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LEGAL PROFESSION DIGESTS

96. NAKPIL v VALDES


Facts:

Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went
into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the property in trust
for Nakpil.
Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands titles were transferred
to his name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes and
his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil.
What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of Jose
Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty
Corporation) while including the loans he contracted.
What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was
pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes.
The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI.
The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of
Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil.

Issue:

Held:

W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely:
o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;
o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and
o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm
prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the
estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.
The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year.
The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed
on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his professional services as a
lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an
agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of
excluding the property from the estate and including the loans he contracted (and
used for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between
Jose and him (they had a close relationship since the 50s), which was the basis for
Imeldas decision to use his services.
As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests
which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question
that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate
and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is
clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and
that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.

97. ORDONIO VS EDUARTE


FACTS:

Antonia Ulibari filed with RTC for annulment of a document against her children. The
case was handled by Atty. Henerido Eduarte. However, Atty. Henerido Eduarte was
appointed as RTC judge. The case of Ulibari was then transferred to Atty, Josephine
Eduarte, wife of Atty. Henerido Eduarte. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Antonia Ulibari. Only one of the children, Dominga Ordonio, appealed to CA. While
the appeal was pending in the CA, Antonia conveyed some parcels of her land to her
children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by Atty.
Josephine Eduarte. Antonia also conveyed 20 hectares of land to Atty. Josephine and
Atty. Henerido as their attorneys fees. All the titles and lands subject to the deeds
of absolute sale and deeds of conveyance were in the name of Antonia.
Subsequently, Dominga filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Josephine on the
basis of an affidavit executed by her mother, Antonia, stating that she never
conveyed parcel of land to Atty. Josephine as attorneys fees and she had no
knowledge of the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children. The
IBPCBD recommended one-year suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE/S: 1. WON Antonia was defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance 2.
WON Atty. Josephine violated any law in preparing and notarizing the deeds of
absolute sale in making it appear that there were considerations therefore, when in
truth there were none so received by the seller
HELD:
1. Yes. It is clear from Antonias affidavit and deposition that she never conveyed
the said land to her lawyer as attorneys fees. Granting for the sake of argument
that Antonio did convey the land as attorneys fee, Atty. Josephine should have not
caused the execution of the deed since a case was still pending before CA covering
the same land. She violated Art 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from
acquiring assignment property and rights which may be subject of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession. The prohibition applies when
a lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in
consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still subject
of a pending case. 2. Yes. Atty. Josephine admitted that Antonia did not actually sell
parcels of land to her children and that she utilized the form of deed of sale because
it was the most convenient and appropriate document to effect transfer of parcels
of land. She violated part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not do any
falsehood. She violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Overall
holding: Suspension of 6 months for having violated Art 1491 of the Civil Code
another 6 months for violation of lawyers oath and Rule 10.01. Total of one year
suspension.

98. Rubias v. Batiller


Facts:
Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed an application for registration of the
parcel of land in question. After the war, the petition was heard and denied. Pending appeal,
Militante sold the land to petitioner, his son-in-law. Plaintiff filed an action for forcible entry
against respondent. Defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of
action, the truth of the matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always

been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of
ownership of the portions of the lot in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law was void
because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration
case involving the property in dispute
Held:
The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of
action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to
the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof made by his father-in- law in his
favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already
been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of
Appeals.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six
paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over
the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly
and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3)
administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees,
prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law.
Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly
prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted
to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and
submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil
Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such
prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning."
Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be
cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not
permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public
and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases
of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions
it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a
new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the
time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist
cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time
of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or
second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the
intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The
ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not
retroact to the date of the first contract."
99.

