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Petitioners filed a complaint to have the Torrens title of David over a parcel of
land declared null and void. The lower court and the Court of appeals both ruled in favor
of David and dismissed the complaint. The CA rejected petitioners' claim of ownership
through accretion on the basis of their factual claims. It appears that David acquired
lawful title to the land in question pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in
accordance with which an order of award and issuance of sales patent was made by the
Director of Lands. Petitioners did not put up any opposition or adverse claim during all
the proceedings in connection with the application of David up to the issuance of sales
patent in his favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the title is null and void?
Held:
The SC ruled that A grant by the government through the appropriate public
officials exercising the competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on
the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing into private
ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Moreover, the fact that since the filing of
the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with
said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffsappellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto is fatal to them because
after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based
on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation
of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under Section 38 of
Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud
should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the
certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible. Lastly, it was stated by the SC that
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title
issued pursuant to a void patent. The petition was dismissed.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC and J. ANTONIO ARANETA
219 SCRA 339
Facts:
The subject land of this application for registration is TAMBAC ISLAND,
Lingayen Gulf situated in Bani, Pangasinan. The original application was filed for Pacific
Farms Inc.
The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the
application alleging that the applicant, Pacific Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple
title to the land nor did its predecessors possess the land for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of application. The opposition likewise specifically
alleged that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the (1973) new
Philippine Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain citing Section
11, Article 14.
The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the
land is within the unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable. Other private parties
also filed their oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn.the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the (1973) new Philippine Constitution from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain citing Section 11, Article 14.
THE MONMON COMMISSION Catalla. Precion. Sta.Maria. Trios-Peralta
Held:
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The commission shall procure radio and television
time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially
among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For
this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the
campaign.
Thus, the law prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space and air
time to the candidates and requires the COMELEC instead to procure print space and air
time for allocation to the candidates. It will be noted that while 90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires
the COMELEC to procure print space which, as we have held, should be paid for, 92
states that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free of charge.
Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and
the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and
television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation.
Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide
free air time is to authorize a taking which is not "a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property." According to petitioners, it stands to lose
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC'S requirement that radio and television stations
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.
Petitioners' argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. A franchise is thus a privilege subject,
among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional
provision that "any such franchise or right granted shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the
franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was
brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just
compensation. What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for
free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly
the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using
them.
DISSENTING:
Romero: Section 92 of BP 881, insofar as it requires radio and television stations to provide
Comelec with radio and television time free of charge is a flagrant violation of the
constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. While it is inherent in the State, the sovereign right to appropriate property
has never been understood to include taking property for public purposes without the
duty and responsibility of ordering compensation to the individual whose property has
THE MONMON COMMISSION Catalla. Precion. Sta.Maria. Trios-Peralta
1.
2.
3.
4.
The State does not own the airwaves and broadcast frequencies. It
merely allocates, supervises and regulates their proper use. Thus,
other than collecting supervision or regulatory fees which it already
does, it cannot exact any onerous and unreasonable post facto burdens
from the franchise holders, without due process and just
compensation. Moreover, the invocation of the "common good" does
not excuse the unbridled and clearly excessive taking of a franchisee's
property.
Assuming arguendo that the State owns the air lanes, the broadcasting
companies already pay rental fees to the government for their use.
Hence, the seizure of air time cannot be justified by the theory of
compensation.
3. Airwaves and frequencies alone, without the radio and television
owner's humongous investments amounting to billions of pesos,
cannot be utilized for broadcasting purposes. Hence, a forced
donation of broadcast time is in actual fact a taking of such
investments without due process and without payment of just
compensation.
I must point out that even Respondent Comelec expressly recognizes
the need for just compensation. Thus, Section 2 of its Resolution No.
2983-A states that "[e]very radio broadcasting and television station
operating under franchise shall grant the Commission, upon payment
of just compensation, at least thirty (30) minutes of prime time daily to
be known as 'Comelec Time' . . ." And yet, even with such a judicious
legal position taken by the very agency tasked by the Constitution to
administer elections, the majority still insists on an arbitrary seizure of
precious property produced and owned by private enterprise.
To sum up, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution expressly guarantees the following rights:
1. No person, whether rich or poor, shall be deprived of property without due process; 2.
Such property shall not be taken by the government, even for the use of the general public,
without first paying just compensation to the owner; 3. No one, regardless of social or
financial status, shall be denied equal protection of the law. The majority, however,
peremptorily brushes aside all these sacred guarantees and prefers to rely on the nebulous
legal theory that broadcast stations are mere recipients of state-granted franchises which
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possession for less than 2 years. The period of possession pertaining to the time when the
land was classified as public cannot be counted since a public land cannot be alienated.
