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Abstract
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange is the only market open on Sundays and trades
ETNs on local and US indices. We use this feature to estimate the causal
relation between the inventory cost and the bid-ask spread. We compare
spreads on the most liquid indices on Sundays and other days using dierencesin-dierences approach to estimate the inventory component of the spread
without making structural assumptions. We show that on Sundays the bid
ask spread in the US ETNs more than doubles relative to the rest of the
week, indicating that inventory cost is an economically signicant transaction cost. The same eect is found during the weekday morning hours when
the Israeli market is open, but the European markets are still closed - the
inventory component can reach as high as 80% of the spread during some
time intervals. No such eects are observed in the Israeli indices.
JEL classication: G10, G12, G15.
Key words: Inventory, Liquidity, Limit order book, ETF.
Introduction
We use a unique feature of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) to estimate the causal relation between the cost of inventory and the bid-ask
spread. TASE is the only market in the world that is open on Sundays,
and which trades Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs) on domestic and foreign
indices throughout the week.1 The ETN market is organized as an electronic limit order book, where the issuers of ETNs implicitly act as market
makers providing additional liquidity. All ETN liquidity providers, including issuers, can hedge their exposure to ETNs on Israeli indices throughout
the week, however, they cannot hedge their exposure to ETNs on foreign
indices on Sunday and holidays.2 This implies that the cost of carrying inventory of foreign ETNs on Sundays is much higher than during the rest of
the week, while there is no corresponding dierence for the domestic ETNs.
We use this natural experiment to estimate the eect of inventory costs on
the spread in ETN markets. We nd that on Sundays and holidays the
bid ask spread in foreign ETNs more than doubles relative to the rest of
the week, indicating that inventory holding cost imposes a large transaction
cost. The same eect is found during the weekday morning hours, when the
Israeli market is open but the European markets are still closed. No eects
are found in the Israeli ETNs.
Our methodological approach is completely dierent from those used in
previous studies of the eect of inventory costs on the spread, which fall into
two broad categories: studies that estimate spread components, and those
1
Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs) are similar to Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), except
that they are structured as bonds, and the issuer is obligated to follow the index rather
than to make the best eort. The dierence is due to the Israeli regulatory environment
and as far as we can tell has no bearing on the issue we study.
2
Hereafter we will use the terms US / foreign ETNs and Israeli / domestic ETNs to
shorten for ETNs on US indices and ETNs on Israeli Indices.
that relate spreads to the actual inventory of the dealer. Empirical papers in
the rst category (e.g. Glosten and Harris 1988, Hasbrouck 1988, Stoll 1989,
George, Kaul and Nimalendran 1991, Huang and Stoll 1997, Madhavan,
Richardson and Roomans 1997, Bollen, Smith and Whaley 2004) impose
strong assumptions on the order arrival and the fundamental price processes
to separate the variation in the bid-ask spread associated with inventory
control considerations from that associated with adverse selection and from
the order processing costs (see Hasbrouck 2002). The common approach is
to model the price process as the sum of transitory and permanent changes:
transitory price changes are attributed to inventory control, while permanent
ones are attributed to information.3 Most studies nd that inventory costs
constitute a small proportion of the spread.
The second category includes papers that use data of market makers on
various exchanges (e.g. Hasbrouck and Soanos 1993, Madhavan and Smidt
1993, Hansh, Naik, and Vishwanathan 1998, and Reiss and Werner 1998),
and show that dealers hold large inventories, which deviate from their target
levels over long periods of time. The inventory positions are endogenous, and
so is the spread, which requires instruments to determine causality. Some try
to address this problem (e.g. Reiss and Werner 1998), but the identication
relies on similarly strong structural assumptions about the price and order
arrival processes.
Our approach does not impose any structural assumptions, and does
not make use of the dealersendogenous inventory levels. Instead, we focus
3
Huang and Stoll (1997) is an interesting example of the eect of the structural assumption on the estimated eects. Their two-way decomposition of the spread implies
that inventory and adverse selection together account for 11% of the spread. Yet, the
result is dierent in a three-way decomposition, which that requires additional structural
assumptions needed to separate the adverse selection component from the inventory component. Now, the inventory component is estimated as 29% of the spread and the adverse
selection is 10%.
