Alex Deaconu

Subjective Universality of Aesthetic Presentations

PG Student: Alex Deaconu
Module Code: PY950-7-SP
Words: 3987
19.04.2015

Alex Deaconu

Kants main purpose in Analytic of Beauty is to disclose the conditions that

make judgments of taste possible. Pure aesthetic judgments, argues Kant, are not
cognitive judgments, thus they do not determine what is grasped as object of
experience. On the contrary the basis of judgments of taste is represented by the way
in which the subject responds to the presentation referred by the judgment. The
aesthetic response consists in a disinterested feeling of pleasure expressing the free
play of cognitive faculties: imagination and understanding. Since, following Kants
theory of knowledge, free play of imagination and understanding is a necessary
condition for cognition in general, then the aesthetic response is universal
communicable.
By claiming that an object X is beautiful the aesthetic judger requires that
everyone, having the same presentation, to have the same aesthetic response. In
consequence, it must be the case that everyone can present the object in the same way
as the one that makes the claim does. Since the aesthetic presentation of an object is
not determined by any concept, then no concept of beauty can determine the kind of
presentation that can occasion an aesthetic response. This means that there can be no
rule for how an aesthetic presentation ought to be. On the other hand it must be the
case that a presentation appearing beautiful to a judger, must be beautiful to any
judger, if aesthetic judgments are to be universally valid. If this is the case, are there
any definable conditions that a presentation of an object has to fulfil in order to be
worthy of aesthetic appreciation? Kant claims that only the form of objects is
universal communicable, thus if aesthetic presentation is to be universal accessible
then the aesthetic response must be occasioned only by the form of objects. This is the
main thesis of Kants formalism.

Alex Deaconu
I argue that if we accept Kants analysis of aesthetic response then we have to
accept that the free play of cognitive faculties is a response to the form of the object
and that the form is universally accessible. First I discuss the thesis of aesthetic
response is occasioned by the form of purposiveness exhibited by an object. Second
I analyse Kants claim that the aesthetic response can be occasioned only by the form
of objects. This thesis requires a separate discussion because, as I will show, the form
of purposiveness cannot impose any restriction on what determinations of a
presentation are aesthetically relevant. Third I discuss Guyers objection that the
universal communicability of aesthetic presentation cannot be granted on the basis of
universal communicability of the aesthetic response.

I
The relation of aesthetic presentations with judgments of taste is the theme of
the Third Moment of Analytic of Beauty. The first task Kant needs to fulfil is to show
how it is possible that a judgement can determine an existing individual. For example
in saying this is an X, what it means that X (for example a concept) determines that
which is present? In other words, how can be secured the relation between the
individual and the concept?
Although Kant does not address the problem precisely in these terms, he does
discuss, in section 10, the relation by which a concept determines an individual. He
calls this kind of relation purposiveness.

The exemplary case in which we are

justified to determine an individual by a concept (make a judgment about their

relation) is when we know that the concept is the cause of the individual. In such a
case the individual fulfils a purpose the latter being defined by the considered
concept. Kant definition of purpose as an object of a concept in so far as we regard

Alex Deaconu
this concept as the objects cause (the real basis of its possibility) and their relation
as the causality that a concept has with regard to its object (that is purposiveness)
suggests that he takes as exemplary, cases in which the existence of the individual is
informed by a concept; this is the case for example with every object produced by
humans1. The power of a concept to determine the existence of an object as purposive
resides in the faculty of will. Will then, the power of desire, insofar as it can be
determined to act only by concepts, can in-form the existence of an object in a
purposive way.2
However there are cases in which the existence of some objects does not
necessarily presuppose the presentation of a purpose.3 Even in this cases, claims
Kant, we call such objects purposive, because we can explain and grasp them only if
we assume that they are based on a causality [that operates] according to purposes,
i.e., on a will that would have so arranged them in accordance with the presentation of
a certain rule.4 Kant does not explain us why shall we call such objects purposive
instead of claiming that they lack any purpose but, what he seems to imply is that in
order to grasp something as meaningful we have to discover a certain regularity,
which the object exhibits; even if we are unable to bring its regularity (the form)
under a concept. Since we discover in such objects regularity rather than mere
buzzing sensations we grasp them as if they fulfil a purpose.
The previous quote makes clear why for Kant it is important to define the
relation of purposiveness as causality a concept has in regard to an object. He is not
interest to isolate a class of objects, say the ones produced by humans, he is rather
interested to highlight that we, as judging subjects, can make sense of something we

Something is a chair because is made to fulfil a certain purpose.

