NILS HOLTUG

ON THE VALUE OF COMING INTO EXISTENCE

(Received 22 December 2000; accepted 10 August 2001)

ABSTRACT. In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) a
person. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence can be better (or
worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claims are highly controversial, I
consider and reject a number of objections which threaten them. These objections raise
various semantic, logical, metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that
there is an important sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to come into
existence. Again, I consider and reject some objections. Finally, I briefly consider what the
conclusions reached in this paper imply for our moral obligations to possible future people.
KEY WORDS: betterness relation, existence, identifiability, metaphysics, value

1. T HE VALUE OF E XISTENCE V IEW

Presumably, most of us do not want to die at least, not yet. Many reasons
for this could be given, but one, and perhaps the strongest, is that it is
better for us that we survive. Therefore, we would be very grateful indeed
if someone were to save us from mortal danger. However, the fact that
people can benefit by receiving a further period of life prompts one to
wonder whether it is not also possible to benefit by receiving life tout court
that is, from coming into existence.1 As Thomas Nagel writes: All of us,
I believe, are fortunate to have been born.2
Nagel surely intends this to be a value judgement, a judgement to the
effect that there is something good about coming into existence. Furthermore, coming into existence is supposed to be of value for the person who
comes into existence. If this were not so, it would be strange to speak of
that persons good fortune.
I am inclined to believe that Nagel is right in holding that we (at least,
most of us) were fortunate to have come into existence; and in what follows
I shall defend:

1 See D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 490.
2 See T. Nagel, Moral Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 7.

The Journal of Ethics 5: 361384, 2001.

2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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The Value of Existence View: Coming into existence can benefit (or harm) a person.

My defence consists partly in an argument to the effect that it can be

better (worse) for a person to come into existence than never to exist, partly
in an attempt to deal with various objections. Let me just briefly mention
two of these objections now. According to the first, we cannot identify the
possible future people who are supposed to benefit if they come into existence. Therefore, the Value of Existence View makes no sense. According
to the second, the claim that existence can be better for a person than nonexistence is incoherent, since it implies that non-existence can be worse for
this person. How can anything be worse for a person who does not exist?
Before I begin defending the Value of Existence View, I need to clarify
it in several respects. This view does not claim that existence is intrinsically
valuable. It is compatible with the more plausible claim that the benefit of
coming into existence consists in the well-being enjoyed in life (where
mere existence is not an element in well-being). The thought is that a
person is benefited by coming into existence it, on balance, his life is worth
living, and harmed if, on balance, it is worth not living.
There is an issue of to whom the Value of Existence View applies. Let
us call people who exist in the actual history of the world whether in the
past, the present or the future actual people. These are the people who are
benefited or harmed by coming into existence (although, of course, some
might fall into neither category, having lives that are neither worth living,
nor worth not living).
There is, however, also a sense in which the Value of Existence View
applies to merely possible people, that is, people who could have existed
but will in fact not. The view tells us that, while such people will never
exist, it is still the case that had they been caused to do so, they may have
benefited (or been harmed) thereby. In other words, had they been actual,
such values could have accrued to them. In that sense, then, the Value of
Existence View applies to merely possible people as well.
Although this is not implied by the Value of Existence View, I shall
even argue that merely possible people can be harmed (or benefited) by
not coming into existence. I shall claim that it can harm (or benefit) a
person never to exist. But since this claim goes beyond what is implied by
the Value of Existence View, and since it requires some explanation, I shall
not address it until Section 6.
Another relevant distinction is that between necessary and contingent
persons. A person is necessary relative to a particular comparison of
outcomes if she exists in all those outcomes; otherwise, she is contingent.
Note that a person may be both actual and contingent. She will be both
actual and contingent if we are comparing an outcome in which she exists

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with one in which she does not and the former is actual. Now, we often
compare different outcomes because we want to make a choice between
them. For instance, if we are deciding whether or not to bring a child into
existence, this child is a contingent person. The Value of Existence View
applies to this contingent child since it informs us that, if she is caused to
exist, she may thereby benefit (be harmed).
The Value of Existence View may have implications for a number of
moral issues, including abortion, in vitro fertilization, benefits to families
with children and, more generally, population policy. This is because
it brings our concern for possible people within the scope of personaffecting morality i.e., the position that morality is concerned only with
the benefiting and harming of individuals. However, note that the Value
of Existence View does not by itself imply any particular answer to the
question of what obligations we have towards possible future people. I
shall briefly return to this issue in Section 9.
Nevertheless, since the Value of Existence View brings our concern for
possible people within the scope of person-affecting morality, perhaps it
can provide some support for the latter view.3 This is important because, if
it is correct to suppose that morality should take a person-affecting form,
various moral theories will have to be abandoned. One such theory is teleological egalitarianism. According to this theory it is in one respect good
to bring about an outcome in which everyone is as badly off as the worst
off, since there is then perfect equality. But how can this be in any respect
good if all we are concerned with is benefits and harms? Levelling down
benefits no one.4,5
3 For instance, assuming the Value of Existence View, we can deal with the so-called

non-identity problem in person-affecting terms (for discussion of this problem, see Parfit,
Reasons and Persons, pp. 31355). Compare outcome A, in which one group of people
exist and outcome B, in which an entirely different group of people exist. Assume that
there are equally many people in A and B, that there is perfect equality in each of A and B,
and that the people in A are better off than those in B. Clearly, everything else being equal,
it would be worse if B came about than if A came about. Assuming the Value of Existence
View, we can explain why this is so in person-affecting terms. For the people that will exist
if A comes about will benefit more from coming into existence than the people that will
exist if B comes about.
4 For discussion of this objection to egalitarianism, see D. Parfit, Equality and
Priority, in A. Mason (ed.), Ideals of Equality (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998); L.
S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), Chapter 9; N. Holtug,
Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection, Analysis 58(2) (1998); N. Holtug,
Good for Whom? Theoria (forthcoming).
5 It may be objected that if the Value of Existence View places the concern for possible
people within the scope of person-affecting morality, this latter view, in effect, becomes an
impersonal view. Consider, for instance, total person-affecting act-utilitarianism, according
to which an act is right if and only if it brings about an outcome with at least as large a

