Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 14

Agco Corporation (AGCO)

Analyst: David Meehan


Date: 2/16/2015
Domicile: U.S.
Price: USD 48.50/Share
Value: USD 76/Share
Upside: 54%
Market Cap: USD 4,423 mln
Float: 92%
Enterprise Value: $4,853 mln
Holders: Insiders 8%, Institutions 88%
REASONS TO OWN
1. Agco is a 20% return on operating capital business (ex-goodwill) and has greatly improved its
competitive position the past 10 years under current management.
2. Cash flow generative: Agco repurchased 8% of shares outstanding in 2014 and has both the initiative
and ability to buy back another $500 million, or 11% of current shares outstanding by year-end 2016.
3. Oligopoly market with rational competitors in Deere and CNH. Agco is the #3 player worldwide with
strong positions in LATAM, Europe, and Asia.
4. Its dealer network creates a competitive advantage versus new entrants. Greater scale supports more
dealers, which improve service offerings and customer relationships.
5. Excellent Management Team: CEO Martin Richenhagen has focused on integrating historical acquisitions
since he took office in 2004. Management is currently focused on increasing modularization (same parts
across different products) and turning a profit in Asia. These self-help initiatives will help increase
margins closer to Deere and CNH.
6. High quality finance book characteristics provide a consistent cash flow stream.
BUSINESS OVERVIEW
Agco is the third largest manufacturer of agriculture equipment in the world behind John Deere and CNH
Industrial. Agco is based in the United States, but roughly 74% of sales and 70% of profits are generated outside
of North America. Agco sells its products through 3,100 independent dealers in 140 countries. Sales are
dominated by tractors (60.0%) but are complemented by replacement parts (12.5%), other machinery (9.3%),
grain storage and protein production (7.0%), combines (6.0%), and application equipment (4.8%). Martin
Richenhagen, CEO, joined the company in 2004 and has successfully focused on increasing ROCE by integrating
assets and generating manufacturing efficiencies. Agco began in 1990 with the acquisition of the former
agriculture equipment business of Allis-Chalmers. Over 20 acquisitions followed before Richenhagen joined the
company in 2004. Richenhagen put a stop to this strategy and has acquired only one company of size during his
tenure, buying GSI Corp for $930 million in 2011.
BRANDS
Agco operates through five major brands, which include: Challenger, Fendt, Massey Ferguson, Valtra, and GSI.

An assortment of products are sold under the Massey Ferguson brand including tractors, combines, hay
& forage, planting and seeding, tillage and several other attachments. Agco also holds a 23% interest in
TAFE in India, which manufactures Massey Ferguson branded tractors under a license agreement.
Fendt is primarily a European tractor and combine brand with sales also in the United States.

Challenger was acquired in 2002 from Caterpillar and sells tractors, combines, hay, seeding and tillage
equipment.
Valtra is a European and Brazilian tractor brand that Agco acquired two months before Richenhagen
was hired in 2004. It also sells tractors in China and Australia.
GSI comprises 7% of AGCO sales. GSI is a grain storage and protein production equipment business that
was acquired in 2011. The majority of sales are in the U.S., but it is expanding globally. See the M&A
section for more information.

GEOGRAPHY
Europe, Africa, Middle East (EMEA) (53% Sales, 59% EBIT, 9.7% OPM)
Europe is by far the largest market for Agco. It has 1,100 dealers and competes against CLAAS, CNH, Deere and
SAME. I have been unable to find market share data for CNH or Agco, but CNH claims it is first in tractor sales,
second in combines, and third in hay and forage equipment. Agco is most likely the second largest player. I have
read in the press that Agco has 25 to 35% market share, but I have been unable to confirm.
In tractors, Deere has a 20% market share in the EU-28, the same share it has had since it began reporting such
data in 2004. The industry data includes low, mid, and high horsepower tractors, but Deere does not break it
out, so it could have gained share in the high horsepower segment while losing share in the lower horsepower
segment. In the combine market, Deere has slipped from 20% market share in 2004 to 16% in 2013.
Since 2004, industry unit growth for both tractors and combines has been very low, if nonexistent. Future
growth will likely come from Eastern Europe as well as Ukraine and Russia, where tractors versus arable land is
1/8 of that in the United States. Obviously, with the outlook for Ukraines and Russias economies being dismal,
this is a long term opportunity, but could be viewed as providing long-term optionality. Although unit growth is
low, equipment manufacturers have been able to increase prices. See appendix for more information.
LATAM/South America (17% Sales, 16% EBIT, 8.1% OPM)
In Brazil and Argentina, Agco sells through 340 independent dealers. Massey Ferguson reportedly has 60%
market share in South America and Brazil, but I have been unable to confirm. Agco holds the number-one
position in sales and is trying to stave off both CNH and Deere. In Brazil, Agco sells through mostly exclusive
dealers. In Argentina and the rest of South America, Agco sells through distributors. Brazil is an attractive market
because it has grown quickly and will likely grow faster than the U.S. and Europe in the future. From 2004 to
2013 tractor unit sales grew 9.5%. Larger farms and increasing arable land have helped drive that growth. Note,
the Brazilian Real (BRL) was down 10% vs the USD in 2014 and is down another 7% YTD. The depreciation will
hurt Agcos translational results in the short term. The BRL is now 75% below the OECDs estimate of PPP and
could prove to be another source of upside for Agcos USD consolidated results if the currency reverts to parity
over time.
North America (25% Sales, 26% EBIT, 9.1% OPM)
Agco is the third-best seller in North America behind Deere at number one and CNH at number two. Agco sells
through 1,300 dealers, out of which 500 are for GSI (grain storage and protein production). Under the umbrella
of price leadership by Deere, Agco has been able to maintain profitability while reducing and thereby optimizing
its dealer network from independent non-exclusive dealers to independent exclusive dealers. In 2005, Agco had
approximately 1,500 agriculture dealers in the United States and has whittled the network down to 800 today.
The initiative has helped Agco increase profitability in North America and will continue to help its service
offering. Some estimate that Agco has a 10% market share in the U.S. tractor market, but I have been unable to
confirm.

