Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: The Myths of Panglong

Author(s): Matthew J. Walton

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 6 (November/December 2008), pp. 889-910
Published by: University of California Press
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ETHNICITY, CONFLICT, AND HISTORY

IN BURMA
The Myths of Panglong

Matthew J. Walton

Abstract
The effects of the 1947 Panglong Agreement on Burmas ethnic minority
groups can still be seen today in calls for a return to the spirit of Panglong, but
there are conflicting versions of this event and its legacy. In order to grasp the
prospects for ethnic unity in Burma, it is necessary to deconstruct the various
myths of Panglong.
Keywords: Burma, Myanmar, Panglong, ethnic, conflict

In 1947, General Aung San, the young military leader

who was quickly becoming the hero of the Burmese independence movement, met with leaders of the countrys various ethnic minorities in the
Shan town of Panglong to discuss their status within a soon-to-be independent Burma. Their meeting concluded with the signing of the Panglong
Agreement on February 12, an accord that was to pave the way for a new
constitution and, eventually, independence. Over 60 years later, the promises of the Panglong Agreement remain unfulfilled and ethnic conflict
continues to plague the nation, but the elusive spirit of Panglong still affects Burmese of every ethnicity. Multiple and conflicting interpretations
of this event echo the conflicts that face this ethnically divided nation
Matthew J. Walton is a Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of Washington in Seattle. He wishes to thank Ian Holliday, Charles Keyes, John
Buchanan, Vince Rafael, Christoph Giebel, and an anonymous reviewer for their detailed
comments on this article. He is grateful for comments on a paper presented to a workshop on
Political Development in Burma/Myanmar held in Bangkok on March 23, 2007. The
workshop was sponsored by the Asian Political and International Studies Association and
the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Email: <mjw22@u.washington.edu>.
Asian Survey, Vol. 48, Issue 6, pp. 889910, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2008
by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Rights and
Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2008.48.6.889.

889

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today, yet the uniting potential of Panglong remains. In this article, I investigate the effects of the Panglong Agreement on Burmas ethnic minority groups and argue that an understanding of ethnicity and the prospects
for ethnic unity in Burma can be best achieved by a thorough examination
of the myths of Panglong.
While some studies reach back to the earliest of the Burmese kings to
examine the impact of ethnicity on the nation, I believe that the best place
to begin discussions of national unity is in the modern event that (despite its
shortcomings) remains the most salient example of the possibility of ethnic
unitythe Panglong Conference. In a 1989 article, Shan writer Chao-Tzang
Yawnghwe calls for scholars and students to dissect the myths surrounding
the political history of Burma.1 Panglong has impacted Burmese politics
through its potential, its failures, and the various perceptions of it held by
opposing groups; therefore, it is an appropriate topic for such dissection.
My concern is not with specific proposals for democratic governance in
Burma that deal with ethnic identity and representational arrangements.2
Instead, I wish to explore the impact that participation in or exclusion
from the Panglong Conference had on various ethnic groups. By extension,
I highlight the vital place that a critical examination of Panglong must
play in discussions of national unity in Burma, following Robert Taylors
frequently quoted remark that ethnic politics is the obverse of the politics of national unity in modern Burma.3 An understanding of the relationship between ethnic identity and national identity (particularly when
the two are not necessarily one and the same) is necessary in identifying
why national unity remains an elusive concept in multi-ethnic nations like
Burma. This relationship can be understood by studying the dominant
myths in a given society and determining the points at which they fail to
resonate with certain groups and individuals.
I will begin with a brief theoretical discussion of ethnicity, nationalism,
and the role of myths and memory in nation-building. It is through this
lens that the conflicting perceptions of Panglong assume a position of
primary importance. Next, I provide a brief history of Burma since the
colonial era, highlighting events that were significant in the creation or
perpetuation of inter-ethnic tensions. This history provides a setting for
1. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, The Burman Military: Holding the Country Together? in
Joseph Silverstein, ed., Independent Burma at Forty Years: Six Assessments (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1989), p. 101.
2. See, for example, the federal constitution proposed in Ethnic Nationalities Council
(Union of Burma), Federal Constitution (Draft), 2006, <http://www.encburma.org/fcdcc/
Data/constitution/Federal_Constitution_(Draft)_Burmese.pdf>, accessed March 14, 2007.
3. Robert Taylor, Perceptions of Ethnicity in the Politics of Burma, Southeast Asian
Journal of Social Science 10:1 (1982), p. 8.

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the unfulfilled promises that characterized Panglong and the period immediately following independence. I then present an overview of the events
surrounding the conference itself and examine the roles of various ethnic
minorities at Panglong and how the agreement affected their perceptions
of the event and also subsequent rebellions. Finally, I look at three different versions of the myth of Panglong, pointing out limitations of each
and suggesting some ways in which a reappraisal of Panglong could provide a vehicle for more effective discussions of national unity in Burma.

Ethnicity, Nation, and Myth

The very notion of ethnicity remains a contested topic within the social
sciences. While recognizing that ethnic groups do not necessarily retain a
constant, stable culture over time, scholars such as Clifford Geertz explored
the contemporary salience of the primordial attachments and characteristics that are constitutive of ethnicity.4 More-recent perspectives have demonstrated the utility in understanding ethnicity as a relational concept, not
built on specific, permanent cultural traits but rather constructed and
changed over time as a result of interactions with different groups and individuals. Charles Keyes has pointed out that ethnicity becomes salient in
the modern world when politics coincides with cultural differences, particularly when articulated with reference to a national ideology.5 Key to understanding ethnicity, then, are cultural differences that are identified through
repeated interactions and gradually perceived as politically important. This
is the point at which a discussion of nationalism and its founding myths becomes relevant for ethnic identity and conflict.
Each group within a nation needs to be able to identify with cultural
symbolism and ideology. Thus, a prerequisite for national unity is understood to be the acceptance of common history and myths. While these common beginnings are often at least partially constructed, their resonance
with the identities of individuals and groups is crucial in determining the
degree to which the national identity will be accepted and internalized.6
Anthony Smith cites the importance of collective history in nation-building,
particularly the indirect influence of myths and symbols of community
that it invokes.7 History both defines the national unit and directs that unit
4. Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and
Africa (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
5. Charles Keyes, Ethnic Groups, Ethnicity, in Thomas J. Barfield, ed., The Blackwell
Dictionary of Anthropology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997).
6. Eric Hobsbawm, The Nation as Invented Tradition, in Nationalism, John Hutchinson
and Anthony D. Smith, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
7. Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1986), p. 200.

