Deconstruction - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Deconstruction | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
09/10/15 13:33
Deconstruction
Although deconstruction has roots in Martin Heideggers concept of Destruktion, to deconstruct is not
to destroy. Deconstruction is always a double movement of simultaneous affirmation and undoing. It
started out as a way of reading the history of metaphysics in Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, but was
soon applied to the interpretation of literary, religious, and legal texts as well as philosophical ones,
and was adopted by several French feminist theorists as a way of making clearer the deep male bias
embedded in the European intellectual tradition.
To deconstruct is to take a text apart along the structural fault lines created by the ambiguities
inherent in one or more of its key concepts or themes in order to reveal the equivocations or
contradictions that make the text possible. For example, in Platos Pharmacy, Derrida deconstructs
Socrates criticism of the written word, arguing that it not only suffers from internal inconsistencies
because of the analogy Socrates himself makes between memory and writing, but also stands in stark
contrast to the fact that his ideas come to us only through the written word he disparaged (D 61-171).
The double movement here is one of tracing this tension in Platos text, and in the traditional reading
of that text, while at the same time acknowledging the fundamental ways in which our understanding
of the world is dependent on Socrates attitude toward the written word. Derrida points out similar
contradictions in philosophical discussions of a preface (by G. W. F. Hegel, D 1-69) and a picture frame
(by Immanuel Kant, TP 17-147), which are simultaneously inside and outside the respective works
under consideration.
Since the distinction between what is inside the text (or painting) and what is outside can itself be
deconstructed according to the same principles, deconstruction is, like Destruktion, an historicizing
movement that opens texts to the conditions of their production, their con-text in a very broad sense,
including not only the historical circumstances and tradition from which they arose, but also the
conventions and nuances of the language in which they were written and the details of their authors
lives. This generates an effectively infinite complexity in texts that makes any deconstructive reading
necessarily partial and preliminary.
Table of Contents
1. Destruktion
2. Deconstruction
1. Early Formulations
2. Literary Deconstruction
3. Contentions and Confrontations
4. Later Versions
http://www.iep.utm.edu/deconst/
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3. Feminist Deconstruction
4. References and Further Readings
1. References
2. Additional Readings
1. Destruktion
Heideggers use of the word Destruktion suffers from the same problem as Edmund Husserls use of
Intentionalitt. Neither is an ordinary German word; both were borrowed from Latin almost as
neologisms to express a concept their creators perceived as relatively new to the philosophical domain,
only to have the words become confused with their more common cognates when translated into
French or English. The usual German word for destruction is Zerstrung, but Heideggers concept
of Destruktion is also closely related to Abbau or dismantling. Derrida uses the word deconstruction to
capture both German terms. (EO 86-6).
In Being and Time, Heidegger says that the purpose of Destruktion is to arrive at those primordial
experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Beingthe ways which
have guided us ever since (BT 44). This is the double gesture referred to above, one that takes apart
the European traditions and in so doing finds the basic understanding of Being beneath its surface.
This goal separates Destruktion from deconstruction, not because deconstruction is purely negative,
but because it has no fixed endpoint or goal. Deconstruction is always an on-going process because the
constantly shifting nature of language means that no final meaning or interpretation of a text is
possible. Subsequent ages, grounded in a different language and different ways of life, will always see
something different in a text as they deconstruct it in the context of the realities with which they live.
What is meant by the written word, for example, has already evolved substantially since Derrida
wrote Platos Pharmacy due to the explosion in electronic media. All deconstruction can reveal are
temporary and more or less adequate truths, not more primordial or deeper ones. For Heidegger, on
the other hand, the primordial experiences of Being revealed through Destruktion result in a single
interpretation that offers a more authentic alternative to philosophys misunderstanding of the
temporality and historicality of human existence.
Temporality and historicality are essential components of Dasein, Heideggers term for human
existence, because it is thrown projection, that is, an entity necessarily oriented toward an unknown
future, but always based on a past for which it is not itself fully responsible and which it can never fully
know. Time, then, is not only a category of experience (as in Kant), but the very core of our existence.