100. DAROY v LEGASPI


FACTS:

Complainants charged Atty. Ramon Chavez- Legaspi with malpractice for having
misappropriated the sum of P4,000.00 which he had collected for them. They prayed
that he be disbarred
FACTUAL EVIDENCE: Complainants hired Atty. Legaspi to represent them in the
intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Gonzaga. The
complainant-heirs in a joint petition, which Atty. Legaspi signed as counsel agreed
that the coconut land left by the decedents would be divided into 6 equal parts and
that the proceeds of the sale of the land would be distributed among them.
Atty. Legaspi wrote to the father of Mrs. Daroy, Teofilo Legaspi that the money
deposited could be withdrawn. However, Atty. Legaspi had already withdrawn the
money (therefore he acted in bad faith). It turned out that Atty. Legaspi was also an
heir (although it wasnt shown how).
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Legaspi should be disbarred because he violated the relation between
attorney and his client?

HELD: YES.
RATIO:
1. The relation between an atty and his client is higly fiduciary in nature and of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good
faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money
or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands
collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the
funds received.
2. The complainants, however, have to recover the money in an ordinary action, and not in
this disbarment proceeding.

101. Businos v. Ricafort


FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Businos entrusted Respondent Francisco Ricafort with
money for deposit in the bank account of Businos husband. The sum of the money
is P32,000. Of this amount, P30,000 was for deposit to the bank account and the
P2,000 is the amount Ricafort asked as a bond for civil case no. 5814 when no such
bond is required. Instead of depositing the money, Ricafort converted the money to
his own personal use and despite several demands, he failed to return the same to
Businos. Businos is then constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and a
disbarment case against Ricafort. Also, the P2,000 Ricafort asked for was never
used for a bond because no bond was required of that case therefore he merely
pocketed the said amount. Despite of numerous summons to comment on the
complaint, Ricafort failed to comply therefore it indicates his high degree of
irresponsibility.
ISSUE/S: WON Ricafort violated rule 16.02 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

HELD: Yes. By converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without
their consent and for collecting P2000 to be used as a bond which is not required,
Ricafort is undoubtedly guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct therefore
the court resolves to disbar him.
RATIO: According to Rule 16.02 a lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate
and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. It bears emphasis that a
lawyer, under his oath pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice
and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obliged to
report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his possession. He
should not commingle it with his private property or use it for personal purposes
without his clients consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity
to private trust.

102. Vda de Caina v. Victoriano


Facts: Respondent Flaviano T. Dalisay, Jr. was the attorney of one of petitioners, Elena
Peralta Vda. de Caia, in an action for ejectment filed before the Justice of the Peace of
Caloocan, Rizal, against Ricardo Nabong, which was dismissed and appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. In the latter court, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3875, and
because of the non-appearance of defendant, the latter was declared in default and
judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff. This judgment became final and executory for
lack of appeal.
On June 26, 1957, respondent Dalisay filed a motion in the same ejectment case for
annotation of his attorney's lien on the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51585
claiming that, notwithstanding the services he had rendered to the widow and her children
who were presented by him in said case, they have failed to pay him his attorney's fees
which he fixed at P2,020. This motion was set for hearing and thereafter the same was
granted in an order entered on July 10, 1957 wherein the court ordered petitioners to
surrender their duplicate copy of said certificate in order that the annotation requested may
be made. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that they were never furnished with a copy of respondent's motion, nor notified of
the date of its hearing, for which reason they were not able to appear to contest the same.
This motion was opposed by respondent Dalisay who averred that petitioners were furnished
with a copy of his motion by registered mail three days before the hearing as shown by the
return card attached to his written opposition. And on August 27, 1957, the court denied the
motion. Hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue: WON the attorney's lien of respondent Dalisay for services he had rendered in the
ejectment case can be ordered annotated on the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
51585.
Held: An attorney's lien is of two kinds: one is called retaining alien and the other charging
lien. The retaining lien is the right of the attorney to retain the funds, documents, and

papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid and to apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. The
charging lien is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of said judgments, which he has secured in
litigation of his client. Under this rule, this lien, whether retaining or charging, takes legal
effect only from and after, but not before, notice of said lien has been entered in the record
and served on the adverse party. It may therefore be seen that the right of a lawyer to
insure the payment of his professional fee is either to retain the funds, documents, and
papers of his client which may have lawfully come into his possession, or to enforce it upon
any judgment for the payment of money he may secure in favor of his client. And it has
been held that the retaining lien is dependent upon possession and does not attach to
anything not in attorney's hands. The lien exists only so long as the attorney's retains
possession ends.
In the instant case, the lien which respondent attorney tried to enforce for the satisfaction of
his professional fee ischarging in the sense that his purpose is to make of record his claim in
order that it may be considered in the execution of the judgment that may be rendered in
the case, and this he has already done. Thus, he had already caused a statement of his
claim to be entered in the record of the ejectment case and that is all what the rule requires
of him to do. Certainly, he cannot go any further, such as what he led the trial court to do,
that is, to have his lien annotated on the back of the title of petitioners which is beyond the
province of the court. The lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the
property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution. The
respondent judge has therefore exceeded his authority in issuing the order subject of the
present petition for certiorari.
Petition is granted.

103. Ruby Mae Barnachea vs. Atty. Edwin T. Quicho, A.C. No. 5925,

March 11, 2003


FACTS:
Ruby Barnachea engaged the legal services of Atty. Edwin Quiocho to cause the
transfer under her name of the title over a property previously owned by her sister.
Ruby Barnachea was able to pay respondent for legal fees. However, despite the
lapse of almost two months, Atty. Edwin Quiocho failed to secure title over the
property in favor of complainant. Ruby Barnachea demanded that Atty. Edwin
Quiocho refund to her the legal fees and return the documents which she earlier
entrusted to him. However, Atty. Edwin Quiocho failed to comply with said demands.
Atty. Edwin Quiocho denied that complainant contracted his legal services, although
Atty. Edwin Quiocho admitted having received the two checks from complainant,
Atty. Edwin Quiocho claimed that said checks were intended to cover actual and
incidental expenses for transportation, communication, representation, necessary

services, taxes and fees for the cancellation and transfer of TCT No. 334411 under
the name of complainant and not for legal services.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Edwin Quiocho violated Rule 16.04
HELD: Yes. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between
them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct
not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. A lawyer
is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his
possession. The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client is a
gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a
very delicate, exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is dutybound to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. The
profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute abdication of every
personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of
his client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting
standard expected of him.

104. Ma. Libertad SJ Cantiller v. Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano


FACTS:
Complainant lost an ejectment case and was issued to vacate the rented premises.
Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan,
on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to herein respondent. After such
introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their
case. In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by
respondent what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and
haphazardly composed 3 petition for annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges
that respondent promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured
if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close
friend). However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the
presiding judge asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground
of their friendship. Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the
latter which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will issue the
restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in locating the judge.
Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed complainant
and Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the Regional Trial
Court to enable them to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose,
respondent told complainant to prepare the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P
10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase
price of the apartment and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the

expenses of the suit. Respondent stressed to the complainant the need and urgency
of filing the new complaint. At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case
No. 55118 on October 30, 1987, respondent, contrary to his promise that he would
secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant.
Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no
restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the
order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced and executed.
Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no
need to make a deposit of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case
No. 55210. After further inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such
deposit made. Thus, on December 23,1987, complainant sent a demand letter to
respondent asking for the return of the total amount of eleven thousand pesos (P
11,000.00) which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was
never answered and the money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this
administrative complaint against herein respondent.
ISSUE/S: WON Respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges
against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite
period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to
deserve to resume the practice of law.
RATIO: When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will
exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise
due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy
of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case
violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics. The Court finds that
respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests.
Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding
judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of
their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a
replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact.

105. Santiago et al. v. Atty. Fojas


Facts:
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and
Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor,
respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador.
The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
a complaint (NCR-OD-M- 90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and
Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor,
respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador.