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toward a goal. Although this means that historical events are frequently
altered in order to be more effectively used for nationalist purposes, a
dominant version persists and guides the people of the nation toward their
collective goal, reminding them of their shared future via their common
past. Myth is thus a necessary component of the nation, something that
tells us who we are and where we are going.
But the persistence of a myth can also limit the autonomy of both
groups and individuals. If myths are necessary to the development of nations, they also constrain the development of individuals and groups within
those nations, particularly when national myths conflict with local histories and perceptions of identity. Prasenjit Duara argues that although
the nation is contested and contingent, it nonetheless seeks to project the
false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time.8 In
addition, when history is altered in the service of national myth, it creates the possibility for dissonance and conflict with other aspects of identity,
particularly ethnicity. This second possibility is particularly relevant with regard to the usage of national myths as a source of national unity in Burma.
Maurice Halbwachs built on the theories of Emile Durkheim to demonstrate how collective memory, far from being a given, is actually a constructed concept.9 Our past is continually reshaped as we see it differently
based on our present needs or understandings. This can have an integrating purpose, helping to foster the common recollections that serve as the
basis for a community or a nation. But in the process, collective memory is
often used as an oppressive tool to legitimize dominant state power, or at
least to legitimize the position of a particular group. The dominant myth
of Panglong presents an example of how collective memory can be manipulated to promote an official version of history. But the analysis of conflicting versions of this myth undermines the hegemony of the dominant myth
and creates the possibility for contestation and inclusion.

Colonization and Burmas Struggle for

Independence
Burma under British Rule
The British conquered Burma in stages, beginning in 1824 and finally
ousting the Burman King Thibaw in 1886.10 They sought to control the
8. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern
China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 4.
9. Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Lewis A. Coser, tr. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992).
10. It is important to make the distinction between Burman or Bama, which is used
to refer to the majority ethnic group in Burma, and Burmese, which is a more contested

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territory through a combination of direct and indirect rule, relying on imported Indian officials in the central region and administering through
traditional leaders in the outlying areas. The result of this policy was the
official division of the colony into Ministerial Burma (the central area, controlled from Rangoon) and the Frontier Areas (the Shan States and the
areas primarily inhabited by the Chin and Kachin).11 The administrative
division between these two areas significantly affected the relationships
that their inhabitants subsequently developed with the British and determined in large part how the negotiations at Panglong were conducted and
how independence was achieved.
Although it is true that Burmas struggle for independence was marked
by divisions that existed long before British rule began, these conflicts were
no doubt exacerbated not only by British territorial divisions but by colonial military recruitment policies as well.12 Although Martin Smith notes
that many important details of Burmas ethnic past are still conjecture,
it is known that throughout the pre-colonial period there were frequent wars
between nominally independent kingdoms that would eventually be consolidated by the British.13 It was British geographical divisions and colonial policies, however, that would solidify ethnic identity and have the
greatest effect on the negotiations at Panglong and future ethnic relations
in Burma.
After annexation at the start of 1886, the British gradually began excluding ethnic Burmans from the armed forces.14 The practice of privileging Chin, Kachin, and particularly Karen soldiers would have severely

term, used to designate an institution of the Burmese state or the people contained within its
borders. This article will also discuss various other ethnic groups in Burma, including the
Karen, Shan, Chin, Kachin, Karenni, Mon, Arakanese, Naga, and Wa. For an overview of
the histories of these various groups, beyond the scope of this article, consult Martin Smith,
Ethnic Groups in Burma (London: Anti-Slavery International, 1994).
11. At this time, the Karenni State was officially considered to be an independent territory,
although it was subordinate to the British in certain respects.
12. For a skeptical view on the degree of pre-colonial ethnic conflict in Burma, see Victor B.
Lieberman, Reinterpreting Burmese History, Comparative Studies in Society and History
29:1 (January 1987). It is probably incorrect to classify these conflicts as having been based on
ethnicity. Identity was constructed primarily around political entities that only later would
coalesce into ethnic groups. Even then, these ethnic distinctions were significantly more
fluid than they are today. See, for example, Edmund R. Leach, Political Systems of Highland
Burma (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).
13. Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books
Ltd., 1999), p. 33.
14. The British Army in Burma was actually the British Indian Army until 1937, when
Burma was officially separated from India and the British began constructing a specifically
Burmese army.

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deleterious effects on the prospects for ethnic integration in the military

