Inocencio Rosete v.

The Auditor General

Feria, J.
31 August 1948
G.R. No. L-1120
Doctrine
A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official, so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to
his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.

Summary

Facts

The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility.
Fire destroyed the house belonging to the complainant, allegedly due to the negligence of officials of a government
agency, the ECA. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Auditor General, finding that the Government could
not be held liable under Art. 1903 (now 2180) because the negligent officials did not fall under the term special agents.
On 2 November 1945, a fire broke out at the warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration (ECA), a
government agency or instrumentality. The fire spread to and destroyed the contiguous house of the claimant.
Claimant alleged that the fire broke out due to the negligence of a certain Jose Frayno in igniting recklessly his
cigarette-lighter near a five-gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of ECA, in
storing gasoline in their Manila warehouse, contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
Additional facts from the dissenting opinion of Perfecto, J.:
o The storage of gasoline and other combustible and inflammable substances required licenses
and permits under various ordinances of Manila. The Mayor of Manila certified that the ECA was
not granted any permit to store gasoline in its motor pool at Azcarraga where the fire took place.
Rosete filed a complaint with the Auditor General by virtue of Act. 327, which authorized the filing of claims
against the Government with the said Auditor.
Auditor General: Denied the claim of the complainant against the Government in the amount of P35,376, for
the damages caused to burned/destroyed buildings.
Claimant Rosete appealed this decision, saying that the ECA or its officers were negligent in storing a highly
combustible substance in its warehouse in violation of the citys ordinances.

Issues/Ratio
I.

W/N the government can be held liable for the negligence of the ECA officials (NO)
1

Claimant Rosete based his claim on Art. 1903 (now 2180 ) of the Civil Code, which states that:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. xxx xxx xxx The state is liable in the scene
when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it
properly pertained to do the act performed xxx xxx xxx
2

The Court cited the case of Meritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands :
A special agentis one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official, so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
[why the Gov. is not liable for the ECA officials] This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.
The responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility.

In this case, the ECA officers did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined
meaning of that word in Art. 1903 (now 2180) in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA. The government is
not responsible for the damages caused through such negligence. [this was probably because storing the
gasoline was inherent in their responsibilities to the warehouse; It was warehouse for storing oils and gasoline]
Holding

Decision appealed from AFFIRMED.

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
2

In this case, the plaintiff was riding on a motorcycle in Calle Padre Faura when a General Hospital ambulance struck the plaintiff causing him to be
severely injured. The Court in that case ruled that the State was only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

Separate
Opinions

Perfecto, J (Dissenting)
1) Art. 1903(5) (now 2180) distinguishes the special agent from the official with specific duty or duties to perform.
Under the meaning of the paragraph, the word official comprises all officials and employees of the government
who exercise duties of their respective public offices.
2) In qualifying the special agent with the adjective "special", the Civil Code aimed at distinguishing it from the
regular or ordinary agent of government, which refers to all officers and employees in the public service.
3) There cannot be any dispute that all persons in the active service of the government, regardless of department
or branch, are agents of the State or of the people.
4) The ECA, however, was not a branch or office of the government, such as the legislative bodies, the executive
offices, or the tribunals. It was an agency set up for specific purposes which were not attainable through the
official functions entrusted by law to the government or its branches.
5) From the foregoing, the decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim should be set aside, not only
because it is supported by law, but because it is premised on the totalitarian philosophy of the State's immunity
for whatever wrong it may perpetrate.