John Searle

John Searle
John Rogers Searle

Searle in 2005.
Born

July 31, 1932

Denver, Colorado, USA

Era

Contemporary philosophy

Region

Western philosophy

School

Analytic

Maininterests

Alma mater

University of Wisconsin
University of Oxford

Notableideas

Indirect speech acts

Chinese room
Biological naturalism

Philosophy of language
Philosophy of mind
Intentionality Social reality

Signature

Website

Homepage at [[UC Berkeley

[1]

]]

John Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932) is an American philosopher and currently the Slusser Professor of
Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of
language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy, he began teaching at Berkeley in 1959. He received the Jean
Nicod Prize in 2000; the National Humanities Medal in 2004; and the Mind & Brain Prize in 2006. Among his
notable concepts is the "Chinese room" argument against "strong" artificial intelligence.

John Searle

Biography
Searle's father, G. W. Searle, an electrical engineer, was employed by AT&T Corporation, while his mother, Hester
Beck Searle, was a physician. Searle began his college education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and
subsequently became a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, where he obtained a doctorate in philosophy.

Politics
While an undergraduate at the University of Wisconsin, Searle was the secretary of "Students against Joseph
McCarthy".[2] McCarthy was then the junior senator from Wisconsin. In 1959, Searle began to teach at Berkeley and
was the first tenured professor to join the 19645 Free Speech Movement.[3] In 1969, while serving as chairman of
the Academic Freedom Committee of the Academic Senate of the University of California,[4] he supported the
university in its dispute with students at People's Park.
In The Campus War: A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony (1971), Searle investigates the causes behind
the campus protests of the era. In it he declares that: "I have been attacked by both the House Un-American
Activities Committee and ... several radical polemicists ... Stylistically, the attacks are interestingly similar. Both rely
heavily on insinuation and innuendo, and both display a hatred one might almost say terror of close analysis and
dissection of argument." He asserts that "My wife was threatened that I (and other members of the administration)
would be assassinated or violently attacked." Shortly after 9/11, Searle wrote an article claiming that it would be
naive to think that the only solution is to preemptively attack and root out governments that support terrorism.[5]

Philosophy
Speech acts
Searle's early work, which did a great deal to establish his reputation, was on speech acts. He attempted to synthesize
ideas from many colleagues including J. L. Austin (the "illocutionary act", from How To Do Things with Words),
Ludwig Wittgenstein and G. C. J. Midgley (the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules) with his own
thesis that such acts are constituted by the rules of language. He also drew on the work of H. Paul Grice (the analysis
of meaning as an attempt at being understood), Hare and Stenius (the distinction, concerning meaning, between
illocutionary force and propositional content), P. F. Strawson, John Rawls and William P. Alston, who maintained
that sentence meaning consists in sets of regulative rules requiring the speaker to perform the illocutionary act
indicated by the sentence and that such acts involve the utterance of a sentence which (a) indicates that one performs
the act; (b) means what one says; and (c) addresses an audience in the vicinity. In his 1969 book Speech Acts, Searle
sets out to combine all these elements to give his account of illocutionary acts.
Despite his announced intention[6] to present a "full dress analysis of the illocutionary act", Searle ultimately does
not give one.[citation needed] Instead, he provides an analysis of what he considers the prototypical illocutionary act of
promising and offers sets of semantical rules intended to represent the linguistic meaning of devices indicating
further illocutionary act types (Speech Acts, p.57-71).
Among the concepts presented in the book is the distinction between the "illocutionary force" and the "propositional
content" of an utterance. Searle does not precisely define the former as such, but rather introduces several possible
illocutionary forces by example. According to Searle, the sentences...
1.
2.
3.
4.

Sam smokes habitually.

Does Sam smoke habitually?
Sam, smoke habitually!
Would that Sam smoked habitually!

...each indicate the same propositional content (Sam smoking habitually) but differ in the illocutionary force
indicated (respectively, a statement, a question, a command and an expression of desire; Speech Acts p.22).