Asia Pacific (5% Sales, -2% EBIT, -2% OPM)


In 2011, Agco purchased Dafeng, a Chinese manufacturer of rice, soybean, corn and grain harvesting equipment
for an enterprise value of $27 million. Dafeng operates through 200 dealers, which are now used by Agco. In
2014, Agco completed a factory to manufacture 50 to 120 horsepower tractors for the local and global markets.
Over the next three years, Agco will be transitioning the assembly of low horsepower tractors from other
countries to that plant. In total, it hopes to improve operating margins on these low horsepower tractors by 5 to
7%. This is significant because the sale of low horsepower tractors total $1 billion globally. As Chinese farms
slowly consolidate to larger farms, Agco expects the demand for the low horsepower equipment to increase.
FINANCE BOOK
Agco owns a 49% interest in a JV with Rabobank dating back to the early 1990s. Rabobank funds the loans and
Agco books its share of the profits using the equity method. The JV provides financing for about 50% of retail
sales. The portfolio is $9.5 billion and write-offs have historically averaged less than 50bps. Agco provides no
guarantees to the JV. The JV uses term-matched funding with liquidity guaranteed to maturity. Most of the
financing is in developed markets, so I expect low single digit growth. I value the finance book at 13x earnings to
equal $650 million.
Ideally, Agco would have a 100% captive finance book (like Deere) to provide more control over terms and
conditions, in addition to providing more income, but to date the relationship has been working.
COMPETITORS
Deere, CNH and Agco account for more than 50% of total global agriculture equipment sales and the vast
majority of high horsepower equipment. CLAAS, a private tractor manufacturer with about 75% of its sales in
Europe, is another competitor. Kubota is a large Japanese company with a presence in the low horsepower
tractor market and has ambitions to enter the high horsepower tractor market. Other competitors are much
smaller and include: Same Deutz Farr Group, Argo Group, Buhler Industries, and Bucher Industries (only
attachments). See comp page for more information.
Deere has a superior business to Agco and CNH because of its greater scale (especially in the U.S.), single brand,
and exclusive independent dealer network. By global revenue, Deere is 1.7x the size of CNH, 2.7x Agco, and 6.3x
CLAAS. Generally, Deere is the price leader in high horsepower tractors and combines and its advantage allows it
to earn the highest operating margins. From 2007 to 2013, Deere averaged 12.7% agriculture operating margins
versus CNH (8.7%) and Agco (7.8%).
CNH Industrial is also a strong competitor. It operates through the Case IH, New Holland, and Steyr brands. CNH
is globally diversified with 44% of sales in the U.S. (versus 60% at Deere), EMEA (30%), LATAM (15%), and APAC
(10%). CNH Industrial is the product of a merger in 2013 between CNH Global and Fiat Industrial, which already
owned 90% of CNH Global. Sergio Marchionne, the well regarded auto executive, is Chairman of CNH Industrial.
The CEO is Rich Tobin, an executive who has worked under Marchionne for many years. I interviewed Tobin in
2011 when he was CFO of CNH Global. He was very confident, and I thought highly of him as he was profit and
return focused.
The European operations of CLAAS are about half of the size of Agcos European operations. By staying local and
focusing only on tractors, CLAAS has been able to maintain operating margins of 7.3% from 2007 to 2013. In
Europe, Agco is superior vs CLAAS for its scale and wider product offering to support dealer profitability.