As beings in a present moment are defined in terms of a past that creates our possibilities and a future
into which we project them. On a larger scale, this temporality of Dasein (as opposed to Hegelian
Spirit) is what creates history; our ability to project forward and interpret backwards not only the
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circumstances of our lives, but also those of the entire social world to which we belong. For Heidegger,
Destruktion of the traditions in that social world can lead us back to a past that can be re-interpreted in
ways that reveal the deeper understanding of Being hidden in the earliest texts of the European
tradition; it can offer ways to project a different, more authentic future for Dasein based on the new
way of seeing the past.
2. Deconstruction
a. Early Formulations
As already noted, deconstruction differs from Destruktion in that it has no fixed or expected endpoint
or map, but is rather a potentially infinite process. Although obviously a critical tool, it also lacks the
sense, evident in Heidegger, that the text to be deconstructed is part of how European thought has
somehow gone wrong and needs correction. This is because deconstruction rejects both the idea that
there is a fixed series of eras (ancient, medieval, modern) in European history that mark a downward
path, and the idea that there is some determinate way in which that path might be reversed, by a reinterpretation of early Greek philosophy. Rather, Derrida insists that what he deconstructs are texts
that he loves (EO 87) and they are vital parts of our intellectual world, with a view to revealing their
underlying complexities and hidden contradictions. He does not seek to undo Kant, for example, or
interpret his writings in ways closer to Derridas own vision of what philosophy should be, but rather
shows us the ways in which Kant both changes and continues the metaphysical tradition, as well as the
ways in which Kants texts undo themselves along the same fault lines that have undermined that
tradition throughout its history.
In 1967, Derrida offered this definition:
To deconstruct philosophy, thus, would be to thinkin the most faithful, interior waythe
structured genealogy of philosophys concepts, but at the same time to determinefrom a
certain exterior that is unqualifiable or unnameable by philosophywhat this history has
been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into a history by means of this. . .motivated
repression (P 6).
What is outside of, or excluded from the realm dominated by the philosophical tradition, although
unnamed in it, provides a vantage point and a key with which to find the flaws and lacunae that
domination seeks to hide. The opposition between the spoken and written word in Plato, the text and
its introduction in Hegel, the painting and its frame in Kant belong to a series of oppositions
(good/evil, mind/body, male/female, center/margin, necessary/contingent, and so forth .) that run
though and in many ways structure the European philosophical tradition. Each of these pairs is also a
hierarchy meant to exclude both the non-dominant member of the pair (the body, the female, the
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margin, the contingent) and anything outside the opposition (the ambiguous, the borderline, the
hybrid) from the philosophical realm. These hierarchical oppositions, in turn, create the basis for
political hierarchy and social domination (male/female, freeman/slave, propertied/landless,
Christian/other, citizen/immigrant), power differentials that motivate the repression to which Derrida
refers. This is why deconstruction denies the possibility of some pre-Socratic primordial experience
of Being to be found through dismantling the metaphysical tradition which could then solve the
problems that tradition has created, because that experience, too, would be subject to deconstruction
along these same lines.
What deconstruction reveals, among other things, is that the repression that is necessary for creating a
history of philosophy is in large part a repression of what philosophy itself cannot control, of what
escapes the grasp of philosophy while being part of it. The fault lines that deconstruction follows are
the traces left inside philosophy by what it must define as exterior to it in order to be philosophy.
Derridas early work connects these fault lines to what is represented by the written word: our inability
to control or limit the meaning that might be given to our words because of the historical development
of language, the ambiguity of linguistic meaning, and the ability of written text to be excerpted,
reproduced and read in contexts we can neither imagine nor control (as opposed, supposedly, to the
immediate and limited context of the spoken word). This is why any text can be deconstructed (even
Friedrich Nietzsches fragmentary message I have forgotten my umbrella in Spurs), but canonical
texts (Plato, Kant, Hegel, later Heidegger himself) offer the richest and most productive grounds for
deconstruction. We learn more about ourselves by seeing the traces of a fear of absolute loss that
motivate the Aufhebung in Hegels texts, than we might from finding the same anxiety in the writing of
someone whose influence on European philosophy (and politics) has been less profound.
