EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it
effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter
in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to
prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________
Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates
for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that
"an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to
"since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On
the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte
informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of
time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already
lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate
of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20,
1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in
SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the
same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of
the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was
the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought
to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has

always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or

residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the
petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating
that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer
the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District
and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent
in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a
bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation
of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out
of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill
did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective,
as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of
the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free
and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of
March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after
the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy,
and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that
the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and,
therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She
averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or
domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could
have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying
affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, to which she always intended
to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that
she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she
has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of
the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her
registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for
the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow
respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban.
She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to
it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest

misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate
of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of
her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which
she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not
cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual
and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because
there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In
fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of
"Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of
respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake
or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an
amendment may be made, she cited the case ofAlialy
v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the
case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of
the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily
to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The
Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as
a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment
cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years
of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected
is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which
adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is
to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of
manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the
election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month
period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was
"since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7
months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of
candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which
reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6
months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition).
Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be reregistered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates
of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited
period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which
on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the
respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing

discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with
the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been
considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96
Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in
1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan,
Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro
Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a
resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more
than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face
of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except
for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In
1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was
again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila
and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could
not have served these positions if she had not been a resident
of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992,
she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a
matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting
for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of
voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood
up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila.
This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa,
Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention
to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in
different places and on several occasions declared that she
was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place
when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In
the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court
explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There
must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically
be animus manendi withanimus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a
voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of
that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there
must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.

Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always

intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice
of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to
show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed
intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a
resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a
resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year,
petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued
by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident
of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a
resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass
show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the
same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a
second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner
be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner
averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections
for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May
8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that
the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes
compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to
the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from
running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte
and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and
Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified
into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election

purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of
one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the
period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said
Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8,
1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division
reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled
concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While
the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency
to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual
residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the
House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.
As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in
our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of
civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean
an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes
the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence
in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the
purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.
One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business,
or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal
for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor
of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we
laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence.
"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for
an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places

of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of

domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no
length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile
are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. .
. is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention
to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine
in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein
to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is
the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and
other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere
absence of an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change
of domicile.

concept that it should be by domicile and not physical

residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given
to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the
same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner
Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement
mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of
what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's
Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly
ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his
or her disqualification.

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members

of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section
merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that
is, in the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from
the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. 29

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed

an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space
provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry
obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay
in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided.
These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the
COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with
a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to
make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent
Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered
in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would
reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for
residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election
thus:

xxx xxx xxx

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I

think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,

Tolosa, Leyte

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence

qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond
doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to
wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my
question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty
especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her
place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down
her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing

down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.

This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a
piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could
not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second
Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April
24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner)
studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution
additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that
petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in
the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to
the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965,
following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a
voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could
not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident
of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual
does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss
of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood
up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for
election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who
has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of
abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an
elector in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating
every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,

34

We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener
pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of
course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation,
or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to
return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional
or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business activities; so
there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications
to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity
to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration,

the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence

of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation
why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing of every person
to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment
to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof
of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited
statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence
on residence in election law and the deliberations of the
constitutional commission but also the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts
which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift
verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old,
she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City).
She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School,
still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with
her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in
the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married exPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman
of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and
her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November
1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate
of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by
COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades.
None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover,
while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban,
reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons.
Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close

relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by

appointment, always with either her influence or consent.
These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of
the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in
our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did
not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban
was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live
there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein
for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in
said place by merely expressing her intention to live there
again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile,
once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows
that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law.
This domicile was not established only when her father brought
his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's
averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these
criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence
be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that
an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For
there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption
that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the
use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are
well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific
area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between
domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a
person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact
while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family.
But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the
concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female
spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that
the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in
favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que
fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con
justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido
transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia"
in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article
clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to
a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover,
this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase
"cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same
provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the
family to another home or place of actual residence. The article
obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the
possibility of transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his
family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of
actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in
harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify
the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife
bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This
difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only
by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual
residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under
Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article
110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live
together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband
and wife are physically together. This takes into account the
situations where the couple has many residences (as in the
case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer
to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be
with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is
illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not
to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various)
residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as

used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with
"domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate
decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose
and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are
used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from
one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the
physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have
two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the
place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence
has been established in one place, there be an intention to
stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in
some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the
husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad
principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has
recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be
compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either
allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her
husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her
original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new
one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a]
married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate
from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage
where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that
the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to
choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where
the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately
from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting
to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could
not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt.
In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is
not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt
to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process
of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the
purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses
to live under the same roof; and he experience of those
countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel
the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly
the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if
the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a
mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case
of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the
other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52),
decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was

not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a

decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by
the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in
appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one
court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a
preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his
domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of
the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish
Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine
evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In
other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc.,
1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain
appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial
de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile,
and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her
possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of
the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which
might accrue to her from the property which she had brought
to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear
that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile
was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences
that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control
of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience
to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then
Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by
virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's
actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is
that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence,
among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte.
There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as
his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed
any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner
gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose
her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial
domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code
of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the
Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted
by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69)
distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in
Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in
the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by
making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may

mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar
as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and
obligations of husband and wife the term residence should
only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained
a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right
to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not
only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin
(assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile.
This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban
and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos
family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in
her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone
straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her
"homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts
of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual
residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our
discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a
new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be
highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her
original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a
positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist
within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife
gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and
domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh
heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had
already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were
rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the
election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which
has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of
judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does
not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute
had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the
same view held by several American authorities, this court
inMarcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is

often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being
that less injury results to the general public by disregarding
than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of
a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within
which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel,
it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of
statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the
mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim
and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the
essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC
should have abstained from rendering a decision after the
period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked
jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasijudicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely
on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a
given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A.
6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that
the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear
and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of
B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House
of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has
no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately
make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality
of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on
such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law,
even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating
power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred
ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves
bending established principles of principles of law to deny an
individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in
doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May
11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870
Petitioner,
- versus DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., G.R. No. 158633
Petitioner,
- versus DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 161658
Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 3, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among
other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall
be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of
the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug
testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which
will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall
be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of
secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the schools student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a
random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a
criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those
found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject
to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules
and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent
portions of the said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory
drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they
are electing and they will be assured that only those who can
serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority
vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws,
RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the
following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory
drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both
national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug
test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed
with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two
(2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of
those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who
failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of

candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with
the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of
those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x
x

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer,

also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and

file drug test certificate.No person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated
under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein
required. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Issue on Locus Standi

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic

and a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,
[1]
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In
it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided
for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article
VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election,
is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that
both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must
first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision
in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as
they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at

bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and
Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and
Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation
of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.[2]
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be
exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which
involves the statute sought to be reviewed. [3] But even with the
presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may
refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite
standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish
that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [5]
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure;
hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.[6] There is no doubt
that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for
the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing
since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the
petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding
SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus
standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and
the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of
Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute
undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that,
subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate
for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2)
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification
to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member
of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise
modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, [7] or
alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be,
are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however,
as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the
powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter,
and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is
the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of
legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.

requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug

clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test.Viewed, therefore,
in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free
bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled
before or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state
that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those
covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not
adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision
deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that
the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office
of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the
mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon
without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms,
it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized
elections and the candidates running in that electoral event.
Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity
as an implementing issuance.

[10]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is

subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of
Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate
for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC,
to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in
the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.[13]
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the

unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA
9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA
9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out
illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well being of [the]
citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policydeclaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit
by the state of an intensive and unrelenting campaign against
the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and
projects.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of
Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS,
JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of
representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando
for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative
for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9
January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed
the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on
Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission
on Elections, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House
of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section
67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the
Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the
Commission on Elections which states that the Honorable
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del
Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in
Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat,
performing an administrative act, did not include the name of
the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the
provision of the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which
states: Any elective official whether national or local running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be consideredipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto'is
defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act itself by the
mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his
certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed
himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives; and,
therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and
will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a
letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent
Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my
duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." The
record does not indicate what action was taken on this
communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his
bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for
such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his
name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all
proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid
the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and

disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other

persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from
performing his duties and from exercising his rights and
privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from
his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He,
however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as
congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary
thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members
of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term
of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well
as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may
be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2,
Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of
the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." On the other hand, the grounds by which such term
may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any
other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for
disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of
the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to
these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the
shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not
provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the intention of
the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of a
Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very
simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution.
They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional
Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the
ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by
respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is
contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently
concludes that respondents acted without authority. He further
maintains that respondents' so-called "administrative act" of
striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as
Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of
the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office
as only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that
he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a
congressman holds another office or employment that
forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not
equivalent to holding another office or employment.