For not meeting the required 30-year prescriptive period mandated by the Public Land
Act, the Bernabes did not acquire ownership over the said land.
(2)
No. The SC declared that the buyers were not deemed to be innocent purchasers
for value. The said buyers made no verifications as to whether or not the lots they bought
were in dispute.
Also, the title issued by the Registrar was void, since the decision rendered by
the trial court was void. A void title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value is to
be cancelled. Thus the alleged buyers are not entitled to the land.
(3)
Yes. The Sol Gen was entitled to such notices because the case involved land
owned by the Government. Thus notices must be given to the Sol Gen to bind the
Government.
The Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the cancellation of
the certificates of registration previously issued to the Bernabes.
REPUBLIC v. IMPERIAL
GR No. 130906 February 11, 1999
Facts:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original. Certificate of
Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of the then Court of First Instance of
Albay, covering a parcel of land in Legaspi City. The said OCT was further subdivided
resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subject of this case, in the
name of the defendants.
Antonio F. Aguilar, requested that OCT No. 408 (500) be cancelled. Subsequent
investigation conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, upon the request of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disclosed that OCT No. 408 (500), from where titles of
the defendants were derived is null and void, considering that it has the features of a
foreshore land.
A motion to dismiss was anchored on the following grounds: (a) the
lands covered by the defendants' transfer certificate of titles which were derived from OCT
No. 408 (500) was already the subject of the cadastral proceedings in 1917 and which has
been implemented by the issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) under the Torrens system.It
further assailed that the adjudication made by the cadastral court is binding against the
whole world including the plaintiff since cadastral proceedings are in rem.
Upon hearing the motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court decreed that the parcel of land covered
by OCT No. 408 was not foreshore and that the 1917 cadastral proceeding was binding
upon the government, which had initiated the same and had been an active and direct
participant thereon. The court further considered as forum shopping petitioner's attempt
to seek a favorable opinion after it was declared in related cases questioning the title of a
certain Jose Baritua, which was also derived from OCT NO. 408(500), that the land in
question was not a foreshore land. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA
dismissed the case for failure to file the appellant's brief within the extended period.
Issue:
Whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands.
Held:
Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be
disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. The classification of public lands is a function
of the executive branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now the director
of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved
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resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of
the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations,
have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in
favor of private respondent is a notarized document. It is not correct to say that private
respondent never took possession of the property. Under the law, possession is transferred
to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. There is no document
showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po as trustor and
private respondent as trustee. The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust
will not suffice. Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "No express trust
concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence."
FRANCISCO BAGUIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RICARDO T. MICHAEL,
in his capacity as Heir-Successor of WILLIAM MICHAEL, SR., and as President of
MICHAEL SLIPWAYS, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 119682 January 21, 1999
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA affirming the decision of
the RTCof Mandaue City, nullifying Free Patent No. 7757 and Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-15457 issued in the name of petitioner Francisco Baguio.The patent and certificate of
title cover a parcel of land, consisting of 5,870 sq. m., in Catarman, Liloan, Cebu. Known as
Lot 1426, Case 2, Pls. 823, the land was declared by the government public land in 1963.
It is shown that private respondent Ricardo Michael's predecessor-in-interest,
William Michael, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of the
land. Michael was granted a provisional permit to occupy the land for one year. By virtue
of said permit, e made some reclamation on the land, built a fence around the premises,
and constructed a bridge over a portion which was under water. Upon the expiration of
the permit, the Highways District Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands that the
land be leased to Michael. On the other hand, the land investigator recommended granting
Michael the authority to survey the foreshore land in view of the completion of the
reclamation made by him on the premises. Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application
covering the reclaimed foreshore land.
Petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands for a free patent covering the
same land. In his application, petitioner stated that the land was agricultural land and not
claimed or occupied by any other person and that he had been in actual and continuous
possession and cultivation of the same. On the basis of these representations, a free patent
was issued to him and, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 was issued in his name by
the Register of Deeds of Cebu.
Petitioner demanded payment of rentals from William Michael for the use of the
land occupied by Michael Slipways Inc.. Petitioner filed an opposition to Michael's
miscellaneous sales application covering the land on the ground that he was the registered
owner thereof.William Michael in turn protested the issuance by the Bureau of Lands of a
free patent to petitioner. He claimed that he had been in actual possession of the land since
1963 and that he had introduced substantial improvements thereon.