Kubota is a Japanese company that has previously focused on low horsepower, combines, attachments, and
construction equipment. Kubota has a new focus on larger agriculture products and has the potential to be a
threat to Agco.
COST STRUCTURE
On average, 75 to 80% of the wholesale cost of equipment is the cost of materials. Approximately 10% of the
cost is direct labor, with the remaining 10% coming from maintenance, utilities and overhead. Needless to say,
Agco operates in a high fixed cost business where profits are driven by scale and volumes.
M&A
In November 2011, Agco acquired GSI, a grain storage and protein production equipment business for an
enterprise value of $930 million from Centerbridge Partners. AGCO paid 11.5x current year EV/EBITA and
believed it would grow sales 7% cagr through 2016 to equal $1.0 billion in sales. Sales by geography were: North
America (71%), South America (9%), Asia (11%), and Europe, Africa and Middle East (9%). The business earned a
13% operating margin in 2011 and Agco forecasted that it would generate 15% margins. In 2011, Agco had $377
million in net operating loss carry forwards (NOLs) in the United States that would begin to expire in 2015. The
stated rationale for the acquisition was that the business benefited from the same end-market and would
improve AGCOs scale in North America. Because GSI products are outside of Agcos core business, I think AGCO
likely bought GSI because it was a quick way to use NOLs in addition to capitalizing on a favorable growth profile.
Through 2014, GSI sales have increased 6.7% cagr and now total $850 million. Although margins for the business
are not disclosed, the acquisition appears to be value enhancing.
MANAGEMENT
Martin Richenhagen joined the company in March 2004 as CEO and became chairman of the board in 2006. He
has excelled by integrating the 20 acquisitions that preceded him and driving efficiencies in distribution and
manufacturing. The GSI acquisition smells a little like empire building because it was not in Agcos core business,
but it has proved worthwhile. Richenhagen plans to stay on at least three more years until he is 65.
BALANCE SHEET
The balance sheet is conservative. Net debt-to-EBITDA is less than 1x my 2015 EBITDA estimate. The next
maturity is a $240 million 4.5% senior note due in 2016, to be followed by a $380 million credit facility maturing
in 2019 at libor +1-2%.
WHY IS THE STOCK CHEAP?
The stock is likely cheap because of the uncertainty of how deep and how long the global downturn in the
agriculture equipment market will last. Farmers are coming off of several strong years of crop prices and cash
receipts on a gross and net basis. Even though their balance sheets are stronger than they have ever been, they
can delay purchasing new equipment if they have young fleets. Moreover, the United States Department of
Agriculture estimates 2014 U.S. farm gross and net receipts were down 5%, and 32%, respectively. And, all the
manufacturers are expecting another down year for unit sales in 2015.
Forecasts
Revenue
One could drive a combine through the difference between Deeres and Agcos 2015 North American market
outlook. Deere forecasts the North American market down 25 to 30%, while Agco forecasts down 5 to 10%. Part
of the gap could be explained by the difference between sales of only high horsepower units versus both low
and high horsepower units if Deeres definition excludes low horsepower. CNH forecasts a flat year for units

under 140 horse power segment but down 15 to 20% for units exceeding 140 horsepower. I am forecasting Agco
North American revenue down 12% in 2015, flat in 2016 and back to 2013 levels by 2019.
Deere, Agco and CNH are all forecasting EMEA down 5 to 10% in 2015. I forecast down 8% organic, flat in 2016
and again back to 2013 peak by 2019. The Euro is down 6% YTD, which I incorporate on top of the organic
decline. For South America, all three manufacturers are forecasting down 10% this year. The BRL/USD has since
weakened 7% YTD, so I am forecasting down 17% in 2015 and the back to 12% above 2013 levels by 2019. The
sales level in 2019 implies 4.5% cagr from 2014 through 2019, in-line with Deeres forecast for Brazil of 4.5%
growth through 2020. I also apply an FX kicker of halfway back to PPP by terminal year.
Margins
I have consolidated margins this year falling to 5.4%, staying flat next year and then increasing with sales growth
to 7.9% in normality by terminal year. The greatest improvement will come from Asia as it emerges from losses
as the new plant in China scales to profitability. In 2012, Agco targeted 10% consolidated operating margins, and
while that level of profitability is achievable, I believe it to be a peak number. With trough margins near 5.5%
and peak of 10%, 7.9% is a fair estimate for a through-cycle normal margin. On a geographic basis, this implies
pre-corporate expense margins of: North America (9%), South America (9%), EMEA (9.5%), and Asia (10%).
Manufacturing plants are located in the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Finland, France, Italy, Germany,
China, and Malaysia. It appears most FX exposure is translational, although Richenhagen said Agco imports
parts from Europe into its Minnesota plant, which will help the North American segment this year.
Use of Cash
Agco initiated a dividend in 2012 and currently has a 15% POR. Management completed a $500 million buy back
in 2014 and initiated another $500 million program running through 2016. Management is maintaining flexibility
by keeping the POR low and by saying they will adjust the buyback based on the stock price. I assume Agco
purchases $250 million per year at current levels.
Capex
Agco increased capex in 2012 and 2013 to meet tier IV engine emission standards and expand capacity. Beyond
Agcos guidance of $325 mln for 2015, I am growing capex at 4.5% cagr to equal 3.6% of sales, which is above
historical averages. I have not seen capacity utilization numbers from Agco, but I do know it will cost money to
maintain market share versus larger competitors looking for growth.
Working capital management appears responsive to market conditions. Agco cut production in 2014 by 15% and
20% in Q4 to maintain reasonable inventory levels. I cut working capital-to-sales in 2015 to 8.5% of sales as
inventory comes down, and then increase it to the historical average of 9% by terminal year.
Bull Case
1. Downturn is short and shallow and Agco continues to increase manufacturing and dealer efficiencies
with greater volumes. Margins increase toward previous goal of 10%.
2. Stock stays low or even falls more over the next 18 months, allowing more shares to be repurchased
before the market rebounds.
3. The Asian market heats up and the Asian operations turn a profit faster than expected.
Bear Case
1. Agriculture downturn is deeper and lasts longer than expected. Unit sales of tractors and combines were
down in 2014 and are expected to decline even further in 2015. Crop prices stay low and the farmers
5

forgo upgrades for several more years. (This would lead to increases in high margin parts sales to offset
some of the lost profits.)
2. Deere and CNH lower prices in South America and Europe to gain market share and erode the profit
base of Agco.
3. Regulations cause crop prices and farm income to dramatically decline, which is a risk in every market
(e.g. the ethanol mandate, subsidies, financing regulations).
4. Reputational risk, especially if Agco fails to protect farmers data.
Valuation
Within two years, Agco will return 11% of the market cap to shareholders if it completes the buyback at current
prices. With dividends of 1% a year, it will return 13% to shareholders while still increasing cash by $400 million,
or $4.60/share. I price AGCO at 9.5x EBIT and 7.9% terminal margins, implying 4% FCF perpetuity growth. Fair
value is 75/share with 55% upside.