Kant, I., Critique of Judgment, Trans. Pluhar, W. S., (Hackett: 1987), p.142 [220]
3
Idem
4
Idem
2

Alex Deaconu
grasp only if we can discover some regularity exhibited by the individual we
encounter. Because of this we can explain something we grasp only if we assume
they are based on a causality [that operates] according to purposes. Such objects
exhibit purposiveness without purpose.
Once the relation between an individual and the concept determining it has been
established as relation of purposiveness, Kant moves on to determine the kind of
purpose that grounds judgments of taste.
There are two kinds of purposes, claims Kant, subjective and objective. In the first
case, to regard something as purposive is to regard it as an object of interest. Since
judgments of taste cannot be mingled with any interest (a point Kant makes in the
First Moment but also in section 13) then the kind of purpose determining judgments
of taste cannot be subjective. But neither can it be an objective purpose, the kind
that determines moral judgments, because such a purpose is determined by a concept
(concept of good) while aesthetic judgments are not determined by any concept. By
elimination it follows that the only kind of purposiveness an aesthetic object can
exhibit is the mere form of purposivness.
Nevertheless the idea that judgments of taste are based on the form of purposiveness
needs further clarifications because in the first two Moments of the Analytic Kant has
argued that what determine judgments of taste is solely the disinterested feeling of
pleasure we are conscious of when our cognitive faculties are in free play. Now it
seems that judgments of taste are determined by two different conditions. On the one
hand, being aesthetic judgments, they are determined by the free play of cognitive
faculties, on the other hand as judgments about individuals they are based on the form
of purposiveness. In what way and why should the form of purposiveness and the
aesthetic pleasure be related?

Alex Deaconu
One way to answer is to argue that the object, in virtue of its form, cause the
aesthetic pleasure, another way to answer is to argue that the presentation is nothing
else but the creation of our own mind, which finds pleasure in fantasizing.
In the first case the object would cause the aesthetic pleasure. The main
problem with this answer is that reduces aesthetic pleasure to mere agreeableness,
the latter being defined as the pleasure that depends directly on the presentation by
which an object is given, while aesthetic pleasure has its basis on the free play of
faculties.5 The second answer is problematic because reduces aesthetic presentations
to mere private mental content and makes impossible the inter-subjective
confirmation.
Kant addresses this problem in section 11 where he reiterates the claim that
the liking we judge to be universally communicable is that which determines a
judgment of taste. In addition the aesthetic response is not occasioned by any
presentation, but only by those presentations which exhibit a form of purposiveness
(in contrast to determinate purposes).6 This does not mean that the object causes the
aesthetic response but rather the inherent purposive nature of our cognitive faculties
can come to light any time a presentation looks as if it is purposive. That our faculty
of judgment has a purposive nature was already one of the implications of the thesis
that judgments about particulars rests on the relation of purposiveness. Following
Allisons interpretation, we can argue that since the relation of purposivness is the
ground for making a judgment about an individual, and since in making such a
judgment two faculties need to collaborate with one another: imagination and
understanding7; then it is reasonable to assume, in the case of judgments of taste, that

Ibidem., p.139 [217]