The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
a complaint (NCR-OD-M- 90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19,
20, and 21 of the Civil Code. As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res judicataby virtue of the final
decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since
what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed
a supplemental motion to dismiss. The trial court, per Judge Teresita DizonCapulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon
Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of
dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their
answer within a non extendible period of fifteen days from notice. Instead of filing
an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the
case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed
therein as CAG.R. SP No. 25834. Although that petition and his subsequent motion
for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did not file the
complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's
motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to
present his evidence ex-parte. The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the
order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of
Court, but to no avail.
ISSUE/S: WON the respondent committed a culpable negligence, as would warrant
disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complaints an answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91.
HELD: Yes. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
RATIO: The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No.
3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein
for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the
complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a
mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so
convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed
the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly provides: (A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's

106. Stemmerik v. Mas


FACTS:
Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips in
thePhilippines, he met Atty. Mas. Since he was marveled at the beauty of

thecountry, he wanted to buy a real property and consulted Atty. Mas. The lattertold
Stemmerik that he could legally acquire a real property in the Phils. andeven
suggested a 86K hectare land in Subic, Zambales. Atty. Mas, as the atty.-in-fact of
Stemmerik bought the property from a certain Bonifacio de Mesa. Thecontract to sell
provided that De Mesa sold the property to Ailyn Gonzales for3.8M. Then, in another
notarized deed made by Atty. Mas, it was stated that Gonzales received the funds from
Stemmerik. In preparing all these documents,Atty. Mas received 400K fee from Stemmerik.
The latter also gave Atty. Mas, the3.8M purchase price to which the latter issued a
receipt.S u d d e n l y , At t y. M a s b e c o m e s c a rc e a n d n o l o n g e r a n s w e r t h e c a l l s
o f Stemmerik. When Stemmerik visited the Phils, he engaged the service of theFernandez
Law Office and found out the subject property is inalienable, beinglocated in the former U.S.
military reservation. Also, he was apprised that alienscannot own real properties in the
Phils.Meanwhile, Atty. Mas had already abandoned his office and his whereabouts
isunknown. Stemmerik filed an action for disbarment against Atty. Mas before
theCommission on Bar Discipline but Atty. Mas never appeared.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Mas should be disbarred?
HELD: YES.
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promotere s p e c t f o r
t h e l a w a n d u p h o l d t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e b a r. A s m e n a n d w o m e n entrusted with
the law, they must ensure that the law functions to protect libertyand not as an instrument
of oppression or deception.Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the
legal profession andhas been found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is alsoguilty of
culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thecode of ethics of
the legal profession.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant andthat de
Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase forand in behalf of
complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violatedthe Anti-Dummy Law.All
lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do nofalsehood.
21
That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is asacred trust that should
be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.
22
Lawyers are servants of the law
23
and the law is their master. They should notsimply obey the laws, they should also inspire
respect for and obedience thereto byserving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that
is the first precept of theCode of Professional Responsibility:

107.

108. Victoria Legarda vs CA, New Cathay House


LEGARDA v CA
Facts:

New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay) and Victoria Legarda entered into a lease
agreement for a property in QC owned by Legarda.
For some reason, Legarda refused to sign the contract. Cathay made a deposit and
downpayment of rentals then filed for specific performance.
Legardas counsel, Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10-day extension to file an
answer which was granted. But Dean Coronel failed to file an answer within that
period.
Cathay presented evidence ex parte. Cathay won the case (Katay si Legarda). Service
of decision was made on Dean Coronel but he still did not do anything.
The QC property was then levied and auctioned off to pay for the judgment debt.
Cathays manager, Cabrera, was the highest bidder in the auction. Legarda did not
redeem the property within the 1 year period.
Kahit natalo na sila dahil walang ginagawa si Dean (hindi nga niya sinabihan si
Legarda kung ano na nangyari sa kaso nila, na wala na yung lupa), Legarda still did
not lose faith in her counsel.
Dean Coronel then filed a petition for annulment of judgment. Petition was denied. No
motion for reconsideration or appeal was made on the order of denial (ibang klase ka
dean!)
So, Legarda hired a new lawyer. New lawyer asked for annulment of judgment upon
the ground that the old lawyer was negligent in his duties. The petition was granted
and the sale of the QC property to be set aside.
The SC said that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Cathay because of the
reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence of Dean Coronel.
Hence this motion for reconsideration of SC decision.