Company
Anlayst:
Date:
Currency:
Local/USD

AGCO (Ticker: AGCO)


David Meehan
2/13/15
Multiples
USD
Enterprise Value
1.0
EV / EBITA
EV / EBITDA
Price
48.5
Net debt / EBITDA
Diluted Shares
91.2
Price / Tangible Book
Market Capitalization
4,423
FCF/ EV
Net liabilities/(assets)
380
EPS
Enterprise Value
4,803
P/E
Target Price
75
Upside
54%
Sales

(Last Actual)
2014

est.
2015

est.
2016

est.
2017

est.
2018

4,803
6.5
4.9
0.7
1.9
4%
4.43
10.9

4,294
9.4
6.1
0.7
1.8
13%
3.01
16.1

4,095
8.5
5.6
0.7
1.7
7%
3.57
13.6

3,906
6.4
4.5
0.4
1.5
7%
4.58
10.6

3,620
4.9
3.6
0.0
1.3
10%
5.60
8.7

9,724

8.7%

EBITDA
% of Sales

EBITA

8,405

8,405

8,990

0.0%

7.0%

7.5%

973

701

733

868

1,004

1,127

10.0%

8.3%

8.7%

9.7%

10.4%

10.5%

Nominal EBITA Multiple


Tax Rate
Normal POR (NCF/EBITA)
NOPAT Multiple
Discount Rate (WACC)
Implied FCF Growth Rate

37%

11.1%

734

454

479

606

735

849

7.5%

5.4%

5.7%

6.7%

7.6%

7.9%

Taxes
NOPAT
Less: Working Capital Addition
Less: Buybacks
Less: Capital Expenditures
Add: Depreciation Amortization
Net Cash Flow
Years
PV Factor
PV of Net Cash Flow

-256
478
-219
-500
-302
280
(261)

-168
286
327
-250
-325
286
325
0.8
0.9
304.0

-177
302
0
-250
-319
293
25
1.8
0.9
21.6

-224
382
-95
0
-333
300
255
2.8
0.8
201.6

-272
463
-61
0
-348
308
362
3.8
0.7
263.5

-314
535
-97
0
-387
316
367
4.8
0.7
246.0

9.5 EBITA Multiple


37% Sum of PVof Cash Flows
69% Present Value of Terminal Value
21.97 Net (debt)/cash
9% (Minority Interest)
4.1% Finance Book
(Dividends Paid)
Long Term Investments
pensions
Equity Value
Terminal, diluted shares
Per Share Value

9.5
1,037
5,404
(728)
(33)
650
0
0
(269)
6,061
81
75

Free Cash Flow


Net Income
Depreciation Amortization
non cash
change in working capital
Operating Cash Flow
Capital Expenditures
Free Cash Flow to Equity
Interest Expense
Interest Expense After Tax
Free Cash Flow to the Firm
FCF % of EBITA
FCF % of NOPAT
Net Debt /(Cash)
Net Adjustments
Shares

404
280
-27
-219
438
(302)
137
58
38
175
24%
37%
728
348
91.2

% of Sales

Tax Rate

3,337
3.9
3.0
-0.2
1.2
11%
6.52
7.4
(Normal)
9,667
10,743

-13.6%

% Change

Discount Rate

est.
2019

valued at book value. Lost money in 2012 and 2013.


12x earnings of 50 million.

Price

Upside

48.5

54%

259
286
0
327
873
(325)
548
29
18
566
125%
198%
472
348
86.0

290
293
0
0
583
(319)
264
27
36
300
63%
99%
502
348
81.3

372
300
0
-95
577
(333)
244
27
17
261
43%
68%
313
348
81.3

455
308
0
-61
702
(348)
354
25
16
370
50%
80%
27
348
81.3

530
316
0
-97
749
(387)
362
22
14
376
44%
70%
-256
348
81.3

Avg
58%
92%

HISTORICALS
Sales
% Change

EBITDA
% of Sales

EBITA
% of Sales
NOPAT

Free Cash Flow


Net Income
Depreciation Amortization
non cash
change in working capital
Operating Cash Flow
Capital Expenditures
Free Cash Flow to Equity
Interest Expense
Interest Expense After Tax
Free Cash Flow to the Firm
FCF % of EBITA
FCF % of NOPAT
Net Debt /(Cash)
Capex % Revenue
Capex % Depreciation
Capex % PP&E