John Searle
According to a later account, which Searle presents in Intentionality (1983) and which differs in important ways
from the one suggested in Speech Acts, illocutionary acts are characterised by their having "conditions of
satisfaction" (an idea adopted from Strawson's 1971 paper "Meaning and Truth" [7]) and a "direction of fit" (an idea
adopted from Elizabeth Anscombe). For example, the statement "John bought two candy bars" is satisfied if and only
if it is true, i.e. John did buy two candy bars. By contrast, the command "John, buy two candy bars!" is satisfied if
and only if John carries out the action of purchasing two candy bars. Searle refers to the first as having the
"word-to-world" direction of fit, since the words are supposed to change to accurately represent the world, and the
second as having the "world-to-word" direction of fit, since the world is supposed to change to match the words.
(There is also the double direction of fit, in which the relationship goes both ways, and the null or zero direction of
fit, in which it goes neither way because the propositional content is presupposed, as in "I'm sorry I ate John's candy
bars.")
In Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (1985, with Daniel Vanderveken), Searle prominently uses the notion of the
"illocutionary point".[8]
Searle's speech-act theory has been challenged by several thinkers in a variety of ways. Collections of articles
referring to Searle's account are found in Burkhardt 1990[9] and Lepore / van Gulick 1991.[10]
Searle-Derrida debate
In the early 1970s, Searle had a brief exchange with Jacques Derrida regarding speech-act theory. The exchange was
characterized by a degree of mutual hostility between the philosophers, each of whom accused the other of having
misunderstood his basic points.[11][citation needed] Searle was particularly hostile to Derrida's deconstructionist
framework and much later refused to let his response to Derrida be printed along with Derrida's papers in the 1988
collection Limited Inc. Searle did not consider Derrida's approach to be legitimate philosophy or even intelligible
writing and argued that he did not want to legitimize the deconstructionist point of view by dedicating any attention
to it. Consequently, some criticsWikipedia:Avoid weasel words have considered the exchange to be a series of
elaborate misunderstandings rather than a debate,[12] while othersWikipedia:Avoid weasel words have seen either
Derrida or Searle gaining the upper hand.[13] The level of hostility can be seen from Searle's statement that "It would
be a mistake to regard Derrida's discussion of Austin as a confrontation between two prominent philosophical
traditions", to which Derrida replied that that sentence was "the only sentence of the "reply" to which I can
subscribe".[14] Commentators have frequently interpreted the exchange as a prominent example of a confrontation
between analytical and continental philosophy.
The debate began in 1972, when, in his paper "Signature Event Context", Derrida analyzed J. L. Austin's theory of
the illocutionary act. While sympathetic to Austin's departure from a purely denotational account of language to one
that includes "force", Derrida was sceptical of the framework of normativity employed by Austin. He argued that
Austin had missed the fact that any speech event is framed by a "structure of absence" (the words that are left unsaid
due to contextual constraints) and by "iterability" (the constraints on what can be said, given by what has been said
in the past). Derrida argued that the focus on intentionality in speech-act theory was misguided because intentionality
is restricted to that which is already established as a possible intention. He also took issue with the way Austin had
excluded the study of fiction, non-serious or "parasitic" speech, wondering whether this exclusion was because
Austin had considered these speech genres governed by different structures of meaning, or simply due to a lack of
interest. In his brief reply to Derrida, "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida", Searle argued that Derrida's
critique was unwarranted because it assumed that Austin's theory attempted to give a full account of language and
meaning when its aim was much narrower. Searle considered leaving out parasitic discourse forms justified by the
narrow scope of Austin's inquiry.[15][16] Searle agreed with Derrida's proposal that intentionality presupposes
iterability, but did not apply the same concept of intentionality used by Derrida, being unable or unwilling to engage
with the continental conceptual apparatus. This, in turn, caused Derrida to criticize Searle for not being sufficiently
familiar with phenomenological perspectives on intentionality.[17] Searle also argued that Derrida's disagreement
with Austin turned on his having misunderstood Austin's typetoken distinction and his failure to understand

John Searle
Austin's concept of failure in relation to performativity. Some criticsWikipedia:Avoid weasel words have suggested
that Searle, by being so grounded in the analytical tradition that he was unable to engage with Derrida's continental
phenomenological tradition, was at fault for the unsuccessful nature of the exchange.
Derrida, in his response to Searle ("a b c ..." in Limited Inc), ridiculed Searle's positions. Claiming that a clear sender
of Searle's message could not be established, he suggesting that Searle had formed with Austin a socit
responsabilit limite (a "limited liability company") due to the ways in which the ambiguities of authorship within
Searle's reply circumvented the very speech act of his reply. Searle did not reply. Later in 1988, Derrida tried to
review his position and his critiques of Austin and Searle, reiterating that he found the constant appeal to "normality"
in the analytical tradition to be problematic.[18][19][20][21][22][23][24]
In 1995, Searle gave a brief reply to Derrida in The Construction of Social Reality. He called Derrida's conclusion
"preposterous" and stated that "Derrida, as far as I can tell, does not have an argument. He simply declares that there
is nothing outside of texts..."[25]