In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected

member of the House of Representatives be recognized, is
anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in
this petition:
A.IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE
UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE
RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE
THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM
EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND
DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the
Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the
voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67
falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office
enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the
Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds
mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition,
other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of
Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction
of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold
public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of
Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from
claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing
laws. They further maintain that their questioned
"administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not
involve any encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section
2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an
office, other than the one for which he has been lastly elected,
shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment
of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this
rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial,
municipal or city official running for an office, other than the
one which he is actually holding, shall be considered
resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local
elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. Any elective
provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district
officer running for an office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso

facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his
term of office commences, or within ten days after his
proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day.
His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be
considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he
has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes
beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. Governors,
mayors, members of various sanggunians, or barangay
officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the
legislature included in the enumeration of elective public
officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the
moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for
another office, except for President and Vice-President. The
advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES: In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the
1971 Election Code, the provision seems to be different I
think this is in Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or
municipal district officer running for an office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment
of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in
departing or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old
Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to
change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the
rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.): I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr.
Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the
people must be given the right to choose any official who
belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for
another office. However, because of the practice in the past
where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did
not assume the office, because of that spectacle the
impression is that these officials were just trifling with the
mandate of the people. They have already obtained a mandate
to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for
mayor or for governor and yet when the people give them that
mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still
preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe,
Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest mandate must be the one
that will be given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of
Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of
Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.): Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this
proposal based on constitutional grounds. We did not propose
this amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the
Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office
other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resignednot because of abuse of facilities of power or the use
of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution,
we have this new chapter on accountability of public officers.
Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution. It states that (sic)
Article XIII, Section 1 Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of

responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain

accountable to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on
accountability of public officers? This only means that all
elective public officials should honor the mandate they have
gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says
that: 'Members of the Batasan shall serve for the term of 6
years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of
barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely
included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a
Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people
and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be
allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other
position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because
his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you
allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated
to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he
was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic)
intention to service the mandate of the people which was
placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso
facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the
accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public
officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or
facilities of his office, but it is because of the Constitution itself
which I said under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted
this new chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the
intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a Batasan Member files
the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want
to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than
the one he was elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a
certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or
relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should
therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he
feels he could be of better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the
Gentleman from Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is
the constitutional provision not only of the fact that Members
of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year
term for which we were elected, but because of this new
chapter on the accountability of public officers not only to the
community which voted him to office, but primarily because
under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the
elective public officers must serve their principal, the people,
not their own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr.
Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62 where
candidates or elective public officers holding offices other than
the one to which they were elected, should be considered ipso
facto resigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate
of candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the
1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on
"Accountability of Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned
statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water.
He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office
of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to
ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office
by discouraging them from running for another public office
and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that
should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their
former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict
that all public officials must serve the people with utmost

loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short
the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to
confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly
distinguished by the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be
extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the
period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure)
may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power
of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may
not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of
the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official
covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another
office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure,
not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is
allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of
shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does
not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such
constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4)
grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the
tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive.
As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the
expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall
bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others.
Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other
grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes
are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the
office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the
legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be
preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his
tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for in
the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never
intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal
concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by
enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed
to be created. This Court has enunciated the presumption in
favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be
applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a
statute and only those things expressed in such positive
affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not
mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of
legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a
constitutional command. This maxim expresses a rule of

construction and serves only as an aid in discovering

legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office
under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough
to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the Constitutional
Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG: Could I address the clarificatory question to
the Committee? The term 'voluntary renunciation' does not
only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: It is also a recurring phrase all over the
constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly
what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to
abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE: Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he
cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any
given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG: Is the Committee saying that the term
voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment and
resignation?
MR. DAVIDE: It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office
constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of
the elective office presently being held is evident from this
exchange between then Members of Parliament Arturo
Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO: My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the
person ... my, shall we say, basis is that in one case the person
is intending to run for an office which is different from his own,
and therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal
significance, an intention to relinquish his office.

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another

office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the
elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as
petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The
ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of
voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another
office having been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg.
881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House
of Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and
functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both
the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from
the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67,
Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections
communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner
had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of
Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by
the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX
of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These
officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason
for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of
public business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.

MR. TOLENTINO: Yes ...

MR. RONO: And in the other, because he is running for the
same position, it is otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO: Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you
going to compel a person to quit an office which he is only
intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear,
must be definite.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public

office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit
of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such
regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his office.

MR. RONO: Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm
saying that while I do not disagree with the conclusion that the
intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of
the certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's
not just an intention; it's already there.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of

R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced
that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon
the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only
the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing
save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:

Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feleciano, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and

Regalado, JJ., concur.

... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of
filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into
account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon
future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the
vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy. ...

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of
Representatives have no power, in purported implementation
of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the
name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents
to represent them in Congress.

The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali

Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical,
politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I
submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the
Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of
fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be
particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political
respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and
attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress
cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for
disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither
can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining
Constitution. This is a true for the President and the members
of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal
found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures.
They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the
unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is
for this reason that the court should ensure that what the
Constitution provides must be followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of
Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior
(Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral
Tribubal in an election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See
Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an
enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated
long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881,
Article IX, Section 67 provides:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the
grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not
exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical
causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital
bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify
in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its
members for reasons other than those found in the
Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It
is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign
country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a
disqualification against running for public office. Whether or
not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is
in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a
matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the
proper case and controversy. My point is Congress cannot by
statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for
disqualification or removal of its members. Only the
Constitution can do it.

The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 namely, Section 2

of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep.
Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election
Code does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they
strengthen the case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective
officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a
certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers.
Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe
causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal
officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional
officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature
during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law
period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of
a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation
from one's current position. It was also a recognition that such
a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be
in the constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary
renunciation of one's public office? In other words, did the
Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the
meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the
Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985
when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a
certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the
House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I
see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang
Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and
implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary
renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in
the context of constitutional requirements should not be
treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a
person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of
ourconstitutional history, running for a local government
position was not considered a voluntary renunciation.
Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier
years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his
present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the
respondents nor this Court can state that heintended to
renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for
Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the
privilege of an existing interpretation of "voluntary
renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation
adopted by the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the
Court should also be guided by the principle that all
presumptions should be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing
with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the
House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing
with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress, as
against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act'
of the respondents.

Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in

favor of representation and strictly against
disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should
only be by due process of law, both substantive and
procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra
vires, administrative act' of the respondents. (Reply to
Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article
XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add
to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman
Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with
the mandate of his people. He wanted to serve a greater
number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner.
He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on
Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of
victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to
continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of
accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to
this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.
# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of
Representatives have no power, in purported implementation
of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the
name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents
to represent them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali
Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical,
politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I
submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the
Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of
fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be
particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political
respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and
attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress
cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for
disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither
can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining
Constitution. This is a true for the President and the members
of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal
found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures.
They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the
unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is
for this reason that the court should ensure that what the
Constitution provides must be followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of
Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);

B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior

(Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral
Tribubal in an election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See
Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an
enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated
long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881,
Article IX, Section 67 provides:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the
grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not
exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical
causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital
bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not justify
in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its
members for reasons other than those found in the
Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It
is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign
country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a
disqualification against running for public office. Whether or
not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is
in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a
matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the
proper case and controversy. My point is Congress cannot by
statute or disciplinary action add to the causes for
disqualification or removal of its members. Only the
Constitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 namely, Section 2
of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep.
Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election
Code does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they
strengthen the case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective
officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a
certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers.
Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe
causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal
officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional
officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature
during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law
period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of
a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation
from one's current position. It was also a recognition that such
a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be
in the constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary
renunciation of one's public office? In other words, did the
Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the
meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the
Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985
when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a

certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the

House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I
see no reason why the passage of a statute by the Batasang
Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and
implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary
renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in
the context of constitutional requirements should not be
treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced from a
person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of
ourconstitutional history, running for a local government
position was not considered a voluntary renunciation.
Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier
years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his
present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the
respondents nor this Court can state that heintended to
renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for
Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the
privilege of an existing interpretation of "voluntary
renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation
adopted by the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the
Court should also be guided by the principle that all
presumptions should be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing
with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the
House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing
with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress, as
against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act'
of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in
favor of representation and strictly against
disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should
only be by due process of law, both substantive and
procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra
vires, administrative act' of the respondents. (Reply to
Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article
XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add
to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman
Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with
the mandate of his people. He wanted to serve a greater
number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner.
He claims (a mistaken claim according to the Commission on
Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of
victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to
continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of
accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to
this specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
2 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 24.
3 Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 30.
4 Rollo, 8 and 14.
5 June 1941.
6 Emphasis supplied.
7 Emphasis supplied.

8 No. 1296.
9 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 8 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.
10 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.
11 Compared to the provision in the 1973 Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with
the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall
remain accountable to the people."
12 Memorandum for Respondents, 9.
13 Underscoring supplied.
14 Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104.
15 McKittrick vs. Wilson, 350 M 486, 166 SW2d 499, 143 ALR 465.
16 People ex rel. Fleming vs. Shorb, 100 Cal 537 P. 163.
17 Am Jur. 2d, p. 63.
18 People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90; Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30; Paredes,
et al. vs. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6.
19 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. vs. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 SW 421.
20 State vs. Driscoll, 54 P. 2d 571, 576, 101 Mont. 348.
21 Garrison vs. City of Shreveport, 154 So. 622, 624, 179 La. 605.
22 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 591, 19 July to 6 August
1986.
23 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985, Underscoring supplied.
24 1 July 1967, 20 SCRA 620, 625.
25 Phil. 94, 196.
26 Section 8, Rule III, Rules of the House of Representatives.
27 Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil 818.
28 Burton vs. U.S., 202 U.S. 344.
29 Am Jur 926.

