Q: Do you think Ultra Vires is an effective form of constraining

administrative action? Discuss by elaborating on the doctrine against the

background of decided cases.
A: The discussion on the effectiveness of the ultra vires doctrine in
constraining administrative action, entails a number of factors and issues.
The questions of the parameters used to measure effectiveness, and how
good a tool this doctrine of ultra vires is, need to be attempted to answer.
DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
The phrase Ultra vires is a combination of Latin words which refers to
beyond the powers". If an act requires legal authority and it is done with
such an authority, it is characterized in law as intra vires literally meaning
"within the powers" and if it is done without such authority, it is ultra
vires. Acts that are intra vires may equivalently be termed "valid" and
those that are ultra vires "invalid".
The ultra vires act is different from an illegal act, although both are void,
an act of the agency which is beyond its objects clause is ultra vires and
therefore is void, even if it is legal.
The legislature delegated authority within certain parameters which the
courts would police, thereby giving effect to the intentions of the
legislature .
The ultra vires principle is based on the assumption that judicial review is
legitimated on the ground that the courts are applying the intent of the
legislature
The courts' function is to police the boundaries stipulated by Parliament
In a broad sense the ultra vires principle has been used as the vehicle
through which to impose a number of constraints on the way in which the
power given to the agency has been exercised: it must comply with rules
of fair procedure, it must exercise its discretion to attain proper and not
improper purposes, it must not act unreasonably etc.
IS IT AN EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT TOOL ?
Judicial review is concerned with the validity or the scope of the agencys
power rather than the merits of the decision.
Doctrine of Ultra Vires is one such tool.
The basis of the traditional model was to ensure the courts would preserve
the legislative monopoly of the parliament by ensuring that the agency

remained in the assigned to it by the legislature, and the courts would

achieve it through the ultra vires principle.
Few problems can though be identified, most of which relate to the
indeterminacy of legislative intent.
First is difficulty in defining the scope of an institutions designated area.
To allow the reviewing court to substitute its opinion on all matters means
that the agency then has power only when the court agrees with the
agencys findings, not otherwise.
Another problem arises when the judiciary are not simply implementing
legislative intent but also supplementing it, through the existence of
certain judicially developed principles.
Third relates with development of law over time. Discretion does not
remain static. It gets altered and new headings get added. This seems like
suddenly the legislative intent signalled in some miraculous fashion that
this should be so. This suggests that it is the courts that decide on
appropriate heads of the review and it is not based legislative intent in
this regard.
Fourth problem concerns the relationship between direct and collateral
attack.
A problem is also the changing nature of the legislation that the courts
interpret. For example, the growth of welfare state led to more open
textured legislation and grant of wide discretionary powers.
The courts indirectly controlling or containing the bureaucratic organs of
the state comes off as a negative point too. The courts are going
overboard in applying the review to public bodies exercising non-statutory
powers, and even to non public bodies in certain circumstances.
Though a weak argument can be made in favour of the doctrine.
Almost any scope of judicial intervention can be reconciled with the idea
that the courts are thereby effectuating the legislative intent and simply
intervening to determine the validity of the agencys decision.
The courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the agency. The
controls over the way in which discretionary power was exercised were,
moreover, justified by reference to legislative intent it would be argued,
for example, that Parliament did not intend the agency to make decisions
based on irrelevant considerations or improper purposes The ultra vires
principle is thus regarded as both a necessary and sufficient basis for
judicial intervention. It is necessary in the sense that any ground of

judicial review has to be fitted into the ultra vires doctrine in order for it to
be acceptable. It is sufficient in the sense that if such a ground of review
can be so fitted into the ultra vires principle it obviates the need for
further independent inquiry.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine on its face may look like an effective solution to counteract
the overstepping of the administrative agencies. But on delving deeper, it
is plagued by some obvious practical problems. And hence cannot be said
to be effective in its traditional form. Variations and modifications would
have to be made.