Intentionality and the Background

Searle defines intentionality as the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and
states of affairs in the world.[26] The nature of intentionality is an important part of discussions of Searle's
"Philosophy of Mind". Searle emphasizes that the word intentionality, (the part of the mind directed to/from/about
objects and relations in the world independent of mind) should not be confused with the word intensionality (the
logical property of some sentences that do not pass the test of 'extensinalidade').[27] In Intentionality: An Essay in the
Philosophy of Mind (1983), Searle applies certain elements of his account(s) of "illocutionary acts" to the
investigation of intentionality. Searle also introduces a technical term the Background,[28] which, according to him,
has been the source of much philosophical discussion ("though I have been arguing for this thesis for almost twenty
years," Searle writes,[29] "many people whose opinions I respect still disagree with me about it.") Background he
calls the set of abilities, capacities, tendencies, and dispositions that humans have and that are not themselves
intentional states. Thus, when someone asks us to "cut the cake" we know to use a knife and when someone asks us
to "cut the grass" we know to use a lawnmower (and not vice versa), even though the actual request did not include
this detail. Searle sometimes supplements his reference to the Background with the concept of the Network, one's
network of other beliefs, desires, and other intentional states necessary for any particular intentional state to make
sense. Searle argues that the concept of a Background is similar to the concepts provided by several other thinkers,
including Wittgenstein's private language argument ("the work of the later Wittgenstein is in large part about the
Background"[30]) and Bourdieu's habitus.
To give an example, two chess players might be engaged in a bitter struggle at the board, but they share all sorts of
Background presuppositions: that they will take turns to move, that no one else will intervene, that they are both
playing to the same rules, that the fire alarm won't go off, that the board won't suddenly disintegrate, that their
opponent won't magically turn into a grapefruit, and so on indefinitely. As most of these possibilities won't have
occurred to either player,[31] Searle thinks the Background must be unconscious, though elements of it can be called
to consciousness (if the fire alarm does go off, say).
In his debate with Derrida, Searle argued against Derrida's notion that a statement can be disjoined from the original
intentionality of its author, for example when no longer connected to the original author, while still being able to
produce meaning. Searle maintained that even if one was to see a written statement with no knowledge of authorship
it would still be impossible to escape the question of intentionality, because "a meaningful sentence is just a standing
possibility of the (intentional) speech act". For Searle ascribing intentionality to a statement was a basic requirement
for attributing it any meaning at all.[32][33]