Ibidem., p.143 [221]
7
I return to this aspect in the next section.
6

Alex Deaconu
the mental state of free harmony is itself <<subjectively purposive>>. 8 Subjective
purposiveness means nothing else but that the purpose is not caused by a concept
rather purposiveness is the way in which our faculties make sense of what is
presented.
Thus the aesthetic presentation does not cause an affective reaction in the
subject but the subject does not create the form ex nihilo either (in the latter case we
would speak about fantasy), rather the relation between subject and object is
reciprocal in the aesthetic case.9 In other words judgments of taste are determined by
what can be called a dual harmony 10, on the one hand is the harmonious free play of
cognitive faculties that lies as a possibility to be actualized in judging, on the other
hand the harmony to be discovered in the presentation of the object, the form of
purposiveness.
This explanation links together two essential conditions that make possible
judgments of taste, the form of purposiveness of presentations and the aesthetic
response.
However, because form of purposiveness cannot be determined objectively
then it cannot be derived any general condition that has to be fulfilled by a
presentation in order to be aesthetically relevant. Beauty cannot be determined in
regard to classes of objects. This means that one cannot judge beforehand if a kind of
presentation exhibits form as to purposiveness (which is a condition for calling an
object beautiful). The point is that although only those presentations that exhibit a
form of purposiveness are aesthetically relevant the form of purposiveness cannot be
defined as a certain configuration exhibited by beautiful presentations.

Allison, H., Kants Theory of Taste, (Cambridge: 2001), p.127

Hughes, F., Kants Aesthetic Epistemology, (Edinburgh: 2007), p.283
10
Hughes, F., Kants Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, (Continuum: 2010), p.21
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Alex Deaconu
The question then remains: why shall we assume that every subject can grasp
the form of purposiveness exhibited by a presentation the same way does the one who
makes the aesthetic claim?
II
Kant deals with this problem in sections 13 and 14. Here he makes two
important claims about aesthetic presentations. First claim is that only the form of a
presentation is universally communicable (form is moreover all that can be
universally communicated with certainty about these presentations [referring to
colours]11. Second he claims that only the form of a presentation occasions an
aesthetic response, but not the matter, beauty should actually concern only form 12.
However, Kant does not offer us any explicit arguments for neither of these claims.
Since the form of purposiveness is nothing more than that in a presentation which
occasions the free play of faculties, it does not follow straight from this claim that
only the form, but not the matter, are determining for calling an object purposive as to
form.
Although Kant does not define the concepts of form and matter he does
offer us two important clues. He claims that the matter of presentations consists
solely on sensation.13 In the next passage he speaks about the form in the
connection of different presentations and about the formal determination of the
manifold14. It seems that Kant links matter with mere sensations and form to what
connects different presentations together, presumably, what unites them. In this sense
we can speak about the matter as bulk of sensations, and form as what connects the
sensations (manifold) in a united presentation.

11

Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 146 [224]

Ibidem., p.145 [223]
13
Ibidem., p.145 [223]
14
Ibidem., p.146
12

Alex Deaconu
Based on this distinction and on Kants claims in section 9 we can construct an
argument to justify the two mentioned claims. In section 9, Kant argues that the
mental state of the free play of cognitive faculties is universal communicable to any
judging subject. The collaboration of imagination and understanding is the subjective
condition for cognition, since, by definition, a judging subject is a subject capable of
cognition as a result of the collaboration of both imagination and understanding. Then
Kant is justified to claim that the mental state in which imagination and understanding
are in collaboration (free play in the case of aesthetic contemplation) is universally
communicable.
The role of imagination in cognition is to combine the manifold in intuition
while understanding provides the unity of the concept uniting the [component]
presentations.15 Considering that in the aesthetic collaboration of imagination and
understanding, the latter does not provide a concept that gives the rule for uniting the
presentations then in aesthetic contemplation imagination and understanding are in
free play.
We cannot give here a detailed account of Kants theory of perception but it is
necessary to clarify a few points about the relation between the faculties of cognition
and form of presentations. In the previous quote Kant says that cognition is possible
when the manifold in intuition is combined by imagination under a concept which
provides the rule for uniting presentations. There are two different components
involved in cognition, the manifold given in intuition (as a result of being affected by
objects) and the work of combining and uniting. The form of an object is nothing
more but the way in which the manifold is combined, is what makes an object
recognizable as a unity of elements. Since the combination is the result of
collaboration between imagination and understanding, and because the capacity to
15

Ibidem., p.140 [217]