As an example of deconstruction here, however, it seems advisable to choose a text closer to Nietzsches
umbrella, than Hegels phenomenology of Spirit. The Truth in Painting takes its title from a letter in
which Paul Czanne tells mile Bernard, I owe you the truth in painting [la verit en peinture] and I
will tell it to you. Derrida points out that the philosophy of language would assert that in writing this,
Czanne must have known what he meant, but in fact the sentence itself has no determinate meaning.
The truth in painting escapes and exceeds the boundaries philosophy wants to draw with regard to
language because it has at least four meanings, none of which is reducible to any of the others: 1) the
truth about truth itself to be found in or through a painting or other work of art, such as the truth
Heidegger finds in Van Goghs painting of the shoes in Origin of the Work of Art; 2) the truth of the
painting as painting, that is, how true to life it is, how well it succeeds in representing what it is
meant to represent; 3) the truth about its object that can be found through the painting, such as when a
portrait lays bare the character of its subject; and 4) the truth about painting in the sense of what is
true in painting as a human enterprise or art form.
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This ambiguity of the French sentence is compounded by the fact that Czanne promises, not to paint
the truth, but to tell or say it in language, thus linking text and painting in a complex nexus of possible
meanings and realizations. There is, and can be, no single meaning of this sentence simply because of
the rather ordinary (but untranslatable) French phrase en peinture. As is sometimes the case with
the deconstruction of such partial and cryptic texts, Derridas target here is not Czannes words
themselves, but rather the account of truth and promises (the implicit debt in Czannes I owe you)
found in contemporary philosophy of language. Not only does this sentence fail traditional
philosophical tests for having a truth value, due to its ambiguity, it also fails to have the conditions of
satisfaction, with which more recent philosophy of language hoped to replace those tests and
determine whether Czanne paid his debt. By deconstructing the phrase the truth in painting,
Derrida hopes to underscore the pragmatic reality that how language functions as a living phenomenon
makes it impossible to develop purely formal criteria for identifying or cataloguing true statements.
b. Literary Deconstruction
One notable fact about the reception of deconstruction in the United States was its relatively early
acceptance by departments of literature compared to departments of philosophy. Undoubtedly , there
are several reasons for this, but one may be that, as Geoffrey Hartman notes, Deconstructive criticism
does not present itself as a novel enterprise because the ambiguity and contextuality, the interplay of
the spoken and written word, that deconstruction emphasizes in philosophical texts are both more
obvious and more acknowledged in literary ones. At the same time, deconstruction, by foregrounding
the fact that Everything we thought of as spirit, or meaning separable from the letter of the text,
remains within an intertextual sphere (DC viii), opened important channels of communication
between philosophy and literary studies.
The tools of deconstruction and the sorts of truths they reveal, are similar in both spheres. The basic
strategy is still to follow the trace of a key ambiguity or blind spot through the text to illuminate
hierarchical oppositions it relies on and the fault lines along which it can be undone, while still
acknowledging its power and importance in European thought. Ernest Jones classic psychoanalytic
reading of Hamlet, for instance, is deconstructive in that it foregrounds the suppressed patricide in
Julius Caesar (Shakespeare ignores the fact that Brutus was Caesars illegitimate son, thus implying
an invariant (beloved-)father/(legitimate-)son pair), and then uses this omission as one key in tracing
the Oedipal fault line in the later play. Here deconstruction yields, not a new meaning to Hamlet, as
one could say Derrida does in his discussion of prefaces in Hegel, but a new richness to our
understanding of Shakespeares work.
This highlights the fact that deconstruction plays a different role in literature than in philosophy.