Equity ROR
After tax Debt ROR
WACC

10.0%
3.5%

Debt Differential

-4.5%

2014
80.2%
19.8%

2014
9,724
-10%
973
10%
734
8%
478

2013
10,787
8%
1,160
11%
949
9%
643

2012
9,962
14%
946
9%
765
8%
589

2011
8,773
27%
783
9%
631
7%
603

2010
6,897
4%
501
7%
347
5%
215

2009
6,630

404
280
-27
-219
438
-302
137
58
38
175
24%
37%
728

597
259
45
-105
797
-392
405
58
39
445
47%
69%
203

522
230
4
-90
666
-341
326
58
44
370
48%
63%
505

583
174
-110
80
726
-300
426
30
29
454
72%
75%
745

221
154
19
44
439
-167
272
33
21
292
84%
136%
-277

136
148
-15
84
352
-215
136
43
27
164
65%
103%
-6

3%
108%
20%

4%
151%
24%

3%
148%
24%

3%
173%
25%

2%
108%
14%

3%
146%
23%

398
6%
251
4%
158

Avg
57%
80%

Normal
80%
20%

8.7%

USD, mlns
Revenue
North America
South America
Europe/Africa/Middle East
Asia Pacific
Total Sales

2006
1,283.0
657.0
3,334.4
159.6
5,434

2007
1,488.1
1,090.6
4,067.1
182.3
6,828

2008
1,794.3
1,496.5
4,905.4
228.4
8,425

2009
1,442.7
1,167.1
3,782.1
238.5
6,630

2010
1,489.3
1,753.3
3,422.9
231.1
6,897

2011

2012

1,771
1,872
4,847
284
8,773

2,584
1,856
5,074
448
9,962

2013
2,758
2,040
5,482
508
10,787

2014

est.
2015

2,414
1,663
5,159
488
9,724

2,124
1,381
4,436
463
8,405

est.
2016
2,124
1,381
4,436
463
8,405

est.
2017

est.
2018

2,294
1,519
4,658
519
8,990

2,478
1,701
4,891
597
9,667

Revenue Growth
North America
South America
Europe/Africa/Middle East
Asia Pacific
Total Sales

-20.2%
1.3%
11.6%
-22.0%
-0.3%

16.0%
66.0%
22.0%
14.2%
25.7%

20.6%
37.2%
20.6%
25.3%
23.4%

-19.6%
-22.0%
-22.9%
4.4%
-21.3%

3.2%
50.2%
-9.5%
-3.1%
4.0%

18.9%
6.7%
41.6%
22.8%
27.2%

46.0%
-0.8%
4.7%
57.9%
13.6%

6.7%
9.9%
8.0%
13.3%
8.3%

-12.5%
-18.4%
-5.9%
-4.0%
-9.9%

-12.0%
-17.0%
-14.0%
-5.0%
-13.6%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

8.0%
10.0%
5.0%
12.0%
7.0%

8.0%
12.0%
5.0%
15.0%
7.5%

Change due to FX
North America
South America
Europe/Africa/Middle East
Asia Pacific
Total Sales

0.7%
6.9%
1.9%
0.4%
2.1%

1.0%
15.5%
10.3%
10.9%
8.7%

-0.8%
7.0%
4.5%
0.8%
3.6%

-2.1%
-4.1%
-6.0%
-4.2%
-4.8%

1.9%
14.0%
-4.8%
3.4%
0.3%

0.9%
4.7%
6.4%
13.1%
5.0%

-0.7%
-15.8%
-7.4%
-2.8%
-7.7%

-0.3%
-11.9%
2.3%
-2.1%
-1.2%

-0.9%
-8.8%
-0.7%
-2.6%
-2.4%

0.0%
-7.0%
-6.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

est.
2019
2,676
2,245
5,136
686
10,743

8.0%
32.0%
5.0%
15.0%
11.1%

0.0%
20.0% kicker
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Organic Revenue Growth - Company provided


North America
-20.9%
South America
-5.6%
Europe/Africa/Middle East
9.6%
Asia Pacific
-22.5%
Total Sales
-2.4%

15.0%
50.5%
11.7%
3.3%
16.9%

21.4%
30.2%
16.2%
24.5%
19.8%

-17.5%
-17.9%
-16.9%
8.6%
-16.5%

1.3%
36.3%
-4.7%
-6.5%
3.7%

18.0%
2.1%
35.2%
9.8%
22.2%

19.8%
10.3%
9.9%
23.2%
12.4%

7.0%
21.8%
5.8%
15.4%
9.5%

-11.5%
-9.6%
-5.2%
-1.4%
-7.5%

-12.0%
-10.0%
-8.0%
-5.0%
-13.6%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

8.0%
10.0%
5.0%
12.0%
7.0%

8.0%
12.0%
5.0%
15.0%
7.5%

8.0%
12.0%
5.0%
15.0%
11.1%

% of Rev
North America
South America
Europe/Africa/Middle East
Asia Pacific
Total Sales