after independence. In the eyes of the Burmans, ethnic minorities came to
be associated with colonial rule. This perception was only exacerbated by
the fact that predominantly Karen troops were used in the bloody suppression of Burmans in the Saya San rebellion of the 1930s. Andrew Selth
points out that before World War Two, the British viewed the Burmese
military primarily as a tool to maintain internal security.15 Consequently,
the Burman majority saw it as an instrument to facilitate their oppression at
the hands of ethnic minorities, particularly when, in 1925, the British formally adopted a policy of recruiting only Chins, Kachins, and Karens.16
The Japanese Occupation
A small group of Burmans opposed to colonial ruleincluding the young
Aung San, who would soon become Burmas independence herobegan
to establish contact with the Japanese in 1939. They were trained by the
Japanese and collaborated in the Japanese invasion of 1941, successfully
ousting the British from Burmese territory by the beginning of 1942. This
initial salvo of World War Two in Burma set the Japanese and their predominantly Burman allies against the British and their forces, made up
almost entirely of Indians and Burmese ethnic minorities. One Shan commentator notes that under these circumstances, it was impossible for the
ethnic minorities to see the Burmans as a legitimate nationalist movement;
instead, they were viewed as collaborators with an occupying power.17
The Burmese Independence Army (BIA) that was subsequently formed
by the Japanese was as ethnically imbalanced as the British military forces
in Burma, but this time the shift was in favor of the Burmans. Since the
Japanese occupation never effectively stretched into Chin, Kachin, or
Shan territory, these ethnicities were severely under-represented.18 Despite
a declaration of Burmas independence on August 1, 1943, it did not
take long for Burman nationalists to become disillusioned with their de
facto role as a Japanese colony, and a new, anti-Japanese resistance was
quickly formed.
Despite the fresh sources of conflict that arose from the Japanese occupation, British officers and ethnic minority troops reluctantly agreed to co15. Andrew Selth, Burmas Armed Forces: Power without Glory (Norwalk, Conn.: Eastbridge, 2002).
16. This policy most likely resulted from the greater success that Christian missionaries
had among the non-Burman ethnicities. The British would have preferred to work with the
graduates of Christian schools, and this group was overwhelmingly non-Burman.
17. Yawnghwe, The Burman Military, p. 86.
18. Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 67.

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operate with these new Burman belligerents in driving the Japanese out.
The resistance campaign took place from 1942 45 and resulted in the British regaining control of Burma. Immediately, though, they were forced to
deal with an armed, organized contingent of Burman war leaders who were
eager to gain true independence. With the expulsion of the Japanese as the
most immediate goal, very little attention was paid to discussing what a
future Burma would look like, in particular how and by whom it would be
governed. As a consequence, the Japanese were defeated by networks of
armed guerillas and soldiers fighting against the same enemy but fighting
for very different visions of the future.19
By the end of 1946, it was clear to both the Burmese and the British
that Burma would soon gain its independence. Despite emphatic warnings
from Winston Churchill and others about the reckless nature of the colonys drive toward freedom, the British government seemed ready to work
with Aung San and his party, the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League
(AFPFL).20 The most pressing question at this time was whether or not
the Frontier Areas would be associated with Ministerial Burma and if so,
in what way.

The Road to Panglong

The First Panglong Conference
The famous conference of 1947 was actually the second meeting to take
place at Panglong. An earlier gathering in March 1946 brought together
leaders of the Shan, Chin, Kachin, and Karen in what was primarily a celebration of ethnic diversity. This meeting also had a political agenda; discussions were held regarding the future status of the people of the Frontier
Areas after independence. One of the highlights of this first conference
was a proposal by H. N. C. Stevenson (the British director of the Frontier
Areas) that would create a United Frontier Union consisting of Chin,
Kachin, Shan, Karenni, and Karen territory.21 Although the AFPFL members present spoke strongly against such an arrangement, it appears to have
been relatively well received by delegates of the minority groups. Stevenson was one of several British officials who worked tirelessly in the year
leading up to independence to ensure that ethnic minority concerns were
addressed both by the British administration and the AFPFL.
19. Ibid., p. 85.
20. Churchills comments are cited in Josef Silverstein, Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of
National Unity (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980).
21. Lian H. Sakhong, In Search of Chin Identity: A Study in Religion, Politics, and Ethnic
Identity in Burma (Copenhagen: Nias Press, 2003), p. 209.

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Preparations for the Second

Panglong Conference
The British White Paper of 1945 (a document discussing the future status
of Burma) stated that no decision would be made on behalf of the people
of the Frontier Areas without their consent. They were to be placed under
a special regime under the Governor until such time as their inhabitants
signify their desire for some suitable form of amalgamation of their territories with Burma proper.22 Despite the frustration of many minority
groups at not having been involved in those discussions, this clause seemed
to indicate that they would have to be involved in future talks regarding
their status. Indeed, on February 2, 1947only a few days before the Panglong ConferenceAung San reinforced his views supporting autonomy
for the hill peoples: As for the people of the Frontier Areas, they must decide their own future. If they wish to come in with us we will welcome them
on equal terms.23
In actuality, Aung San went into the Panglong Conference viewing it
simply as an informal discussion; he was apparently not very optimistic
about the results.24 First of all, as will be seen in the following sections, the
positions of the ethnic minority leaders were by no means consistent on
the question of independence or federation with Ministerial Burma. In addition, the AFPFL was suspicious of the British and believed that regional
authorities and soldiers sympathetic to the minorities were spreading dissension among the hill people in the hopes of derailing the Burman-led
drive to independence. While there is evidence to suggest that British officers
were discussing plans for independence with at least the Karen leaders,
this does not seem to have been part of a concerted British effort to undermine the AFPFLs efforts at Burmese independence. Rather, it points to the
relatively common colonial phenomenon of significant disconnect between
local officials and officers in the colony, and the policy makers back home.
The Second Panglong Conference
The second Panglong Conference was convened on February 6, with Shan
and Kachin delegates initially in attendance. They agreed on several foundational principles for federating with Burma, including internal autonomy, the desire for a Kachin state, and the right to secession. They were
joined on February 7 by the members of the Chin delegation, who suggested
22. Hugh Tinker, ed., Burma: The Struggle for Independence 19441948, vol. 1 (London:
Her Majestys Stationery Office, 1984), p. 262.
23. Quoted in Maung Maung, Aung San of Burma (The Hague: Martinus Nighoff, 1969),
p. 188.
24. Tinker, Burma, pp. 397, 395.