In this section we describe the specic features of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) that allow us to estimate the eect of the inventory cost
4
Our study is tangentially related to the literature on the relation between derivatives
and spot markets. Facilitating e cient risk sharing is the main argument supporting new
derivatives markets, yet, the benets of an increased speculative activity associated with
them are controversial (for example, see the theoretical discussion in Stein, 1987, and the
empirical analyses in Bessembinder and Seguin, 1992). In our data, we cannot determine
which traders provide liquidity. They could be better diversied (Stoll, 1978), informed
(Bloomeld et al., 2005), speculators (Grossman and Miller, 1988) or patient traders
(Foucault et al., 2005). Even though we can not test how any one of the trader types
aects liquidity, we are able to show that when liquidity providers can hedge against
inventory risks the costs of liquidity provision decreases, depth increases, spreads are
narrow and the traded volume is high.
2.1
TASE equity market operates quite similarly to Paris Euronext and Milan
Exchange. Trading starts with a call auction, followed by a continuous phase
and culminates with a closing phase. The day starts with an empty order
book at 8:30 AM, when traders start submitting limit and market orders.
At a random time between 9:45AM and 9:50AM all the submitted orders
are crossed, using an auction mechanism with time and price priority rules,
and the continuous trading phase begins. The continuous phase is a limit
order book, with designated market makers in some securities. All traders
observe the best three prices and quantities on each side. Traders may post
either market or limit orders, and those are executed according to price and
time priority rules. The closing phase begins at 4:55 PM; during our sample
period it was a simple crossing of tradersmarket orders that were executed
at the closing price. All unexecuted orders are cancelled at the end of the
trading day and the next day starts, again, with an empty book. Equities,
bonds, index options, futures contracts and ETNs are all traded on the same
TASE platform, with some minor dierences in hours, minimum order size
and tick size.
Since their inception, ETNs gained popularity in Israel as an inexpensive
tool for retail and institutional investors to get exposure to local and foreign
indices. We focus on three institutions that dominate the market with a
large number of oerings of ETNs on Israeli and US indices.5 The issuers
serve as informal market makers and supply liquidity for their ETNs along
5
We chose ETNs on the major US indices, since they are much more liquid in Israel
than ETNs on other foreign indices.
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) show that the availability of options reduces inventory costs on NASDAQ, since dealers may use them to hedg their inventory position.
Note that in Stoll(1978) and OHara and Oldeld (1986) price volatility aects the
spread because it increases the probability of loss due to an adverse price change after the
trade in which inventory was acquired (inventory eect). In Copeland and Galai (1983)
price volatility aects the spread because it increases the probability of loss due to an
adverse price change before the trade (free option / picking o eect).
of inventory.
H4: The inventory component of the spread for US ETNs on Sundays
(described in Hypothesis H1) increases in the volatility of the price process.
When price volatility is low (in 2006) we expect the inventory component to
be small; when price volatility is high (in the second period of 2008, after
Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy) we expect the inventory component to
be large.
2.2
We have chosen a sample period of one year: January 1 to December 31, 2006.
During this period there were no drastic events aecting the TASE market,
and there were no signicant regulatory changes. Our methodology relies on
dierences between days of the week thus, which requires a relatively long
sample period. We chose 14 most liquid ETNs and obtain quotes, orders
and transactions data on all the above mentioned ETNs from TASE. We
restrict our sample to the three largest issuers, each of whom has ETNs on
both Israeli and US indices. In Table 1 we present summary statistics for
the sample of ETNs, and it is evident that there is a similar pattern for all
issuers: ETNs on the Israeli indices have higher daily volumes and lower
spreads.
As stated above, we are interested in comparisons of the percentage
quoted bid-ask spread across two regimes: on days/hours when the European
futures exchanges are closed (Sundays and European holidays, as well as
the morning hours of regular weekdays) versus other trading days/hours.
Unlike the US ETNs, the Israeli ETNs are not predicted to exhibit signicant
dierences under the two regimes.8 In Table 2 we present summary statistics
8
We will shorten the description of ETNs and use the terms US/foreign ETNs and
Israeli/domestic ETNs.
for Israeli and US ETNs and the two regimes. The bid ask spread for
Israeli ETNs is practically unaected by Sundays (0.11% versus 0.13%),
while the spread for US ETNs is more than doubled (0.40% versus 0.94%).