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2. T HE M AIN A RGUMENT

It is now time to present my main argument for the Value of Existence

View. I shall argue that coming into existence can be better (or worse) for
a person than never existing or, for short, that existence can be better (or
worse) for a person than non-existence. Again, I should emphasize that I
am claiming here that having a life in which the good outweighs the bad
can be better than never existing. I am not claiming that existence as such
can be better than never existing. Since I argue that existence can be better
(or worse) for a person than non-existence, my argument for the Value of
Existence View is based on a comparative judgement.
Let us consider, then, a particular person who, we shall assume, exists
call him Jeremy. What is needed, in order to defend the Value of Existence View, is an evaluative comparison of his existence and non-existence;
or, more precisely, an evaluative ranking of them in terms of their value
for him. It is essential that they are assessed in terms of their value for
Jeremy, rather than, for instance, in terms of their aesthetic value or value
for others. What we are interested in is the effect in terms of benefits and
harms on the person whose existence is at stake.
Now, since the sort of value we are interested in when comparing existence and non-existence is well-being, the details of the comparison will
depend on the particular theory of well-being assumed. I shall begin by
considering the implications of a preference theory, and then, much more
briefly, consider a mental state theory and an objective list theory.
The simplest comparison will appeal to an object account of preferences, according to which it is the object of an intrinsic preference that
has intrinsic value. This account should be contrasted with a satisfaction
account, according to which states of affairs consisting of intrinsic preferences and the objects that satisfy them are the bearers of intrinsic value.6
If, then, Jeremy intrinsically prefers reading Rimbaud, what has intrinsic
total sum of benefits to individuals as any other available act. If the value of coming into
existence counts as a benefit to an individual, this view will generate judgements exactly
similar to those generated by total impersonal act-utilitarianism, according to which an act
is right if and only if it brings about an outcome with at least as large a total sum of benefits
as any other available act (simply because all benefits will be benefits to individuals).
Nevertheless, even if these two views coincide in this manner, our reason for accepting
the impersonal version may be that it coincides with the person-affecting version. That is,
we may believe that what matters is benefits to individuals and that since all benefits are
benefits to individuals, the impersonal version captures our view. In this sense, then, our
view may still have a person-affecting form.
6 On this distinction, see W. Rabinowicz and J. sterberg, Value Based on Preferences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism, Economics and Philosophy
12 (1996), pp. 127.

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value on the object account is the state of affairs that he reads Rimbaud,
whereas what has such value on the satisfaction account is that his
preference is satisfied.
The object account allows for an assessment of Jeremys existence and
his non-existence of the basis of one global preference. Suppose Jeremy
intrinsically prefers existing (with all that his particular life includes in
terms of achievements, enjoyments, sorrows, disappointments and so on)
to never existing?7 We then have a ranking of the two objects, the state
of affairs that Jeremy exists and the state of affairs that he does not. The
former state is better.
In order to conclude that the former state is better for Jeremy, perhaps
Jeremys preference must satisfy certain requirements. Perhaps it must be
self-regarding and rational. Now, Jeremys preference for existing, it seems
to me, qualifies as self-regarding and it may very well be rational. For
present purposes, the most important feature of a rational preference is that
it would survive full (or ideal) information about its objects. Importantly,
this condition does not require Jeremy actually to possess full information about his life and what non-existence would amount to in order to
rationally prefer existence.
Note that on the object account, the preference on the basis of which
a world is assessed need not exist in that world. Thus, a world in which
Jeremy does not exist may be assessed on the basis of Jeremys preference
in a world in which he does. Furthermore, while here, I am comparing
Jeremys existence and non-existence on the basis of his preference in the
actual world, this is not essential to the argument. Had Jeremy not existed,
I might have based the comparison on a preference of his in some other
possible world.
Now, the object account does not imply that the value of Jeremys existence and non-existence should be assessed on the basis of a single global
preference. But since it provides the simplest comparison, I shall simply
assume such a global version of this account. Since, then, Jeremy prefers
existing to never existing, he has benefited from coming into existence.
Had he preferred never to exist, he would have been harmed instead.
Of course, it cannot be known in advance whether a person will come
to prefer having come into existence. So if we were to claim that a person
will benefit from coming into existence, this would need to be taken as
a prediction that once she exists she will prefer doing so. Such a claim
is fallible, but that does not make it meaningless or incapable of truth. In
any case, all that the Value of Existence View says is that it can benefit
(or harm) a person to come into existence, not that one can make reli7 This preference is global in the sense that it has an entire life as one of its objects.

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able predictions in advance about whether existence will benefit or harm a

person in a particular case.
The object account does not provide the only preference-based argument for the Value of Existence View. Suppose we accept a satisfaction
account of preferences instead. It seems that we should then compare the
state of affairs that Jeremy exists and the state of affairs that he does not
on the basis of the preference-satisfactions generated by each of the these
states. The value of each state for Jeremy will thus be determined on the
basis of the preferences he has in that state and the extent to which they
are satisfied.8 And the argument for the Value of Existence View will then
proceed as a two-step procedure. First, the value of each state must be
assessed. And then a comparison must be made.
Moreover, one may want to compare existence and non-existence using
a mental state theory or an objective list theory of well-being. Since I do
not want to presuppose the truth of any particular such theory, let me just
briefly suggest how the Value of Existence View can be accommodated by
those who accept the satisfaction account of preferences, or a mental state
theory, or an objective list theory.
Let us suppose that Jeremys life contains a net surplus of positive
values (preference-satisfactions, positive mental states or items on an
objective list). What can we say about the value of his non-existence, then?
If Jeremy never exists, no positive or negative values accrue to him, and
so his non-existence has no value for him. On the basis of these value
assessments, existence seems to be better. After all, it seems to be better
for a person to have a surplus of positive value than to have no value accrue
to him (such an absence of value may of course be realized in either of two
ways; by non-existence or a life with no values). Therefore, once again,
Jeremy has benefited from coming into existence.
This concludes my main argument for the Value of Existence View. I
now need to consider a number of objections.

3. T HE I DENTIFIABILITY O BJECTION

In my main argument, I compared the existence and non-existence of a

person who exists. The identification of this person therefore posed no
problem. But the Value of Existence View also applies to people who might
8 Again, the assessment may be based on either global or local preferences. If local
preferences are employed, the value of a state for Jeremy will be the sum of preferencesatisfactions contained in it. Furthermore, perhaps the relevant preferences must satisfy
certain conditions, e.g., perhaps they must be self-regarding and rational.