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the addition of several clauses dealing with revenue sharing as well as the
formation of a Supreme Executive Council of the United Hill Peoples.
Aung San and Tin Tut, representing the AFPFL, arrived on February 8
andgiven the mixed signals they had been receivingwere agreeably
surprised at the desire expressed by the three delegations to proceed with
some type of union with Burma.25 The next few days consisted of speeches,
meetings, and negotiations among the various groups. It was reputedly at
Panglong that Aung San made his famous promise to the hill tribes: If
Burma gets one kyat [of currency] then you will get one kyat. This promise has been subsequently cited by many ethnic minority organizations in
criticizing economic inequality and discrimination on the part of the Burmese government.26
Finally, the Panglong Agreement was signed by all of the delegates in
attendance on February 12.27 The British had insisted that the inhabitants
of the Frontier Areas state their willingness to join a union of Burma, and
Panglong had effectively satisfied that requirement. Having theoretically
addressed the issue of the Frontier Areas, the AFPFL continued to organize throughout Burma for the upcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly. Tragically, Aung San was assassinated on July 19, throwing the
country and the fledgling government into confusion. Rebellions by various
communist factions in the months prior to independence overshadowed
efforts to continue to address complaints from ethnic groups, particularly
the Karen, leading to several ethnic revolts in the months following independence on January 4, 1948. Whatever spirit of unity might have existed
at Panglong was already in tatters at independence and would be completely extinguished by the time of the second military coup in 1962.
The Role of Aung San
Before turning to a closer examination of the participation of different
ethnic groups at Panglong, it is useful to study the role of Aung San in the
conference, as well as his views on ethnicity in Burma. The standard myth
of Panglong positions Aung San as possibly the only Burman figure to
enjoy the trust of the ethnic minorities, and thus, the only man who could
conceivably unite all of Burma. It is true that the young leader of the
AFPFL went to great lengths to take his partys message of Burmese unity
25. John Leyden, quoted in Tinker, Burma, vol. 2, p. 294.
26. See, for example, Ethnic Nationalities Council (Union of Burma), Unity in Diversity
(60th Anniversary of the Panglong Agreement), 2007, <http://www.encburma.org/enc/enc_
statements.htm#The_Panglong_Agreement>, accessed March 14, 2007.
27. The full text of the agreement is cited in many sources, including Tinker, Burma, pp.
40405.

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to the people of the Frontier Areas, traveling to Chin and Kachin territory
and to the Shan states in November and December 1946.28 In speeches
Aung San repeatedly stressed the need for all of the nationalities of Burma
to work together in achieving independence. In his negotiations with the
British, he demanded the same rights for the people of the Frontier Areas
as for those who lived in Ministerial Burma.29 The good standing he reportedly enjoyed among many ethnic minority communities is apparent in
the following comment by Saw San Po Thin, a Karen who initially fought
against Aung San, then joined forces with him during the campaign against
the Japanese: He had a magnetic personality, and one could not help following him.30
But Aung Sans legacy regarding ethnicity in Burma appears to be more
mixed than his defenders choose to acknowledge. He insisted on abiding
by Stalins famously exclusive definition of the nation, even going so far as
to suggest that only the Shan were numerous enough to warrant the label
of nationality.31 During his campaigns to garner support for the AFPFL,
he also spent a good deal of time debating with leaders of ethnic minority
groups over their future status in the union. In a letter to Karen leaders on
March 3, 1947less than a month after Panglonghe refused to consider
ethnic quotas to address Karen concerns about representation. He also
gave no guarantee on a future Karen state.32
After the expulsion of the Japanese, Aung San was justifiably concerned
with the treatment that his (mostly Burman) soldiers would receive in a
newly reconstituted Burmese Army that had mostly Karen in the top leadership positions. He and other military leaders suggested that the new
army maintain ethnically separate units, creatively using the British notion
of class battalions in an effort to protect his Burman troops from discrimination that was expected at the hands of British and Karen officers.33
This strategy underscored the lack of trust between Burman and Karen
troops, and created ethnic divides within the Burmese armed forces that
would explode into violence in the months following independence.
28. Union of Burma, The 1947 Constitution and the Nationalities: Vol. 1 (Rangoon: Innwa
Publishing House, 1999), p. 145.
29. Tinker, Burma.
30. Quoted in Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win (Bombay: Asia Publishing
House, 1962), p. 149.
31. Josef Silverstein, ed., The Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1993), especially pp. 9697. Stalins frequently cited essay restricts a nation
to a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture. The full text can be found in Joseph
Stalin, The Nation, in Nationalism, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 1821.
32. Tinker, Burma, p. 446.
33. Callahan, Making Enemies, p. 95.

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The Ethnic Minorities Experiences

of Panglong
Having given a brief overview of the situation leading up to Panglong and
the proceedings of the conference itself, I will now address the individual
experiences of each minority group at Panglong, as well as those groups
that were not involved. This will help to situate Panglong within the collective histories and identities of these various groups, facilitating an understanding of how Panglong continues to function as a national myth, while
also identifying some of its limitations in this respect. At the same time, it
is vital to stress that these histories remain incomplete. Not only have the
perspectives of many ethnic minority groups been ignored in constructing
and maintaining the official history of Panglong but the diversity within
each of those oppositional perspectives has also been disregarded in the
struggle to maintain a unified stance against government hegemony. Part
of my argument is that it is necessary to recover these alternate histories in
order to recognize the exclusionary nature of modern Burmas founding
myth. Thus, it is important for scholars of contemporary Burmese history
and politics to continue to uncover more perspectives on a formative historical event like the Panglong Conference.
The Participants at Panglong: Shan, Kachin,
and Chin
Shan. Only the Shan, Kachin, and Chin were officially represented at the
Panglong Conference. Although the official history of Panglong portrays
their participation as motivated by patriotism and a desire for independence, their actual positions were much more complex and varied. Far
from representing the unified voice of the ethnic minorities, the delegates
at Panglong themselves only spoke for a certain portion of their ethnic
kin. For example, the Shan saophas (traditional hereditary leaders) were
the official representatives of the Shan people at Panglong. However, their
leadership in the Shan states was being increasingly challenged by various
organizations agitating for democratic reforms. One of these, the Shan State
Freedom League (SSFL), was even an ally of the AFPFL but was bypassed
at Panglong in favor of the saophas for reasons of political expediency. In
the months leading up to Panglong, the Shan leadership continued to send
mixed signals, probably a result of the considerable internal political
change occurring in the Shan states.34
Kachin. As they had with the Shan, the AFPFL initially turned to a
younger generation of Kachin, establishing an alliance with the Kachin
34. Union of Burma, The 1947 Constitution and the Nationalities, pp. 120 44.