The spreads for US ETNs are higher on any day of the week, which may
result from FX exposure risk, lower liquidity and higher cost of hedging
abroad. It is clear that the Sunday eect on Israeli ETNs is trivial while the
eect on US ETNs is large.
It is evident that other variables are also aected by the type of the
ETN and by holidays. The average daily trading volume, which proxies
for liquidity, is higher for Israeli ETNs and it decreases much more for US
ETNs on Sundays. We also dene a measure of order imbalance as the net
buy-side order volume scaled by the total order volume for the day. This
measure ranges from minus one to one, and assumes the extreme values if
all the orders are either sell side (-1) or buy-side orders (+1). Since we are
interested in the imbalance for orders that demand liquidity, we consider only
market orders in this calculation.9 Order imbalance is on average negative
and, on average, it is more extreme for Israeli ETNs. For US ETNs on
Sundays, we observe the lowest average imbalance.
Lastly, we show that there is intense competition among liquidity providers
on TASE. The daily order volume is about 1,000 times higher than the
traded volume, and practically all of that volume is limit orders (supply of
liquidity). Market orders, which constitute about 35% of the order ow for
the most liquid stocks traded on TASE, constitute only 2% of the ETNs
daily order ow. This is what we expect to see in a market with high frequency computerized trading, in which traders make money as voluntary
9
We will use the term market order to describe both market and marketable limit
orders, since market orders per se are almost never used on TASE. A marketable limit
order is a dened as limit buy (sell) order priced at or above the best ask (bid).
suppliers of liquidity. Hendershott et al. (2009) show that this phenomena contributed to the decrease in spreads on the NYSE. Even though the
trading and order volumes for US ETNs Sundays are low relative to other
trading day, we still nd 94% limit order in the order ow, which suggests
an intense competition among liquidity suppliers.
Results
We start by modeling the daily average bid-ask spread. Then, we investigate a more detailed intraday version of the data, in which the dependent
variable is the average bid-ask spread measured for ve 90 minutes time
intervals during the day. We use two dierent estimation approaches: a
regression model with clustered (robust) standard errors and a mixed linear
model approach.10 The disadvantage of mixed linear models is the assumption of normality,11 but it has one major advantage. We are able to explicitly model a specic variance-covariance structure, which contributed to
our understanding of inventories and spreads beyond the control for possible
correlations and heteroskedasticity.
3.1
ij
+ xst
ij
+ "st ;
where i takes the value of one (or U SIndexs = 1) if ETN s is on one of the US
indices, and zero if the ETN is on an Israeli index. Similarly, j takes the value
of one (or Sundayt = 1) if the European markets are open on date t (Sunday or holiday), and zero otherwise. The superscript ij identies four sets of
parameters, one for each combination of the binary variables U SIndexs and
Sundayt . We estimate four intercepts (
slope coe cients (
00 ;
01 ;
10 ;
11 ),
00 ;
01 ;
10 ;
11 )
explanatory variables on the spreads, for the Israeli and US ETNs, on Sundays and on other trading days. The vector of explanatory variables is the
same for all ETNs and regimes ij, xst = [LogV olumst ; Imbalancest ; D1st ; D2st ].
We denote by LogV olumst the log of daily trading volume for ETN s on
day t. Imbalancest is the absolute value of net buy-side market order ow
scaled by the total market order volume for for ETN s on day t. We also
use dealer / issuer xed eects (D1st and D2st ) and cluster the standard
errors by ETN and date.
Estimation results are presented in Table 3. Model 1 uses only four
intercepts, which are the conditional means of the spread for various categories: weekdays versus Sundays, and Israeli versus US ETNs.13 At the
12
We have spread data for 248 days, but the orders and transactions data is missing for
the week of January 22 - January 26. Therefore, we include 248 days in all analyses of the
spread, but only 243 day in the analyses involving trading volume and order imbalances.
13
Note that the specication of an intercept for every one of the four combinations
of U SIndexs , and Sundayt is standard for Generalized Linear Models (GLM), and it is
10
bottom of the table we present the estimates of dierences and dierencesin-dierences across various categories. First, the spreads of US ETNs are
always signicantly higher than those of Israeli ETNs, which is not surprising as the former involve higher processing and hedging costs. The dierence
between the spread on Israeli ETNs on weekdays and Sundays is not statistically signicant (0.113% versus 0.127%) as there are no dierences in the
inventory costs. The spread of US ETNs is more than doubled on Sundays
relative to other trading days (0.404% versus 0.943%) and the dierence
is highly statistically signicant. The DID estimate is large (0.526%) and
highly signicant. This implies that the inventory component of the bid-ask
spread is over 55% , which is higher than what was traditionally found in
the empirical studies.
