousness of it directlyhome to the offender. Mr. Stout
may replythat this object is the one that is emphasized by the
deterrentand correctivetheories. Of course it is. Hegel's
is merelythat according
view includes these. The difference
to these theoriesthe connectionbetween evil and punishment
is accidental,whereaswithHegel it is essential. Hegel recognizes that punishmentis implicitin evil, because evil is by its
nature a negative value. Punishmentsimply makes this explicit. It does not, as Mr. Stout puts it, "add pain to evil :"
it simply brings the painfulnessof evil home to roost, If it
eitherdeter
did not do this,it could not in the end effectively
or correct. If a man does a piece of work that has bread in
it, he has earned the bread; and ifhe receives it, both he and
others are encouraged to do such work. If a man does a
piece of work that has a horsewhippingin it, he has earnedthe horsewhipping; and if he receives it,both he and others
* Mr. Stout'simage of the clock surelyinvolvesa gross misrepresentation
of
myposition. The shadow on a sundial mighthave been a betterimage.
26
VOL. IV.-No. 3

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382

Internationaljournal of Ethics.

are deterred. In both cases the good result depends on the

recognitionthat a man has received what he earned,that the
normal resultof his action has been produced withinhis own
world. The criminalought to be made to feel thatwhat has
come upon him is just that withwhich his action was big.
" The wheel has come full circle, I am here." Of course it
should be rememberedthat this is merelya Theoryof Punishment,-i.e., a justificationof the practice of inflictingpain
upon a wrong-doer. It is not at all incompatible with the
view that it would be better to reformthan to punish-i.e.,
that it would be betterto raise a man into a higher world
instead of merely completing the circle within his present
world. Similarly, a Theory of Wages is not incompatible
with the doctrinethat a man ought to be rewardedin proportion to his wants rather than in proportionto his earnings.
Though a man has earned punishment,there may be a sufficientreason for a reprieve; and the possibility of curing
him may constitutesuch a reason. Hegel's theoryof punishment is merelydesigned to show that there is a sense in
which punishment is earned, not necessarily that in such
cases it ought always to be inflicted.*
Mr. Stout's otherpointsseem to me less important. I admit
that in dealing with " universesof desire" a referencemight
with advantage have been made to Herbart,though I do not
think that the idea is by any means peculiar to him, and
though Herbart's view is connected with a psychological
theoryto which I do not wish to commitmyself. I admitalso
that the provisionalanswer to the question,what is the nature
of the self with which we are to be consistent? is " scarcely
satisfactory." In the passage to which Mr. Stout refersI state
and go on to discovera better.
thatthe answeris unsatisfactory,
I do not consider that a complete answer could have been
given at that point. There must,however,be some want of
* There may even be cases in which,forthe sake of social welfare,it may be
necessaryto inflictpain on thosewho have not earnedpunishment. But in such
cases it seems bestnot to describe the pain as punishment;just as it is best not
to describe the surplusprofitsof a manufacturer(however justlytheymay be
due to him) as his wages.

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Discussions.

383

clearness in the passage; forI observethatMr. Muirheadalso,

in his reviewof my book in Mind,misunderstandsmy meaning in the same way as Mr. Stout does. In his referenceto
my treatmentof Dr. Sidgwick's view of " Pleasure and Desire," I do not feel sure whetherMr. Stout intendsto raise an
objection to my position. So faras I understandhis remarks
on this subject,I entirelyagree with them. I never denied
that thereis such a thing as pleasure of pursuit,in the sense
of pleasure of progressive attainment; or that in the case of
such pleasures the desire remains at each stage partlyunsatisfied; or even that in such cases the pleasure is dependent
on the fact that the attainmentis progressive; and these are
all the statementsthat Mr. Stout appears to make at this
point. What I affirmis merely that in all such cases the
pleasure, so far as I can see, is dependent on the fact that
there is an attainment,actual or prospective, and not on
the factthat the desire is unsatisfied.To put it paradoxically,
if therewere an immediateattainmentin such cases it would
not be an attainmentat all; because what is sought is not an
immediateresult,but a process. The only possible end is the
completion of a series,and the series can be given only as a
succession. No one desires a happy old age, forinstance,except as the crown of a happy life. To become suddenly old
of such a desire,though it were
would not be the fulfilment
accompanied by all sorts of honor and troops of friends. The
object aimed at is, on the other hand, becoming progressively
attainedat everystage in a happy life,and the ultimategoal is
simplythe consummationof all that has gone before. As regards the freedomof the will, again, I am somewhat surprised
that Priestleyshould be referredto as having understoodthe
freedomwhich consists in self-determination.I should have
thought that Priestley was one of the most remarkableinstances of a man who entirelyfailed to see this, and who
habitually thought of the will as being determined by external motives. This seems to come out clearly in the whole
course of Priestley's argumentswith Price. It is true that
Price's own view,of self-determination
was not clear. He
understood it in the purely indeterministsense. But surely

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384

International-ournaZ of Ethics.

Priestley was equally unenlightenedon the opposite side.

Such a merelynegativecriticismas that quoted by Mr. Stout
does not sufficeto show any positive appreciation of the
significanceof self-determination.
TRINITY

COLLEGE,

CAMBRIDGE.

A PERSONAL

J. S. MACKENZIE.

EXPLANATION.

WHEN a book has been long out of print and is not to be

reprinted,what is its author to do when parts of it are
attacked? What is he to do specially when the attack is
aimed at a point on which for many years he has come to
think that he was partlymistaken? If he keeps silence, he
may seem to shrink fromacknowledging an error. But if
he thrustshimselfforwardto admit that seventeenyears ago
he made a mistake,he may be charged with some degree of
indecency.
A portionof the argumentswhich in my " Ethical Studies"
I brought against Hedonism, I findhas been attacked by Mr.
Mr. Hodder's
Hodder in this JOURNAL, Vol. III. pp. 107-8.
writingis vigorous,and when I say that the substance of his
article strikes me as much what in his day J.S. Mill might
have put out, I shall not have strainedmy conscience and yet
may hope to have gratifiedmy critic. But I feel concerned
in the matteronly so far as it compels me unwillinglyto obtrude a kind of personal explanation.
In my "Ethical Studies," i876, and in a pamphlet which
followedin I877, I urged thatthe Hedonistic End contradicts
itselfin a certainway. If you take this End, I argued, as
a collection or aggregate, and still furtherif you take it as
an infinitesum, you find yourselflanded in inconsistencies.
intowhich I need
There were otheradditions and refinements,
hardly now enter. But I used the above argument,and I
admit that it was largely mistaken,and I would ask permission to say why and how I thinkit went wrong.
I firstmade an assumption. I assumed that with regard
to its End Hedonism is bound to have an idea which is
logically consistent. As to the truth of this assumption I

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