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exist in the future (i.e., possible future people, whether they be actual or
merely possible). Now, it has been argued that possible future people are
not identifiable, because they cannot be picked out by rigid designators9
(a rigid designator is a referring term that denotes one and the same individuals in all possible worlds in which it has denotation). This argument
forces us to reconsider whether the Value of Existence View makes any
sense: when it is said that one can benefit (or harm) a person by bringing
her into existence, what is the reference of a person supposed to be?10
To bring out the point about identifiability more clearly, consider the
following case. James and Sharon are planning to have a child. They refer
to this child by the term our future child. However, our future child
does not refer uniquely; it may refer to any one of the children they might
have, depending on which sperm fertilises which egg.11 In other words,
our future child is not a rigid designator, even when uttered by James or
Sharon. So who is it that they may benefit (or harm)?
The problem of identifiability can be interpreted in three distinct ways.
According to one interpretation, the problem is claimed to be that there
are no rigid designators available to us by which to refer to possible future
people. However, at least sometimes, we do in fact have access to such
designators. Suppose that a doctor is about to micro-inject a sperm into an
egg to perform in vitro fertilization. Arguably, in such a case, the term the
person who will result if this sperm fertilises this egg, and the fertilised
egg is inserted into a woman, and twinning does not occur, and the fetus is
carried to term, and develops a psychology (of a certain complexity) is a
rigid designator. It uniquely picks out a particular person.
Here, I am of course assuming that only one person could come into
existence in the organism that results if the sperm fertilises the egg, twinning does not occur, and so on. This might be denied. It might be held that
different psychological features (traits, memories, etc.) could be instantiated in this organism, and that a numerically distinct person would emerge
if a sufficiently different psychology was instantiated.
However, it is by no means obvious that distinct persons could emerge
in this way. Suppose Tony Blair (say) had been adopted at birth, taken to
Brazil to work in a coffee plantation and so had grown up in an environ9 See M. D. Bayles, Harm to the Unconceived, Philosophy and Public Affairs 5(3)

(19751976), pp. 299300. For a similar point, see J. McKie, Thinking about Possible
People: A Comment on Tooley and Rachels, Bioethics 15(2) (2001), pp. 146156.
10 For a critical discussion of the identifiability objection, see also R. M. Hare, When
Does Potentiality Count? A Comment on Lockwood, Bioethics 2(3) (1988), pp. 219221;
and I. Persson, Person-Affecting Principles and Beyond, in N. Fotion and J. C. Heller
(eds.), Contingent Future Persons (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 48.
11 See Bayles, Harm to the Unconceived, pp. 299300.

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ment very different from that in which he in fact grew up. His memories,
beliefs and habits of mind would then have been quite different from what
they actually are. But surely this is something that could have happened
to Tony Blair. In other words, surely Tony Blair the very man we watch
on television is numerically identical to the person who is adopted and
grows up in Brazil in our imagined possible world.12 It seems, then, that
where there is no question of there being more than one organism, significant psychological variation can be accommodated by one and the same
person.13
In any case, even if one of several persons could develop in an organism,
this need not make it impossible to provide rigid designators for possible
future people. We would then just have to make the reference more specific
than suggested above. For instance, we could refer to a person along the
lines of the person who will result if this sperm fertilises this egg (etc.)
. . . and the fertilized egg develops such and such a psychology.
To return to the case of James and Sharon, then, we could in principle
provide rigid designators for all the children they could have nine months
from now by itemising possible combinations of gametes and perhaps
specifying certain further conditions. For any one of these children, we
can claim that it would benefit (or be harmed) by coming into existence,
in accordance with the Value of Existence View. Note, also, that we can
refer to these possible future children whether or not they actually come
into existence. Thus in trying to assess claims about the harm or benefit of
coming into existence, we are not necessarily dealing in senseless claims
lacking referents.
However, the problem of identifiability can be interpreted differently.
Perhaps the problem is that of identifying, not possible future people, but
actual future people those who will in fact exist in the future. We can
identify children James and Sharon might have in nine months, it might
be conceded, but this is inadequate: we cannot identify the child they will
have (if any).
What prevents the identification of actual future children? The problem
can take one of two forms. In an epistemic version, it is claimed to be that
there are no rigid designators available to us which can be known to refer
to future people. For instance, we do not know, in the case of James and
Sharon, which sperm will fertilize which egg, and thus we have no way of
uniquely referring to their future child. In a stronger, ontological version,
12 Or, if we do not believe in transworld identity, surely the person who grows up in

Brazil is a counterpart of Tony Blair.

13 See also I. Persson, Genetic Therapy, Identity and Person-Regarding Reasons,
Bioethics 9(1) (1995), pp. 1725.

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the problem is claimed to be that the identities of future people are not fixed
by present states of affairs, and that therefore there are no rigid designators
available to us by which to refer to them. Notice that neither version rules
out the possibility of our possessing rigid designators that refer to possible
future people. The epistemic version merely rules out our knowing whether
they also refer to actual future people. The ontological version merely rules
out its being presently fixed that they refer to such people.
In fact, an inclination to accept the epistemic version puts one under
pressure to accept the ontological version as well. An obvious basis on
which to deny that we can know whether a person will come into existence,
at least, is that that issue is not fixed by present states of affairs. Equally, if
the future existence or non-existence of this person were fixed by present
states of affairs then, at least ideally, it seems that we could know about it.
As it turns out, however, these epistemic and ontological versions of the
problem of identifiability fail to undermine the Value of Existence View.
Suppose s is a rigid designator that picks out a possible future person. All
that the Value of Existence View claims is that if this person comes into
existence, he may thereby benefit or be harmed. The fact (if it is a fact)
that we do not know whether he will come into existence, and so whether s
refers to an actual future person, does not impugn this claim. Nor does the
fact (if it is a fact) that it is not presently fixed whether or not he will come
into existence (and so whether or not s refers to an actual future person).
Having now established the possibility of identifying possible future
people, it is worth pointing out that the Value of Existence View does
not really depend on this possibility, even when applied to possible future
persons. For the view can be taken to mean that, if one brings a person into
existence, then whoever she is she may thereby be benefited (or harmed).
So suppose we cannot provide rigid designators for the children James
and Sharon may have. We can still claim that if they have a child, then,
whoever it is, this child may thereby be benefited (or harmed). While we
cannot pick out the candidates for being their child (or rather, so we are
assuming), we can employ a description their child and claim that
if, in the future, anything satisfies it, this individual might be benefited (or
harmed) by coming into existence.14
It may be objected that this claim does not make any sense, because
one cannot benefit (or harm) non-identifiable people. Arguably, benefits
and harms accrue only to particular people. But if James and Sharon have
a child, they will have a particular child, and so there will be a particular
person to whom the value (or disvalue) of having come into existence
14 To ensure that only one thing satisfies the description, their first child or their next

child can be used.