Model 2 controls for other explanatory variables: trading volume, order
imbalances and dealer eects, which implies that the intercepts are no longer
simple conditional means. Yet, the implied inventory component still range
between 51% and 59% across dealers. The coe cients on the explanatory
variables are in line with our expectations: the trading volume has a negative
and signicant eect on the spread, while the eect of order imbalances is
positive but insignicant. We test the DID contrasts for those two variables
and show that trading volume and order imbalances have stronger eects
when traders cannot hedge inventory risk: the contrast of trading volume is
negative and statistically signicant while the order imbalances contrast is
positive but insignicant.
When presented with the predictions of theoretical models of inventory
equivalent to the specication yst = + 1 U SIndexs + 2 Sundayt + 3 U SIndexs
Sundayt +"st , in which 00 = , 01 = + 1 , 10 = + 2 and 11 = + 1 + 2 + 3 . We
choose to structure the equation that way to simplify the interpretation of the parameters,
interaction terms and DID tests.
11
and
t,
ij
ij
+ xst
+ xst
ij
ij
+ "st ;
Estimation results of the restricted models are not presented in the paper. They are
available upon request.
12
13
3.2
ijk
+ xstk
ij
+ "stk :
00 ;
01 ;
10 ;
11 ),
one for each combination of the binary variables U SIndexs and Sundayt .
As for the intercepts, we now use the superscript ijk to identify 20 parameters (
001 ; :::;
005 ;
011 ; :::;
115 ),
and
t,
15
3.3
In this section we introduce one more exogenous shock to test the volatility
hypothesis. The model is similar to that described for average daily bid
ask spreads, but now we simultaneously estimate the intercepts for three
time periods: 2006, 2008 before Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy (January, 1 - September, 15) and 2008 after Lehman Brothers les for bankruptcy. Estimation results are presented in Table 6. Model 1 uses only
twelve intercepts (four for every period), which are the conditional means
of the spread for various categories: weekdays versus Sundays, and Israeli
versus US ETNs. At the bottom of the table we present the estimates of
dierences-in-dierences (DID) and dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences
(DIDID) across categories.
15
16
First, it is clear that spreads for all ETNs on all trading days are relatively low in 2006 and they increase to the highest level in the second period
of 2008. This eect may be attributed to the high levels of uncertainty and
price volatility during the nancial crisis, but we are interested in the causal
eect of volatility on the cost of inventory and therefore on the spread rather
than a general relation between price volatility and spreads. We start with
the rst three DID tests, which are similar to those we presented in Tables
3 and 4 and imply a signicant inventory cost in every one of the three time
intervals. Yet, the test of a causal volatility eect comes from a comparison
of the inventory component over time. Since price volatility increases from
a relatively low level in 2006 to a higher level in the rst period of 2008
and its highest level in the second period of 2008, we expect the inventory
component to increase as well. Comparing the three inventory components,
we get a signicant increases as a result of the rise in price volatility (0.7410.526=0.215 and 1.129-0.741=0.388), which supports our fourth hypothesis.
In this test we establish a causal relation between the price volatility and the
cost of inventory, which leads to a statistically and economically signicant
increase in the bid ask spread.
Conclusions
In this paper we use the fact that Tel Aviv Stock Exchange is open on
Sundays to estimate the causal relation between the inventory cost and the
bid-ask spread. We compare spreads on the most liquid ETNs on the major Israeli and US indices, on Sunday and other days, using dierences-indierences approach. This allows us to avoid making structural assumptions
to estimate the inventory component of the spread. We show that on Sundays and other European holidays the bid ask spread in the US ETNs more
17
than doubles relative to the rest of the week, indicating that inventory cost
is an economically signicant transaction cost. The same eect is found
during the weekday morning hours when the Israeli market is open, but the
European markets are still closed - the inventory component can reach as
high as 80% of the spread during some intraday time intervals. No such
eect is observed in the Israeli indices. Finally, we show that the eect of
the trading volume on the spread is much more pronounced in foreign indices on Sunday than on other days or on the Israeli indices. The eect of
buying/selling pressure on the spread is positive but insignicant. The eect
of price volatility on the inventory component of the spread is economically
and statistically signicant.