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Youth League (KYL). For the Panglong Conference, however, the AFPFL
returned to working with the duwas (traditional leaders) because they could
provide the legitimacy the AFPFL needed. Robert Taylor also suggests
that at a time when the AFPFL was concerned with working quickly to secure at least the appearance of unity in the struggle for independence, relying on the traditional power of the duwas was easier than muddling
through the democratic processes demanded by the KYL and the SSFL.35
Chin. Many commentators have attributed the hesitation and indecision
of the Chin delegation at Panglong to their inability to understand the political concepts being discussed. While some of this uncertainty can be attributed to confusion over the still rather foreign concept of federalism, it
seems that the Chin delegation was also hindered by translation difficulties. The Chin leaders were expecting H. N. C. Stevenson to be in attendance
at Panglong, because he was apparently fluent in their dialect. However,
he resigned one week before the conference and they had to rely on another interpreter who spoke a different dialect. According to Lian Sakhong,
this disadvantage led to several significant discrepancies in the subsequent
agreement.36 These translation difficulties are merely one example of the
circumstances that weakened the position of the minority delegates at
Panglong and allowed the AFPFL to proceed with creating a Burmese nation essentially on their own terms.
Despite their disillusionment at the failure of the 1947 Constitution to
fully realize the promises of Panglong, members of the three participating
ethnic groups remained mostly loyal to the Burmese government throughout the initial communist revolt and rebellions by the Karen and other
ethnic groups.37 But tensions continued to grow between the military and
ethnic minority groups: by the end of the 1950s, there was serious discussion regarding the right to secede that the minorities had been promised in
the Panglong Agreement. The later wave of ethnic rebellion began in the
Shan state in 1959 and spread to the Kachin state in 1961.38 After General
Ne Wins second coup on March 2, 1962 (ostensibly a reaction to threats
of secession), it was clear to the ethnic minority groups that the promises
of Panglong had been all but forgotten.
35. Taylor, Perceptions of Ethnicity.
36. Sakhong, In Search of Chin Identity.
37. A small contingent of Kachin Rifles did defect from the Burmese Army in early 1949
to join the Karen uprising, but it met with only limited support from the general population
and did not trigger a more widespread rebellion among the Kachin at that time.
38. The Chin rebellion did not become organized as such until the mid-1960s, but many
ethnic Chin participated in the insurgencies of various groups in the neighboring state of
Arakan, as well as with the communists.

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The Karen and Panglong

The experience of the Karen at meetings leading up to Panglong and at
the conference itself provides an excellent example of the seemingly intractable nature of ethnic divisions in contemporary Burma. A combination
of false British promises, sustained Burman hostility toward the Karen,
and the refusal of the Karen leadership to compromise when faced with
the loss of British support led to the Karen rebellion that broke out immediately following independence and has continued to this day.
As early as September 1945, there had been renewed calls for an independent state from the Karen leadership; they had reason to believe that
their British patrons would support them.39 British officers in Burma had,
in many cases, developed close relationships with their Karen protgs and
were quick to assure the Karen that their loyalty and service would be recognized by the British government. Unfortunately, the men in charge of
Burma policy in London were more concerned with reaching a quick settlement, and after the Japanese were defeated, the AFPFL rapidly became
the dominant group in negotiations with the British.
The Karen leadership sent a goodwill mission to England in 1946, hoping to make the case for an independent Karen state. British officials, on
the other hand, either accidentally or intentionally misconstrued the purpose of this visit, believing that the question of a separate Karen state had
already been decided in the negative. It seems that by this time the British
had chosen to stand by the AFPFL, requiring only the token declaration
of minority support that the Panglong Agreement would provide.
As representatives of other ethnic minorities were preparing for negotiations with the AFPFL at Panglong, the Karen leaders were also meeting,
and on February 5, 1947, the Karen National Union (KNU) was formed.
The Karen were, admittedly, in a very difficult negotiating position, primarily because of geographic contingencies. The various ethnic groups
claimed under the Karen label were split between Ministerial Burma and
the Frontier Areas, and both the British and the AFPFL insisted that they
were unable to consider Burma as a whole until these two regions had
been officially united. Of course, this disadvantaged the Karen, whose
population would surely be misrepresented if they were forced to be recognized separately as parts of both territories.
The Karen role at Panglong also remains somewhat confusing. Although several Karen delegates attended, their position was apparently
only as observers. According to one explanation from some Karen leaders,
39. Books like Donald Smeaton, The Loyal Karen of Burma (London: K. Paul, Trench,
and Co., 1887), added to Karen beliefs that they enjoyed a privileged position within the British
colonial state and would be rewarded for their service.

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the four delegates, after arriving and realizing that certain saophas had
signed the agreement, decided not to take an active part in the negotiations.40 Karen refusal to participate in Panglong put them at a disadvantage in negotiating with the AFPFL, which by this time dominated the
political stage in Burma. The subsequent KNU boycott of the Constituent Assembly elections meant that there was no Karen representation independent of the AFPFL in the government. Even though all avenues to a
political settlement seemed to be closed, Karen troops in the army remained loyal through independence and even played a vital role in repulsing a communist attack on Rangoon at the end of 1948. But atrocities
committed by Burman army units and irregular militia units that December pushed the Karen into open rebellion. The KNU revolted in January
1949, and Karen militias occupied several critical cities before being slowly
driven back as the Burmese military regained ground.
Absent from Panglong: The Mon, Arakanese,
Wa, and Naga
Mon. The Mon are a people who have been territorially and (to some
degree) culturally intertwined with the Burmans in central Burma for hundreds of years.41 Since the conference at Panglong was specifically called
to ascertain the wishes of the people of the Frontier Areas, the Mon were
excluded because they lived primarily in what was then Ministerial Burma.
In the months prior to independence, many Mon were beginning to build
alliances with the Karen, both groups having been either excluded from
or disadvantaged with regard to Panglong as a result of geographical
conditions. In 1947, Prime Minister U Nu rejected Mon demands for selfgovernment and the Mon Freedom League (MFL) was born, an organization that would join the Karen in armed insurrection soon after
independence.42
Arakanese. Like the Mon, the Arakanese (inhabitants of the Arakan
Hills region on Burmas western border) were considered part of Ministerial Burma and were thus not invited to Panglong. Their leaders, although
initially allied with the AFPFL, harbored strong doubts about the ability
of the Burmans in that organization to represent their interests; splits
40. Tinker, Burma, p. 438.
41. This analysis certainly does not exhaust the list of ethnic groups that have grievances
as a result of exclusion from Panglong. Although the present article is limited by both space
and sources, a more complete study would include the perspectives of the Lahu, Palaung, Pao,
and other smaller groups that are often subsumed under more dominant ethnicities.
42. Ashley South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