Deconstruction tends to be used in literary theory in arguments between and among theorists about
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the value of their theories, rather than about the value of the texts under discussion. One deconstructs
Kant to argue with Kant (and perhaps others), but one doesnt deconstruct Shakespeare to argue with
Shakespeare (or, as we saw above, Czanne to argue with Czanne). In addition, literary
deconstruction is about texts that are of a different nature than the deconstruction itself, while the
deconstruction of one philosophical text results in another philosophical text. This makes it much
clearer in philosophy that deconstructive texts can themselves be, in fact must be, deconstructed.
What literary deconstruction produces, on the other hand, is not itself literature. This doesnt mean
that literary deconstructions cannot be deconstructed, but that they are not deconstructed in the same
way that they are constructed. The context in which such a deconstruction might be carried out, is quite
different from the context in which the original deconstructive text was created. Put another way,
literary deconstruction assumes the possibility and reality of literature in at least some sense of the
term, whereas deconstruction as a philosophical enterprise questions, at its most basic level, the
possibility of philosophy itself.
c. Contentions and Confrontations

Deconstruction has always been engaged in active dialogue with other contemporary approaches to
philosophical and literary texts. The most productive of these conversations have been with those
schools of thought that are closest in history and orientation to deconstruction, often sharing its roots
in Heideggers work. At the same time, the issues raised in those debates are often similar to those
raised by more strident critics completely opposed to the deconstructive enterprise. A brief summary
of some of the most notable confrontations, across more than twenty years, offers an opportunity to
consider the most powerful objections to deconstruction, from the end of the 20th century, onwards.
The 1981 conversation between deconstruction (in the person of Derrida) and hermeneutics (in the
person of Hans-Georg Gadamer) raises at least two recurrent themes. The first has already been
indirectly discussedthe charge that deconstruction is a negative enterprise. Gadamer, who speaks of
the debate as one between Heideggers reading of Nietzsche and Derridas, calls deconstruction a
repudiation of the language of concepts that is the legacy of European philosophy (DD 101). As
already noted, however, deconstruction is always a question and a double movement aware of its own
debt to the texts it deconstructs, and so never a repudiation. The second charge is that deconstruction
does not allow for the possibility that a word can be redefined or used independently of its traditional
metaphysical meaning. Gadamer raises this point with regard to understanding in general, selfunderstanding and dialectic, asking why these terms must be considered part of metaphysics when
used in the way he uses them. This argument is weakened, however, by Gadamers own reference to
an older wisdom that speaks in living language, thus affirming the continuing echo of the tradition
even in the most carefully redefined or well-intentioned philosophical terms (DD 95-99).
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Although directed at postmodernism, the 1990 exchange between major feminist theorists recorded in
Feminist Contentions raises some of the same themes as the earlier debate, but also bears directly on
the feminist reception of deconstruction in the United States. The feminists who argue here against
postmodernism, and by extension against deconstruction, make the case that political action requires a
stronger basis than either of these is capable of providing. Seyla Benhabib, for instance, acknowledges
that subjectivity is largely shaped by language and other symbolic structures, but insists that there
must remain some sense in which we are both author and character at once in our own life histories.
She argues that, in order to be politically effective in the face of womens sometimes tenuous sense of
self and lack of autonomy, feminist philosophy requires a core of irreducible selfhood and agency that
deconstruction would deny (FC 21-22). As Judith Butler points out however, this line of argument
precludes the possibility of any political opposition to the self as traditionally understood because it
allows us no political way to move beyond the traditional metaphysical dualisms (author/character,
authority/submission, self/other, autonomy/heteronomy, and back to, e.g., male/female) (FC 36).