22%
16%
60%
3%
100%

21%
18%
58%
3%
100%

22%
18%
57%
4%
100%

22%
25%
50%
3%
100%

20%
21%
55%
3%
100%

26%
19%
51%
5%
100%

26%
19%
51%
5%
100%

25%
17%
53%
5%
100%

25%
16%
53%
6%
100%

25%
16%
53%
6%
100%

26%
17%
52%
6%
100%

26%
18%
51%
6%
100%

25%
21%
48%
6%
100%

9
134
517
28
688
(72)
(32)
584
584

22
65
222
21
330
(71)
(8)
251
251

50
162
196
26
433
(73)
(13)
347
347

91
143
487
24
745
(91)
(23)
631
631

260
162
475
10
907
(107)
(35)
765
765

326
213
558
1
1,097
(116)
(33)
949
949

219
134
500
(12)
842
(118)
10
734
734

127
90
355
572
(101)
(17)
454
454

138
90
355
14
597
(101)
(17)
479
479

184
121
396
31
732
(108)
(18)
606
606

223
153
440
54
870
(116)
(19)
735
735

241
202
488
69
999
(129)
(21)
849
849

24%
12%
61%
3%
100%

Segment Income, after depreciation, before corp. overhead


North America
(38)
(36)
South America
45
101
Europe/Africa/Middle East
279
398
Asia Pacific
20
20
Segment Income
307
484
Corporate Expenses
(45)
(48)
Stock Compensation
(4)
(25)
EBITA
258
410
EBITA from P&L
410
Segment Margins
North America
South America
Europe/Africa/Middle East
Asia Pacific
Segment Income
Corporate Expenses
Stock Compensation
EBITA

-2.9%
6.9%
8.4%
12.7%
5.7%
-0.8%
-0.1%
4.8%

-2.4%
9.3%
9.8%
10.9%
7.1%
-0.7%
-0.4%
6.0%

0.5%
9.0%
10.5%
12.4%
8.2%
-0.9%
-0.4%
6.9%

1.5%
5.5%
5.9%
8.9%
5.0%
-1.1%
-0.1%
3.8%

3.3%
9.2%
5.7%
11.1%
6.3%
-1.1%
-0.2%
5.0%

5.1%
7.6%
10.0%
8.4%
8.5%
-1.0%
-0.3%
7.2%

10.1%
8.7%
9.4%
2.3%
9.1%
-1.1%
-0.3%
7.7%

11.8%
10.4%
10.2%
0.1%
10.2%
-1.1%
-0.3%
8.8%

9.1%
8.1%
9.7%
-2.4%
8.7%
-1.2%
0.1%
7.5%

6.0%
6.5%
8.0%
0.0%
6.8%
-1.2%
-0.2%
5.4%

6.5%
6.5%
8.0%
3.0%
7.1%
-1.2%
-0.2%
5.7%

8.0%
8.0%
8.5%
6.0%
8.1%
-1.2%
-0.2%
6.7%

9.0%
9.0%
9.0%
9.0%
9.0%
-1.2%
-0.2%
7.6%

9.0%
9.0%
9.5%
10.0%
9.3%
-1.2%
-0.2%
7.9%

% of Profit
North America
South America
Europe/Africa/Middle East
Asia Pacific
Segment Income

-12.3%
14.7%
91.0%
6.6%
100.0%

-7.4%
21.0%
82.3%
4.1%
100.0%

1.2%
19.5%
75.1%
4.1%
100.0%

6.6%
19.6%
67.4%
6.4%
100.0%

11.4%
37.4%
45.2%
5.9%
100.0%

12.2%
19.2%
65.4%
3.2%
100.0%

28.7%
17.8%
52.4%
1.1%
100.0%

29.7%
19.4%
50.9%
0.0%
100.0%

26.0%
15.9%
59.4%
-1.4%
100.0%

22.3%
15.7%
62.0%
0.0%
100.0%

23.1%
15.0%
59.5%
2.3%
100.0%

25.1%
16.6%
54.1%
4.3%
100.0%

25.6%
17.6%
50.6%
6.2%
100.0%

24.1%
20.2%
48.8%
6.9%
100.0%

5,779
1,275
723
38
610
345
8,770

5,882
1,286
963
728
638
462
9,959

6,491
1,349
1,001
771
652
521
10,785

Tractors
Replacement Parts
Other Machinery
Grain Storage and Protein Production systems
Combines
Application Equipment
Total Sales

cagr
07-'14
5.7%
13.3%
5.5%
9.1%
6.8%

07-'14
4.9%
8.5%
8.9%
6.5%
7.9%
-1.0%
-0.2%
6.6%

11-'14
9.0%
8.7%
9.8%
2.1%
9.1%
-1.1%
-0.2%
7.8%

851

Revenue

2007
6,828

2008
8,425
23.4%

-21.3%

4.0%

27.2%

13.6%

8.3%

-9.9%

(5,637)
1,191

(6,925)
1,500

(5,558)
1,073

(5,638)
1,259

(6,997)
1,776

(7,839)
2,123

(8,396)
2,391

(7,657)
2,066

17.4%

17.8%

16.2%

18.3%

20.2%

21.3%

22.2%

21.3%

(626)

(721)

(630)

(692)

(869)

(1,041)

(1,089)

(995)

-9.2%

-8.6%

-9.5%

-10.0%

-9.9%

-10.5%

-10.1%

-10.2%

(155)

(195)

(192)

(220)

(276)

(317)

(353)

(337)

-2.3%

-2.3%

-2.9%

-3.2%

-3.1%

-3.2%

-3.3%

-3.5%

544
(134)

731
(147)

398
(148)

501
(154)

783
(152)

946
(181)

1,160
(212)

973
(239)