John Searle

Consciousness
Building upon his views about Intentionality, Searle presents a view concerning consciousness in his book The
Rediscovery of the Mind (1992). He argues that, starting with behaviorism (an early but influential scientific view,
succeeded by many later accounts that Searle also dismisses), much of modern philosophy has tried to deny the
existence of consciousness, with little success. In Intentionality, he parodies several alternative theories of
consciousness by replacing their accounts of intentionality with comparable accounts of the hand:
No one would think of saying, for example, "Having a hand is just being disposed to certain sorts of behavior
such as grasping" (manual behaviorism), or "Hands can be defined entirely in terms of their causes and
effects" (manual functionalism), or "For a system to have a hand is just for it to be in a certain computer state
with the right sorts of inputs and outputs" (manual Turing machine functionalism), or "Saying that a system
has hands is just adopting a certain stance toward it" (the manual stance). (p. 263)
Searle argues that philosophy has been trapped by a false dichotomy: that, on the one hand, the world consists of
nothing but objective particles in fields of force, but that yet, on the other hand, consciousness is clearly a subjective
first-person experience.
Searle says simply that both are true: consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes
of the brain. (A view which he suggests might be called biological naturalism.)
Ontological subjectivity
Searle has argued[34] that critics like Daniel Dennett, who (he claims) insist that discussing subjectivity is
unscientific because science presupposes objectivity, are making a category error. Perhaps the goal of science is to
establish and validate statements which are epistemically objective, (i.e., whose truth can be discovered and
evaluated by any interested party), but are not necessarily ontologically objective.
Searle calls any value judgment epistemically subjective. Thus, "McKinley is prettier than Everest" is "epistemically
subjective", whereas "McKinley is higher than Everest" is "epistemically objective." In other words, the latter
statement is evaluable (in fact, falsifiable) by an understood ('background') criterion for mountain height, like 'the
summit is so many meters above sea level'. No such criteria exist for prettiness.
Beyond this distinction, Searle thinks there are certain phenomena (including all conscious experiences) that are
ontologically subjective, i.e. can only exist as subjective experience. For example, although it might be subjective or
objective in the epistemic sense, a doctor's note that a patient suffers from back pain is an ontologically objective
claim: it counts as a medical diagnosis only because the existence of back pain is "an objective fact of medical
science".[35] But the pain itself is ontologically subjective: it is only experienced by the person having it.
Searle goes on to affirm that "where consciousness is concerned, the appearance is the reality".[36] His view that the
epistemic and ontological senses of objective/subjective are cleanly separable is crucial to his self-proclaimed
biological naturalism.
Artificial intelligence
A consequence of biological naturalism is that if we want to create a conscious being, we will have to duplicate
whatever physical processes the brain goes through to cause consciousness. Searle thereby means to contradict to
what he calls "Strong AI", defined by the assumption that as soon as a certain kind of software is running on a
computer, a conscious being is thereby created.[37]
In 1980, Searle presented the "Chinese room" argument, which purports to prove the falsity of strong AI.[38]
(Familiarity with the Turing test is useful for understanding the issue.) Assume you do not speak Chinese and
imagine yourself in a room with two slits, a book, and some scratch paper. Someone slides you some Chinese
characters through the first slit, you follow the instructions in the book, translate what it says onto the scratch paper,
and slide the resulting sheet out the second slit. To people on the outside world, it appears the room speaks
Chinesethey slide Chinese statements in one slit and get valid responses in returnyet you do not understand a

John Searle
word of Chinese. This suggests, according to Searle, that no computer can ever understand Chinese or English,
because, as the thought experiment suggests, being able to 'translate' Chinese into English does not entail
'understanding' either Chinese or English: all which the person in the thought experiment, and hence a computer, is
able to do is to execute certain syntactic manipulations.[39]
Stevan Harnad argues that Searle's "Strong AI" is really just another name for functionalism and computationalism,
and that these positions are the real targets of his critique.[40] Functionalists claim that consciousness can be defined
as a set of informational processes inside the brain. It follows that anything that carries out the same informational
processes as a human is also conscious. Thus, if we wrote a computer program that was conscious, we could run that
computer program on, say, a system of ping-pong balls and beer cups and the system would be equally conscious,
because it was running the same information processes.
Searle argues that this is impossible, since consciousness is a physical property, like digestion or fire. No matter how
good a simulation of digestion you build on the computer, it will not digest anything; no matter how well you
simulate fire, nothing will get burnt. By contrast, informational processes are observer-relative: observers pick out
certain patterns in the world and consider them information processes, but information processes are not
things-in-the-world themselves. Since they do not exist at a physical level, Searle argues, they cannot have causal
efficacy and thus cannot cause consciousness. There is no physical law, Searle insists, that can see the equivalence
between a personal computer, a series of ping-pong balls and beer cans, and a pipe-and-water system all
implementing the same program.[41]

Social reality
Searle extended his inquiries into observer-relative phenomena by trying to understand social reality. Searle begins
by arguing collective intentionality (e.g. "we're going for a walk") is a distinct form of intentionality, not simply
reducible to individual intentionality (e.g. "I'm going for a walk with him and I think he thinks he's going for a walk
with me and thinks I think I'm going for a walk with him and ...").
Searle's The Construction of Social Reality (1995) addresses the mystery of how social constructs like "baseball" or
"money" can exist in a world consisting only of physical particles in fields of force. Adapting an idea by Elizabeth
Anscombe in "On Brute Facts," Searle distinguishes between brute facts, like the height of a mountain, and
institutional facts, like the score of a baseball game. Aiming at an explanation of social phenomena in terms of
Anscombe's notion, he argues that society can be explained in terms of institutional facts, and institutional facts arise
out of collective intentionality through constitutive rules with the logical form "X counts as Y in C". Thus, for
instance, filling out a ballot counts as a vote in a polling place, getting so many votes counts as a victory in an
election, getting a victory counts as being elected president in the presidential race, etc.

