Gonzales v.

Office of the President 2012/2014

Petitioners: Emilio A. Gonzales III / Wendell Barreras-Sulit
Respondents: Office of the President
(SUBJECT/TOPIC COVERED OR ARTICLE/PROVISION APPLIED)
SUMMARY: 2 consolidated petitions questioning the Presidents exercise of the power to
remove petitioners from the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman
FACTS:

Both petitioners seeks to declare sec 8(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which
gives president the power to dismiss a deputy ombudsman of the office of the
ombudsman
o Gonzales case: assails jurisdictional grounds on the Office of the President
decision that dismissed him as deputy ombudsman for the military and other law
enforcement offices upon a finding of guilt on administrative charges of gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct constituting a betrayal of public trust.
o Barreras-Sulit: seeks to reverse order requiring petitioner to submit a written
explanation with respect to acts constituting serious offenses in relation to the
plea bargaining agreement entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia
issued by Office of the President
2008: Formal charge for grave misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion,
and physical injuries) was filed before the PNP-NCR against Manila Police District
Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and 4 others docketed/
o Christian M. Kalaw, private complainant, filed a similar charge before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila docketed as I.S. No. 08E-09512
July 24, 2008: During the pendency of the cases, Office of the Regional Director of the
National Police Commission turned over, upon request of Gonzales, all relevant
documents and evidence of said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
administrative adjudication
o Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers
Aug 26, 2008: I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed
o October 17, 2008: Internal affairs of PNP recommended dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against same police officers
Feb 16, 2009 Emilio Gonzales III recommended dismissal of Rolando Mendoza and
others guilty of Grave Misconduct in case OMB-P-A-08-0670-H
o May 6, 2010: Gonzales endorsed Order for final approval of Ombudsman
Meceditas Gutierrez
August 23, 2010: Rolando Mendoza hijacked Chinese tourist bus to have himself
reinstated
o 8 HK nationals died, 7 injured, and Mendoza died

Incident Investigation and Review Committee was created to determine accountability

for the incident
o Petitioner and ombudsman refused to appear on the assertion that the Office of
the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body
o IIRC found that petitioner is among those whom culpability must lie for
letting Mendozas MoR lie more than 9 months without justification
violating Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve MoRs within 5 days
o If they had acted on the MoR, the hostage taking would have been avoided as
Mendoza expressed willingness to take full responsibility of the incident if his
demand for the release of the final decision or reinstatement was met
o Office of the President instituted a formal charge against Gonzales and
dismissed him
Barreras-Sulit Case: Petitioner sought Sandiganbayans approval of a Plea Bargaining
Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with General Carlos F. Garcia and family who are
charged with Plunder and Money Laundering
o HoR Committee on Justice: recommended dismissal of Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit
for allowing Garcia to get off the hook despite strong evidence for serious public
offenses because of the PLEBARA

ISSUE/S:

WoN OotP has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office
of the Ombudsman - NO
o The ombudsmans administrative disciplinary power over a deputy ombudsman
and special prosecutor is not exclusive
o Sec 21 of RA 6770: Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who
may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary
o Sec 8(2) of RA 6770: (2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed
from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of
the Ombudsman, and after due process
o Petitioners contend that they cannot be removed by the president because under
RA 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over them
o Statcon: in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be
given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not
as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.
harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in
R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had
intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent

disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and

Special Prosecutor, respectively
Congressional deliberations show that the Chair expressed apprehension
that the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman may try to protect one
another. Senator Angara: outside official should be vested with authority
to discipline Ombudsman to effect a check and balance
The Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people
and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service, but the President has concurrent
authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions.
By granting express authority power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law
o Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the
power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies
o While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in
the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article,
there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal
from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter.
o By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law
without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In
fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for
the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
Power of the president to remove a deputy ombudsman and a special prosecutor is
implied from his power to appoint
o Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove.
o As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him.
o The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the
power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the
appointing power
Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed
after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article
XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme
Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel
(Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of
the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission
on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit
Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President,
but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As
priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the

President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by

impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
diminish independence of the office of the ombudsman
What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that
"the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all
persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of
politicians."
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the
Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the
executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's
exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely:
(1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there
must be observance of due process.
Gonzales may not be removed from office where questioned acts do not
constitute betrayal of public trust
The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of
removal from office was based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and
grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public trust, which is
a constitutional ground for the removal by impeachment of the
Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a statutory
ground for the President to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and
a Special Prosecutor Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted
of his unexplained action in directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case records to his office; his failure to verify the basis for
requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his pronouncement of
administrative liability and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal
on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified complaint-affidavit; his
inordinate haste in implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal
notwithstanding the latter's non-receipt of his copy of the Decision and the
subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration; and his apparent
unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for more
than five months had deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies
against the immediate implementation of the Decision dismissing him
from the service.
Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the
allegations and evidence of petitioner in his Answer as well as other
documentary evidence, the OP concluded that: (1) petitioner failed to
supervise his subordinates to act with dispatch on the draft resolution of
P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration and thereby caused
undue prejudice to P/S Insp. Mendoza by effectively depriving the latter of

the right to challenge the dismissal before the courts and prevent its
immediate execution, and (2) petitioner showed undue interest by having
P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and
resolving the same against P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis of the
unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim Christian Kalaw.
Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy
Ombudsman's duties constitute betrayal of public trust warranting
immediate removal from office? The question calls for a deeper,
circumspective look at the nature of the grounds for the removal of a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common
administrative offenses.
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability
against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding
penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of
neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of
public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority,
cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there
being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting
to a betrayal of public trust.
Barrera-Sulit petition: Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged. However, if
the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then
it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution promulgated on January 7, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and
declared that "the conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by
the Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of bail."

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with
payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the
Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above
case against petitioner. InG.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to
culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dissent Brion, J:
I disagree with the conclusion that Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 (which empowers the
President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman or a Special Prosecutor) is constitutionally valid. It is my
considered view that the power to discipline or remove an official of the Office of the Ombudsman

should be lodged only with the Ombudsman and not with the Office of the President, in light of the
independence the Constitution guarantees the Office of the Ombudsman.
In more concrete terms, subjecting the officials of the Office of the Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are
subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Ombudsman and her officials, and must consequently run counter to the
independence that the Constitution guarantees the Office of the Ombudsman. What is true for the
Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but for other lesser officials of that
Office who act as delegates and agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of her duties. The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in subordinate officials who are not
as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her
Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like
the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 67706(providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) clearly runs against the constitutional intent and should, thus, be declared void.
January 28, 2014 petition (wrote by Brion LOL): court reverses ruling on the previous case and
holds presidential power over ombudsman as unconstitutional because the ombudsman was made
to be independent from politics because it derives its authority from the constitution.
o

On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales
petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be
inferior but is similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the
Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political
interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning
Sec 8(2) of RA 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy
Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by
express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the
Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionallygranted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office
of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation
of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate
officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures
and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and
truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major

problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that
the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
Mutual protection argument: this concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the
existing checks and balances already in place. On the one hand, the Ombudsmans
Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is subject to the impeachment power
of Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsmans attempt to cover up the misdeeds of her
Deputies can be questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari. The same attempt can
likewise subject her to impeachment.
Congress power determines the manner and causes for the removal of non-impeachable
officers is not a carte blanch authority
o In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the
manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not
mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the
Constitution.

NOTES:

Guys sorry I copy pasted most of this because of consti midterms pls forgive me huhu at
least u get somewhat a whole picture of the cases HUHUHU.