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quickly developed in the leadership. Divisions within Arakanese communities often occurred along religious lines; the Buddhists were sometimes
allied with the AFPFL, while the Muslim Rohingya have repeatedly been
excluded from membership in the Burmese nation-state.43 As a result, Arakanese concerns were almost completely unaddressed, and instability and
rebellion plagued the region even before independence was achieved.
Other Groups. The Wa, Naga, and various other smaller ethnic groups,
although resident in the Frontier Areas, were denied the right to participate at Panglong. The report of the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry
(FACE)a followup to Panglong that conducted interviews in March and
April 1947 to determine the best method for associating the Frontier Areas
with Ministerial Burmademonstrates the disdain that residents of the
more central regions (and even sometimes, the dominant ethnic groups of
the Frontier Areas) had for these groups living on the periphery. In explaining why they saw no need for representation from these groups, the
report cited the primitive nature of their civilization and the impossibility of their finding persons who will be able to assist in the drawing up of
Burmas future constitution.44
The Karenni and Panglong
The FACE report affirmed the historical independence of the Karenni
people, citing their 1875 treaty between the British and Burmese governments. And although the Karenni state had been officially incorporated
into Burma during the Japanese occupation, Japanese control never effectively extended into the region. Even though it is clear from the FACE report that the Karenni requested representation in the future Constituent
Assembly without committing to a federation with Burma, the Karenni
state was incorporated into the Union of Burma on August 9, 1948. Significant dissatisfaction with this affront to their sovereignty resulted in
many Karenni joining the Karen revolt in January 1949.45

Three Myths of Panglong

Having provided an overview of Panglong, I will now examine three different versions of the myth held by various groups regarding this event.
Both the differences and the similarities in the three myths are important in
determining the significance of Panglong in ethnic group identity formation
43. Human Rights Watch, Burma: The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a Cycle of Exodus?
(New York: Human Rights Watch/Asia, 1996).
44. Quoted in Tinker, Burma, p. 487.
45. Jean-Marc Rastorfer, The Development of Kayah National Identity, in Tradition
and Modernity in Myanmar, Uta Gardner and Jens Lorenz, eds. (Hamburg: Munster, 1994).

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and opposition, as well as its potential as a vehicle for promoting national

unity. I wish to stress that these three versions of the myth are broadly attributed, and there are of course many variations within each category.
However, these distinctions are analytically and comparatively useful because they map onto what are commonly seen as the three primary actors
within contemporary Burmese politics: the government/military, the democratic opposition, and the ethnic minorities.
Panglong Myth #1: The Government
For the purposes of this essay, I am attributing the dominant myth of
Panglong (briefly described at the beginning of the article) to the (predominantly Burman) government of the Burmese state, which has been
the strongest force in institutionalizing the myth. This myth highlights the
unity of the ethnic groups of Burma in the struggle against the Japanese,
as well as the harmonious spirit in which the groups representatives gathered at Panglong to sign the historic agreement. Prominent in the government myth is the adversarial role of first the Japanese, then the British, in
attempting to thwart the unification of all the peoples of Burma. It was
only through the peerless leadership of Aung San and the wise decisions
of the leaders of the ethnic minorities that Burma was able to free itself of
its colonial shackles. The government (ably assisted by the military) has
struggled in the years since the agreement to protect the unity of the nation. It has had to defend the integrity of Burma against both foreign attacks on national sovereignty and against internal elements attempting to
dismantle the union through separatist politics. Yet, all of its actions have
been in the spirit of Burmese unity, the spirit of Panglong.
Of course, this myth conveniently ignores the fact that only three of the
main ethnic minority groups were in attendance at Panglong and that
there was still significant dissension within those groups. The AFPFLin
an effort to fulfill its promises of achieving complete independence as
quickly as possiblewas willing to forego some of its more democratically inclined allies and work instead with the significantly less democratic
traditional leaders. There was virtually no attention given to the status of
minority groups within Ministerial Burma, and the ethnic minorities utilitarian (particularly economic) reasons for signing the agreement have
been glossed over in favor of the preferred nationalistic language of unity
and independence.
Panglong Myth #2: The Democratic Opposition
The second myth of Panglong, which I will be broadly attributing to the
democratic opposition (dominated by the National League for Democracy
or NLD) is similar in many ways to the first. It also reifies Aung Sans role