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accrues. The fact that, at some time, this child may not have been identifiable does not change the fact that once it exists, values can accrue to it.
In short, then, even if possible future people are not identifiable (a dubious
assumption), it seems that we can make sense of the Value of Existence
View.

4. O N THE L OGIC OF B ETTERNESS

I have argued for the Value of Existence View by making the comparative claim that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than
non-existence. However, some philosophers suggest that it is incoherent
to defend the Value of Existence View in this way. Here are representative
observations, made by Derek Parfit and John Broome, respectively:
Causing someone to exist is a special case because the alternative would not have been
worse for this person. We may admit that, for this reason, causing someone to exist cannot
be better for this person.15
At least, it cannot ever be true that it is better for a person that she lives than that she should
never have lived at all. If it were better for a person that she lives than that she should never
have lived at all, then if she had never lived at all, that would have been worse for her than
if she had lived. But if she had never lived at all, there would have been no her for it to be
worse for, so it could not have been worse for her.16

The argument set out by Parfit and Broome seems to have two premises.
According to the first, the judgement that it is better (or worse) to exist than
never to exist entails that it is worse (or better) never to exist than to exist.
According to the second, it cannot be worse (or better) never to exist.
Presumably, the first premise is based on a claim about the logic of
betterness relation; and presumably, the second premise is based on the
following metaphysical principle:
The No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle: An individual cannot have any properties
if it does not exist.

It is because a person who does not exist cannot have any properties that
she cannot be worse (or better) off.
The claim that Parfit and Broome are committed to the No Properties
of the Non-Existent Principle can be disputed, but their argument is best
explained by invoking this principle. After all, what reason could there
15 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 489.
16 See J. Broome, Goodness is Reducible to Betterness: The Evil of Death is the Value

of Life, in P. Koslowski and Y. Shionoya (eds.), The Good and the Economical (Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 1993), p. 77.

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be for denying that it is worse (or better) never to exist, if not because,
in general, a person cannot have properties if she does not exist? This
interpretation is also suggested by Broomes remark that if she had never
lived at all, there would have been no her for it to be worse for, so it could
not have been worse for her (my emphasis). Broomes point would seem
to be that, if a person does not exist, her absence makes it impossible for
properties to stick to her.
Let us call this argument against the view that existence can be better
(worse) than non-existence the Metaphysical Argument. Besides being
pressed into service by Broome and Parfit, it also seems to be endorsed by
David Heyd, who claims it make no sense to regret having been born:
For if regret means in this case being better off not born, who is the subject of this better
state? The answer is that there is no such subject, and hence . . . such a judgement cannot
make sense.17

Heyd does not make any explicit claims about the logic of the betterness
relation, but he must be assuming that in order for existence to be worse
than non-existence, non-existence must be better than existence. If he were
not assuming this, the truth of the former claim alone would establish a
reason for regret. Also, Heyd seems to invoke the No Properties of the
Non-Existent Principle when he argues that a person who does not exist
cannot be in a state of being better off (for present purposes we can assume
that being in such a state is equivalent to having the property of being better
off).
In this section, I briefly comment on the logic of the betterness relation.
In the following section, I shall attempt to show how both premises of
the Metaphysical Argument are in fact compatible with my defence of the
Value of Existence View.
What logical property, or properties, of the betterness relation ensure
that the proposition that existence is better (or worse) than non-existence
implies that non-existence is worse (or better) than existence? Such an
entailment might be based on the way better than and worse than are
defined. So consider the following definition:
(1)

y is worse than x, if and only if x is better than y.18

How will (1) help Broome, Heyd and Parfit? If we substitute nonexistence and existence for x and y we get:
17 See D. Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1992), p. 122. See also pp. 3031.

18 A similar definition is sometimes proposed for the preference relation, see L. J.
Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (New York: Dover Publications, 1992), p. 19.

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Existence is worse than non-existence, if and only if nonexistence is better than existence.

This may seem to establish the entailment our authors require. However,
what is needed is not a two-place but a three-place predicate, since the
claim at issue is that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than
non-existence. So let us consider the following definition:
(3)

y is worse for S than x, if and only if x is better for S than y.

(3) states that if existence is better (or worse) for a person than nonexistence, non-existence is worse (or better) for her. And the claim that
non-existence is worse (or better) for her seems to violate the No Properties
of the Non-Existent Principle. It seems to ascribe to her the property of
being worse (or better) off in a possible world in which she does not exist.
So (3), then, seems to be just what Broome, Heyd and Parfit need.

5. M ETAPHYSICS

Let us now examine more closely the second premise in the Metaphysical
Argument the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. What exactly
is it that this principle rules out regarding the properties of non-existent
individuals? Consider what we may call a positive property such as having
black hair. This property is instantiated in any object that has black hair.
Certainly, the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle rules out that
individuals can have positive properties if they do not exist.19
Now, according to the Metaphysical Argument, we cannot claim that
existence is better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, because this
implies that non-existence is worse (or better) for her than existence, and
this is ruled out by the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. Let us
now re-assess this argument. Consider the following (allegedly dubious)
proposition:
P: Non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence.
The question is whether the truth of P can be established without ascribing
positive properties to Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist.
19 It may be suggested that, besides positive properties, individuals can have negative

properties (for instance, the property of not having black hair). I, myself, do not find
this a plausible suggestion [for various arguments for rejecting negative properties, see
D. M. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
pp. 2329]. But in any case, this does not matter for present purposes. All we need to agree
on here is that non-existing individuals do not have positive properties.

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In my main argument, I described different theories of well-being on

