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LONZANIDA VS COMELEC

FACTS: Lonzanida was elected as mayor and served two consecutive terms from 1988 to 1995. He then
ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as mayor.
However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC, which
ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC
affirmed this decision and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate his post. In the 1998 elections,
Lonzanida again filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor but was protested against due to the reason
that he allegedly had served 3 consecutive terms already.
ISSUE: Whether or not it may be considered that petitioner had served 3 consecutive terms, granting
that he did not finish his term in 1995.
HELD: Negative. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term and became a private citizen.
LONZANIDA vs. COMELEC
(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)
Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged
the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election
protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as
null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San
Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to
disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May
1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for
one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly
elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be
counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government
officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years
until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.
Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such
officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: No local
elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections,
not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
SOCRATES VS COMELEC
FACTS: Edward Hagedorn had already served for 3 consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor,
Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August 23 of the same
year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was
filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4 th consecutive term.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The court ruled that the rationale behind the 3-term rule was to prevent
consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of
his third term and before the recall election.
SOCRATES vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three
consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the
three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in
the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his
term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for
the formers unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorns disqualification under
the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE:
WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule

HELD:

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that
an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear
intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The
second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service

or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth
term, The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the
same office following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election
like a recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive
terms; and 2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.
After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until
the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest
opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen.
This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not
because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. (Socrates vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002)

LATASA VS COMELEC
FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998. During his third term, the municipality was declared as a component city. This event marked
the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, since the post is vacant,
Latasa was mandated to serve a hold-over capacity 1 as mayor of the new City of Digos. Latasa filed his
COC for the 2001 elections but was protested against by Sunga, saying that Latasa is not eligible to run
for mayor since he already served for three consecutive terms from 1992-2001.
ISSUE: Whether or not Latasa is disqualified from running again for mayor, but this time, for the CITY
OF DIGOS.
HELD: Affirmative. Upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, Latasa continued
to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There may be some changes in the
political and economic rights of Digos as an LGU but no substantial changes occurred as to petitioners
authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.

1 It is a general rule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the conclusion or expiration of his term until the
appointment of his successor

LABO VS COMELEC
FACTS: Ramon Labo Jr. is a person granted Australian citizenship in 1976 although this fact is still
questionable since no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance 2 as a
naturalized Australian citizen. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980 and in 1988, Labo ran and won
as mayor of Baguio City but was protested against by Luis Lardizabal, alleging that Labo is an alien
and therefore, disqualified to run for office. Lardizabal asked for Labos proclamation as mayor be
annulled and as the person who got the second highest number of votes in the previously held election,
he be declared as the new mayor of Baguio City.
ISSUE: Whether or not a runner up in the elections can replace an ousted official.
HELD: Negative. Lardizabal can not assume the position of mayor because he has not been duly
elected by the people of Baguio. Labos disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office.
Instead, the vice mayor shall replace Labo.
ONG VS ALEGRE
FACTS: Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course
and Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Francis Ong. The petition to disqualify was predicated on
the three-consecutive term rule. Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, 1998, and
May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as Mayor and discharged the duties thereof for
three consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
The First Division of COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the said petition
of Alegre, rationalizing that Francis might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998;
1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004 but the mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered
his because he was not duly elected thereto. The RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte Branch 41 has voided
his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Alegre was the "legally elected Mayor in
the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte."
ISSUE: Whether or not Ongs assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the
mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
HELD: Affirmative. Ong is disqualified as even if the COMELEC had declared Alegre to be the legally
elected mayor in the 1998 elections, it was without effect as the declaration only took place AFTER the
expiration of the contested office.

FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner,


vs.
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the petition to disqualify Ong which was predicated on the threeconsecutive term rule. Francis ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and

2 The laws of Australia at that time required any person over the age of 16 who is granted citizenship to take an oath of
allegiance

have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections.
The May 1998 elections, both Alegre and Ong ran for the office of mayor, with Ong was proclaimed
winner. Alegre filed an election protest. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that
1998 mayoralty contest, but the decision came out only when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001
mayoralty term and starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 10,
2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution 5
dismissing the said petition of Alegre.
Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc issued, a resolution6 reversing the
resolution of the COMELECs First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run for
mayor in the May 10, 2004"; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of
candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in
his favor.
The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a
certificate of candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as
substitute candidate for his brother Francis. However, it is recommended that the substitute certificate of
candidacy of Rommel Ong should be denied due course and the election officer be directed to delete his name
from the list of candidates.
ISSUE:
a) whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should
be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run
c) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommels certificate
of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.
HELD:
a) Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. The three-term limit rule for elective
local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. For the three-term limit for
elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post,
and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running
for mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of
the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
b) The ascription of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified
Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post cannot be sustained.
c) A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same
way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7,
2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.

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