Alex Deaconu
combine a manifold in intuition, and to uniting under a concept, is what it takes to be
a judging subject, then we can infer that the form of a presentation is universally
communicable to any judging subject.16
Even if in judging aesthetically imagination and understanding collaborate
freely, we have seen that there is a form which presentations qualified as aesthetic
must exhibit (as condition of possibility for aesthetic judgments), this is the
indefinable form of purposiveness. Thus, since the free play of faculties is universally
communicable then the form of purposiveness exhibited by an aesthetic presentation
is also universally accessible to any judging subject.
But why could not be possible that even the matter (sensations as colours or
tones) of presentations determine an aesthetic response? The aesthetic pleasure occurs
when imagination and understanding collaborate to each other in free play, but since
their collaboration aims at the form of the presentation and not at its matter, then
matter is not aesthetically relevant. It does not follow that the form and the matter do
not influence each other, as we will see when I discuss Guyers objections to Kants
formalism colours can play in certain cases a determinant role in aesthetic evaluation.
III
Some commentators argued that Kant makes an illegitimate move from the
conditions of aesthetic response, form of purposiveness, to claims about presentations,
purposiveness as to form. I tried to show in the first two sections why Kant is justified
to make this move. Others, like Guyer, had argued that Kant is not justified to reclaim
universal communicability for aesthetic presentations. The focus of Guyers
objections is Kants thesis that only the form of objects is aesthetically relevant, while
the matter can be associated only with mere agreeableness.

16

Ibidem., p.140 [217]

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Alex Deaconu
Hes first objection is that de facto certain colours and tones, while nothing
by sensations themselves, might be felt to belong together in such a way as to satisfy
the understandings requirement of unity in the manifolds imagination presents to
it.17 He gives the example of Josef Albers paintings Homage to the square. These
paintings are representative because they conform fully with the Kantian constrains
on aesthetic response, but do so because their colour rather than their form produce
harmony between imagination and understanding.18 If this is the case then Kant is
not justified to say that only the form of objects is aesthetically relevant.
In addition Guyer19 argues that Kant is not justified to presuppose that the
matter of a presentation is not universally communicable because varies from subject
to subject. Considering that colours and tones represent in Kants view the matter of a
presentation and since colours and tones can actually determine the beauty of a
presentation then either Kant is wrong in assuming that the matter of sensations varies
from subject to subject, either the matter of presentations really vary from one subject
to another and it is possible that an object occasions an aesthetic response to one
subject but not to another. Thus the object is really beautiful for one person but is not
for the other. In response to this I notice that Kant claims only that we cannot assume
that in all subjects the sensations themselves agree in quality 20 because we cannot
connect the quality of sensations with the cognitive conditions as we do with form.
Guyers objections are reducible to the claim that colours and tones are de
facto aesthetically relevant because there are presentations that are only play of colour
(and tones) but which occasion aesthetic response. From this follows that the free play
of faculties actually can be entertained by the matter of presentations, and the matter

17

Guyer, P., Kant and The Claims of Taste, (Cambridge: 2007), p.204
Ibidem., p.205
19
Ibidem., p.209
20
Kant, Critique, p.146 [224]
18

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Alex Deaconu
of presentations either makes possible the universal communicability of the
presentation (in which case Kant is unjustified to claim that only the form has such a
property), either does not make possible the universal communicability of
presentations; in which case aesthetic presentations do not necessarily imply the
possibility of intersubjective agreement21
Further on I show why these objections are not fatal to Kants formalism. First
Kant does not consider colours and tones a priori irrelevant for aesthetics. In the
passage of section 14 where he discusses Eulers theory of colour Kant considers the
possibility that colours and tones might not be simple sensations, but vibrations of
aether, in which case the mind could perceive by reflection the regular play of the
impressions (and hence the form in the connection of different presentations) and so
colour and tone would [] be the formal determination of the manifold in these
[impressions].22 I do not claim that Kant was committed to this theory but I only
want to remark that for Kant colours could be determinant for aesthetic response if
they were to influence the form of presentations.
My intention is to show that even if we accept colours as aesthetically relevant
for determining the beauty of an object this does not prove that Kants formalism is
faulty. I consider that Kants formalism can accommodated the thesis that colours and
tones do contribute to aesthetic responses. My argument is that colours (presumably
tones) can be grasped in two ways, aesthetically and non-aesthetically/mere
sensations. In the second case we consider the way in which colours affect our senses
while in the first case it is essential the role colours play in suggesting form and
shape.