Upon the recommendation of the Land Management Bureau of the DENR, the
government, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a petition for cancellation of title
and/or reversion of land against petitioner Baguio and the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The
case was filed in the RTC of Mandaue City which granted private respondent Ricardo
Michael leave to intervene as heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael and as
president of Michael Slipways, Inc.
The RTC rendered a decision canceling the free patent and the certificate of title
of petitioner Baguio, ordering the reversion of the land to the public domain, and
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Issue:
Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the
total common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of
common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?
Held:
[The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public
utility, i.e., to the total common shares in PLDT.]
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control,
as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the
preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term
capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control
or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of
directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding capital stock,
including both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent
and letter of the Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition unjustifiably
disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control
of the public utility.
Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the
election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation expressly state that the holders of
Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders
for the election of directors or for any other purpose or otherwise participate in any
action taken by the corporation or its stockholders, or to receive notice of any meeting of
stockholders. On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive
right to vote in the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation state that each
holder of Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of such stock
held by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common
Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for
all other purposes.
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a
majority of the common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDTs 2010 General
Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to be submitted annually to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of
PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners
hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDTs common shares, while Filipinos hold only
35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear that
foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the
allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT
common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per
share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but
cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover,
99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a
minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the
authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%. This
undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred
shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of
60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less
than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command
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On even date, the PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills18 (April 19
transaction). In turn, Bancap sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of
the Philippines, which in turn sold it to the BOC.
On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB
informed20 the Officer-in-Charge of the BSPs Government Securities Department,21
Lagrimas Nuqui, of the PDBs claim over these CB bills, based on the Detached
Assignments in its possession. The PDB requested the BSP22 to record its claim in the
BSPs books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is on account of imperfect
negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer.
Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations
Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue,
Servicing and Redemption of the Public Debt) which requires the presentation of the bond
before a registered bond may be
transferred on the books of the BSP.
In a July 25, 1994 letter, the PDB clarified to Nuqui that it was not asking for the
transfer of the CB Bills. [rather] it [intends] to put the [BSP] on formal notice that
whoever is in possession of said bills is not a holder in due course, and, therefore the BSP
should not make payment upon the presentation of the CB bills on maturity.26 Nuqui
responded that the BSP was not in a position at [that] point in time to determine who is
and who is not the holder in due course [since it] is not privy to all acts and time involving
the transfers or negotiation of the CB bills. Nuqui added that the BSPs action shall be
governed by CB Circular No. 28, as amended.
On November 17, 1994, the PDB also asked BSP Deputy Governor Edgardo
Zialcita that (i) a notation in the BSPs books be made against the transfer, exchange, or
payment of the bonds and the payment of interest thereon; and (ii) the presenter of the
bonds upon maturity be required to submit proof as a holder in due course (of the first set
of CB bills). The PDB relied on Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.
In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of the CB bills, the
PDB filed29 with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and
Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3233 (covering the first set of CB bills) and Civil Case 943254 (covering the second set of CB bills) against Nuqui, the BSP and the RCBC.
On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from
paying the face value of the CB bills on maturity.32 On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an
Amended Petition, additionally impleading the BOC and All Asia. In a January 13, 1995
Order, the cases were consolidated. On January 17, 1995, the RTC granted the PDBs
application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that
the PDB has no cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB
bills. Contrary to the PDBs warehousing theory, the BOC asserted that the (i) April 15
transaction and the (ii) April 19 transaction covering both sets of CB bills - were valid
contracts of sale, followed by a transfer of title (i) to the BOC (in the April 15 transaction)
upon the PDBs delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in substitution of the Treasury Bills the
PDB originally intended to sell, and (ii) to Bancap (in the April 19 transaction) upon the
PDBs delivery of the 2nd set of CB bills to Bancap, likewise by way of substitution.
On the other hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d)
4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies only to an owner and a person
presenting the bond, of which the PDB is neither. The PDB has not presented to the BSP
any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly recorded in the BSPs books, in its favor to
clothe it with the status of an owner.
In light of the developments, on May 4, 1998, the RTC required the parties to
manifest their intention regarding the case and to inform the court of any amicable
settlement; otherwise, th[e] case shall be dismissed for lack of interest. Complying with
the RTCs order, the BOC moved (i) that the case be set for pre-trial and (ii) for further
proceeding to resolve the remaining issues between the BOC and the PDB, particularly on
who has a better right over the subject CB bills.55 The PDB joined the BOC in its motion.
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