Rationality
In Rationality in Action (2001), Searle argues that standard notions of rationality are badly flawed. According to
what he calls the Classical Model, rationality is seen as something like a train track: you get on at one point with
your beliefs and desires and the rules of rationality compel you all the way to a conclusion. Searle doubts this picture
of rationality holds generally.
Searle briefly critiques one particular set of these rules: those of mathematical decision theory. He points out that its
axioms require that anyone who valued a quarter and their life would, at some odds, bet their life for a quarter. Searle
insists he would never take such a bet and believes that this stance is perfectly rational.
Most of his attack is directed against the common conception of rationality, which he believes is badly flawed. First,
he argues that reasons don't cause you to do anything, because having sufficient reason wills (but doesn't force) you
to do that thing. So in any decision situation we experience a gap between our reasons and our actions. For example,
when we decide to vote, we do not simply determine that we care most about economic policy and that we prefer
candidate Jones's economic policy. We also have to make an effort to cast our vote. Similarly, every time a guilty

John Searle
smoker lights a cigarette they are aware of succumbing to their craving, not merely of acting automatically as they
do when they exhale. It is this gap that makes us think we have freedom of the will. Searle thinks whether we really
have free will or not is an open question, but considers its absence highly unappealing because it makes the feeling
of freedom of will an epiphenomenon, which is highly unlikely from the evolutionary point of view given its
biological cost. He also says: " All rational activity presupposes free will ".[42]
Second, Searle believes we can rationally do things that don't result from our own desires. It is widely believed that
one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is", i.e. that facts about how the world is can never tell you what you should
do ('Hume's Law'). By contrast, in so far as a fact is understood as relating to an institution (marriage, promises,
commitments, etc.), which is to be understood as a system of constitutive rules, then what one should do can be
understood as following from the institutional fact of what one has done; institutional fact, then, can be understood
as opposed to the "brute facts" related to Hume's Law. For example, Searle believes the fact that you promised to do
something means you should do it, because by making the promise you are participating in the constitutive rules that
arrange the system of promise making itself, and therefore understand a "shouldness" as implicit in the mere factual
action of promising. Furthermore, he believes that this provides a desire-independent reason for an actionif you
order a drink at a bar, you should pay for it even if you have no desire to. This argument, which he first made in his
paper, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'" (1964),[43] remains highly controversial, but even three decades later Searle
continued to defend his view that "..the traditional metaphysical distinction between fact and value cannot be
captured by the linguistic distinction between 'evaluative' and 'descriptive' because all such speech act notions are
already normative."[44]
Third, Searle argues that much of rational deliberation involves adjusting our (often inconsistent) patterns of desires
to decide between outcomes, not the other way around. While in the Classical Model, one would start from a desire
to go to Paris greater than that of saving money and calculate the cheapest way to get there, in reality people balance
the niceness of Paris against the costs of travel to decide which desire (visiting Paris or saving money) they value
more. Hence, he believes rationality is not a system of rules, but more of an adverb. We see certain behavior as
rational, no matter what its source, and our system of rules derives from finding patterns in what we see as rational.

Bibliography

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969)

The Campus War: A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony (political commentary; 1971)
Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (essay collection; 1979)
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983)
Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures (lecture collection; 1984)
Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (John Searle & Daniel Vanderveken 1985)
John Searle and His Critics (Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick, eds.; 1991)
The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992)
The Construction of Social Reality (1995)
The Mystery of Consciousness (review collection; 1997)
Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (summary of earlier work; 1998)
Rationality in Action (2001)
Consciousness and Language (essay collection; 2002)
Freedom and Neurobiology (lecture collection; 2004)
Mind: A Brief Introduction (summary of work in philosophy of mind; 2004)
Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts (essay collection; 2007)
Philosophy in a New Century: Selected Essays (2008)

Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (2010)

