People vs.

Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)

FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of June 23, 1994 was seen entering Peoples
Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the accused approach a table where the victim was sitting,
pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the latters throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the accused
returned with a gun, entered the kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached the victim from
behind and shot him six times successively. The defendant was later apprehended and caught in
his possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in Camp Crame, it was found out
that Ringor is not a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed. Ringor put up selfdefense but he failed to prove Floridas unlawful aggression. He was found guilty of murder
qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was found guilty of a separate charge of
possession of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amendatory law RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime occurred in
1994) is applicable

No. At the time of the commission of the crime the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an
aggravating circumstance in murder to homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is unfavorable
to the accused, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.

2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting appellant for simple illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.

Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there
can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under PD No. 1866. t
is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance, no longer as a separate offence.
According to the article 22 of RPC, retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is favourable to
the accused.

3. Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused of murder

No. For self-defence to prosper, unlawful aggression, proportionality of methods to fend said
aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation from defender must be proven. In this case,
defendant failed to prove unlawful aggression. The statement that the victim approached him with
a bolo was inconsistent to the witness statement of the victim being in a prone position in the
table. This does not constitute the requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. With the
first requirement missing, the last two requisites have no basis.

4. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused to death for muder which was not proven and that
the alleged murder committed by the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the offense is reclusion
perpetua due to to the absence of an aggravating circumstance.

Yes. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances to a crime of murder as described

by art 248 of RPC, a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be imposed in according to article
63(2) of RPC

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo

Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant
for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accusedappellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister
motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of
rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on
the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug,
and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group
of the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accusedappellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence
of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7659.

Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied
for lack of merit.

Ratio:

The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had
entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence
with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping,
rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of
whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of
the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment

ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray

scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the
TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also
encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already
been rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve
which is an executive function.

HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power
of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict
do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the three branches of our government.