Growth

Cost of Revenue
Gross Profit
% of Rev

SG&A
% of Rev

Engineering & Research


% of Rev

EBITDA
Depreciation
% of Rev

EBITA
% of sales

(Interest Expense)/income
JV w/ Rabobank, equity method
Amortization of Intangibles
(other expenses)/income
Pre-tax Income
Taxes
Tax Rate
Minority Interest (income)/loss
Net Income
EPS
Dividends
payout %

Diluted Shares Outstanding


Balance Sheet
Cash
Short-term debt
Long-term debt
Total debt
net debt / (cash)
Minority Interest
PP&E
Goodwill, gross
Goodwill, net
Assets
Equity
Tangible Equity

-2%

-2%

2009
6,630

-2%

2010
6,897

-2%

2011
8,773

-2%

2012
9,962

-2%

2013
10,787

-2%

2014
9,724

-2%

est.
2015
8,405

est.
2016
8,405

est.
2017
8,990

est.
2018
9,667

est.
2019
10,743

-13.6%

0.0%

7.0%

7.5%

11.1%

701
(247)

733
(254)

868
(262)

1,004
(269)

1,127
(278)

-2%

-2%

-2%

-2%

-2%

410

584

251

347

631

765

949

734

454

479

606

735

849

6.0%

6.9%

3.8%

5.0%

7.2%

7.7%

8.8%

7.5%

5.4%

5.7%

6.7%

7.6%

7.9%

(24)
30
(18)
(41)
358
(111)
-34.0%
0
246
2.55
0.00

(33)
39
(19)
(20)
551
(165)
-32.2%
0
386
3.95
0.00

(43)
38
(18)
(35)
192
(57)
-36.7%
0
136
1.44
0.00

(33)
50
(18)
(20)
325
(104)
-38.0%
0
221
2.29
0.00

(30)
49
(22)
(19)
609
(25)
-4.4%
(2)
583
5.94
0.00

(58)
54
(49)
(57)
654
(138)
-23.0%
6
522
5.30
0.00

(58)
48
(48)
(40)
851
(259)
-32.2%
5
597
6.01
0.40

(58)
53
(41)
(96)
592
(188)
-34.8%
6
404
4.43
0.44

(29)
54
(40)
(60)
379
(120)
-37%
0
259
3.01
0.48

(27)
55
(39)
(40)
429
(138)
-37%
0
290
3.57
0.54

(27)
56
(38)
(40)
557
(185)
-37%
0
372
4.58
0.69

(25)
57
(38)
(40)
689
(234)
-37%
0
455
5.60
0.84

(22)
58
(38)
(40)
807
(277)
-37%
0
530
6.52
0.98

0.0

0.0%

0.0%

6.7%

9.9%

15.9%

15.0%

15.0%

15.0%

15.0%

96.6

0.0

97.7
1.1%

0.0

94.1
-3.7%

0.0

96.4
2.4%

98.1
1.8%

98.6
0.5%

99.4
0.8%

91.2
-8.2%

86.0
-5.7%

81.3
-5.5%

81.3
0.0%

81.3
0.0%

81.3
0.0%

582
403
294
697
114
0
753
666
666
4,788
2,043
1,377

546
0
625
625
79
6
811
666
587
4,955
2,020
1,433

653
193
454
647
(6)
8
943
666
634
5,062
2,401
1,767

720
0
443
443
(277)
1
1,223
666
633
5,437
2,659
2,027

724
60
1,410
1,470
745
36
1,223
1,195
1,195
7,257
3,031
1,837

781
251
1,035
1,286
505
33
1,406
1,195
1,192
7,722
3,482
2,289

1,047
312
938
1,250
203
35
1,602
1,195
1,179
8,439
4,045
2,866

364
94
998
1,092
728
48
1,530
1,195
1,193
7,396
3,497
2,304

620

590

779

1,065

1,347

1,092
472
48
1,530
1,195
1,193
7,364
3,465
2,272

1,092
502
48
1,530
1,195
1,193
7,360
3,461
2,269

1,092
313
48
1,530
1,195
1,193
7,676
3,777
2,585

1,092
27
48
1,530
1,195
1,193
8,063
4,164
2,971

1,092
(256)
48
1,530
1,195
1,193
8,514
4,615
3,422

10

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

est.
2015

est.
2016

est.
2017

est.
2018

est.
2019

18
116
134
27
0
0.0%
459
6.7%
98
(141)
-2.1%
0
8
(121)
(86)
6
0
0
0
(3)
0
14
0

19
127
147
47
0
0.0%
481
5.7%
(288)
(251)
-3.0%
0
0
37
1
5
0
0
0
(33)
0
(116)
(3)

18
130
148
(15)
0
0.0%
611
9.2%
84
(215)
-3.2%
0
0
(61)
(17)
3
1
0
0
37
0
47
(5)

18
136
154
19
0
0.0%
488
7.1%
44
(167)
-2.4%
0
1
(99)
(82)
1
0
(25)
0
0
0
12
(12)

22
152
174
(110)
1,457
16.6%
793
9.0%
80
(300)
-3.4%
0
0
689
(1,018)
2
(2)
(35)
(8)
0
0
(29)
(6)