EN BANC
ARTURO
M.
TOLENTINO
and
ARTURO
C.
MOJICA, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and
SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC
01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and
Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No.
01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as
Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01006 declared official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators
proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January
2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as VicePresident. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February
2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on
8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 (Resolution No. 84)
certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate.
Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the
regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6year term each, were due to be elected in that election.
[1]
Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial
candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.[2]
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the
election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del
Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally
proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution
No. 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators
shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13 th)
Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed VicePresident.[3] Respondents Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio
Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in
Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo
Mojica (petitioners), as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant
petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as
respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving
the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special
election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly,

petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005

in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No.
01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as
required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A. No.
6645);[4] (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate
in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election
under the special or regular elections as allegedly required
under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; [5] and,
consequently,
(3)
it
failed
to
specify
in the Voters Information Sheet thecandidates seeking election
under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646
(R.A. No. 6646).[6] Petitioners add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the
senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without
distinction such that there were no two separate Senate
elections held simultaneously but just a single election for
thirteen seats, irrespective of term.[7]
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held
simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be
distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results.To support their claim, petitioners
cite the special elections simultaneously held with the regular
elections of 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill
the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P.
Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their
tenures in the Senate.[8] Petitioners point out that in those
elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for
the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections
from the votes cast for the candidates running under the
special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the
winners in each of those elections.[9]
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining
order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining
COMELEC to Comment on the petition.

order,

we required

On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the

results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006
declaring official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators
proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took
their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the
Court required petitioners to file an amended petition
impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents.
Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they
reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and,
in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all
claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated by Senator
Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and
Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of
the petition and on petitioners standing to litigate. Honasan
also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his
proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition

and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction.
For his part, Recto, as the 12 th ranking Senator, contends he is
not a proper party to this case because the petition only
involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in
the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo
warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is
the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant
three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to
determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his
office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not
well-founded.[10] Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the
Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant
petition shows, however, that what petitioners are questioning
is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which
Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namely:
(1) a declaration that no special election was held
simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2)
to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won in the
special election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and
01-006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the
winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers
on COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain
requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special
election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine
Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator.
Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans proclamation
and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners
cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the instant petition.

Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to

command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an act
threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[11]
Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already
done.[12] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness,
courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.[13] Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol,
[14]
we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order
canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the petition
was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted
in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order
sought to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections
and yet the question may not be decided before the date of
such elections, the mootness of the petition is no bar to its
resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant
case. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a
vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to
comply with requirements on the conduct of such special
election is likely to arise in every such election. Such question,
however, may not be decided before the date of the election.
On Petitioners Standing
Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the
instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners do
not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds.
Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury
because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act.[15] The requirement of standing, which
necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues,[16] relates to
the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual
cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[18]
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will
indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity
as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001,
petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance.
This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal
measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who
voted in that election.[19] Neither have petitioners alleged, in
their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due
course to the petition because in the special election held on
14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such
funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any
improper purpose.[20]

On the Mootness of the Petition

COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001
of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July
2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant
petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot
and academic.

On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on

standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to
voters suits involving the right of suffrage. [21] Also, in the recent
case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] we
gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP questioned the

validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the

Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro
Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too
general an interest. We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution.
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the
IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to
take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner
is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the
petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover,
because peace and order are under constant threat and
lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go
away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves
the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the
instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise
important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering
that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special
election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the
House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law,
thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress
passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least
eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at
least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members
of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a
resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy
and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election
to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official

communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a

special election by the President of the Senate or by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of
the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such
resolution or communication, stating among other things the
office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if
within the said period a general election is scheduled to be
held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with
such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166
amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:

subsequently

Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or
House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the
expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a
special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60)
days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of
the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate,
the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one
year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special
election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall
not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90)
after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in
the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices
to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial
election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular
elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645?
A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct
of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they contain nothing
which would amount to a compliance, either strict or
substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions [24] or even
in its press releases[25] did COMELEC state that it would hold a
special election for a single three-year term Senate seat
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor
did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as
winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13 th highest
number of votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure,
assuming it did fail, to comply with the requirements in Section
2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly
rendered Honasans proclamation as the winner in that special
election void. More precisely, the question is whether the
special election is invalid for lack of a call for such election and

for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by

which the winner in the special election is to be determined.
For reasons stated below, the Court answers in the negative.
COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the
Special Election Did Not Negate the Calling of such
Election

election and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so

notifies them.
No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the
Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the
Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters

The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the

time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the
legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such
call, is indispensable to the elections validity. [26] In a general
election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the
election is valid without any call by the body charged to
administer the election.[27]

The test in determining the validity of a special election in

relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is
whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a
sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the
special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there
was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small
percentage of voters would be void.[32]

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a

statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a
vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the
date at which the special election is to be held and operates as
the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the
time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the
body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed
to do so.[28] This is because the right and duty to hold the
election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the
election by some authority[29] and the law thus charges voters
with knowledge of the time and place of the election. [30]

The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001

special senatorial election covers two matters. First, that
COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single
three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular
elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC
will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the
13th highest number of votes in the special election. Petitioners
have neither claimed nor proved that COMELECs failure to give
this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of the special senatorial election or led
them to believe that there was no such special election.

Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place
for holding a special election but empowers some authority to
fix the time and place after the happening of a condition
precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is
considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the
election a nullity.[31]

Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since

COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election took
place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted in the
elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy
in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as
Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next
succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the
absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the
possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special
election, the office to be voted in that election, and the manner
by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual
notice could come from many sources, such as media reports
of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda
during the campaign.[33]

In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself

provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with
the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special
election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001
could not be held at any other time but must be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on
14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of
this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the
additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case
involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of
Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special
election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the
vacancy should take place at least one year before the
expiration of the term. The time of the election is left to the
discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it
holds the special election within the range of time provided in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory
the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for
COMELEC to call x x x a special election x x x not earlier than
60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancy and give notice of the office to be filled. The
COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will nullify any
attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it
will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the congressional
district involved to know the time and place of the special

More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of

Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the instant
petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for
Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELECs omission
prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as
to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court
is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is
impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are
unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the
great body of the voters have been prevented by violence,
intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise. [34]
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the
electorates will and let the results of the election stand,
despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of
the
elections.[35] This
is
but
to
acknowledge
the
purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as
ours, which is:

to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their

government, either in determining who shall be their public
officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for
that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted,
unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is
done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should
be counted and the election should not be declared
null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their
participation in the affairs of their government for mere
irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they
are in no way responsible. A different rule would make
the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater
importance than the duty itself.[36] (Emphasis in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing not Required
under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner
by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election
on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to
document separately the candidates and to canvass separately
the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements
exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC fix the date of the election, if
necessary, and state, among others, the office or offices to be
voted for. Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P.
Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on
Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns
and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These
provisions govern elections in general and in no way require
separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of
votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in
conducting the special election on 14 May 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84.Initially, the original draft of Resolution No.
84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad)
made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by
former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator Roco), the Senate
agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now
appears, that the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth
(13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC
and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters
further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now
consider Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 [later converted
to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the motion is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in
order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read
only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934
entitled

RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN

THE SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH
ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR
ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED
TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected
Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire
on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as VicePresident of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been
confirmed by a majority vote of all the members of both House
of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as
Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for
twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of the House of
Representatives, and all elective provincial city and municipal
officials shall be held on the second Monday and every three
years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as
it hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate
and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up
such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus
elected to serve only for the unexpired term.
Adopted,(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of
this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the
distinguished Majority Leader, Chairman of the Committee on
Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953,
there was a special election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As
a matter of fact, the one who was elected in that special
election was then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto
Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the
seat. In other words, the electorate had to cast a vote for a

ninth senator because at that time there were only eight to

elect a member or rather, a candidate to that particular seat.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a

guidance for the Comelec.

Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the

EDSA revolution, twice there were 24 candidates and the first
12 were elected to a six-year term and the next 12 were
elected to a three-year term.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.

My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this

election? Is the candidate with the 13th largest number of votes
going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or is there
going to be an election for a position of senator for the
unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are
leaving the mechanics to the Commission on Elections. But
personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate
obtaining the 13thlargest number of votes be declared as
elected to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the
Comelec to conduct such an election? Is it not the case that
the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am
rising here because I think it is something that we should
consider. I do not know if we can No, this is not a Concurrent
Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the
Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under
Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a resolution of this
Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a
special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular
case, by the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona,
as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a
slot for the particular candidate to fill up would be that
reserved for Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In other words, it
can be arranged in such a manner.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the
flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of
the forthcoming elections that will be held simultaneously as a
special election under this law as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise,
Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that
later, maybe it will be better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory
proposal because I do not believe that there will be anyone
running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and
campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is
the 13th candidate will be running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as
the intent of this resolution.

xxxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute
caucus, wordings to the effect that in the simultaneous
elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the special
election for this purpose.So we just nominate 13 and it is good
for our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less
expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be
less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this
resolution to be such a special election, maybe, we satisfy the
requirement of the law.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that

amendment and if there will be no other amendment, I move
for the adoption of this resolution.
xxxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we
adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this
resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the motion is approved.[37]
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to
use means and methods to conduct the special election within
the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the
Senates proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court
has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs wide

latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its

mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject
only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal
or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. [38] COMELECs
decision to abandon the means it employed in the 13
November 1951 and 8 November 1955 special elections and
adopt the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a
legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will
not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special senatorial
elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13
November 1951 and 8 November 1955 elections. That
COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is
no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion. As
we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is
intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the
case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may
err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created
free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with
its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere.[39]
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the
giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information
regarding a special election, are central to an informed
exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances
attendant to the present case have led us to conclude
that COMELECs failure to so call and give notice did not
invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May
2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future
elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly with all the
requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of
regular elections in general and special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.