John Searle

References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]

http:/ / ist-socrates. berkeley. edu/ ~jsearle/

http:/ / www. ditext. com/ searle/ campus/ 1. html
http:/ / socrates. berkeley. edu/ ~jsearle/ Free%20Speech%20Movement-1. htm
http:/ / www. ditext. com/ searle/ campus/ 4. html
http:/ / ist-socrates. berkeley. edu/ ~jsearle/ pdf/ terrorism. pdf
"Language Arts & Disciplines" (1969) by John R. Searle- Chapter 3 - "THE STRUCTURE OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS", p. 54
http:/ / apertum. 110mb. com/ library_09/ Strawson-Meaning-and-Truth. pdf
Although Searle does not mention earlier uses of the concept, it originates from Alexander Sesonske's article "Performatives" (http:/ /
philpapers. org/ rec/ SESP).
[9] Burkhardt, Armin (ed.), Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle. Berlin / New York
1990.
[10] Lepore, Ernest / van Gulick, Robert (eds): John Searle and his Critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1991.
[11] Derrida, Jacques. Limited, Inc. Northwestern University Press, 1988. p. 29: "...I have read some of his [Searle's] work (more, in any case,
than he seems to have read of mine)"
[12] Maclean, Ian. 2004. "un dialogue de sourds? Some implications of the Austin-Searle-Derrida debate", in Jacques Derrida: critical thought.
Ian Maclachlan (ed.) Ashgate Publishing, 2004
[13] "Another Look at the Derrida-Searle Debate". Mark Alfino. Philosophy & Rhetoric , Vol. 24, No. 2 (1991), pp. 143-152 (http:/ / www. jstor.
org/ stable/ 10. 2307/ 40237667)
[14] Simon Glendinning. 2001. Arguing with Derrida. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 18
[15] Gregor Campbell. 1993. "John R. Searle" in Irene Rima Makaryk (ed). Encyclopedia of contemporary literary theory: approaches, scholars,
terms. University of Toronto Press, 1993
[16] John Searle, "Reiterating the Diffrences: A Reply to Derrida", Glyph 2 (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
[17] Marian Hobson. 1998. Jacques Derrida: opening lines. Psychology Press. pp. 95-97
[18] Jacques Derrida, "Afterwords" in Limited, Inc. (Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 133
[19] Farrell, F. B. (1988), Iterability and meaning: the SearleDerrida debate. Metaphilosophy, 19: 5364. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9973.1988.tb00701 (http:/ / onlinelibrary. wiley. com/ doi/ 10. 1111/ j. 1467-9973. 1988. tb00701. x/ abstract)
[20] "With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida" (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 10. 2307/ 1343193). Stanley E.
Fish. Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1982), pp. 693-721.
[21] "Derrida, Searle, Contexts, Games, Riddles" (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 10. 2307/ 468793). Edmond Wright. New Literary History,
Vol. 13, No. 3 ("Theory: Parodies, Puzzles, Paradigms"), Spring 1982, pp. 463-477.
[22] "Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin" (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 10. 2307/ 468640). Jonathan Culler. New Literary History,
Vol. 13, No. 1 ("On Convention: I"), Autumn 1981, pp. 15-30.
[23] "Language, philosophy and the risk of failure: rereading the debate between Searle and Derrida" (http:/ / www. springerlink. com/ content/
dwu9j5cx8ft1jum8/ ). Hagi Kenaan. Continental Philosophy Review. Volume 35, Number 2, 117-133, DOI: 10.1023/A:1016583115826.
[24] "Understanding Each Other: The Case of the Derrida-Searle Debate" (http:/ / www. springerlink. com/ content/ x16m6724k5513827/
fulltext. pdf). Stanley Raffel. Human Studies, Volume 34, Number 3, 277-292, DOI: 10.1007/s10746-011-9189-6 Theoretical/Philosophical
Paper.
[25] Searle The Construction of Social Reality (1995) p.157-160.
[26] Searle, Intentionality (1983)
[27] Searle "Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization" (2010) p. 48-62
[28] Searle, Intentionality (1983); The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992) ch. 8
[29] "Literary Theory and Its Discontents", New Literary History, 640
[30] Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), p.177
[31] Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), p.185
[32] John Searle, "Reiterating the Diffrences: A Reply to Derrida'"', Glyph 2 (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977 p. 202
[33] Gerald Graff. 1988. Summary of Reiterating the differences. in Derrida, JAcques. Limited Inc. p. 26.
[34] Searle, J R: The Mystery of Consciousness (1997) p.95-131
[35] Searle, J R: The Mystery of Consciousness (1997) p.122
[36] Searle, J R: The Mystery of Consciousness (1997) p.112
[37] ". . . I call the view that all there is to having a mind is having a program, Strong AI, . . . " The Rediscovery of the Mind, p.201
[38] "Minds, Brains and Programs" (http:/ / www. bbsonline. org/ Preprints/ OldArchive/ bbs. searle2. html), The Behavioral and Brain
Sciences.3, pp.417-424. (1980)
[39] Interview with John R. Searle | http:/ / globetrotter. berkeley. edu/ people/ Searle/ searle-con4. html
[40] Harnad, Stevan (2001) (http:/ / cogprints. org/ 4023/ ), "What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument", in M.; Preston,
J., Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument, Oxford University Press.
[41] Searle 1980
[42] Rationality in Action by John R. Searle (2003)