This study shows that inventory control consideration can have large
eects on the trading costs. Market designers and regulators should make
sure that liquidity providers can hedge their inventory risk to reduce the
costs of liquidity provision.
References
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with inventory. Journal of Financial Economics 8, 31-53.
[2] Bessembinder, H., Seguin, P., 1992. Futures Trading Activity and Stock
Price Volatility. The Journal of Finance 47, 2015-2034.
[3] Bloomeld, R., OHara, M., Saar, G., 2005. The make or takedecision
in an electronic market: evidence on the evolution of liquidity. Journal
of Financial Economics 75, 165-199.
[4] Bollen, N., Smith, T., Whaley, R., 2004. Modeling the bid/ask spread:
measuring the inventory-holding premium. Journal of Financial Economics 72, 97-141.
[5] Copeland, T., Galai, D., 1983. Information Eects on the Bid-Ask
Spread, Journal of Finance, 38, 1457-69.
[6] Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2002. Order imbalance, liquidity, and market returns. Journal of Financial Economics 65, 111-130.
18
[7] Foucault T., Kadan, O., Kandel, E. 2005. Limit order book as a market
for liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 18, 1171-1218.
[8] George, T., Kaul, G., Nimalendran, M., 1991. Estimation of the bid-ask
spread and its components: a new approach. The Review of Financial
Studies 4, 623-656.
[9] Glosten, L., Harris, L., 1988. Estimating the components of the bid-ask
spread. Journal of Financial Economics 21, 123-142.
[10] Grossman, S. J., Miller, M. H., 1988. Liquidity and market structure.
The Journal of Finance 43, 617-633.
[11] Hansch, O., Naik, N., Viswanathan, S., 1998. Do inventories matter in
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[12] Hasbrouck, J., 1988. Trades, quotes, inventories and information. Journal of Financial Economics 22, 229-252.
[13] Hasbrouck, J., 2002. Stalking the e cient pricein market microstructure specications: an overview. Journal of Financial Markets 5, 329
339.
[14] Hasbrouck, J., 2007. Empirical Market Microstructure: The Institutions, Economics, and Econometrics of Securities Trading. Oxford University Press, US.
[15] Hasbrouck, J., Soanos, G., 1993. The trades of market makers: an
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[16] Hsiao, C., 2003. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambrige University Press,
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[17] Hendershott, T., Jones, C. M., Menkveld, A. J., 2009. Does algorithmic
trading improve liquidity? Unpublished working paper.
[18] Ho, T., Stoll, H., 1983. The dynamics of dealer markets under competition. Journal of Finance 38, 1053-1074.
[19] Huang, R. D., Stoll, H. R., 1997. The components of the bid-ask spread:
a general approach. Review of Financial Studies 10, 995-1034.
[20] Kaniel, R., Liu, H., 2006. So What Orders Do Informed Traders Use?
Journal of Business 79, 1867-1913.
[21] Madhavan, A., Richardson, M., Roomans, M., 1997. Why do security
prices change? A transaction-level analysis of NYSE stocks. Review of
Financial Studies 10, 1035-1064.
19
20
Avg. Price*
Avg. Bid-Ask
Daily Trading
Issuer (Dealer)
Index
Country
Trading Days
(NIS)**
Spread
Volume (NIS)**
Excellence
TA100
Israel
248
85.3
0.10%
8,783,466
21,121,451
Excellence
TA25
Israel
248
84.4
0.08%
Excellence
SP500
US
248
58.4
0.22%
3,857,287
Excellence
NASDQ100
US
248
73.1
0.21%
5,013,806
50.9
0.52%
618,422
1,152,598
Excellence
DJ30
US
248
Excellence
Russell2000
US
248
32.7
0.50%
CLAL Finance
TA100
Israel
248
8.6
0.18%
3,075,061
8.4
0.09%
10,999,631
596,337
CLAL Finance
Number of
TA25
Israel
248
CLAL Finance
SP500
US
248
58.4
0.74%
CLAL Finance
NASDQ100
US
248
16.2
0.44%
562,095
TACHLIT
TA100
Israel
248
85.9
0.16%
3,637,179
7,967,820
TACHLIT
TA25
Israel
248
8.4
0.09%
TACHLIT
SP500
US
224
58.3
0.67%
661,398
TACHLIT
NASDQ100
US
219
36.5
0.89%
611,715
The tick size is {0.001 if price < NIS 10; 0.01 if NIS 10 price< NIS 100; 0.1 if NIS 100 price< NIS 1000; 1 if price > NIS 1,000}