the basis of which the Value of Existence View can be defended. Each of
these theories involves distinctive ontological commitments. Invoking the
object account of preferences, I argued that existence is better for Jeremy
because he prefers existence to non-existence. And it may now be argued
that, for the same reason, non-existence is worse for him. Here, the truth of
P is established merely by appeal to a preference Jeremy has in a possible
world the actual world in which he exists. In this world, then, he has
the positive property of having a particular preference. More importantly,
the truth of P is established without ascribing any positive properties to
Jeremy in a possible world in which he does not exist.
The three other theories of well-being on the basis of which I argued
for the Value of Existence View involved a two-step procedure. First, it
was pointed out that Jeremys life includes a surplus of positive value
(preference-satisfactions, positive mental states, or items on an objective
list), and that his non-existence involves no such values. Both of these
claims are, of course, compatible with the No Properties of the NonExistent Principle. It was then pointed out that it seems to be better to have
a surplus of positive value than to have no value. Contrariwise, it seems
to be worse to have no value than it is to have a surplus of value. This
judgement relies only on the nature of positive value and no value. Thus,
assuming any of these other theories of well-being, once again, the truth of
P is established without presupposing any dubious ontology.
It may be objected that I have not yet shown that P is metaphysically
innocent. It may be argued that, if P is true, it must be true in virtue of
a particular relation that obtains and serves as a truthmaker for P. More
precisely, the (triadic) relation x is worse for S than y must obtain between
the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, Jeremy, and the state of affairs,
Jeremy exists. Now, Jeremy exists and thus the state of affairs, Jeremy
exists, obtains. But the state of affairs, Jeremy does not exist, does not
obtain. So how can the betterness relation obtain, when one of its relata
does not?
It seems clear that, in fact, a state need not obtain in order to be an object
in a betterness relation. Consider, for instance, the following relation: the
state of affairs that the allies win the war is better than the state of affairs
that the Nazis win the war.
A more plausible requirement, then, is that in order for a relation to
obtain, its relata must exist. And while the state of affairs, Jeremy does not
exist, does not obtain, it can be sensibly claimed that it exists as an abstract

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NILS HOLTUG

entity.20 Since all three relata thus exist, we can claim that the triadic
relation, Jeremy does not exist is worse for Jeremy than Jeremy exists,
obtains.21 Therefore, assuming that this relation is indeed the truthmaker
for P, P is true.
Nevertheless, perhaps Broome, Heyd and Parfits point is not that P
cannot be true. Perhaps their point is that it cannot be true if Jeremy does
not come into existence. Indeed, this (counterfactual) situation seems to be
what Broome aims at in the passage quoted above: if it were better for
a person that she lives than that she should never have lived at all, then if
she had never lived at all, that would have been worse for her than if she
had lived (my emphasis). However, (3) does not claim that if existence is
better for Jeremy than non-existence, then if Jeremy does not exist, nonexistence is worse for him than existence. In order for this to follow, we
would have to accept something like:
(4)

If x is better (or worse) for S than y, then x is better (or worse)

for S than y even if x obtains.

How does (4) challenge my argument for the Value of Existence View? I
have argued that existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence. (3) then
implies that non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence. And given
this implication, (4) implies that even if Jeremy had not existed, nonexistence would be worse for him. But the No Properties of the Non-Existent
Principle rules out that Jeremy can have any positive properties, including
20 Thus, it is common for modal actualists (i.e., proponents of the view that everything
that exists actually exists) to distinguish between existence and obtaining. A merely
possible entity is one that exists but does not obtain (is not instantiated). See R. C. Stalnaker, Possible Worlds, and A. Plantinga, Actualism and Possible Worlds, both in M. J.
Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).
21 Wlodek Rabinowicz has suggested this account of the relevant relation (personal
communication). With respect to ontological modesty, it is located between two alternative
accounts of the relation. On the more modest account, statements about possible (but nonactual) states have actual states as their truthmakers i.e., what renders them true, when
true, is the way things actually are (e.g. D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapter 10). The relevant relation can
then be claimed to obtain between the state of affairs, Jeremy exists, Jeremy, and (appropriate) states of affairs serving as truthmakers for claims about Jeremys non-existence.
This account is ontologically less extravagant in the sense that it does not claim the existence of non-obtaining states of affairs. More extravagant than both this account and that
offered in the main text is one according to which the relevant relation obtains between
Jeremy and the state of affairs, Jeremy exists, in one world, and the state of affairs, Jeremy
does not exist, in another world. This account relies on an extreme modal realism [for
discussion and defence of such a realism, see D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1986)].

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375

relational ones, if he does not exist. So it would seem that my claim that
existence is better for Jeremy than non-existence leads to a contradiction.
However, nothing forces us to accept (4). In fact, assuming the account
of the truthmaking relation suggested above, we may have reason to reject
(4), at least in cases in which x implies the non-existence of S. Consider
again P. Since Jeremy exists, P is true in virtue of the obtaining of the
truthmaking relation. But if, instead, we assume that Jeremy does not exist,
P does not preserve this truth value for the simple reason that one of the
relata, Jeremy, does not exist.22 Thus, we have a perfectly natural explanation of why (4) does not hold in such cases. The metaphysical basis for P
is not preserved.
So much for the Metaphysical Argument. Before I move on, note that
nothing in my defence of the Value of Existence View in this section hinges
on the fact that Jeremy exists. Even if Jeremy had never come into existence, it would still be true that, had he been caused to exist, he may have
benefited. Had he been caused to exist the relevant relation would obtain
(or so we may assume), and so he would have benefited from coming into
existence.

6. T HE H ARM OF N ON -E XISTENCE

I now want to go further. It can benefit (or harm) a person to come into
existence; but there is also a sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person
not to come into existence. To see this, let us first consider the (dis-)value
of death. Suppose a person dies painlessly but prematurely. Suppose also,
for simplicity, that we accept hedonism as our theory of well-being. On
this assumption, since her death was a painless one, it did not intrinsically
harm her. Finally, suppose that, had this person not died, she would have
experienced far more future pleasure than pain. Surely, then, there is a
sense in which her death harmed her. Indeed, I suggest that it extrinsically
harmed her, where:
(5)

x extrinsically harms S if and only if: (a) S would have been

intrinsically better off, had x not occurred, and (b) x does not
intrinsically harm S.23

22 It may be suggested that even a merely possible person can be an object in the truth-

making relation, namely in so far as such a person (in an appropriate abstract form) may
exist even if he is not instantiated. However, even if we were to grant this, it would hardly
help the proponent of the Metaphysical Argument. This is because P could then be true
even if Jeremy were a merely possible person, which is in accordance with (4).
23 For a somewhat similar definition of extrinsically bad, see F. Feldman, Confrontations with the Reaper (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 138, and for the

