NOLASCO VS.

PAO
G.R. L-69803 OCTOBER 8, 1985
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group. Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of
the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same
day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2
boxes were seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant for
rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of
subversion and rebellion were filed but the fiscal''s office merely charged her and
Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Milagros asked for
suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained. The search
warrant described the things to be seized as "Documents, papers and other records
of the CPP, NPA and NDF, xxx".
HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to describe with particularity the
things to be seized. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions
are and what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make
them subversive. There is absent a definite guideline as to what items might
lawfully be seized, thus giving the officers discretion regarding what articles they
should seize. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant. But the seizure of the
articles could be justified as an incident of a valid arrest. It is a general rule that, as
an incident of an arrest, the place of premises where the arrest was made can also
be searched without a search warrant.
NOLASCO VS. PAO
GR L-69803 JANUARY 30, 1987
FACTS: The case at bar is for the motion for partial reconsideration of both
petitioners and respondents of the SCs decision that the questioned search warrant
by petitioners is null and void, that respondents are enjoined from introducing
evidence using such search warrant, but such personalities obtained would still be
retained, without prejudice to petitioner Aguilar-Roque.
Respondents contend that the search warrant is valid and that it should be
considered in the context of the crime of rebellion, where the warrant was based.
Petitioners on the other hand, on the part of petitioner Aguilar-Roque, contend that
a lawful search would be justified only by a lawful arrest. And since there was illegal
arrest of Aguilar-Roque, the search
was unlawful and that the personalities seized during the illegal search should be
returned to the petitioner.
The respondents, in defense, concede that the search warrants were null and void
but the arrests were not.
The court decides to use the dissenting opinion of Teehankee regarding this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the personalities seized using an illegal search warrant be
returned
HELD: Yes, it should be. Following the dissenting opinion of Teehankee stated as
follows:
... The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and
void in the Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross
violation of the constitutional mandate that 'the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects aqainst
unreasonable Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]).
This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule
has proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby
removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to
disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the
Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or
modify.
All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary rule totally and
unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners,
as held by the majority in the recent
case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MIKAEL MALMSTEDT
THE SWEDISH NATIONAL WITH HASHISH CASE
198 SCRA 401 JUNE 19, 1991
FACTS: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was found, via a routine NARCOM
inspection at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay Mountain Province, carrying Hashish, a
derivative of Marijuana. RTC La Trinidad found him guilty for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the
reversal of the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal
because there was no search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be reversed (or
affirmed) because the accused argues that the search and arrest was made without
a warrant
HELD: The RTC decision is affirmed.
The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person
without a warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The offense was
recognized with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted by
probable cause: (1) the receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming

from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to
immediately present his passport.
TOLENTINO VS. ONGSIAKO
GR L-17938 APRIL 30, 1963
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant claims to be the successor-in-interest of the late Severino
Domingo, who was involved in a case against Ongsiako. Plaintiff-appellant said that
Domingo died without ever receiving the decision of the case, and he has just found
out of the decision, over 20 years since its promulgation. This prompted him to file a
complaint for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion. This was dismissed by the
trial court for lack of cause of action.
ISSUES: Whether or not appellants claim that decision was erroneous and unjust is
tenable; Whether or not one can move for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion
HELD: On the first issue, it is untenable. Appellant is barred by res judicata, the
decision of the case being final and executory for a long time already.
On the second issue, the enforcement of the dissenting opinion is ridiculous as the
dissenting opinion enforces no right, claim, or whatsoever. It is just a dissent from
the conclusion of the case.
RECUERDO VS. PEOPLE
GR 133036 JANUARY 22, 2003
FACTS: Recuerdo, petitioner, issued checks to Yolanda Floro in exchange of a 3karat loose diamond, 3 of which were cleared while the 5 were dishonored due to
the closure of the petitioners account. The check when presented for payment
within 90 days thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
(Prudential) for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite receipt of such dishonor
the accused failed to pay the said payee the face amount of the said check or to
make an arrangement for full payment within 5 banking days after receiving said
notice.
After trial, Branch 67 of the Makati MTC finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on five (5) counts and therefore
sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment, and pay an amount to Miss Floro
plus an amount as damages to compensate the payment for attorneys fees.
The RTC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the MeTC. And the court of Appeals
affirmed that of RTC.
Petitioner contends in her appeal to the SC that she has been convicted of an
unconstitutional law and that the trial court erred in not upholding her presumption
of innocence as well as upholding the evidence of prosecution even if it didnt prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Joy Lee Recuerdo violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing
Checks Law) on 5 counts; Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional

HELD: The Supreme Court AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the decision of the Court
of Appeals finding the petitioner guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In
lieu of imprisonment, Joy Lee Recuerdo, is
ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check
subject of the five cases at bar. And she is also ordered to pay private complainant
Yolanda Floro, the amount of 200,000.00 Pesos representing the total amount of the
dishonored checks.
These matters subject of petitioners contention have long been settled in the
landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez where this Court upheld the constitutionality of
B.P 22:
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has
the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P 22, which
is explicit that, any person who makes
or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank which check is subsequently dishonored
shall be punished by imprisonment.
BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by
the parties, its primordial intention being instead ensure the stability and
commercial value of checks as being virtual
substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to
determine the reason for which checks are issued, of the terms and conditions for
their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be
made.
NICOLAS-LEWIS V COMELEC
G.R. NO 162759 AUGUST 4, 2006
Ponente: Garcia, J.
***duals may now exercise the right to suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme
and as overseas absentee voters***
Facts: Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship
under RA 9225 which accords to such applicants the right to suffrage, among
others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought
registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the
Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to
vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement

prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different
Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as
the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain
individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that to
exercise absentee voting; the one year residency requirement should be fulfilled.
Held: RA 9189 provides a list those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee
voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and
qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the
host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country
implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to
register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has
not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in
Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that
Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual,
physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of
the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political
rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.

there is no provision in the dual citizenship

law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
"duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its
Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an
absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that
As may be noted,

R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended
to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to

young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in
the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion
of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is
that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting
scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to
in the following wise:
"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines
abroad exercise their right to vote;
"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to
register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on
the day of elections