Issue:

W/N Legarda can be bound by the gross negligence of her counsel

Held:

Yes. Original decision is reinstated (Legarda=loser)


As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course,
she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law.
If indeed Legarda is innocent, then all the more that Cathay is innocent. Between two
innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be
the one to bear the resulting loss.
Legarda misjudged and hired the services of Dean Coronel who in the end sort of
abandoned her case.
Decision was res ipso final due to failure to appeal the decision.

109. Natividad Uy vs. Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin


FACTS:
Natividad was the defendant in an ejectment case filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court to defend her rights, Natividad engaged the services of Atty. Braulio RG
Tansinin who timely filed an Answer to the complaint for ejectment. Required to file
a Position Paper, respondent, however, failed to file one for and on behalf of

Natividad. Eventually, a decision was rendered by the MTC against Natividad.


Natividad, through Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin, elevated the case to the RTC by filing a
Notice of Appeal. In an Orderdated May 25, 2004, the RTC dismissed the appeal
solely because of the failure of Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin to file a memorandum on
appeal. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for having been filed out
of time. Realizing that she lost her case because of the negligence of her counsel,
Natividad initiated the disbarment case against respondent, before the IBP.
Natividad averred that she gave her full trust and confidence to Atty. Braulio RG
Tansinin, but the latter failed miserably in his duty as a lawyer and advocate. She
also claimed that respondents failure to file the required position paper and
memorandum on appeal constituted gross incompetence and gross negligence,
which caused grave injury to Natividad.Lastly, Natividad alleged that not only did
Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin fail to file the required pleadings, he also was remiss in
informing her of the status of the case. For his part, Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin
admitted that Natividad obtained his legal services, but no legal fee was ever paid
to him. Respondent explained that he could not submit an intelligible position paper,
because the contract between Natividad and her lessor had long expired. He added
that he failed to file the position paper and memorandum on appeal, because
Natividad told him that she would work out the transfer of ownership to her of the
land subject matter of the ejectment case. In effect, Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin said
that he did not submit the required pleadings, because he knew that the law
favored the plaintiff as against Natividad in the ejectment case.
ISSUE/S: WON the lawyer violated canon 18 section 3.
HELD: YES, he violated it.
RATIO: Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin failure to file the required pleadings and to inform
his client about the developments in her case fall below the standard exacted upon
lawyers on dedication and commitment to their clients cause. Every case a lawyer
accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance, and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer should serve
his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and he should provide a
quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would expect of a
competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he
represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care
and skill demanded by the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect
the clients interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor; and his
client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently. It must be
recalled that the MTC required the parties to submit their respective position
papers. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court
order. In addition Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin failed to file the memorandum on appeal
this time with the RTC where complainants appeal was then pending. The case was
dismissed on that ground alone. Respondents failure to file the required pleadings
is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Resposibility

110. Spouses Garcia vs. Atty. Rolando S. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November
25, 2005
FACTS: Complainants Spouses Garcia engaged the services of respondent Atty. Bala
to appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Instead, Atty. Bala erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal
with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of
the DARAB should be filed with the CA through a verified petition for review.
Because of Atty. Balas error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to
the prejudice of his clients.Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before this
Court a Letter-Complaint against Atty. Rolando S. Bala. The Court required Atty. Bala
to comment on the Complaint. He failed to comply; thus, he was presumed to have
waived his right to be heard. In its Resolution, the Court referred the case to the IBP
for investigation, report, and recommendation. Investigating IBP Commissioner
Teresita J. Herbosa found Atty. Bala guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution which adopted
with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
commissioner. It recommended that Atty. Bala should be reprimanded and
suspended from the practice of law for six months; and that he should return, within
thirty days from his receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with legal
interest from the filing of the present Complaint with this Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Bala should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He should be disciplined. Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of
negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer; he is suspended from the practice of
law for six months.
RATIO: Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. A
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized by
law, and is expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion. Despite adequate time, he did not familiarize himself
with the correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he repeatedly
assured them that the supposed petition had already been filed. Since he effectively
waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume that there was no valid
reason for his failure to file a petition for review, and that he was therefore
negligent. Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the
money paid by complainants.