[1]

As provided under Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 7166, as

amended.
[2]
Resolution No. 84 reads:
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was elected
Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term which
will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona
as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been
conferred by a majority vote of all the members of
both Houses of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as
Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for
twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of the
House of Representatives, and all elective provincial,
city and municipal officials shall be held on the second
Monday of May and every three years thereafter. Now,
therefore be it Resolved by the Senate, as it is hereby
resolved to certify as it hereby certifies, the existence
of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up said
vacancy through election to be held simultaneously
with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the
senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th)
highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. (Emphasis supplied)
[3]
Resolution No. 01-005 reads:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting [E]n [B]anc as
the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
Senators of the Philippines, officially canvassed in
open and public proceedings the certificates of
canvass of votes cast nationwide for senators in the
national and local elections conducted on May 14,
2001.
Based on the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass submitted
by seventy-eight (78) out of seventy-nine (79)
Provincial Boards of Canvassers, twenty (20) City
Boards of Canvassers of cities comprising one (1) or
more legislative districts, two (2) District Boards of
Canvassers of Metro Manila, and one (1) Absentee
Voting, and the remaining uncanvassed certificate of
canvass which will not anymore affect the results, the
Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the
National Board of Canvassers finds that the following
candidates for senators in said elections obtained as
of June 04, 2001 the following number of votes as
indicated opposite their names:

Name

Votes Garnered
(as of 4 June 20

NOLI DE CASTRO

16,157,811

JUAN M. FLAVIER

11,676,129

SERGIO R. OSMEA, III

11,531,427

Puno, J., please see dissenting opinion.

Vitug, J., joins the dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins J. Punos dissent.
Tinga, J., joins Justice Punos dissent.

FRANKLIN M. DRILON

11,223,020

RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR.

11,187,447

JOKER P. ARROYO

11,163,801

MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR.

11,084,884

FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN

10,877,989

EDGARDO J. ANGARA

10,746,843

PANFILO M. LACSON

10,481,755

LUISA P. EJERCITO ESTRADA

10,456,674

RALPH G. RECTO

10,387,108

GREGORIO G. HONASAN

10,364,272

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under

the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and
other election laws, the Commission on Elections
sitting En Banc as the National Board of Canvassers
hereby PROCLAIMS the above-named thirteen (13)
candidates as the duly elected Senators of
the Philippines in the May 14, 2001 elections. Based
on the certificates of canvass finally tabulated, the
first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six
(6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve
the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed VicePresident of the Philippines pursuant to Section 9,
Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9,
Article VI thereof, as implemented under Republic Act
No. 6645. (Emphasis supplied)
[4]
This provision states: The Commission on Elections shall fix
the date of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety
(90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office
or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if
within the said period a general election is scheduled
to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election.
[5]
This provision reads: Certificate of candidacy. No person
shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he
files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to

the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the
office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled
in the same election, and if he files his certificate of
candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be
eligible for any of them. However, before the
expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the
office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel
the certificate of candidacy for the other office or
offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not
affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
[6]
This provision reads: Certificates of Candidacy; Certified List
of Candidates. x x x The names of all registered
candidates immediately followed by the nickname or
stage name shall also be printed in the election
returns and tally sheets.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 5-7, 12-14.
[8]
Senator Roseller T. Lim was elected in the special election of
13 November 1951 while Senator Felisberto Verano
was elected in the special election of 8 November
1955.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 8-12.
[10]
Castro v. Del Rosario, 25 Phil. 611 (1967); Section 1(a), Rule
66, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[11]
Sections 1-2, Rule 65, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
[12]
Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (minute
resolution).
[13]
Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134856, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA
577; Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 343 Phil. 184 (1997);
Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997).
[14]
342 Phil. 467 (1997).
[15]
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R.
No. 96541, 24 August 1993, 225 SCRA 568.
[16]
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).
[17]
CONST., art. VIII, secs. 1 and 5(2).
[18]
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 352 Phil.
153 (1998).
[19]
See Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
[20]
Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95
SCRA 392 (internal citations omitted).
[21]
De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, 6 May 1992, 208
SCRA 420; Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7
(1967). See also Telecom & Broadcast Attys. of the
Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).
[22]
G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[23]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No.
141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[24]
E.g. Resolution No. 3258, dated 28 September 2000
(providing for the calendar of activities and periods of
prohibited acts in connection with the 14 May 2001
elections as amended by Resolution Nos. 3322, dated
5 October 2000; 3284, dated 20 October 2000; 3306,
dated 7 November 2000; 3426, dated 22 December
2000; and 3359, dated 6 February 2001); Resolution
No. 3632, dated 1 March 2001 (canceling the
certificates of candidacy of nuisance senatorial
candidates); and Resolution No. 3743, dated 12 March
2001 (providing for the general instructions to the
Boards of Election Inspectors on the casting and
counting of votes).
[25]
E.g. undated COMELEC pamphlet entitled Frequently Asked
Questions on the May 14, 2001 Elections.

[26]

[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

[35]

[36]
[37]

[38]

26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70

(1965).
Ibid; ibid.
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 282 (1996).
Ibid.
McCoy v. Fisher, 67 S.E. 2d 543 (1951).
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70
(1965).
See 26 AM.
JUR. 2d Elections 292
(1996);
29
C.J.S. Elections 72 (1965).
Indeed,
the
fact
that
13
senators
were
due
to be elected in the 14 May 2001 elections and that
the senator elected to the 13th place will serve the
remaining term of Senator Guingona was published in
news reports (see Philippine Star, 9 February 2001,
pp. 1, 6 and Daily Tribune, 9 February 2001, pp. 1,
8; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1,
10; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Today, 8 February
2001, p. 10; Manila Bulletin, 9 February 2001, pp. 3,
8). Furthermore, the fact that the administration and
opposition coalitions each fielded 13 senatorial
candidates (and not only 12) was similarly given
extensive coverage by news publications (see
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10;
13 February 2001, pp. 1, A14; 14 February 2001, pp.
1, A20; Philippine Star, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 14
February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Today, 9 February 2001, pp.
1, 4; 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001,
pp. 1, 10; Manila Standard, 13 February 2001, pp. 1,
2; Malaya, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; 14 February
2001, pp. 1, 4; Daily Tribune 14 February 2001, pp. 1,
6; Manila Times, 14 February 2001, pp. 1,
2A; Philippine Star Ngayon, 13 February 2001, pp. 1,
4).
Florendo,
Sr. vs. Buyser, 129
Phil.
353
(1967); Capalla v. Tabiana,
63
Phil.
95 (1936); Kiamzon v. Pugeda, 54 Phil. 755 (1930);
Cailles v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 852 (1924). Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as amended, (Omnibus Election Code), on
failure of elections (resulting to the annulment of
elections), provides: SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes the election in any polling
place had not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall,
on the basis of a verified petition by an interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
Alcala v. Commission
on
Elections, 218
Phil.
322
(1984); Villareal v. Fornier, 84
Phil.
756
(1949);
Lucero v. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852 (1924).
Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918).
Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, 8
February 2001, pp. 49-54. (Emphasis supplied)
E.g. Cauton v. COMELEC, 126 Phil. 291 (1967).

[39]

Pugutan v. Abubakar,
150
Phil.
1
(1972) citing Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,
73 Phil. 237 (1941).

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25554

October 4, 1966

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta and Felixberto Serrano for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit
association duly incorporated and organized under the laws of
the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and
taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former
Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco,
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned
thereto by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking
to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing
or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964)
to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives
before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay,
present Auditor General, was substituted for Amable M.
Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided,
inter alia, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate
and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be
P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing
their present compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per
annum for the Presiding officers and members, respectively, as
set in the Constitution). The section expressly provided that
"the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution". Section 7
of the same Act provides "that the salary increase of the
President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary
increase of Congressmen and Senators.
The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965,
to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) contained the
following items for the House of Representatives:
SPEAKER
1.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives at
P16,000 from July 1 to December 29, 1965
and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 . . .
P29,129.00
MEMBERS
2.
One hundred three Members of the House of
Representatives at P7,200 from July 1 to December 29, 1965
and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966
2,032,866.00
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items
appear to be:
1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . .

P 16,000.00

2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . . .

165,600.00.

Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642)

implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act
4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative
of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in
1940, that provides as follows:

SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of

Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two
hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of traveling
expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of
Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such, increase. Until otherwise
provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators
elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic
Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the
term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written
protest from petitioners (Petition, Annex "A"), along the lines
summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the
Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law
involved (Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General evaded the
issue by suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought
from the Secretary of Justice (Annex "C", Petition). Conformably
to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed
the PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on November
26, 1965; but on or before January, 1966, and before the
Justice Secretary could act, respondent Aguiluz, as former
Acting Auditor General, directed his representative in
Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass in audit and approve
the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the
Appropriation Act in force; hence the filing of the present
action.
The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of
personality of petitioners to institute the action, for lack of
showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of the
House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the
answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with
the Constitutional provisions, insofar as present members of
the Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965,
subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand,
in short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of
the House of Representatives who approved the increase
suffices to make the higher compensation effective for them,
regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the
Solicitor General, as their counsel, need not give pause. As
taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law (Cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez,
L-23326, December 18, 1965; Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257;
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works L-10405, December 29,
1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825, December 24,
1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, L24022, March 3, 1965). Moreover, as stated in 52 Am. Jur.,
page 5:
The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as
such, sue to enjoin an unlawful expenditure or waste of state
funds is the minority doctrine.
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House
of Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to say that since
the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing
in audit and the approval of the payment of the
Representatives' increased salaries, and not the collection or
receipt thereof, only respondent auditors were indispensable or
proper parties defendant to this action.