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in the conference and stresses the unity of the groups involved. In fact, the
only significant difference between these two versions of the myth is the
contrasting perspective regarding what happened subsequent to the Panglong Conference. The first myth highlights the role of the government in
protecting the unity enshrined at Panglong. The second myth names the
government (and the military that controls it) as the institution that has
betrayed the spirit of Panglong, beginning with the rewriting of the Constitution in 1947 in a way that limited the sovereignty of ethnic minorities
and threw the country into civil war.
In this version of the myth, the spirit of Panglong is something that
needs to be recaptured, and this can only be done by recognizing the rights
of the minority peoples that were agreed to on February 12, 1947. Frequently, these sentiments are captured by the call for another Panglong, a
contemporary conference that would look back to the time in Burmas
history when all of the people were united and shared similar goals in
working toward first, independence, and then, prosperity.46 Not surprisingly, this would require recognition of the results of the 1990 election,
which would place political power in the hands of the NLD and its allies.
This account of Panglongwhile adhering more closely to historical
reality than the firstis still problematic. While its criticism of government and military policies is important, it too ignores the historical tensions both between the minority groups and the AFPFL and also among
the minority groups themselves. Although she has repeatedly denounced
the oppression of minority groups, Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the
NLD and guiding light of the democracy movement, disregards the exclusion and deception that characterized Panglong as well as the complexity
of Burmas recent ethnic history with statements such as, We won our independence through the unity of the various nationalities.47 The NLD
myth assumes that as long as government policies can be changed, a spirit
of Burmese unity will be attained. Indeed, the myth often insists that unity
will be attained in this way. One cannot help but be suspicious of statements such as, All the nationalities of the Union are members of the
same family. . . . They should live together in peace and harmony having
permanent unity.48
Panglong Myth #3: The Ethnic Minorities
The third version of the myth of Panglong will be broadly attributed to
the ethnic minorities. This account is significantly more skeptical of the
46. NLD Policy Statement, NLD Policy on the Nationalities of Burma, 1996, <http://
www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199610/msg00282.html>, accessed July 3, 2006.
47. Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1995), p. 223.
48. NLD Policy Statement, NLD Policy on the Nationalities of Burma, n. p.

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actual events of Panglong, recognizing not only the ways in which its promises were betrayed by the government but also the limited nature of those
promises to begin with. From ethnic minority accounts of Panglong, we
begin to get a picture of the primarily economic motives that prompted
the three signatory groups to join the union. The cynical, often hostile
quotes from minority leaders regarding Burmese unity present an unapologetically honest view of the challenges of ethnic unity in a country deeply
scarred by its colonial years. In fact, it is in this side of the myth that we
see the truth in one British operatives comment that minority resistance
during the independence struggle against the Japanese was based as
much on hostility to the Burmese of the plains as on loyalty to the British
regime.49
At the same time, this version of the myth falls short in refusing to acknowledge the inconsistencies in the positions taken by various ethnic minority and insurgency groups. In a 2003 article, Christina Fink reminded
observers that there is no unity of opinion on political strategy within
minority communities and even within groups representing minority interests, unity has been created through coercive mechanisms: by marginalizing or removing dissenters.50 Jessica Harriden explores these coercive
mechanisms in a 2002 article on the politicization of Karen identity. According to Harriden, Karen identity as espoused by KNU leaders is singular and exclusive, with an emphasis on pan-Karen solidarity in opposition
to other ethnocultural, politico-ideological, and religious movements.51
Because this version of Karen identity is only representative of a minority
of Karen people, it ignores the diversity within its own community, thus
weakening the movement overall. Harridens analysis can be applied to
other organizations representing ethnic minorities that are often guilty of
generalizations of unity and homogeneity that strongly resemble those
made by the Burmese government.52 It is absolutely necessary that, when
evaluating the myth of Panglong, ethnic minority groups recognize the

49. Charles Cruickshank, quoted in Andrew Selth, The Anti-Fascist Resistance in Burma,
19421945: The Racial Dimension, Occasional Paper 14, Center for Southeast Asian Studies
(Townsville, Qld.: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1983), p. 16.
50. Fink, Ethnic Politics at the Periphery, 2003, <http://www.burmadebate.org/burma
View.php?article_id=26&page_no=2>, accessed July 9, 2006.
51. Jessica Harriden, Making a Name for Themselves: Karen Identity and the Politicization of Ethnicity in Burma, Journal of Burma Studies 7 (2002), p. 86.
52. Other analyses of factionalism within ethnic insurgency groups are Ashley South,
Karen Nationalist Communities: The Problem of Diversity, Contemporary Southeast Asia
29:1 (April 2007); and Desmond Ball and Hazel Lang, Factionalism and the Ethnic Insurgent Organizations, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Working Paper, no. 356 (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2001).

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presence of similarly dominating and exclusionary myths within their own

histories.

Rethinking the Myth of Panglong

Despite the betrayal by the military government of mostif not allof
the key components of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, the calls for a return
to the spirit of Panglong still occur; they are becoming more prevalent
in writings about the prospects for federalism in Burma.53 This implies
that, even as various official histories continue to delude with regard to
participation and motivation at the conference, the vision of ethnic and
national unity that Panglong represents (or at least suggests) remains compelling. Similarly, contemporary ethnic identity in Burma has been fundamentally shaped by the legacies of Panglong.
The initial circumstances of participation in or exclusion from the agreement played a prominent role in determining how different ethnic minority
groups chose to demonstrate their opposition to the Burmese government.
The three participants in the conference were all among the last to rebel,
staying loyal to the government and even fighting other ethnic insurgencies as members of the armed forces. The Shan and Kachin rebellions did
not begin in earnest until it became clear that the military government
under Ne Win had no intention of honoring the promises made at Panglong. All those groups that were not party to Panglong rose up almost immediately following independence, and despite a series of ceasefires signed
throughout the 1990s, some are still engaged in active conflict with the
central government. Yet, even as this essay and several others have documented the limitations of claims to Burmese unity via Panglong, the conference, the agreement, and the myths retain a strong pull on the consciousness
of Burmese of every ethnicity.
In the years following the conference, ethnic minority groups (the Karen
in particular) did not hesitate to express their skepticism at the shortcomings of the Panglong gathering. Yet, as demands for secession fade and the
reality of the Burmese nation-state becomes more entrenched, even ethnic
minority voices are calling for a return to the spirit of Panglong. Martin
Smith notes the shift among many ethnic minority groups to a focus on inclusion in politics rather than opposition.54 When some of the primary
53. See, for example, The New Panglong Initiative, 2001, <http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/
RationalePanglongInitiative%5B1%5D.htm>, accessed July 16, 2006; and Khin Maung Win,
Federalism and Burma, Legal Issues on Burma Journal (Bangkok), no. 9 (August 2001).
54. Martin Smith, Ethnic Conflict: The Challenge of Civil Society in Burma, in Strengthening Civil Society in Burma, Burma Center Netherlands and Transnational Institute, ed.
(Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), p. 39.