In her response to Butler, Benhabib emphasizes another recurring theme in debates about
deconstruction: how can one be constituted by discourse without being determined by it? That is,
how does the deconstructive understanding of the self as opaque and internally divided provide a
starting point for social and political critique (FC 110)? We have seen, however, that for deconstruction
discourse is neither monolithic nor unequivocal, which means that it cannot be fully determinative of
the self, either. The very lack of a permanent, substantial self in the usual sense that Benhabib and
others criticize in deconstruction, is at the same time, what creates the possibility of agency outside and
beyond the world of fixed essences and meanings envisioned by the philosophical tradition. (A
Cartesian self, Descartes himself tells us in the Meditations, is most free when it has no choice but to
follow Reason.) The complexities here can be seen in the way deconstructive texts themselves often
grapple with these same questions about the possibility of personal and political agency (see below)
but, as might be expected, come up with no final answer.
The 1993 confrontation between deconstruction and the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty raises
similar points. Rorty accuses Derrida of being a humanist in the sense of a follower of the
Enlightenment, while he suggests that deconstruction itself diverts attention, at least in the United
States, away from real politics (which he later defines as a matter of pragmatic, short-term reforms
and compromises). He embraces the deconstructive understanding of language, which he likens to
Ludwig Wittgensteins, but denies that the consequences of a Wittgensteinian theory of language can
be meaningfully applied to the natural sciences. He argues instead for an empiricist and naturalist
position in science, that he sees to be in conflict with the transcendental side of deconstruction, that
is, its continuing concern with metaphysics and the resultant tendency to see science as a form of
metaphysical materialism (DP 14-17).
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In response, Derrida accepts some commonality between pragmatism and deconstruction, but defends
the asking of the transcendental question and the refusal to do away with metaphysics altogether as a
defense against empiricism, positivism, and psychologism. He also refers to his work on the
inevitability of violence in the political realm, which counters the tacit optimism in Rortys political
views (DP 81-83). Derridas argument is that the political state relies on the rule of law, and the rule of
law, in turn, relies on the power to punish, that is, on violence, which is therefore the ground of the
political state. His later work on immigration also underscores the dependence of the political state on
a sharp and often violent boundary between who has the full rights of democratic citizenship
(fraternity in the French context)--that is, the citizen, the landowner, the freeman, all always male-and who does not (aliens, peasants, slaves, women).
Philosophy in a Time of Terror (2003) is not a direct confrontation between deconstruction and
Jrgen Habermas theory of communicative action, but illustrates the continuity of themes among
those critical of deconstruction over the preceding twenty years. In the context of 9/11, Habermas
remarks acknowledges the structural violence that underlies the successful societies of what he terms
the West. But then questions the deconstructivist suspicion, that the model of communication that
works reasonably well in everyday situations, will no longer be adequate when we move to larger
conversations between political and social groups. He argues that insisting dialogue is nothing but
displaced violence obscures the potential of dialogue for ending violence without creating new pretexts
for it (PT 35-38). He similarly objects to the deconstruction of the concept of tolerance as always an
exercise of the power to tolerate or not, because the toleration demanded in a democracy is one
between equals and thus mutual rather than paternalistic. He also finds a certain circularity in
deconstruction, since it seems to rely on the same universalism, tolerance, and so forth , it seeks to
undo.
As already noted, however, this double gesture is itself the essence of deconstruction. Derrida, for his
part, points out that the major events that provoke the kind of communication between groups
Habermas refers to are more often, if not exclusively, those that directly affect Europe and the United
States and not, for instance, an equal number of deaths in Somalia or the Sudan. What is threatened
by 9/11, he goes on, is exactly a particular context of interpretation that has dominated the dialogues
between the West and its Other, legitimating some forms of violence while disallowing others (PT 9293). He reasserts his reading of toleration as an exercise of paternalistic, or specifically religious,
power (PT 127). One does not ask an oppressed group to tolerate their oppressors; it is something
asked only of those in a position to grant or deny such toleration. He also questions the possibility of
an actually existing democracy, due to the violence of power relations (PT 120), much less the
possibility of a democracy in which different groups would be sufficiently equal for toleration to be
genuinely mutual.