These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to

the main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution
require that not only the term of all the members of the House
but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase
must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
Or, on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the
payment of the increased compensation to the members of the
House of Representatives who were elected after the
expiration of the term of those House members who approved
the increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of
office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the
approval of the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a
legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to
increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher
compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to
elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a
deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is
clearly felt" (Taada & Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting
period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to
"all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit,
without distinction or separation between them. This unitary
treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks
of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular
form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of
office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives
thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both
houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single
Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase "all the members of the
Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application
of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that
the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives)
must have expired before the increase in compensation can
become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in
favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact that the
enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire
Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not apportionable
between the two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as
reported by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296,
et. seq.), the committee on legislative power in the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it was decided that
the Legislature should be bicameral in form, initially
recommended that the increase in the compensation of
legislators should not take effect until the expiration of the
term of office of all members of the Legislature that approved
the increase. The report of the committee read as follows:
The Senator and Representatives shall receive for their
services an annual compensation of four thousand pesos
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances and
exclusive of travelling expenses to and from their respective
residences when attending sessions of the National Legislature,
unless otherwise fixed by law: Provided, That no increase in
this yearly compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the terms of office of all the Members of the
Legislature that approved such increase. (Emphasis supplied) .
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final
choice of a unicameral legislature, was carried over and made
more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional provision,
which read:
Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not
take effect until after the expiration of the term of office of the
Members of the National Assembly who may be elected

subsequent to the approval of such increase. (Aruego, 1, p.

297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally
approved and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the Constitution
of the Commonwealth, provided that:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of the Members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940
amendments to our fundamental law, the limitation assumed
its present form:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the
plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered. From the first
proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934
Convention down to the present, the intendment of the clause
has been to require expiration of the full term of all members
of the Legislature that approved the higher compensation,
whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to
circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in
its adoption.
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that
if the framers of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution had
intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the
Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the
increase, they would have just used the expression "term of all
the members of the Congress" instead of specifying "all the
members of the Senate and of the House". This is a distinction
without a difference, since the Senate and the House together
constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the
reason for specifying the component chambers was rather the
desire to emphasize the transition from a unicameral to a
bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to
the Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the
words "of the" before "House" in the provision being
considered, and in the use of the phrase "of the Senate and of
the House" when it could have employed the shorter
expression "of the Senate and the House". It was
grammatically correct to refer to "the members of the Senate
and (the members) of the House", because the members of the
Senate are not members of the House. To speak of "members
of the Senate and the House" would imply that the members of
the Senate also held membership in the House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term
of office of the Senators, as well as that of the Representatives,
must all expire the Constitution would have spoken of the
"terms" (in the plural) "of the members of the Senate and of
the House", instead of using "term" in the singular (as the
Constitution does in section 14 of Article VI), has been already
considered. As previously observed, the use of the singular
form "term" precisely emphasizes that in the provision in
question the Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers
as one single unit, and this conclusion is reinforced by the
expression employed, "until the expiration of the full term of
ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase".
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term
of the Senators before the effectivity of the increased
compensation would subject the present members of the
House of Representatives to the same restrictions as under the
Constitution prior to its amendment. It may well be wondered
whether this was not, in fact, the design of the framers of the
1940 constitutional amendments. For under either the original
limitation or the present one, as amended, as maximum delay

of six (6) years and a minimum of four (4) is necessary before

an increase of legislators' compensation can take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately
following an election, two assemblymen's terms, of 3 years
each, had to elapse under the former limitation in order that
the increase could become operative, because the original
Constitution required that the new emolument should operate
only after expiration of the term of assemblymen elected
subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an
assemblyman's term was then 3 years only. Under the
Constitution, as amended, the same interval obtains, since
Senators hold office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were
approved by the legislature on its last session just prior to an
election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the
original restriction, because to the last year of the term of the
approving assemblymen the full 3-year term of their
successors must be added. Once again an identical period
must elapse under the 1940 amendment: because one-third of
the Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a
given election four of the approving Senators' full six-year term
still remain to run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the
assemblymen elected in, say, 1935 were to approve an
increase of pay in the 1936 sessions, the new pay would not be
effective until after the expiration of the term of the
succeeding assemblymen elected in 1938; i.e., the increase
would not be payable until December 30, 1941, six years after
1935. Under the present Constitution, if the higher pay were
approved in 1964 with the participation of Senators elected in
1963, the same would not be collectible until December 30,
1969, since the said Senators' term would expire on the latter
date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original
Constitution) were to approve the increase in compensation,
not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new
compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four
years later, since the term of assemblymen elected in
November of 1938 (subsequent to the approval of the
increase) would end in December 30,1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is
approved in the 1965 sessions immediately preceding the
elections in November of that year, the higher compensation
would be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years
later, because the most recently elected members of the
Senate would then be Senators chosen by the electors in
November of 1963, and their term would not expire until
December 30, 1969.
This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the
original and the amended constitution can not be just due to
accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the
Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been
maintained unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows
how unfounded is the argument that by requiring members of
the present House to await the expiration of the term of the
Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in
compensation, they are placed in a worse position than under
the Constitution as originally written.
The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to
discourage the approval of increases of compensation just
before an election by legislators who can anticipate their
reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution
should not be nullified by resorting to technical and involved
interpretation of the constitutional mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased
compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20,
1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such

increased compensation may not be disbursed until December

30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966
Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the
increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also
violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is
hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the
fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to
authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even
prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of
Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and
enjoined from approving and passing in audit any
disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by
Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House
of Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No costs.
We concur in the foregoing opinion and in the concurring
opinions of Justices Bengzon, Zaldivar and Castro.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
Fully concurring with the ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, I
should like only to mention a few thoughts related to some
points contained therein.
As stated in the majority opinion, it is argued by respondents
that if it was intended that the increase should take effect at
the same time, the provision of the Constitution could have
been phrased as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Congress approving such increase.
They maintain that in specifying "the Senate" and "the House"
instead of just using the words "the Congress" the body
obviously considered that inasmuch as the terms of the
Representatives and Senators under the legislature provided
for, would not necessarily coincide, the effective date of the
increased salary of the Representatives could also be different
from that of the Senators.
The fact that "Congress" is not used in the provision in
question, in my opinion, is rather an argument for the
petitioner herein. "Congress" is not used, obviously because
after every four years the Congress is dissolved. On the other
hand, the term of a member of the Senate, being six years,
goes beyond the duration of one Congress and extends to that
of the next Congress. In other words, while the term of the
members of the House of Representatives coincides with the
lifetime of the Congress, the term of a member of the Senate
goes beyond the existence of one Congress.
The Constitution, instead, uses (1) "Senate" and "House of
Representatives" and (2) adds "all" before "the Members",
clearly intending that no increase in the compensation therein
provided for shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the most junior among the members of the Senate at
the time the increase was approved. Precisely, therefore,
because the Constitution speaks of "Senate" and "House of
Representatives" instead of "Congress", the prohibition against
effectivity continues even after the end of the Congress which
approved the measure and, which amounts to the same thing,
even after the end of the term of the members of the House of
Representatives approving the increase. In specifying "the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives approving such increase", the
Constitution leaves no doubt that until after the condition is

met as to the Senate, no increase in the compensation laid

down for Senators and Representatives shall take effect.
It is also contended by respondents that the Constitution in
using "term" instead of "terms" shows the clear intention to
consider the "term" of the Senators independently from that of
the Representatives. The contention is untenable. The
provision clearly uses "term" in the general sense. For,
otherwise, even in referring to members of the Senate alone, it
should have used "terms" since the Senators had originally
different terms of office (two, four and six years), as provided
for in Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution, a provision
contemporaneous with the one involved herein. Yet just the
same, the Constitution uses the would "term" (singular) to
cover all these different terms of office.
I am of the opinion therefore that no other course is open to
the Supreme Court in this case but to apply the provision of the
Constitution restricting the increase of salaries of Senators and
Representatives by subjecting it to a period of waiting. To
forestall the view that the Supreme Court thereby offends
equity, because the other Constitutional officers including
the members of said Court are already receiving their
increased salaries under Republic Act No. 4134, suffice it to
bear in mind that it was within the hands of the legislators
themselves if they had so desired, to have provided that the
salary increases of the aforesaid other Constitution officers
take effect at the same time as their own. In other words, if
they had thought it would be inequitable to grant salary
increases to others before they could receive their own salary
increase an argument which, I am glad to note, has not been
advanced they could have easily provided that the salary
increases therein given be effective December 30, 1969, as in
their case.
I consequently reiterate my concurrence.
ZALDIVAR, J., concurring:
During the third regular session of the Fifth Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines House Bill No. 6190 was approved,
and this bill was signed into law on June 20, 1964 by the
President of the Philippines and became Republic Act No. 4134.
Section 1, paragraph A of Republic Act 4134 provides, among
others, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate
and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be
forty thousand pesos, and that of the Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall be thirty-two thousand
pesos each. The paragraph ends with this sentence: "The
salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution."
The pertinent provision of the Constitution as far as the
effectivity of any law increasing the compensation of the
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives is
concerned reads as follows:
. . . No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase. . . . (Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution)
Inasmuch as House Bill No. 6190 was passed during the third
regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, in 1964,
said bill was approved by the House of Representatives whose
members were elected in the elections of November, 1961 and
whose term of office would expire on December 29, 1965; and
by the Senate whose membership was composed of: eight
Senators who were elected in November, 1959 and whose term
would expire on December 29, 1965; eight Senators who were
elected in November, 1961 and whose term would expire on
December 29, 1967; and eight Senators who were elected in
November, 1963 whose term would expire on December 29,
1969.

Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, writing the opinion of the Court in the
case now before Us, interpreting the effectivity clause in
paragraph A, Section 1 of Republic Act 4134 in relation to the
pertinent provision of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution,
herein-above quoted, says that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act 4134 for the Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives will not take effect until
December 30, 1969. I concur with this opinion because it will
not be until December 29, 1969 when the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
that approved the increase in 1964 would expire. And I also
agree with the opinion that in so far as Republic Act No. 4642
(Appropriation Law for the fiscal year 1965-1966) authorizes
the disbursement of the increased compensation for the
Members of the House of Representatives prior to December
30, 1960 violates the Constitution and must be held null and
void..
My opinion in this regard is based upon a personal knowledge
of how the constitutional proviso, Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution, which is now in question, became a part of our
present Constitution. It was the Second National Assembly
which amended our original Constitution. I was a humble
Member of the Second National Assembly, representing the
province of Antique.
The three important amendments that were incorporated in
our Constitution by the Second National Assembly in 1940
were the provisions regarding (1) the establishment of a
bicameral legislature composed of a House of Representatives
and a Senate, to take the place of the then existing unicameral
legislature known as the National Assembly; (2) the change in
the term of the office of the President of the Philippines, and
the Vice-President, which formerly was for a period of six
years, to that of four years, with the proviso that no person
shall serve as President for more than eight consecutive years;
and (3) the creation of the Commission on Elections.
It is regrettable that the deliberations of the Second National
Assembly on the 1940 amendments to the Constitution were
mostly done in caucuses behind closed doors, and the
discussions were not recorded. It was during the first special
sessions of the Second National Assembly in September, 1939
when discussions on proposed amendments to the Constitution
were held. It was only after the propose amendments had been
approved in caucuses when the amendments were embodied
in a resolution and submitted to the National Assembly in open
session. The amendments as approved in caucuses were
embodied in Resolution No. 38 and adopted on September 15,
1939. However, during the second regular sessions in 1940
Resolution No. 38 was amended by Resolution No. 73 which
was adopted on April 11, 1940. That is how the amendments
came to be known as the 1940 Amendments. Those
amendments were approved in a plebiscite that was held on
June 18, 1940.
I still have vivid recollections of the important points brought
up during the deliberations in caucus over proposed
amendments and of the agreements arrived at. I remember too
the influences that worked, and the pressures that were
brought to bear upon the Assemblymen, in the efforts to bring
about agreements on very controversial matters and thus
secure the insertion of the desired amendments to the
Constitution. The discussions on the proposed amendments
affecting the legislative branch of the government were
specially of interest to us then because we were in some way
personally affected, as most of us were interested in running
for reelection.
It is not my purpose here to impose on anyone my
recollections of matters that were brought up during our
caucuses then, but I only wish to emphasize the fact that my
concurring opinion in the decision of the case now before Us
has for its basis my honest and best recollections of what had
transpired, or what had been expressed, during the caucuses
held by the Members of the Second National Assembly in the
deliberations which later brought about the 1940 amendments.

I distinctly remember that the proposed amendment to change

the legislature from unicameral to that of bicameral, just as the
proposal to change the term of office of the President from six
years without reelection to that of four years with one
reelection, at first met very strong oppositon by a considerable
group of Assemblymen. But somehow the opposition was
finally subdued, so to say. In the case of the legislature, the
basic idea of having two chambers of the legislature one
chamber serving as a check to the other was accepted. It
was then considered as a wise idea to have the Senate as the
upper chamber, to be composed of members who would be
elected at large, and it was expected that those who would be
elected to the Senate would be men of national prestige;
prestigious because of their known integrity, in their record
and experience as a public servant, or in their prominence as a
successful member of his profession. It was even said, then,
that the Senate would be a training ground for future
Presidents of the nation. And so, when it was agreed that a
bicameral legislature would be provided in the Constitution,
the next matter that had to be considered was the tenure of
office of the members of each of the two chambers of the
legislature. As far as the terms of the members of the lower
chamber, to be known as the House of Representatives, there
was no disagreement over the idea that their term be for a
period of four years, to coincide with the term of the President.
But as far as the term of office of the members of the upper
chamber, to be known as the Senate, there was at first a
divergence of opinion. There was a group that supported the
idea that the term of the members of the upper chamber be
four years, similar to that of the House of Representatives, so
that in the national elections that would take place every four
years there would be elections for President, Vice-President,
and all the members of the Congress of the Philippines.
However, there was a very strong advocacy on the part of top
political leaders at that time that the Senate should be made a
continuing body, such that the complete membership of that
chamber should not be elected during the national elections
that would take place every four years.
Finally, it was agreed that the members of the Senate, which
was decided to be composed of twenty-four, would have a
term of six years, one-third of which number would be elected
every two years. The idea of having elections of one-third of
the membership of the Senate was adjusted to the situation
that in between two national elections there were the elections
for local officials. The question regarding the term of office of
the Members of the first Senate to be elected under the
Constitution as amended was settled by inserting a proviso
that the first senators elected should, in the manner provided
by law, be divided equally into three groups: the senators of
the first group to serve for a term of six years, those of the
second group to serve for a term of four years, and those of
the third group for a term of two years (Article VI, Section 3).
And for the purposes of the first elections under the amended
Constitution Commonwealth Act No. 666 was enacted by the
National Assembly providing, as far as the first Senate was
concerned, that "The Senate shall, within ten days after it shall
have been organized with the election of its President,
determine by lot which of the elected Senators shall belong to
the group who shall serve six years, which to the group who
shall serve for four years, and which to the group which shall
serve for two years." (Section 9, Com. Act No. 666)
When the matter regarding the compensation of the members
of both chambers came up for the deliberation, there were
proposals that the Senators be given more compensation than
the Members of the House of Representatives, and a number of
proposals were presented regarding the amount of
compensation that would be paid to the Senators or to the
Representatives, as the case may be. This matter was the
subject of long discussions. It was finally agreed that the
amount of compensation for the Senators and for the Members
of the House of Representatives be the same, and it was fixed
at P7,200.00 per annum each, including per diems and other
emoluments, exclusive only of travelling expenses in going to
and returning from the sessions. There was an increase of

P2,200.00 over the P5,000.00 per annum that the Members of

the National Assembly were receiving at the time. It is thus
seen that in the matter of compensation the sense of the
Members of the Second National Assembly who amended the
Constitution in 1940 was to provide for an equal compensation
for the Members of the Senate and to the Members of the
House of Representatives.
When the matter regarding the increase in the compensation
of the Senators and of the Representatives came up for
consideration, there was unanimity among the Assemblymen
in support of the idea that members of the Congress of the
Philippines may approve a law increasing their compensation,
but that no Member of the House of Representatives or of the
Senate that approved the law increasing the compensation
should receive the increased compensation during their term
of office when the increase was approved. I remember that the
question as to when the increase of compensation as approved
by the Members of the Congress of the Philippines should take
effect was the subject of a prolonged and heated discussion.
Many Members of the National Assembly wanted to continue
with the provision of Article VI, Section 5 of the original
Constitution that "No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members
of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval
of such increase." I have taken note that no less than eighteen
members of the Second National Assembly in 1940 were
members of the 1934 constitutional convention that drafted
the original Constitution, and it was this group of Assemblymen
that were zealous in maintaining the idea that one full term of
a member of the legislature subsequent to the approval of the
increase in compensation should be made to lapse before the
increase shall take effect. But this idea could not be insisted
upon because while that was feasible in the case of Members
of the National Assembly which was a unicameral body, that
idea could not be adopted in a bicameral body where the term
of office of the members of one chamber was not the same as
that of the members of the other chamber. I recall that it was
finally agreed to simply adopt the constitutional precept that
no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
receive any increase in compensation, as approved by the
House and the Senate of a particular Congress, before the
expiration of the term of all the members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate that approved the increase.
Inasmuch as the term of the Members of the House of
Representatives is shorter than that of the Senators, it was
understood that the expiration of the term of the Members of
the Senate that approved the increase should be awaited
before the increase in compensation would take effect. As
finally worded by the Committee on Style of the Assembly, and
that Committee on Style was headed by the illustrious and
indefatigable Assemblyman Gregorio Perfecto, who later
became a worthy member of this Court, that constitutional
precept which became part of Section 14, Article VI of the
amended Constitution was worded as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
It should be noted that the above-quoted portion of Section 14,
Article VI of the Constitution talks of the "expiration of the full
term of all the Members" then followed by the words "of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase." This proviso contemplates not the Representatives
or the Senators who voted in favor of the increase, but the
Senate and the House of Representatives as a body that
approved the increase. And so, because the understanding of
the amending Assemblymen was that the effectiveness of the
increase should take place after the expiration of the term of
the Senators with the longest term among the Members of the
Senate that approved the increase the constitutional proviso
was so worded "shall take effect until after the full term of all
the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase." It will be noted that
this Section 14 starts with using the words "Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives" in referring to the