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opposition groups (including the Democratic Alliance of Burma and the

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma [NCGUB])
dropped their demands for independence, appeals to Panglong began appearing in their work.55
Allusions to Panglong can also be seen as attempts to refer to what is
likely the only event in Burmese history that retains some degree of legitimacy with regard to ethnic unity. The myths of the conference, the agreement, and the vague spirit of this event are fundamental elements of the
identities of all ethnic groups in Burma, whether as participants or as opposition. Any discussion of national unity must acknowledge the effects
that Panglong has had, and continues to have, on ethnic politics in Burma.

Constructing a New History of Panglong

What are the necessary steps in reassessing Panglong and its consequences?
In the following section, I offer five suggestions for historians and students
of Burma interested in uncovering more of the complicated history of this
formative event.
First and foremost, more of an effort needs to be made to gather individual and collective remembrances of Panglong and of the meetings that
occurred between and within ethnic groups both before and after the conference. Burmese history generally addresses pre-independence ethnic issues
through the lens of Panglong, and while it was likely the most definitive
event, similar discussions and negotiations were occurring within ethnic
groups at the time. It is among those groups that were not invited to Panglong (either because of their geographical location within Ministerial
Burma or because the participants considered their input to be inconsequential) that the most historical research needs to be conducted.
Second, a reappraisal of Panglong must also recognize the limited nature of the promises that were part of the agreement. Although Aung San
made significant concessions to the minority leaders such as granting full
autonomy in internal affairs, the negotiations did not take place with all
parties on an equal footing. The motivations for participation varied
among the ethnic minority signatories, yet economic concerns were of primary importance. Recognition of this fact is necessary in breaking though
false claims of ethnic unity that are attributed to Panglong.
Third, the complicated and often contradictory roles of the participants
in the conference need to be critically examined. I recognize that in the
55. See, for example, NCGUB Statement, Statement on Occasion of 51st Anniversary of
Union Day, 1998, <http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199802/msg00239.html>,
accessed July 17, 2006.

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case of Aung San this is a particularly difficult task because of the nearmythical status he has assumed as the father of modern Burma. In this
article, I have given a very brief account of his complex views and actions
with regard to ethnicity and the Burmese nation, but this topic must be
addressed in far more detail. The positions of the ethnic minority leaders
at Panglong must also be reviewed, as well as the dynamics that led the
AFPFL to work mainly with traditional leaders at Panglong, disregarding
their more democratically inclined allies.
Fourth, scholars must engage in a critical study of the formation of hegemonic identities among ethnic minority groups. Works by Jessica Harriden, Christina Fink, and Ashley South are notable in this regard, but for
the most part this difficult and complex aspect of the history of ethnic
conflict in Burma remains untouched. Granted, the illusion of unity and
solidarity is often vital when a group is engaged in a struggle for survival
against a more powerful enemy (as most ethnic minority opposition groups
have been against the Burmese government for 4050 years), but the reappraisal of founding myths must occur at every level of this conflict. Recognizing exclusion can be a painful process, but it is necessary in order to
redress the wrongs of the past and create a more inclusive community for
the future.
Finally, all the people within the borders of the Burmese state (and the
many who have been exiled both voluntarily and involuntarily) must engage
with difficult questions: What does it mean to speak of the Burmese nation? Who is included or excluded from this entity? These questions must
be answered so that the ethnic and religious exclusion that marred Panglong is not repeated. Ethnic conflict exists in every society and its visible
presence often depends less on the existence of true ethnic harmony and
more on the ability of a dominant central power to impose a hegemonic
identity. Although the space for critical discussion remains severely limited within Burma itself, it will be necessary for the Burmese people to collectively discover a meaningful foundation for a national community, a
task that seems monumental in a country whose very name remains contested to this day.56

Conclusion
Both history and the collective memory on which history is founded are
constructed concepts. National myths are not unchanging entities; even
56. Although the government officially changed the name to Myanmar in June 1989,
most people outside of the country continue to use the name Burma either in solidarity with
the democratic opposition, as a form of protest against the illegitimacy of the present government, or simply as a matter of convenience and continuity.

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dominant, hegemonic narratives of a nation are contested and reshaped,

sometimes subtly, sometimes drastically. Can we engage in a collective reappraisal of Panglong, constructing an alternative history which emphasizes
the dynamic, multiple, and contested nature of historical identities?57
Burma (and indeed, any multi-ethnic nation) faces the dilemma of attempting to build national unity on a myth that is perceived in drastically
different (often exclusionary) ways by the different groups it seeks to incorporate. In this essay, I have attempted to present a history of Panglong
that goes beyond the official account and to identify the different ways the
conference and its effects are mythologized by the various conflicting
groups in Burma. As a national myth, Panglong is crucial to deciphering
the persistent ethnic conflict that has plagued Burma since independence,
but it is also necessary to reinterpret this common history in a way that
recognizes ethnic diversity and even ethnic conflict, particularly if the
spirit of Panglong is to have any resonance in fostering national unity.
Is it possible to acknowledge a nationalist founding mythology that is
basic enough to be effective in inspiring loyalty to the nation while simultaneously being flexible enough to allow individuals and groups the freedom to respond to, contest, and reshape those myths when necessary? The
Panglong Conference is the event that came closest to embodying ethnic
unity in Burma, and it remains a compelling image of the possibility of
ethnic unity. But calls for a return to the spirit of Panglong will remain
ineffective unless the event and its consequences are understood. The reassessment of modern Burmas founding myth will be a necessary step in the
struggle for national unity.

57. Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, p. 16.

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