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This last contestation between Habermas and Derrida, is indirect because it was in the form of separate
interviews, illustrates three main points. One, already noted, is the continuity of objections to
deconstruction over an extended period of time, primarily focused around issues of the everyday vs. the
transcendental (a dualism that deconstruction seeks to undermine) and the political implications of
deconstruction. The second is the lingering impression that these confrontations rely more on
contradiction than on real attempts at communication, or even argument. A method that questions
everything, including itself and even the concept of method, as deconstruction does, leaves critics little
concrete substance to criticize, except the circularity and the double gesture that deconstruction
embraces. At the same time, the third point to be noted is the increasing engagement of
deconstruction with politics after 1989, if not directly in response to these challenges, at least in the
context of their persistence.
d. Later Versions
In the 2001 interview about 9/11, Derrida makes a series of statements about the nature of
deconstruction that suggest both similarities and differences from his earlier pronouncements. He
defines the deconstructive philosopher as someone who analyzes and then draws the practical and
effective consequences of the relationship between our philosophical heritage and the structure of the
still dominant juridico-political system that is so clearly undergoing mutation (PT 106). The explicit
emphasis on both politics and the pragmatic is as marked as the much more obscure references that
were more common thirty years earlier. At the same time, he emphatically repeats the double gesture
of affirming his faith in and allegiance to the idea of an international law that is, like democracy,
unrealizable and, again like democracy, undecidable, that is, impossible even to envision without
contradiction (PT 115). Finally, he refers back to Platos Pharmacy to suggest that the political state
is, like writing for Socrates, at once remedy and poison, something we can live neither with, because
of its inherent violence, nor without, because only the state can protect us from the violence it
engenders (PT 124).
Deconstruction retains it critical edge well into the 21st century, even when directed against closely
allied texts. For instance, the 2001 address Derrida gave upon receiving the Theodor Adorno Prize
turns back on Adorno himself, specifically on his privileging of the German language even as he
champions globalism and a united Europe. This deconstruction centers in the familiar manner on the
untranslatably ambiguous French word fichu (n. neckerchief; adj., lost or done for). The word appears
in French in a letter to Adornos wife by Walter Benjamin, who uses it in describing a dream where he
speaks of changing a poem into a fichu in the first sense (neckerchief or scarf). This fichu is then
associated in the dream with the letter d, which Derrida suggests might refer to a name Benjamin
used in signing letters, or to his sister or his wife, both named Dora. Derrida then goes on to point out
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that dora in Greek can mean scorched or scratched skin, hence linking it to fichu in the second sense,
but also to Auschwitz and to 9/11, which was Adornos birthdate (PM 164-181). In an excellent example
of the deconstruction of a deconstruction, the English translator of this address inserts a footnote here
to add that dor, meaning gift, is also part of Adornos given name, Theodor, gift of the gods (PM
203).
Clearly gender plays a central role in the deconstructive process in Fichus. If the fault line or rifts in
traditional philosophical texts are the result of attempts to exclude from philosophy what it cannot
control, Woman (i.e., Adornos wife, Benjamins wife and sister, any woman who wears a fichu) will be
one of the constant sites of deconstructive undoing. Death also becomes of increasing importance in
deconstruction, as shown in Derridas late works focused on the death of the father, the mother, and
eventually his own. In addition to the connection psychoanalysis makes between women and death,
both these themes are revealed by deconstruction to be at the root of what the philosophical tradition
has always sought to avoid. Writing, for Socrates, can be deceptive (like a woman), or wander from the
source like an illegitimate son (born to such a woman). Socrates does not say either woman or
death, but the hatred of writing, deconstruction argues, as of all manifestations of our embodiment
in Plato and the tradition he inaugurates, is fundamentally a motivated repression of what always
exceeds philosophy, the philosophers body, his desires, and ultimately his death.