compensation to be received by each. They are considered

individually. But in the matter of determining the time when
the increase is to take effect they are considered as collective
by the use of the phrase "all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives approving such increase." The
use of the word all includes every Member of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives, regardless of whether or not he
or she voted affirmatively for the increase. It is the House and
the Senate that approved the increase. And so because the
effectiveness of the increase depends on the expiration of the
term of all the members of both chambers it stands to reason
that all the members of the two chambers were taken into
consideration, and because when the increase was approved
by the Senate and the House of Representatives there were
members of the Senate whose term of office was longer than
that of some other Members of the Senate and of the Members
of the House of Representatives it is the term of the Senators
which was the longest that should first expire before the
increase should take effect. That is how I understood then that
portion of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, and I
sincerely believe that that was also how most if not all of my
colleagues understood it.
The question precisely was raised whether under that
constitutional proviso, as above-quoted, the Members of the
House of Representatives who are elected during the elections
subsequent to the approval of the increase by the Congress of
the Philippines could receive the increased compensation
inasmuch as the term of those Members of the House that had
approved the increase had already expired. I remember that it
was the understanding of the Members of the National
Assembly that those members of the House of Representatives
who would be elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase could not immediately receive the increased
compensation as approved during the preceding Congress; and
neither could the eight Senators who would be elected along
with those Representatives in the same elections. To allow
those newly elected Representatives and Senators to receive
the increased compensation would give rise to a situation
whereby the Members of the House of Representatives and
eight Senators would be receiving a compensation higher than
that received by at least sixteen Members of the Senate,
including the President of the Senate, as the case might
happen. That would be inconsistent with the basic idea
adopted by the Members of the National Assembly that the
compensation of the Members of the House of Representatives
and those of the Senate should be the same; and it is only
logical that when we say that the compensation of the
Members of the House and of the Members of the Senate is the
same, that compensation should be the same not only in
amount but also at the same time within their respective terms
of office.
It was envisaged by the Members of the National Assembly
that the salary increase, under the constitutional proviso now
in question, would become effective after the lapse of two
years, or four years, as the case may be, after the
commencement of the term of office of those Members of the
House of Representatives that are elected in the elections
subsequent to the approval of the increase. In the case of the
lapse of four years, which we have just stated, it would mean
that it would be the Members of the House of Representatives
who would be elected in the second elections subsequent to
the approval of the increase who would receive the increased
compensation.
As I have stated, it was the sense of the Members of the
Second National Assembly that approved the constitutional
amendment in 1940 that the increase in the compensation for
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate
would take effect only until after the expiration of the full term
of the senators who were Members of the Senate that
approved the increase. It is my recollection that the main idea
of the Members of the National Assembly in adopting the
proviso in question was to maintain the equality of the
compensation of the Members of the House of Representatives
and of the Senate at all times.

Three situations were anticipated to happen by the amending

Assemblymen under the constitutional proviso in question:
1.
This is the first situation. Let us take the case of the
First Congress of the Philippines which was elected in
November, 1941 already under the Constitution as amended in
1940. This Congress was composed of a House of
Representatives whose members were elected for a term of 4
years, to expire on December 29, 1945; and of a Senate
composed of eight Senators with a term of 6 years to expire on
December 29, 1947; eight senators with a term of 4 years to
expire on December 29, 1945, and eight senators with a term
of 2 years to expire on December 29, 1943.
If a law increasing the compensation of Members of Congress
was passed during the sessions of 1942, supposing that there
was no war, the increase would take effect on December 30,
1947, after the expiration of the term of the eight senators who
were elected in the elections in November, 1941 who served
for a term of six years. The term of the eight senators who
were elected in 1941 and who would have served for only two
years would have expired on December 29, 1943; and the term
of the eight senators who would have served for four years
would have expired on December 29, 1945. The term (4 years)
of the Representatives who were elected in November, 1941
would also have expired on December 29, 1945. But in
November, 1943 elections for eight senators who would serve
for a regular term of 6 years would have taken place; and
likewise elections for a full House of Representatives and for
another set of senators to serve for a full term of six years
would have taken place in November, 1945. If the war did not
upset the national affairs a new Congress would have
convened in January, 1946, already composed of a House of
Representatives and a Senate whose members would all have
been elected for a term of six years each.
So, on December 30, 1947 when the increase in the
compensation would take effect, the increased compensation
would be uniformly enjoyed by all members of Congress
(Senators and Representatives alike) those Senators who
were elected in the 1943, 1945 and 1947 elections, and by the
Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in
the 1945 elections. Under that situation, the Members of the
House of Representatives who were elected in 1945 would
have waited for two years before they could receive the
increased compensation that was approved in the 1942
sessions of Congress. And this is so, because it is on December
29, 1947, when the six-year term of the eight Senators who
were Members of the Senate that approved the increased
compensation in 1942 (along with the then existing House of
Representatives) had expired.
2.
Now let us take the second situation. Let us take the
case of a Congress that is normally constituted. When I say
"normally constituted" I mean a Congress composed of a
House of Representatives whose members had been elected
for a term of four years, and a Senate that is composed of
Members who had each been elected for a term of six years,
although at different elections, as provided in the Constitution.
We make the Third Congress of the Republic of the Philippines
as an example. This Congress covered the period of four years
from January, 1954 to December, 1957, inclusive. During the
first two years (or two regular sessions) this Congress was
composed of the House of Representatives whose members
were elected in the elections of November, 1953 and whose
term would expire on December 29, 1957; and twenty-four
senators: eight who were elected in November, 1953 whose
term would expire on December 29, 1959; eight who were
elected in November, 1951 and whose term would expire on
December 29, 1957; and eight who were elected in November,
1949 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1955.
If a law increasing the salary is passed, say in the first regular
session of the Third Congress in May, 1954, then the increase
provided for in this law would take effect on December 30,

1959. Why? Because that law was approved by the House of

Representatives (the term of whose members ended on
December 29, 1957) and by a Senate at least eight of whose
members were elected in November, 1953 and whose term of
office would expire on December 29, 1959. That means that
the members of the House of Representatives who were
elected in the elections of November, 1957 (many of whom
may be members of the Third Congress who voted for the law
in May, 1954) would have to wait for two years before they
could receive the increased compensation. In other words,
beginning December 30, 1959, the Members of the House of
Representatives and all the Members of the Senate (those
elected in the 1955, 1957 and 1959 elections) would all be
uniformly getting the increased salary.
3.
Let us take the third situation. We still use the Third
Congress of the Republic of the Philippines as an example. Let
us suppose that the law increasing the compensation was
passed in the third regular session of the Third Congress in
May, 1956. This time the Third Congress is composed of the
same members of the House of Representatives who were
elected in November, 1953, but the Senate has a different
composition. The Senate would already be composed of eight
new Senators who were elected during the elections of
November, 1955 and whose term of office would expire on
December 29, 1961, the remaining eight Senators elected in
1953 and eight Senators who were elected in 1951. If the law
increasing the compensation is passed during the regular
session of 1956 this law would be approved by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate that had eight new
members whose term would expire on December 29, 1961.
Since the term of these new eight Senators would expire on
December 29, 1961, then the increased compensation would
take effect on December 30, 1961.
In November, 1957 there were elections and a new House of
Representatives was then elected, and the term of office of the
members of the new House would expire on December 29,
1961. Likewise, a new set of eight Senators were elected
whose term would expire on December 29, 1963. Those
Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in
November, 1957, among whom perhaps were Representatives
who voted for the increase during the 1956 sessions, would not
enjoy the increased compensation because their term would
expire on December 29, 1961 the very same date of the
termination of the term of the eight Senators who were elected
in 1955 and who were Members of the Senate that approved
the increase during the session of 1956. In this case the
increased compensation would be received by the Members of
the House of Representatives who were elected in the elections
of November, 1961, along with the Senators who were elected
in November, 1961 and the remaining Senators who were
elected in 1959 and 1957. They would all be receiving the
same compensation and at the same time while they are in
office during the term for which they were elected.
As far as the House of Representatives is concerned, the
situation as portrayed in this third case is the same situation as
that which was contemplated by the framers of the original
Constitution of 1935 when it was provided in the Constitution
as adopted that the increase in salary should not take effect
"until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the
National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase." In the example we have given, the increase in
salaries of the Members of the House of Representatives which
was approved by the Members of the House in the third regular
session of the Third Congress did not take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of the Members of the House who
were elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The case now before Us is similar to Case No. 3 that we have
portrayed above. Republic Act 4134 was approved during the
regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines in May, 1964 and signed into law by the President
on June 20, 1964. As I have stated earlier, the increase
provided in this law was approved by the House of
Representatives whose members were elected in November,

1961, and whose term of office expired on December 29, 1965;

and by the Senate composed of eight Senators who were
elected in November, 1963 whose term would expire on
December 29, 1969, eight Senators who were elected in
November, 1961 whose term would expire on December 29,
1967, and eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959
whose term had expired on December 29, 1965. Inasmuch as
the increase would take effect at the expiration of the term of
the Senators who were elected in November, 1963 which is
on December 29, 1969 the Members of the present House of
Representatives cannot receive this increased compensation
during their present term of office. It will be the Members of
the House of Representatives who will be elected in November,
1969, along with the Senators elected in 1965, 1967 and 1969,
who will receive this increased compensation. They will then all
be receiving the same compensation during the time that they
are in office.
I have endeavored to make a discourse of facts as I know
them, because I sincerely believe that the interpretation
embodied in the opinion penned by my esteemed colleague,
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, of the pertinent provision of Article VI,
Section 14 of our Constitution is in consonance with the facts
and circumstances as I remember them, and as I know them.
As I have stated at the early part of this concurring opinion, it
is not my purpose to impose on anyone my recollection of what
transpired, or of what had been discussed about, or of what
had been agreed upon, by the Members of the Second National
Assembly during the deliberations which brought about the
1940 amendments to our Constitution. My perception and my
memory are as frail as those of any other human being, and I
may have incurred myself in error. It just happened that the
facts and the circumstances that I have herein narrated, as I
remember them, have engendered in my mind an opinion, nay
a conviction, which dovetails with the opinion of my illustrious
colleague that has penned the opinion for the majority of the
Court in this case.
CASTRO J., concurring:
Republic Act 4134, increasing the salary of all the members of
Congress, was approved on June 20, 1964. In the light of the
constitutional prohibition or station embodied in section 14 of
article VI of the Constitution, when does such increase in salary
take effect? Shall effectivity be this year 1966 for the members
of the House of Representatives, considering that the full term
of the members thereof who participated in the approval of the
salary increase has expired? Even if the full terms of all the
members of the Senate, as composed in 1964, have not
expired? Or shall effectivity be only on December 30, 1969,
after the expiration of the full term of the senators elected in
1963? .
I fully adhere to and support the position taken by my
esteemed brethren, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Jose P. Bengzon and
Calixto Zaldivar. Their thorough going treatment of the issue
effectively exploits logical, historical and empirical
considerations leading quite inevitably to the firm conclusion
that the salary increase provided for by Congress in 1964 can
take effect, for any and all members of Congress, only after the
expiration of the full term of the senators elected in 1963, that
is to say, only after December 29, 1969.
There is, however, a vital aspect of the problem that, in my
view, requires not only projection but emphasis as well. This is
the language of the pertinent constitutional prohibition or
limitation which by itself forcefully compels the very conclusion
arrived at by the majority of the Court.
We cannot overemphasize the essential role of language. It is
one of the distinctive qualities of man, especially of modern
thinking man. Man does feel and analyze his intellectual and
material experiences; but more than this he has the ability to
articulate, and through articulation he manages synthesis and
brings forth the creation and evolution of culture, literature,
science and law. In the process, the unceasing effort is to say
what is meant and to mean what is said.

