Mejia, Melanie

Criminal Law 1
A. NICOLAS V ROMULO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 17588
FACTS: L/CPL Daniel Smith was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape in the
Makati RTC. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together
with the accessory penalties provided for under the RPC art. 41. However, pursuant
to the VFA entered by the Philippines and US, Smith shall serve his sentence in the
facilities which is deemed appropriate by both countries. Pending agreement on
such facilities, Smith was temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail. However,
on December 29, 2006, Smith was taken out of Makati City Jail and was transferred
to the Rowe Building (US Embassy Compound) in accordance to the Romulo-Kenney
agreement dated December 19 and 22, 2006. The petitioners contended that the
Philippines should have custody over Smith because the VFA is void and
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the VFA is constitutional; Granted that it is constitutional, does the
Romulo-Kenney agreement in accordance with the provisions of the VFA itself?
DISCUSSION: The SC ruled that the VFA between the Philippines and US is
constitutional for two reasons: 1. The VFA was duly concurred by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and certified by
the duly authorized representative of the US government. The fact that the VFA was
not submitted for advice and consent of the US senate does not detract from its
status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
This is already a matter of internal US law; 2. The VFA falls within the provisions of
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. It is clear then that the VFA is
constitutional.
However, whether the Romulo-Kenney agreement follows the
provision of the VFA, it is a different matter. The rules that govern the custody of
Smith after his conviction are the provisions stipulated in the VFA:
Art V Section 10 (Criminal Jurisdiction): The confinement or detention
by Philippine authorities of US personnel shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and US authorities. US
personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to
visits and material assistance.
The above provision clearly indicates that the detention shall be carried out in
facilities agreed by both States, but also that the detention shall be by Philippine
authorities. As such the Romulo-Kenney agreement which allowed the transfer of
Smith from Makati City Jail to the US Embassy compound is not in accordance with
the VFA provisions.
The SC ruled that the petition is partially granted; the VFA is upheld as
constitutional but the Romulo-Kenney agreements on December 19 and 22, 2006,
are declared not in accordance with the VFA. The department of foreign affairs was
ordered to negotiate with the US representatives for the appropriate detention
facilities pursuant to Art V Section 10 of the VFA
B. US V AH SING 36 PHIL 978

FACTS: Eight cans of opium were found inside the Shun Chang, a foreign vessel
which arrived on the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917. Said drugs that found in the
ashes below the boiler of the steam engine belonged to Ah Sing, a Chinese national
who worked as a fireman in the vessel. The defendant confessed that the drugs
belonged to him and were bought in Saigon. However, he did not confess the
purpose in buying the opium and even mentioned that it was not his intention to
import the drugs to the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant should be liable for illegal importation of prohibited
drugs to the Philippine Islands
DISCUSSION: Although mere possession of illegal drugs is prohibited in the
Philippines, when aboard in a foreign vessel (even in any of the Philippine ports), as
a general rule does not constitute a crime which can be tried in Philippine courts.
The reason for such is that such vessel is considered as an extension of its own
nationality. However, this does not apply to the present case.
Section 4 of Act no. 2381 states that, any person who shall unlawfully import or
bring any prohibited drugs into the Philippine Islands. It should be noted that the
use of import and bring are synonymous. Importation means bringing products into
port as well as before the custom house. As per the Opium Law: [we hold that] any
person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drugs into the Philippine Islands,
or if the prohibited drugs are found under this persons control on a foreign vessel,
is within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal
importation of the drug unless sufficient evidences prove otherwise. Applying this
law to the present case, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely
carrying the opium back and from between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure
of doing so. Likewise, it is also impossible to think that the accused needed such a
large amount of opium for his personal use. Although the accused did not clearly
express it, it can only be deduced from the given facts that the accused brought the
opium intentionally for purposes other than personal use.
The SC affirmed the CFI decision in finding the defendant guilty of violating Section
4 of Act no. 2381 (Opium Law) and was sentenced him to two years imprisonment,
a fine of P 300 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. With costs
against the appellant.
C. DE JOYA V JAIL WARDEN 417 SCRA 636
FACTS: Petitioner Norma de Joya was charged with two counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). While the trial was going on, the
petitioner jumped bail. She was tried in absentia and eventually convicted of the
crimes charged. After five years, De Joya was arrested while applying for an NBI
clearance. The petitioner, while under detention, filed an urgent petition with the
trial court asking the court to apply SC Admin Circular no. 12-000. The trial court
denied the motion on the grounds that the decision had long become final and
executory; as such, it could no longer be amended to change the penalty imposed.
Furthermore, SC Admin Circular no. 12-000 is prospective in application and cannot
be applied retroactively. The petitioner also filed for a writ of habeas corpus
contending that the SC Admin Circular no. 12-000 deleted the penalty of
imprisonment for violation of BP 22, and only allowed for the imposition of a fine.