21
22

Guyer, Kant and The Claims, p.210

Kant, Critique, p.146 [224]

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Alex Deaconu
That colours can influence our moods is a fact we can all observe. Colours can
have an immediate effect on our disposition. Some psychologists even speak about a
psychology of colour which treats questions as: what colour can be associated with
what mood?23
However there is also an aesthetic way of appreciating colours. When we make an
aesthetic evaluation about a painting we are not interested in the way in which the
colour influences our mood. Lets consider an abstract painting, as Albers paintings
are. I will refer to Liza Lou painting Carbon Gunmetal/Divide which is part of hers
exposition Solid/Divide24. The painting consists of only two colours that delineate
each other; but if we keep contemplating the painting we observe that what presents at
first as a dull image of two colours, starts to reveal more and more details. For
example, at a certain moment we might start seeing that the painting actually
illustrates a calm see and the line that separates the colours is actually the horizon that
separates the sea from the sky. The way in which the colour is disposed in the inferior
part of the painting, I am referring to different shades of black, blue-grey, suggests
small waves; the way in which the grey-blue of the sky is illuminated from the line of
the horizon and fades away in the upper part of the painting suggests distance.
I do not say we have to fantasy about the presentation it is the presentation
which allows us to grasp it in this way. For example, the whole aesthetic effect
depends on the precise colours and the relation in which the colours stand to each
other.
But the effect that colours contribute to is the design (form and depth) which
we discover gradually and which monopolize our attention as soon as we start

23

Elliot, 2007) (Color and Psychological Functioning, Andrew J. Elliot, Markus A. Maier).
Pictures of Lous paintings can be found here:
http://whitecube.com/exhibitions/liza_lou_bermondsey_2014/ Unfortunately the pictures cannot
reproduce the level of detail of her works.
24

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Alex Deaconu
discovering the complexity of the painting. It cannot be the case that we enjoy the
mere colours, because we can easily see that if the colours were misplaced or if the
wrong colours were used the whole effect would be ruined. Even if I like the green
colour I can easily imagine that if instead of the blue-grey of the sky was bright green,
then the aesthetic effect would have been destroyed.
The same kind of effect we can observe when we contemplate Albers
paintings, thus I think that Guyer is right to say that this kind of works of art do
occasion aesthetic response. But I consider that Guyer misinterprets the aesthetic
experience when he says that what we enjoy in such cases are the mere colours. It is
clear that when we interact with aesthetic presentations which are coloured we do not
have the same attitude we have when we interact in a non-aesthetic way with colours.
For example it is said that the purple colour is intellectually stimulating and so it is
preferable to study in rooms where are purple walls. But who would argue that this
kind of effect colours have on us is aesthetically relevant?
On the contrary, in aesthetical context the role of colour is to create space,
form, depth, distance or proximity. Once we discover that the mentioned painting
reveals depth and the space is split between the plan of sea and that of sky, we
understand it and it is really difficult to try then to see it in a different way. Once we
start to see the space created by the play of colours our mind forces us to follow that
direction.
Finally, if I am right and we can distinguish between an aesthetic and an unaesthetic way of relating to colours and if the aesthetic way of relating to colours is to
grasp the form and the space which colours create then Kant is right to claim that
colours are not aesthetically relevant (when grasped un-aesthetically) and that only

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Alex Deaconu
the form of the presentation counts aesthetically (if we consider that colours can shape
the space and make form visible).
In conclusion I consider that if Kant is right in interpreting the aesthetic
pleasure as expression of the free play of our faculties then he is also justified to claim
the universal communicability of presentations that occasion aesthetic response, since
the cognitive faculties in their free play aim at the form of presentations.
Words: 3998

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Alex Deaconu
Bibliography:
Allison, H., Kants Theory of Taste, Cambridge: University Press, 2001.
Elliot, A.J. and Maier, M.A., Color and Psychological Functioning, in Current
Directions in Psychological Science, Oct. 1, 2007, Vol. 16, No. 5
Guyer, P., Kant and the Claims of Taste, Harvard: University Press, 1979.
Hughes, F., (2007), Kants Aesthetic Epistemology, Edinburgh: University
Press, 2007.
Hughes, F., (2010), Kants Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, London:
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010.
Kant, I., Critique of Judgment, Trans. Pluhar Werner S., Indianapolis, Hackett
Publishing Company, 1997, Kindle edition.

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