21
Percentage Spread
Israel
# of Obs.
Median
Mean
STD
1,176
0.07%
0.11%
0.23%
Weekday
Sunday
312
0.07%
0.13%
0.25%
1,526
0.31%
0.40%
0.38%
405
0.68%
0.94%
0.82%
1,152
-0.102
-0.077
0.405
306
-0.074
-0.108
0.401
1,502
-0.026
-0.053
0.658
399
0.000
-0.032
0.597
US
Weekday
Sunday
Weekday
Sunday
Sunday
US
Weekday
Sunday
Weekday
Sunday
5,298
9,794
13,378
306
4,549
7,270
9,577
1,502
564
1,993
3,898
399
123
392
623
1,152
6,922,351
9,693,085
11,099,233
306
6,433,447
9,577,979
12,083,183
1,502
537,151
1,010,417
1,277,976
399
5,985
12,694
25,103
Weekday
Sunday
99.71%
99.34%
1.44%
306
99.73%
99.32%
1.64%
1,502
99.56%
98.51%
3.93%
399
94.04%
86.94%
18.45%
0.12%
0.46%
1.24%
306
0.10%
0.49%
1.45%
1,502
0.15%
0.90%
3.19%
399
4.50%
11.23%
17.68%
49.56%
53.08%
30.35%
306
46.19%
50.95%
32.31%
1,502
60.60%
65.34%
118.04%
399
96.60%
95.88%
67.62%
Weekday
Sunday
Weekday
Sunday
22
Model 2
Notation
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
00
0.113
<.01
0.361
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
01
0.127
<.01
0.406
0.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
10
0.404
<.01
0.776
0.03
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
11
0.943
<.01
2.011
<.01
Sunday = 0
V
00
-0.017
0.02
01
-0.019
0.02
10
-0.037
0.12
USindex = 0
USindex = 0
Log Volume
Sunday = 1
USindex = 1
Log Volume
Sunday = 0
USindex = 1
Log Volume
Sunday = 1
USindex = 0
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
Usindex = 1
Sunday = 0
V
11
-0.106
<.01
Imbalance
00
0.025
0.35
Imbalance
01
0.017
0.65
Imbalance
10
0.045
0.37
Imbalance
0.061
0.56
Log Volume
Sunday = 0
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
11
USindex = 0
Dealer = D1
0.017
0.54
USindex = 0
Dealer = D2
0.010
0.61
Usindex = 1
Dealer = D1
0.024
0.81
USindex = 1
Dealer = D2
0.311
<.01
Hypothesis Tests
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
0.013
0.56
0.044
0.73
0.540
<.01
1.235
0.02
0.526
<.01
1.190
0.02
-0.067
0.05
0.024
0.83
4. H0: (
11
10)
01
00)
=0
Adjusted R
0.52
0.62
Number of Observations
3,419
3,359
23
Model 2
Notation
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
00
0.113
0.07
0.112
0.26
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
01
0.127
0.05
-0.089
0.61
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
10
0.412
<.01
0.612
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
11
0.952
<.01
1.905
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
00
-0.002
0.78
01
0.012
0.25
10
-0.023
<.01
USindex = 0
Log Volume
Sunday = 1
USindex = 1
Log Volume
Sunday = 0
Log Volume
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
Log Volume
11
-0.097
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
Imbalance
00
-0.005
0.83
Imbalance
01
0.005
0.91
Imbalance
10
-0.013
0.61
Imbalance
0.018
0.85
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
11
USindex = 0
Dealer = D1
0.041
0.49
USindex = 0
Dealer = D2
0.036
0.55
Usindex = 1
Dealer = D1
0.065
0.24
USindex = 1
Dealer = D2
0.384
<.01
Hypothesis Tests
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
0.013
0.58
-0.201
0.25
0.540
<.01
1.293
<.01
0.527
<.01
1.494
<.01
4. H0: (
11
10)
01
00)
=0
Sunday = 0
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
-0.087
<.01
0.020
0.86
Notation
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
2
ETN
2
Date
0.023
<.01
0.003
0.01
0.017
<.01
0.018
<.01
2
00
2
01
2
10
2
11
0.036
<.01
0.037
<.01
0.039
<.01
0.039
<.01
0.094
<.01
0.093
<.01
0.570
<.01
0.469
<.01
Fit Statistics
-2 Log Likelihood
Number of Observations
24
1,414.8
1,290.7
3,419
3,359
Model 2
Notation
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
0.138
<.01
0.146
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
09:45 - 11:15
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
11:15 - 12:45
001
002
0.060
0.03
0.066
0.01
12:45 - 14:15
003
0.064
0.02
0.069
0.01
0.110
<.01
0.116
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
14:15 - 15:45
004
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