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NILS HOLTUG

This persons death extrinsically harmed her since she would have been
intrinsically better off, had she survived (she would have enjoyed future
pleasures), and since it did not cause her any pain. In other words, her
death harmed her since it deprived her of future benefits.24 In fact, I believe
that this notion of extrinsic harm provides us with the best account of the
badness of death.
Nevertheless, it may be suggested that if we accept an alternative theory
of well-being, say, a preference theory, then we do not need a concept of
extrinsic harm to explain the badness of death. But this is not so. All plausible theories of well-being will need to appeal to extrinsic harm (I shall
argue this in the case of preference theories in the next section). Therefore,
extrinsic harm has prudential and moral significance.
Now, just as death may extrinsically harm a person, a person may be
extrinsically harmed by never coming into existence.25 After all, had a
persons non-existence not occurred, that is, had he been caused to exist,
he may have been intrinsically better off, since he may then have enjoyed
various intrinsic benefits (for instance, pleasures). Also, this persons nonexistence does not intrinsically harm him. Therefore, depending on what
his life would have been like, he may be extrinsically harmed (or benefited)
by not being caused to exist.26
Note that what makes it true that a person is extrinsically harmed by
not coming into existence is the truth of a counterfactual claim about what
would be the case if he existed. And as we have seen, if he existed, it may
both be true that his existence is better for him and that his non-existence
is worse for him. Therefore, once again, there is no dubious metaphysics
in the wings here.
However, if we claim that a person is harmed by his non-existence,
does it then not follow by the principle of existential generalization in
classical logic that he must exist?27 Not necessarily. Thus, S is harmed
by his non-existence may be interpreted as meaning S does not exist
and had he existed, his existence would be intrinsically better for him than
suggestion that something like my (b)-clause needs to be added to Feldmans definition,
see Persson, Person-affecting Principles and Beyond, p. 55.
24 See Feldman, Confrontations with the Reaper, p. 139.
25 Elsewhere, I have denied that it can harm (or benefit) a person not to come into existence; see N. Holtug, In Defense of the Slogan, in W. Rabinowicz (ed.), Preference and
Value. Preferentialism in Ethics, Studies in Philosophy (Lund: Department of Philosophy,
Lund Univesity, 1996), pp. 7584, and N. Holtug, Utility, Priority and Possible People,
Utilitas 11(1) (1999), pp. 2225. I now believe that my earlier argument was unsatisfactory.
26 See also R. M. Hare, Abortion and the Golden Rule, Philosophy and Public Affairs
4 (1975), p. 221, and Persson, Person-Affecting Principles and Beyond, p. 47.
27 According to this principle, if Fa, then there exists an x such that Fx.

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377

his non-existence. Clearly, the latter claim does not legitimate existential
generalization; it does not imply that S exists.

7. ACTUAL , P OSSIBLE AND C ONTINGENT P EOPLE

Sometimes it is suggested that only actual people, or, alternatively, only

necessary people, can be benefited or harmed. Since these views are
incompatible with my claim that non-existence can harm a person and the
Value of Existence View, respectively, I want to show that the arguments
for their adoption are weak.
Bonnie Steinbock denies what I argued in the last section, namely that it
can harm a person never to come into existence. She claims that it is only
actual people who can be harmed, not merely possible people.28 Thus, she
argues that while death can harm a person, never coming into existence
cannot:
Death is not merely non-existence, but the termination of someones life. Death ends all
of ones plans, projects, concerns, and desires. Feinberg explains why death is a harm
in this way: To extinguish a persons life is, at one stroke, to defeat almost all of his
self-regarding interests: to ensure that his ongoing projects and enterprises, his long-range
goals, and his most earnest hopes for his own achievement and personal enjoyment, must
all be dashed.29
None of this is true of never-existing people. The failure to bring them into existence does
not thwart their plans, end their relationships, or destroy their hopes of achievement and
happiness. Admittedly, it forecloses the possibility of there ever being these plans, hopes,
and relationships, but that is a tragedy for no one. There is literally no one to feel sorry for,
or guilty about, when people who might have existed are not brought into existence.30

In this passage it is possible to find two quite distinct arguments to

the effect that while death can harm a person, never coming into existence cannot. According to the first, people who die may have their plans,
projects and goals (for short, preferences) frustrated, whereas people who
never exist do not because they have no preferences. We might put the
matter thusly: only actual people have actual preferences, and it is only
actual preferences that give rise to benefits and harms.
However, this view is quite implausible. Consider the following case.
A young Buddhist has succeeded in ridding himself of his preferences for
the future. His past preferences were all rather short term and related to
objects that no longer exist. The Buddhist is now killed. Had he not been
28 See B. Steinbock, Life Before Birth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 71.
29 See J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 8182.
30 See Steinbock, Life Before Birth, pp. 7172.

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NILS HOLTUG

killed, however, he would have formed many new preferences that would
all have been satisfied. But since these preferences are not actual, his death
does not harm him, according to Steinbock. Surely, this must be wrong.
Rather, the Buddhist is harmed when he is killed because, had he not
been killed, he would have enjoyed a great deal of preference-satisfaction.
In other words, he is extrinsically harmed. In order to explain this extrinsic
harm, we need to invoke possible (but non-actual) preferences. But this
move, of course, paves the way for the claim that it can harm a person
never to come into existence. Just like the Buddhist, a person who does not
come into existence has possible (but non-actual) preferences and, indeed,
misses out on a great deal of preference-satisfaction. So if missing out
in this way harms the Buddhist, albeit extrinsically, how are we to resist
the claim that a person who is not brought into existence is extrinsically
harmed as well?31
However, there is another actualist view that implies that, while death
can harm a person, never existing cannot. According to this view it is not
actual preferences but the preferences of actual people that give rise to
benefits and harms.32 While, of course, all actual preferences are held by
actual individuals, actual individuals may have possible, but non-actual
preferences. Thus, since the Buddhist is an actual person, we are entitled
to invoke his possible, but non-actual preferences when explaining why
death harms him. A person who never exists, on the other hand, is not
actual, and thus his possible, but non-actual preferences cannot give rise to
benefits or harms. Perhaps, then, this is the view that Steinbock means to
endorse in the passage quoted above.
This view certainly entails that death can harm a person, and that never
existing cannot, but it does nothing to explain why this is so. We need to
know why it harms the Buddhist to miss out on the satisfaction of possible,
but non-actual preferences when that does no harm to a person who never
exists. Since what is supposed to harm the Buddhist does not presuppose
actuality, it is unclear why only actual people can suffer such harm.
Now, as I said, Steinbock can be understood to be propounding another
argument in the passage quoted above and perhaps this argument provides
a rationale for her focus on actual people. She points out that, if a person is
not caused to exist, this is a tragedy for no one. There is no actual person
31 There is, nevertheless, the following difference between actual and merely possible

people: while both can be extrinsically benefited and harmed, intrinsic benefits and harms
accrue only to actual people.
32 For an account of the difference between actualism regarding preferences and
regarding persons, see K. Bykvist, Changing Preferences. A Study in Preferentialism,
dissertation (Uppsala University, 1998), Chapter 5. Bykvist asks which preferences matter
morally (not prudentially).