49
181
230
4
1,491
15.0%
961
9.6%
(90)
(341)
-3.4%
0
(18)
(223)
(3)
1
(1)
(20)
(16)
0
0
7
3

48
212
259
45
1,705
15.8%
970
9.0%
(105)
(392)
-3.6%
(39)
(1)
(59)
(10)
3
(3)
0
(10)
0
0
(16)
(6)

41
239
280
(27)
1,924
19.8%
1,042
10.7%
(219)
(302)
-3.1%
(41)
(500)
(102)
(130)
3
(6)
(4)
0
0
0
(27)
(13)

40
247
286
0
1,597
19.0%
714
8.5%
327
(325)
-3.9%
(41)
(250)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

39
254
293
0
1,597
19.0%
714
8.5%
0
(319)
-3.8%
(44)
(250)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

38
262
300
0
1,691
18.8%
809
9.0%
(95)
(333)
-3.7%
(56)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

38
269
308
0
1,752
18.1%
870
9.0%
(61)
(348)
-3.6%
(68)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

38
278
316
0
1,849
17.2%
967
9.0%
(97)
(387)
-3.6%
(79)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Working Capital
Current Assets (minus cash)
2,139
Current Liabilities (minus debt)
1,681
Current Assets
2,722
Current Liabilities
2,083
Current Assets/Current Liabilities, adj.
1.3
Inventory
1,134
days
73.4
Accounts Receivable
766
days
41.0
Accounts Payable
827
days
53.6
Trade Working Capital
1,074
% of sales
15.7%
Trade W/C Days
61
days
Fixed Asset Turnover
9.1
PP&E/Depreciation
5.6

2,459
1,978
3,005
1,979
1.2
1,390
66.5
816
34.3
1,027
48.9
1,178
14.0%
52
9
10.4
5.5

2,136
1,525
2,789
1,718
1.4
1,187
84.6
732
42.6
644
54.9
1,275
19.2%
72
(20)
7.0
6.4

2,401
1,913
3,121
1,913
1.3
1,234
78.4
909
43.4
683
43.0
1,459
21.2%
79
(6)
5.6
7.9

2,938
2,145
3,663
2,206
1.4
1,560
72.9
994
39.6
937
42.2
1,617
18.4%
70
9
7.2
8.0

3,173
2,213
3,955
2,464
1.4
1,703
76.0
925
35.2
888
42.5
1,739
17.5%
69
2
7.1
7.8

3,470
2,500
4,517
2,812
1.4
2,016
80.8
941
31.6
960
40.2
1,996
18.5%
72
(4)
6.7
7.6

3,164
2,123
3,528
2,217
1.5
1,750
89.8
964
35.7
670
38.9
2,044
21.0%
87
(14)
6.4
6.4

Cash Flow Items


Amortization of Intangibles
Depreciation
Depreciation and Amortization
Other Non Cash
Working Capital
% of Revenue
Working Capital, adjusted
% of Revenue
Working Capital (use)/ source
(Capital Expenditures)
% of Revenue
(Dividends)
New Equity
New Debt
(Acquire)
Divest
Minority Interest
Investments / Loans to Affiliates
Sale of Interest in Affiliates
Liquidity Management
Asset Management
Foreign Exchange
Other

Returns
ROE
ROA
ROCE
ROCE, Operating (no goodwill)
Net Debt/EBITDA
Net Debt/EBITA
EBITA/ Interest Expense

12%
5%
14%
22%
0.2
0.3
17.0

19%
8%
20%
31%
0.1
0.1
17.6

6%
3%
7%
10%
(0.0)
(0.0)
5.8

9%
4%
9%
13%
(0.6)
(0.8)
10.4

20%
9%
19%
30%
1.0
1.2
20.9

16%
7%
17%
25%
0.5
0.7
13.3

16%
7%
17%
25%
0.2
0.2
16.4

11%
5%
13%
19%
0.7
1.0
12.6

7%
4%
8%
13%
0.7
1.0
15.6

8%
4%
9%
13%
0.7
1.0
18.0

10%
5%
11%
16%
0.4
0.5
22.6

11%
6%
13%
19%
0.0
0.0
29.4

12%
6%
14%
21%
(0.2)
(0.3)
38.4

Interest Income
% of cash
Interest Expense
% of debt
Net Interest (expense)/income

26
4.5%
(50.5)
0.0%
(24.1)

34
6.3%
(67.4)
0.0%
(33.2)

22
3.4%
(65.7)
0.0%
(43.3)

31
4.3%
(64.0)
0.0%
(33.3)

29
4.0%
(59.0)
0.0%
(30.2)

20
2.6%
(77.7)
-6.0%
(57.6)

21
2.0%
(78.8)
-6.3%
(58.0)

16
1.5%
(54.6)
-5.0%
(38.9)

4
1.0%
(32.8)
-3.00%
(29.1)

6
1.0%
(32.8)
-3.00%
(26.6)

6
1.0%
(32.8)
-3.00%
(26.9)

8
1.0%
(32.8)
-3.00%
(25.0)

11
1.0%
(32.8)
-3.00%
(22.1)

48.0
(250)
(5.2)

52.8
(250)
(4.7)

58.1
0
0.0

63.9
0
0.0

70.3
0
0.0

Buyback
Price
Total Amount
Number of shares, implied

11

12

13

14

Вам также может понравиться