15:45 - 17:15
005
0.156
<.01
0.157
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
09:45 - 11:15
0.131
<.01
0.127
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
11:15 - 12:45
011
012
0.060
0.03
0.056
0.03
0.057
0.04
0.052
0.04
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
12:45 - 14:15
013
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
14:15 - 15:45
014
0.141
<.01
0.138
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
15:45 - 17:15
015
0.192
<.01
0.175
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
09:45 - 11:15
1.066
<.01
1.074
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
11:15 - 12:45
101
102
0.183
<.01
0.183
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
12:45 - 14:15
103
0.166
<.01
0.165
<.01
14:15 - 15:45
104
0.235
<.01
0.234
<.01
0.271
<.01
0.266
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
15:45 - 17:15
105
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
09:45 - 11:15
1.525
<.01
1.650
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
11:15 - 12:45
111
112
0.802
<.01
0.909
<.01
0.713
<.01
0.812
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
12:45 - 14:15
113
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
14:15 - 15:45
114
0.788
<.01
0.880
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
15:45 - 17:15
115
0.777
<.01
0.871
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
00
-0.001
0.01
01
-0.000
0.33
10
-0.002
<.01
USindex = 0
USindex = 1
USindex = 1
USindex = 0
USindex = 0
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
Sunday = 0
Sunday = 1
Sunday = 0
Sunday = 1
Sunday = 0
Log Volume
Log Volume
Log Volume
V
11
-0.018
<.01
Imbalance
00
0.008
0.02
Imbalance
01
0.005
0.12
Imbalance
10
-0.000
0.99
Imbalance
0.019
0.63
Log Volume
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
USindex = 0
Dealer = D1
0.006
0.86
USindex = 0
Dealer = D2
0.011
0.75
Usindex = 1
Dealer = D1
0.139
<.01
Dealer = D2
-0.051
0.10
USindex = 1
11
25
Model 2
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
0.466
<.01
0.594
<.01
0.619
<.01
0.736
<.01
0.553
<.01
0.664
<.01
0.522
<.01
0.623
<.01
0.4670
<.01
0.587
<.01
<.01
0.142
0.03
8. H0: (
11
10)
01
00)
0.02
=0
0.03
-0.017
<.01
0.022
0.58
Notation
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
2
ETN
2
Date
0.004
<.01
0.001
0.01
0.001
<.01
0.001
<.01
0.010
<.01
0.010
<.01
0.002
<.01
0.002
<.01
0.043
<.01
0.044
<.01
0.243
<.01
0.248
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
11:15 - 12:45
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
12:45 - 14:15
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
14:15 - 15:45
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
15:45 - 17:15
2
001
2
002
2
003
2
004
2
005
0.135
<.01
0.129
<.01
0.202
<.01
0.202
<.01
0.008
<.01
0.008
<.01
0.001
<.01
0.001
<.01
0.001
<.01
0.001
<.01
0.379
<.01
0.386
<.01
0.124
<.01
0.097
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
09:45 - 11:15
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
ARH(1)
00
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
09:45 - 11:15
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
11:15 - 12:45
011
2
012
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
12:45 - 14:15
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
14:15 - 15:45
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
15:45 - 17:15
2
013
2
014
2
015
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
ARH(1)
10
0.490
<.01
0.494
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
09:45 - 11:15
1.518
<.01
1.534
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
11:15 - 12:45
101
2
102
0.035
<.01
0.035
<.01
12:45 - 14:15
0.011
<.01
0.011
<.01
0.459
<.01
0.464
<.01
0.118
<.01
0.110
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
14:15 - 15:45
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
15:45 - 17:15
2
103
2
104
2
105
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