3. Feminist Deconstruction
The connection between deconstruction and feminist readings of the European tradition, although
implicit in Derridas work since Platos Pharmacy (1972), was made explicit in a 1981 interview with
Christie V. McDonald called Choreographies. Much earlier, however, feminist theorists in France
were incorporating deconstructive strategies in their work. In their 1975 book The Newly Born
Woman, for instance, Hlne Cixous and Catherine Clment underscore the series of hierarchical
oppositions (good/bad, life/death, day/night, culture/nature, male/female) that provide most, if not
all, of the key terms that open a text to a deconstructive reading. The list, which carries a footnoted
reference to Derrida, is not, as we have already seen, an innocent one. In Plato the pair speech/writing
is one central theme; in the ancient Greeks generally, active/passive; in religion God/man, later
Christian/Jew; in Ren Descartes and the moderns mind/body; in colonial or racist ideology
Western/Oriental, white/black. In a further repetition of Derridas method, Cixous and Clments
move is not to reverse these hierarchies, which would only create another system of power. They seek
instead to think in a third way. This third way is called bisexuality here, meaning the refusal to focus
on a single sexual organ in favor of undifferentiated pleasures of the flesh (NBW 84-85). This move to
rethink sexuality as part of a deconstructive strategy, drawing on psychoanalysis and anthropological
texts such as Marcel Mauss Essay on the Gift, is a common theme in French feminist deconstruction,
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also found, for example, in the work of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva (and in later texts by Derrida
himself).
Given the importance of Sigmund Freuds work to this strain of feminist deconstruction, Sarah
Kofmans 1980 book on Freud provides a detailed example of the potential power of this method for
feminist thought. One major fault line she examines is the concept of penis envy, a phenomenon that
is supposedly central to the process that transforms bisexual creatures into women. Kofman notes,
however, that this process amounts to transforming into a woman a little girl who has first been a little
boy because within psychoanalysis pre-Oedipal bisexuality affirms the original predominance of
masculinity (in both sexes) (EW 111-122). She draws extensively on Freuds biography, as well as his
texts, to make clear how he characterizes women as defined both by lack (their penis envy) and their
excess (her narcissistic self-sufficiency and her indifference which leaves the male emptied of this
original narcissism in favor of the love object [EW 52]), another classic deconstructive selfcontradiction. Ultimately, she argues that penis envy, Freuds ide fixe, and indeed his whole account
of femininity and female sexuality, allows him to blame nature for the cultural injustice by which man
subordinates womans sexual desires to his. She also notes Freuds surprise that, given all this,
women might be hostile to men or frigid (EW 208-209).
In The Man of Reason (1984) Genevieve Lloyd undertakes a feminist reading on a larger historical
scale, deconstructing (although she does not use that term) major philosophical texts from Plato to
Simone de Beauvoir along a fault line that would equate reason with the masculine. The hierarchical
dualism found in deconstruction (speech/writing, male/female, and so forth.) in epistemologicallyoriented English language philosophy take the form rational/irrational, knowledge/ignorance, and so
forth. Lloyd traces the ways in which these last two pairs maintained a powerfully gendered meaning
as the concept of Reason itself evolved through the history of European philosophy. After 1600,
public/private and universal/particular became politically important additions to the list; in the
twentieth century existentialism adds transcendence/embodiment. Most important, Lloyd says, has
been the underlying pair superior/inferior. As we have already seen, whatever is on the masculine side
of the dichotomy is assumed, simply from that fact, to have value; whatever is the feminine side, to
have none. Again, like Derrida, Cixous and Clment, Lloyd rejects a move to reverse this polarity
because ironically, it [would] occur in a space already prepared for it by the intellectual tradition it
seeks to reject (MR 105). Perhaps more optimistic than her French counterparts, Lloyd ends with her
own version of the deconstructive double gesture: Philosophy has defined ideals of Reason through
exclusions of the feminine. But it also contains within it the resources for critical reflection on those
ideals and on its own aspirations (MR 109).
4. References and Further Readings
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a. References
Benhabib, Seyla, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser. Feminist Contentions: A
Philosophical Exchange. New York: Routledge, 1995. (FC)
Bloom, Harold, Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman, and J. Hillis Miller.