John Searle
[43] John Searle, " How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' (http:/ / links. jstor. org/ sici?sici=0031-8108(196401)73:1<43:HTD"F">2. 0. CO;2-9)", The
Philosophical Review, 73:1 (January 1964), 43-58
[44] John Searle in Thomas Mautner, "Dictionary of Philosophy" (Penguin 1996). ISBN 0-14-051250-0

Further reading
Papers on the History of Speech Act Theory by Barry Smith (http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/
smith_speech_acts.htm)
"Minds, Brains and Programs" (http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.searle2.html), The
Behavioral and Brain Sciences.3, pp.417424. (1980)
"Is the Brain a Digital Computer?" (http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/searle.comp.html)
(1990) Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association
"Collective Intentions and Actions" (1990) in Intentions in Communication J. M. P. R. Cohen, & M. and E.
Pollack. Cambridge, Mass.: . MIT Press: 401-416.
The Problem of Consciousness (http://users.ecs.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Py104/searle.prob.html), Social
Research, Vol. 60, No.1, Spring 1993.
Consciousness (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&
dopt=Abstract&list_uids=10845075) Ann. Rev. Neurosci. (2000) 23:557-78. Review.
D. Koepsell (ed.) and L. Moss (ed.) "Searle and Smith: A Dialogue" in John Searle's Ideas About Social Reality:
Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions (2003), Blackwell, ISBN 978-1-4051-1258-1
Dualism revisited (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18276124?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.
PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_DefaultReportPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum) J Physiol Paris.
2007 Jul-Nov;101(4-6):169-78. Epub 2008 Jan 19.
M. Bennett, D. Dennett, P. Hacker, J. Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind and Language (2007),
Columbia University Press, ISBN 0-231-14044-4
The Storm Over the University (http://www.ditext.com/searle/searle1.html)
Doerge (2006), Friedrich Christoph: Illocutionary Acts - Austin's Account and What Searle Made Out of It.
Tuebingen: Tuebingen University. http://tobias-lib.ub.uni-tuebingen.de/volltexte/2006/2273/pdf/
Dissertation_Doerge.pdf

External links
John Searle's Machines Like Us interview (http://machineslikeus.com/interviews/
machines-us-interviews-john-searle)
Conversations with Searle (http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Searle/searle-con0.html).
Interview in Conversations with History (http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/) series. Available in
webcast (http://webcast.ucsd.edu:8080/ramgen/UCSD_TV/7796.rm) and podcast (http://132.239.126.220/
mp3/7796.mp3).
Conversations with History:John R. Searle on YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=giwXG3QYWQA/Coversations)
Video (http://www.childrenofthecode.org/pvid/searle/part1.htm) or transcript (http://www.
childrenofthecode.org/interviews/searle.htm) of an interview with John Searle on language, writing, mind, and
consciousness
John Searle (http://www.imdb.com/name/nm1790698/) at the Internet Movie Database
Webcast of Philosophy of Society lectures (http://webcast.berkeley.edu/course_details_new.
php?seriesid=2009-D-67309&semesterid=2009-D)
Philosophy of Language: an interview with John Searle (http://www.revel.inf.br/site2007/_pdf/8/entrevistas/
revel_8_interview_john_searle.pdf) ReVEL, vol. 5, n. 8, 2007.

John Searle
The Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies video interview with John Searle (http://hardproblem.ru/
interview/j-searle/lang-pref/en/) 2011-06-13
BBC Reith Audio Lectures - John Searle: Minds, Brain & Science (1984) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/
p00gq1fk)Wikipedia:Link rot
Searle's May 2013 TED talk, "Our shared condition -- consciousness" (http://www.ted.com/talks/
john_searle_our_shared_condition_consciousness.html)

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