The petitioner prayed that the SC declare her detention illegal and order her release
from Batangas City Jail.
ISSUE: Whether SC Admin Circular no. 12-000 can be applied retroactively to the
present case
DISCUSSION: The SC ruled in the case of De Joya that the SC Admin Circular no. 12000 is not a penal law and as such, RPC art. 22 (retroactive effect of Penal Laws)
does not apply. The said circular only applies to pending cases as of the date of its
effectivity and not to cases that have already been rendered final. Furthermore, the
said circular does mot amend BP 22; it merely lays down a rule of preference on the
application of penalties for the violation of BP 22. The SC Admin Circular no. 12000 provides discretion for judges to impose either a single penalty or conjunctive
penalty. This is based on the idea that if the offender clearly acted in good faith or a
clear mistake of fact without negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be
enough as the more appropriate penalty. It does not, in any way, intend to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty. However, it should be kept in mind that the
court, in imposing penalties, follows the positivist theory. The penalty imposed,
then, is not only meant to be retributive but also reformative. In the above case,
even if the SC circular can be retroactively applied, the petition will still be denied
on the basis that the defendant did not provide any argument for her defense.
Worse, she remained in hiding for five years and was only arrested when she
applied for an NBI clearance. As such, the SC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
D. ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN 369 SCRA 394
FACTS:
ISSUE:
DISCUSSION:
E. REODICA V CA 292 SCRA 87
FACTS: On the evening of October 17, 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving
a van along Dona Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision in Paranaque, Metro
Manila. Allegedly due to her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant
Norberto Bonsol which as a result, the complainant sustained slight physical injuries
and damage to his car which amounted to P 8,542.00. A complaint was submitted
to Makati RTC on January 31, 1988, charging the petitioner with reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injury. Thereafter,
the Makati RTC convicted Reodica of quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property with slight physical injuries and sentencing her: to suffer
imprisonment of 6 months arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant P 13,542.00
and the costs herein. According to the RTC, the penalty imposed for physical
injuries is imprisonment, a penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period following
People v Aguiles L-11302 October 28, 1960. Reodica filed a petition to the CA,
however the CA ruled the same.
Petitioner, then, filed a petition for review on certiorari on the following grounds: CA
decision and resolutions are contrary to law and grossly erroneous in that they
imposed a penalty in excess of what is authorized by Law for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, on the basiso f a clerical error in a

secondary source. According to the petitioner, the lower court should have
pronounced that there were two light felonies involved: reckless imprudence with
slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of
one complex crime. Both felonies, according to her, do not rate a single penalty of
arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months.
ISSUE: Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting damage to
property in the amount of P 8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries are light felonies
DISCUSSION: According to RPC Art. 3: Felonies are committed not only by means of
deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). Deceit is present when a wrongful
act is done with deliberate intent (voluntary); there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. The SC rule
that a reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by
public censure only since according to Art. IX, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a
penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P 200.00 or both.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property is
penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto
mayor is a correctional penalty under Art. XXV of RPC, the quasi offense in question
is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by the petitioner.