Deconstruction and Criticism. New York: The Seabury Press,1979. (DC)
Borradori, Giovanna. Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jrgen Harbermas and
Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. (PT)
Cixous, Hlne, and Catherine Clment. The Newly Born Woman, Betsy Wing, trans.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. (NBW)
Critchley, Simon, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau, and Richard Rorty. Deconstruction and
Pragmatism, Chantal Mouffe, ed. New York: Routledge, 1996. (DP)
Derrida, Jacques. Positions, Alan Bass, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. (P)
Derrida, Jacques. Dissemination, Barbara Johnson, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1981. (D)
Derrida, Jacques. The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation, Christie V.
McDonald, ed., Peggy Kamuf, trans. NewYork: Schocken, 1985. (EO)
Derrida, Jacques. The Truth in Painting, Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, trans. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987. (TP)
Derrida, Jacques, and Christie V. McDonald. Choreographies, in Feminist Interpretations of
Jacques Derrida, Nancy J. Holland, ed. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1997.
Derrida, Jacques. Paper Machine, Rachel Bowlby, trans. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2005. (PM)
Descartes, Ren. The Philosophical Words of Descartes, Volume I, Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.
R. T. Ross, trans. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1911).
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans. New York:
Harper, 1962. (BT)
Heidegger, Martin. The Origin of the Work of Art in Poetry, Language, Thought, Albert
Hofstadter, trans. New York: Harper, 1971.
Jones, Ernest. Hamlet and Oedipus. New York: Doubleday, 1954.
Kofman, Sarah. The Enigma of Woman: Woman in Freuds Writings, Catherine Porter, trans.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985. (EW)
Lloyd, Genevieve. The Man of Reason: Male and Female in Western Philosophy.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. (MR)
Michelfelder, Diane P., and Richard E. Palmer, eds. Dialogue and Deconstruction: The GadamerDerrida Encounter. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989. (DD)
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b. Additional Readings
Armour, Ellen T. Deconstruction, Feminist Theology, and the Problem of Difference. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Excellent, but dense, example of the political use of deconstruction.
Bordo, Susan R. The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism & Culture. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1987.
Excellent, accessible feminist deconstruction of Descartes.
Cornell, Drucilla. Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.
Excellent, but dense, example of the use of deconstruction in legal theory.
Derrida, Jacques. Writing and Difference, Alan Bass, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1978.
Early deconstructions of Foucault, Hegel, Husserl, and others.
Derrida, Jacques. Margins Of Philosophy, Alan Bass, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982.
Early deconstructions of Heidegger, Hegel, and J. L. Austin.
Derrida, Jacques, and Anne Dufourmantelle. Of Hospitality, Rachel Bowlby, trans. Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Addresses issues of gender, immigration, and the political state.
Derrida, Jacques. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas.
Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005.
Excellent political and feminist late deconstruction.
Derrida, Jacques. Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth
Rottenber, eds. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Includes both Geschlecht articles on Heidegger and gender, plus other important papers
from 1998-2003.
Fraser, Nancy. Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social
Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
A major feminist theorist who is critical of deconstruction.
Kofman, Sarah. Selected Writings, Thomas Albrecht, ed., with Georgia Albert and Elizabeth
Rotten berg. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
Moi, Toril, ed. The Kristeva Reader. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Sellers, Susan, ed. The Hlne Cixous Reader. New York: Routledge, 1994. (CR)
Silverman, Hugh J., and Gary Aylesworth, eds. The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction and its
Differences. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990.
Several interesting articles on deconstruction, including one by Paul DeMan.
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Taylor, Mark C., ed. Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986.
Collection of philosophical writings from Kant onward that provides some of the historical
context for deconstruction.
Whitford, Margaret, ed. The Irigaray Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1991.
Author Information
Nancy J. Holland
Email: nholland@gw.hamline.edu
Hamline University
U. S. A.
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