ON THE VALUE OF COMING INTO EXISTENCE

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for whom never existing is a tragedy. This is, of course, true. If a person is
actual it cannot be true of her that she never exists. But apart from making
this trivially true claim, Steinbock is also assuming what needs to be
shown, namely that merely possible people cannot suffer tragedies. To be
sure, they cannot suffer tragedies in the sense that they suffer or have actual
preferences frustrated. But since it may extrinsically harm a person never
to come into existence, there is a sense in which non-existence may be a
tragedy for him. It may be a tragedy in the same sense that the Buddhists
death is a tragedy.
Note, finally, that the Steinbock passage does not directly contradict the
Value of Existence View. According to this view, coming into existence
may benefit (or harm) a person. And, if a person comes into existence, he
is actual, and so are his preferences. To the extent that these preferences
are satisfied, then, he may have benefited.33

33 Steinbock apparently misses this point when accepting the Asymmetry, according
to which ceteris paribus we have moral reason not to bring into existence people who will
have lives that are worth not living but no moral reason to bring into existence people who
will have lives that are worth living [Jan Narveson has famously defended this view; see
J. Narveson, Utilitarianism and New Generations, Mind 76 (1967), pp. 6971. The term
the Asymmetry is due to Jeff McMahan, see his Problems of Population Policy, Ethics
92 (1981), p. 100].
Steinbocks reason for accepting the Asymmetry is that we should be concerned with
the happiness or unhappiness of beings who have interests (Steinbock, Life Before Birth,
p. 74). Clearly, she must mean here that we should be concerned with actual beings, but it
is not entirely clear whether her focus is on actual people or actual preferences [she quotes
Mary Anne Warren, who also defends the Asymmetry on the basis of actualism, but in
Warrens discussion it is not entirely clear where the focus is either: M. A. Warren, Do
Potential People Have Moral Rights?, in R. I. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.), Obligations to
Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 25]. But whether
Steinbocks focus is on actual people or on actual preferences, she provides no support for
the Asymmetry.
If we bring a miserable child into existence, this child will be actual and so will its preferences. Furthermore, its preferences will be largely frustrated, we may assume, since it is a
miserable child. Therefore, causing this child to exist is wrong, according to Steinbock. On
the other hand, if we fail to bring a happy child into existence, it will not be actual. It will
therefore not have any actual preferences; a fortiori it will not have any frustrated actual
preferences. So according to Steinbock, failing to bring this child into existence is not
wrong (Life Before Birth, p. 74). Does this not suffice to establish the relevant asymmetry?
It does not. Just as the miserable child will have her actual preferences (largely) frustrated, the happy child will have her actual preferences (largely) satisfied, if she is caused
to exist. Likewise, just as the happy child will not have any actual preferences frustrated,
the miserable child will not have any actual preferences satisfied, if he does not come to
exist. The focus on actual preferences or on actual persons does nothing to explain the
Asymmetry.

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What, then, about the other modal distinction, that between necessary
and contingent people? Does it appropriately distinguish those we can
benefit and harm from those we cannot? It will be recalled that a person
is necessary vis--vis a particular comparison of outcomes if she exists
in all of them; and that otherwise she is contingent. The suggestion that
contingent persons cannot be benefited or harmed therefore amounts to the
claim that it cannot benefit or harm a person that an outcome in which she
exists comes about rather than one in which she does not (or vice versa).
Clearly this suggestion is incompatible with the Value of Existence View.
Now Heyd has argued that we can benefit and harm what he calls
actual people but not potential people.34 His arguments, however, do
not exploit this distinction, but trade instead on the distinction between
necessary and contingent people. In fact, I have already dealt with one of
these arguments in discussing the Metaphysical Argument. What ensures
that existence cannot be better for a person than non-existence, according
to this argument, is the fact that in one of the outcomes considered she does
not exist and so cannot have any properties. Similarly, the fact that, in one
of the outcomes, she does not exist makes her a contingent person.
But Heyd has another argument against the Value of Existence View. If
this argument were sound, it would have to be conceded that the distinction between necessary and contingent people is critical. Consider the
following passage:
First, there is no way to compare the amount of suffering of states of actual people and
the state of non-existence of these people. We should resist the temptation of assigning a
zero-value to non-existence, thus making it quantatively commensurable with either the
positive or the negative net value of the lives of actual people.35

According to Heyd, then, a miserable life cannot be worse than nonexistence, because we cannot assign a value, even zero value, to nonexistence. And while he does not explicitly tell us why he believes that we
cannot assign zero value to non-existence, perhaps it is because he holds
the following view on values:
The volitional concept of value holds that value is always for human beings; it has to do
with what they in the broad sense want or need. In that respect, volitionism draws
an un-Platonic distinction between truth and goodness: truth is an attribute of the world,
which is independent of any knowing subject (although knowing it obviously presupposes
the existence of such subjects); value (the good) is dependent on the existence of human
beings not just for its being known but for its very existence, since it is constituted by the
human will. Unlike truth, the concept of value always requires an answer to the question
for whom.36
34 See Heyd, Genetics, pp. 97103.
35 See Heyd, Genetics, p. 113.
36 See Heyd, Genetics, p. 84.

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Heyd seems to be describing preferentialism in this passage (Heyd

calls it volitionism). According to preferentialists, all value depends
on preferences. It is apparently because he accepts preferentialism that
Heyd says, in the first passage, that one cannot assign zero value to nonexistence. In a possible world in which a person, S, does not exist, S
has no preferences. In Heyds terms, S does not want or need anything.
Thus non-existence has no value for S, not even zero value. And since
non-existence has no value for S not even zero value it cannot be
evaluatively compared with existence.
First, note that on the object account of preferences, the value of a state
of affairs in one world may be determined on the basis of preferences
that exist only in another world. Thus, Jeremys preference establishes the
evaluative ordering of his existence and his non-existence all by itself. In
putting this argument I did not need to invoke a preference from a possible
world in which Jeremy does not exist.
Furthermore, when assessing existence and non-existence in connection with the satisfaction theory of preferences, I argued that if Jeremys
life holds a surplus of positive value, existence would seem to be better
for him than non-existence and the absence of anything of intrinsic value.
Thus, I did not assign a value to non-existence.
Also, there seems to be no decisive objection to assigning zero intrinsic
value to non-existence.37 I am unsure why Heyd thinks that we have to be
able to assign zero value rather than no value to non-existence in order to
evaluatively compare it to existence. Perhaps it is because he holds that
no value cannot figure on a value-scale and so cannot be compared to
either positive or negative value.
Let us say that existence (or non-existence) has zero value for a person,
if and only if no positive and negative values befall her or the positive and
negative values cancel each other out. Now suppose that a person exists
but that no positive or negative values befall her. Since no positive or
negative values befall her, her life has zero value. Likewise, no positive
or negative values befall a person who does not exist. For the same reason,
then, we may assign zero value to her non-existence. In both cases, zero
value is assigned in the virtue of the absence of positive properties (having
preference-satisfactions, or positive mental states, etc.) and so the No
Properties of the Non-Existent Principle is not violated.38 Heyds second
37 I say zero intrinsic value, because I have claimed that non-existence can extrinsically
harm or benefit a person. In the remaining part of this section, all the values I speak of are
intrinsic.
38 Broome also objects to the ascription of zero value to non-existence (personal
communication). He argues that having no value is not the same as having zero value.