How, then, is the constitutional prohibition or limitation on

congressional salary increases stated? "No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase." This statement has
a literal message of striking clarity. The phrase "No increase in
said compensation shall take effect" establishes the character
of the provision as a prohibition or limitation, as can be seen
from the unqualified words "no increase". The words "until
after the expiration of the full term" impart the period of time
during which the prohibition or limitation operates, after which
period the increase in compensation can take effect. Whose full
term must first expire before the increase can take effect? It is
the full term "of the members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives approving such increase." The immediate
as well as lasting impact of these words is that what must first
expire is the full term of the members of both houses of
Congress approving the increase. It cannot be the full term of
the members of either house, nor yet the full term of the
members of the Senate or that of the members of the House of
Representatives.
The key word is the particle "and". "And" is a conjunction
pertinently defined as meaning "together with," "joined with"
(Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
Language, p. 105); "along or together with," "added to or
linked to," used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase,
clause with clause (Webster's New International Dictionary, p.
98). The word "and" does not mean "or"; it is a conjunction
used to denote a joinder or union, "binding together relating
the one to the other" (See 3 Words and Phrases, 569-571.).
As understood from the common and usual meaning of the
conjunction "and," the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate is inseparable from the expiration of
the full term of all the members of the House of
Representatives. From the perspective of semantics, it is
undeniably perceived that those who framed the constitutional
provision, when they utilized the word "and," stated what they
meant and meant what they stated.
There is, to be sure, a specific rule of interpretation that would
allow "or" to be interchanged with "and," in which event a
negation of the concept of joinder would ensue. But this is the
exception rather than the general rule. The exception is
resorted to only when a literal interpretation would pervert the
plain intention of the writer or draftsman as gleaned from the
overall context of the writing and/or from external factors. This
does not obtain in the provision under discussion. Indeed, a
departure from the general rule and a resort to the exception
would pervert section 14 of article VI. Note the parity of
compensation of the senators and the members of the House
of Representatives. If the expiration of the full term of the
members of the Senate would be considered as separable from
the expiration of the full term of the members of the House of
Representatives, despite the conjunction "and," then the result
would be to allow members of the House of Representatives to
enjoy the increase in compensation ahead of the senators,
thereby producing a disparity of compensation. Furthermore, if
the framers of the provision were concerned with the realities
of the term of office of the senators and that of the
representatives, more than with the reality of the parity of
compensation, then they should have staggered the effectivity
of entitlement to the increased salary and allowed the first
group of senators elected after the approval of the increase to
enjoy such increase.
The prohibition or limitation may be stated elsewise: "The full
terms of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase must first expire
before an increase in compensation can take effect." Would the
literal meaning of the provision still be in doubt?
The framers of the constitutional provision under discussion
certainly were not wanting of competent legal stylists. With
such more reason, then, must they be regarded as having

achieved a unity of intention, statement and meaning. These

experienced stylists could have so easily phrased the provision
differently to conform to a different intention. For example, it
could have been: ". . . until after the expiration of the full term
of all the members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives approving such increase, as the case may be."
But this was not done, and we cannot deviate from what able
stylists have plainly stated in plain language.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15905

August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for
defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor
T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums
of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower
court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in
question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether
it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said
publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not
the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the
phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress
used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this
category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14,
1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or
about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or
any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned?
Addressed to the President, the communication began with the
following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however
unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected
members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumormongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open
letter to focus public attention to certain vital information
which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn
duty to our people to expose.1wph1.t

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly

three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious
AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans"
referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be
"an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then
Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing
and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to
become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the
"planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that
Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the
Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and
psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National
Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter
says are "available to adequately finance a political
campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the
following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose
Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col.
Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public
information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners"
purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to
study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col.
Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero,
Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and
while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose
Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon
Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is
considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of
course, possible that the offices mentioned above are
unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely
no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the
letter lists, under the heading "other operational technique the
following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines
for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics
on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of
letters "typed in two (2) typewriters only" to Editors of
magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the
"hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the
administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of
Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches
of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as
to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the
people or the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with
which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning
stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and
subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by
trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty
parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a
speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in
an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him,
and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas
be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced
absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National
Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that
no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen.
Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs
of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces

including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence

agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned,
considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas
and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to
the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now
serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those
holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular
Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed
by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training
divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and
Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or
undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to
support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says
that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons
therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be
noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which
they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the
very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly
indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools
of the planners. We do not think that this statement is
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to
recover damages, considering that they are officers of our
Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control
of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and
that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group
therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high
ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in
question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false
and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose
them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to
alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are
mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of
said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very
basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their
complaint that said communication is false, they could not
have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan
to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the
"planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the
defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not
among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they
could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of
said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.

THIRD DIVISION
ANTERO J. POBRE,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7399

Present:

- versus Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO,

Respondent.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 25, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with
enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the
following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming
in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I
am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am
not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this
nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in another environment but not in
the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect
on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and the other members of the Court and
constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks
that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be
taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25,
2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny
making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained
that those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech
she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of
Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech,
according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial
anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial
legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she
believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],
which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the
soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually
inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme
Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should
have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting
members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for
the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted
primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the
House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof. Explaining the import of the underscored portion of
the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our
Constitution
enshrines
parliamentary
immunity
which
is
a
fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world.
As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
is to enable and encourage a representative
of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success for it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be

protected from resentment of every one,

however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.[1]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative
privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a
means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the
legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite
and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from
deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a
trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to
the motives.[2]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in
the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court
lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight
functions of the Congress that enable this representative body
to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate
and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does
not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary authority of the
assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago
for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary
action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last
word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about
the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in
her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To
the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits
of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate
and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted
as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and
calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We
draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she
should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of
this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the
result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the
respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the
peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator
clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall
not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to the judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most

lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a
former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited
authority on constitutional and international law, an author of
numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the
land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the
Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain
the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their
brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of
the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her
privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on
the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in
light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the
passage once more:
x
x
x I am
not
angry. I am
irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I
feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts
in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in another environment but not in
the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis
ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily
show that her statements were expressions of personal anger
and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary
immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and
its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a
privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to
her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive
personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was
directly traceable to what she considered as an unjust act the
JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the
Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for
the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officiochairperson,
[8]
have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment
to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to
understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate
assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and
debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5)
of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxxx
(5)
Promulgate
rules
concerning
the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in

all courts, the admission to the practice of

the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis
ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules
governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the
integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which
traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that
politics and self interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality
and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards
x x x.[9]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S.
Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the
Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts
can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold.
The Court wrote in Rheem of thePhilippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of
legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the
duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance. That same canon, as a
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against unjust
criticism and clamor. And more. The
attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a
conduct that should be with all good fidelity x
x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding
in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel [12] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts;
he is, like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His
duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to
promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity
of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people. Thus has it been said
of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and
not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem
and regard towards the courts so essential to
the proper administration of justice.[13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession
bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the law
and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer
holding a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the
discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer. [14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct
committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,
[15]
a good character being an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference
is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with
the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers

any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of

their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law
invest in them.[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the
peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who,
for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct
the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of
courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women
who compose them. We have done it in the case of former
Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda
in Sorreda, and
in
the
case of
Atty.
Francisco
B.
Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and
threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of
disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on
her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and
legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from
doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the
Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely
tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on
our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind
her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus
granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their
office without fear of being made responsible before the courts
or other forums outside the congressional hall. [18] It is intended
to protect members of Congress against government pressure
and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision
on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator
from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper
language against another Senator or against any public
institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary
remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to
order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules
dictates under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that
her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own
rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in
filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must
be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree
with her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of
intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest
court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect
lawyers owe to the courts.[21]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre
has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in
question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has
not categorically denied making such statements, she has
unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege
speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre
against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably
to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution,DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

Additional member as per August 3, 2009 raffle.

[1]
109 Phil. 863 (1960); cited in Bernas, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 643
(1996).

[2]

Tenney v. Brandhove, 34 US 367, 71 S. Ct. 783786.

Id.
[4]
Osmena, Jr., supra.
[5]
Tenney, supra note 2.
[6]
82 Phil. 595, 602 (1949).
[7]
Ali v. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005, 453
SCRA 1, 13.
[8]
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 8.
[9]
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 26-27.
[3]

[10]

A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 43.

No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441, 444.
[12]
No. L-27072, January 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1, 16-17.
[13]
Id.; citing People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 60 A.L.R.
851,855; Sotto, supra note 6; Malcolm, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
ETHICS 160 (1949); and People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).
[14]
Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003, 400
SCRA 172, 178.
[11]