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The Wisdom of General George S

Patton
By Copyright 2015, J.D. Neal, All Rights Reserved
Patton on 37mm Gun M3 after the Sicilian campaign; US Anti-Tank Artillery
1941-45; Zaloga; Osprey; 2005
If a projectile can be developed for the 37mm gun with more penetrating effect, it is superior to the
57mm as an offensive anti-tank weapon ... it can be pulled by the low relief 1/4-ton truck (while) the
57mm cannot and must be towed either by a half-track or a high relief 3/4-ton truck. Second, with
limited crews available, the 57mm cannot be manhandled any distance over bad country while the
37mm can. Even with the present ammunition, the 37mm is deadly against tanks up to 400yds.
"...a projectile can be developed for the 37mm gun with more penetrating effect...
is a kicker. He could very well have said:
If a projectile can be developed for the .45 caliber pistol with more penetrating effect, it is superior to
the 37mm or 57mm as an offensive anti-tank weapon ... it can carried in hand by one man (while)
the 37mm or 57mm cannot and must be towed either by a half-track or a high relief 3/4-ton truck.
Second, with limited crews available, the 37mm or 57mm cannot be manhandled any distance over
bad country while the .45 can simply be carried where needed.
The Ordnance Department developed a HVAP round for the 37-mm in 1942 that could
penetrate 50% more than normal shot (about 90-mm/3.5" to 95-mm/3.75" to even
4"/100-mm according to whose quote is used) but tungsten was deemed too valuable
for high speed machining for the upper staffers to allow its use in munitions.
Although a single ton of tungsten (2,000 pounds)could (using common weights)
supplied 4,000 rounds and 10 tons (20,000 pounds) 40,000 rounds - out of the tens
of millions of pounds of tungsten being used each year. Pumping out 18,000+ 37s,
15,000+ 57s (5,000 for the British), 50,000 M4 tanks, 10,000 tank destroyers, and
22,000+ pathetic M3/M5 light tanks, meant far more than supplying reasonable
weapons for the men doing the fighting and dieing.

Patton on AT Guns Europe; Tank Killers; Hogg; Pan Books; 1997


"Towed antitank guns should be well to the front and located to cover
likely avenues of enemy tank approach. They must be
emplaced so that they cannot be seen beyond their lethal
anti-tank range. Self-propelled anti-tank weapons should
be held in reserve to intervene against enemy armored
attacks. They should locate routes to and firing positions
from probable sites of future activities. All anti-tank guns
should be trained to fire as field artillery and be provided
with a large proportion of high-explosive shells."
These are all common sense concepts and to have to put them in a command memo is
sad, indicating a lack of training for upper level officers and men. Tankers
themselves often did not receive training in tank killing because "Tanks support

infantry; anti-tank guns (tank destroyers) destroy enemy tanks." Not immediately
supplying U.S. gunners with HE rounds and canister for the 57-mm (despite having
produced the guns since 1942) was one of those asinine disconnects of the Ordnance
Department from the needs of the ground forces during the war.

Patton on US Tanks 45-03-31 from Sherman at War Green


It has come to my knowledge that certain misguided or
perhaps deliberately mendacious individuals, returning
from the theater of war, have criticized
the equipment of the American soldier. I have been in
command of fighting units since the 7th of November
1942, and may therefore claim some knowledge of the
various types of equipment. . . . Since 1 August 1944,
when the Third Army became operational; our total
tank casualties have amounted to 1,136 tanks. During
the same period, we have accounted for 2,287 German
tanks, of which 808 were of the Tiger or Panther
variety, and 851 on our side were M4. These figures of
themselves refute any inferiority of our tanks, but let
me add that the Third Army has always attacked, and
therefore better than 70 percent of our tank casualties
have occurred from dug-in antitank guns and not
enemy tanks, whereas a majority of the enemy tanks
put out have been put out by our tanks. . . . Finally, we
must remember that all our tanks have to be transported
on steamers and the difference between 40 tons
and 70 tons is very marked. The 70-ton tank
could never have been brought ashore in landing
boats as many of our medium tanks were. Nor could
they have marched from the Cotentin Peninsula to
the Rhine as practically all of our tanks have been
required to do.
"I have been in command of fighting units..." does not make him an actual user who
knows what the tankers want and need. As if anyone suggested the US build and field
German tanks. Which they did not. The tankers just wanted a better US tank with a
better gun and armor. Which the U.S. could have supplied - given upper level
staffers and an Ordnance Department that was not pursuing their own agenda. The
disconnect between improving what the tankers have and wild schemes was prevalent
in the war.

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