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argument, then, does not show that contingent persons cannot be benefited
or harmed, and hence the Value of Existence View has not been refuted.

8. F RUSTRATIONISM

Let me consider a final objection to my argument for the Value of Existence View. When exploiting the satisfaction account of preferences, I
suggested that when we cause a person to exist, we benefit her to the
extent her preferences are satisfied. However, this is not a case of simply
satisfying her preferences, rather, it is a case of creating (satisfied) preferences. Does this somehow diminish the value of the satisfactions we bring
about?
The view normally taken on the value of preference-satisfaction is
satisfactionism. According to this view, positive value attaches to satisfied preferences (it is more valuable that a preference is satisfied than that
it never exists).39 So if a persons preferences are (largely) satisfied, we
can claim that she has benefited from coming into existence.
Frustrationists deny these claims. They believe that the only value
involved in satisfying a preference is that it is not frustrated. So the satisfaction of a preference produces not positive value but zero value, i.e., the
value of satisfying a preference equals that of not having it. The frustration
of a preference, on the other hand, has negative value.40
According to frustrationists, then, satisfying ones existing preferences
is valuable in the limited sense that one thereby avoids intrinsic harm, but
there is no value involved in creating preferences that are then satisfied:
the package creating and satisfying a preference creates no positive value.
But it is exactly this package that we bring about, when we cause a person
to exist. So we cannot benefit a person by causing him to exist; at best, we
will not harm him.
Logic has no temperature, but that does not mean it has zero temperature and thus is, say,
colder than the ocean. However, this does not seem to me to be a good analogy. It makes
good sense to restrict temperatures to objects that have certain properties at a molecular
level. However, as the case of the person to whom no positive or negative values accrue
seems to show, there are cases in which it is the absence of certain (positive) properties that
makes an ascription of zero value correct.
39 Of course, satisfactionism should not be confused with the satisfaction account of
preferences.
40 For a defence of frustrationism, see C. Fehige, A Pareto Principle for Possible
People, in C. Fehige and U. Wessels (eds.), Preferences (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998).
Actually, Fehige calls this view anti-frustrationism. For a sympathetic discussion (using
the term moral ledger model), see P. Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), pp. 128131.

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Frustrationism is connected with a view about our moral reasons for

bringing people into existence that many people find appealing. Everything
else being equal, if a person will have a life that is worth not living, we
have a moral reason not to bring her into existence, while there is no level
of well-being that she could have that will give us a moral reason to bring
her into existence.41
In what way are frustrationism and this attractive-looking view
connected? According to frustrationism, we harm a person by bringing
her into existence if she turns out to have frustrated preferences. For the
frustration of her preferences will have negative value for her, and because
preference-satisfaction only has zero value, this negative value cannot be
compensated for by positive value.
On the other hand, we cannot benefit a person by bringing her into
existence, precisely because there is no positive value to be had in her life.
Even if all her preferences were satisfied, this would have only zero value.
So there is no level of well-being that a person can have that would give us
a reason to bring her into existence.
The only problem with this promising theoretical development is that
frustrationism is implausible indeed deeply counter-intuitive. In practice,
it entails that we always harm children by causing them to exist, no matter
how happy they seem, since in the nature of things they will always have at
least some frustrated preferences. Other things being equal, it will therefore
be wrong to have a child whose life is much better than the life of anyone
we know. Surely, this cannot be right, and so in accounting for the value of
preference-satisfaction we should reject frustrationism. And we may then
claim that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) a person.
Finally, it should be noted that frustrationism, if it were accepted, would
not undermine the part of the Value of Existence View that claims that it
can harm a person to come into existence. In fact, the main problem with
frustrationism is that it implies that people are harmed in this way all too
often.

9. C ONCLUSIONS

I have defended the Value of Existence View on the basis of the comparative judgement that existence can be better (or worse) for a person
than non-existence. I have also argued that a person can be harmed by
not coming into existence. Furthermore, I have considered a number of
objections to these claims and argued that all of them are flawed.
41 This, of course, is the Asymmetry referred to above.

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If a person can be benefited by coming into existence, it may seem that

we have some moral reason to cause people to exist. In fact, some people
may find the Value of Existence View objectionable precisely because it
seems to imply this. However, the Value of Existence View does not entail
any particular answer to the question of what our moral obligations are
to people we may cause to exist. Indeed, some philosophers argue that
while it may benefit a person to come into existence, we do not wrong
her by denying her that benefit, since she is then not there to be wronged.42
Nevertheless, I believe that acceptance of the Value of Existence View may
make it difficult to resist the claim that, everything else being equal, we
ought to cause (happy) people to exist. The Value of Existence View may
even put a certain amount of pressure on us to hold that there are situations
in which we are obliged to create new people all things considered. But
while these issues of population policy are indeed very important, they
require a paper of their own.43

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank John Broome, Krister Bykvist, Jan Faye, Wlodek
Rabinowicz and two anonymous referees for some very helpful comments
on earlier versions of this article. The article was presented at the OxfordCopenhagen Summit on Ethics in 1999, and at the International Society
for Utilitarian Studies conference in North Carolina in 2000, and I would
also like to thank the participants who commented on my talk on each of
these two occasions, especially Krister Bykvist, Ingmar Persson and Peter
Vallentyne.
Department of Philosophy
University of Copenhagen
Njalsgade 80
2300 Copenhagen S
Denmark
E-mail: nhol@hum.ku.dk

42 See, e.g., M. Roberts, Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in
Ethics and the Law (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), and P. Vallentyne,
Melinda Roberts, Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics
and the Law, Nos 34 (2000), pp. 634647.
43 See, e.g., Holtug, Utility, Priority and Possible People.