ARH(1)
10
0.343
<.01
0.345
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
09:45 - 11:15
2.468
<.01
2.351
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
11:15 - 12:45
111
2
112
0.662
<.01
0.606
<.01
0.435
<.01
0.392
<.01
0.952
<.01
0.909
<.01
0.692
<.01
0.631
<.01
0.722
<.01
0.694
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
12:45 - 14:15
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
14:15 - 15:45
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
15:45 - 17:15
2
113
2
114
2
115
ARH(1)
11
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
Fit Statistics
-2 Log Likelihood
2,795.0
2,618.0
Number of Observations
16,699
16,401
26
Model 2
Notation
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
2006
006
0.113
0.07
0.089
0.43
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
2006
016
0.127
0.05
-0.170
0.27
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
2006
106
0.413
<.01
0.565
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
2006
116
0.953
<.01
1.774
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
2008 BLB
00B
0.231
<.01
0.208
0.02
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
2008 BLB
01B
0.186
<.01
-0.117
0.41
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
2008 BLB
10B
0.417
<.01
0.569
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
2008 BLB
11B
1.113
<.01
1.837
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
2008 ALB
00A
0.282
0.10
0.259
0.15
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
2008 ALB
01A
0.294
0.09
-0.015
0.94
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
2008 ALB
10A
0.707
<.01
0.857
<.01
1.847
<.01
2.606
<.01
00
-0.002
0.69
01
0.016
0.06
10
-0.016
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
2008 ALB
11A
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
Log Volume
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
USindex = 1
Log Volume
Sunday = 0
Log Volume
V
V
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
Log Volume
11
-0.080
<.01
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
Imbalance
00
-0.047
0.14
Imbalance
01
-0.031
0.59
Imbalance
10
0.004
0.85
Imbalance
0.043
0.47
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
11
USindex = 0
Dealer = D1
0.154
0.00
USindex = 0
Dealer = D2
0.014
0.78
Usindex = 1
Dealer = D1
0.264
<.01
USindex = 1
Dealer = D2
-0.066
0.16
Hypothesis Tests
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
0.527
<.01
1.469
<.01
0.741
<.01
1.593
<.01
1.129
<.01
2.022
<.01
0.214
<.01
0.125
0.04
0.388
<.01
0.429
<.01
-0.082
<.01
0.023
0.80
4. H0: (
11
10)
(
I
01
00)
=0
27
2006
ETN RE
2008 ALB
2008 BLB
Date RE
2006
Date RE
2008 BLB
Date RE
2008 ALB
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
2006
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
2006
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
2006
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
2006
Notation
Estimate
P_Value
Estimate
P_Value
2
ETN,6
2
ETN,B
2
ETN,A
0.023
<.01
0.037
<.01
0.021
<.01
0.002
0.08
0.172
<.01
0.153
<.01
2
Date,6
2
Date,B
2
Date,A
0.017
<.01
0.018
<.01
0.046
<.01
0.046
<.01
0.018
<.01
0.018
<.01
2
006
2
016
2
106
2
116
0.036
<.01
0.037
<.01
0.039
<.01
0.039
<.01
0.094
<.01
0.093
<.01
0.570
<.01
0.466
<.01
0.115
<.01
0.115
<.01
0.051
<.01
0.050
<.01
0.182
<.01
0.183
<.01
0.432
<.01
0.411
<.01
2
00A
2
01A
2
10A
2
11A
0.026
<.01
0.026
<.01
0.026
<.01
0.026
<.01
0.509
<.01
0.517
<.01
0.964
<.01
0.891
<.01
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
2008 BLB
2
00B
2
01B
2
10B
2
11B
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
2008 ALB
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
2008 ALB
USindex = 0
Sunday = 0
2008 BLB
USindex = 0
Sunday = 1
2008 BLB
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
2008 BLB
USindex = 1
Sunday = 0
2008 ALB
USindex = 1
Sunday = 1
2008 ALB
Model 2
Fit Statistics
-2 Log Likelihood
Number of Observations
28
5,724.7
5,130.1
6,849
6,789