112.

113. Felisa Joven-De Jesus vs. PNB, et. al., G.R. No. L-19299
November 28, 1964
FACTS:
The case at bar presents a procedural question on the dismissal of in appeal as
perfected out of time. On September 15, 1956, Feliza Joven De Jesus filed a civil
case against Philippine National Bank (PNB), Del Carmen Branch at the CFI of
Pampanga. The Court rendered a decision ordering the latter to pay the former the
sum of P3,274.98 with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6% a year from the date
of the filing of the complaint. until the principal shall have been fully paid, plus the
other sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees of the said plaintiff. On March 16, 1961
defendant PNB filed its notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file
record on appeal. On March 17, 1961, it filed its record on appeal and appeal bond.
However, its appeal was dismissed on that day by the court on plaintiff Joven De
Jesus motion as filed out of time because the registry return card showed receipt by
PNB of its copy of the decision on February 13, 1961. PNB filed a "motion for
reconsideration and relief from, and/or to set aside the order of March 17, 1961." It
alleged that movant's failure to appeal on time was due to "accident, mistake
and/or excusable negligence," as supported by affidavits annexed to the motion.
The Court denied the motion on May 18, 1961. Defendant bank has appealed from
the orders of March 17, 1961 and May 18, 1961. The record will show that copy of
the decision sent to appellant's counsel in its legal department was received on
February 13, 1961. In its motion filed, it stated that the registered mail containing
said copy was received from the post office on February 13, 1961 by Eugenio
Magpoc. Although the latter is postal mail and delivery clerk of appellant's cashier
department, his affidavit states that "as such, one of my duties is to get and receive
from the Post Office all registered mail matters addressed to the Philippine National
Bank, its personnel and different departments" PNB admitted having filed its notice
of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond beyond the 30-day period, but
contended in its motion of March 22, 1961, that the delay was due to "accident,
mistake and/or excusable negligence." In support of such contention, it is alleged
that on February 13, 1961 the registered letter was given by the bank's postal mail
clerk Eugenio Magpoc to Feliciano Jimenez, Jr., registered mail clerk of appellant's
cashier department. Due to volume of work, Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. delivered it to the
receiving clerk of appellant's legal department only on February 15, 1961 and failed
to inform the latter that it was received two days before. Thereupon, it was stamped
by said receiving clerk as received on February 15, 1961. On the basis of this date,
appellant's counsel computed the period to appeal.
ISSUE/S: WON the counsel of the appellant neglected the period for appeal in the
case at bar.
HELD: Yes, appellants counsel carelessly took for granted that the date of receipt
stamped on the letter. He violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
RATIO: According to Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable. The lower court did not find
excusable the negligence in the circumstances of the case. Appellant's counsel
carelessly took for granted that the date of receipt stamped on the letter by the
legal department's receiving clerk was the date of receipt from the post office. It
was known or at least should have been known to him that letters addressed to
appellant's legal department were taken from the post office by Eugenio Magpoc
and sorted out by Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. Thus, from appellant's system of handling
and receiving correspondence for its legal and all other departments, it was clear
that the date of receipt by the receiving clerks of its several departments could not
be relied upon as the very same date of receipt from the post office. Counsel for
appellant could have easily found out the latter date had he inquired from Eugenio
Magpoc or Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. and in the circumstances, we find no excuse for his
having failed to do so. The Court cited, Bello vs. Fernando, Section 3, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court requires that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond, and the
record on appeal be all filed in court, and served on the adverse party, within thirty
days from notice of judgment. ...; and compliance with this period for appeal is
considered absolutely indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and to
the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business, so that if said period is not
complied with, the judgment becomes final and executory.
114.

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