ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Concept
Administrative Law belongs to the field of public law. It embraces all
the laws that regulate or control the administrative organization and
operations of the government including the legislative and judicial
branches. In general, it means that part of the law which governs the
organization, functions, and procedures of administrative agencies of
the government to which quasi legislative powers are delegated and
quasi judicial powers are granted, and the extent manner to which
such agencies are subject to control by the courts. (De Leon, 2013)
Scope
The administrative law embraces not only the law that governs
administrative authorities, that is, the Constitution, statutes, and
judicial decisions that construe and apply them as well as appropriate
principles of justice and equity in particular cases but also the law
made by the administrative authorities. (De Leon, 2013)
1. The Law which fixes the administrative organization and structure
of the government.
2. The law, the execution or enforcement of which is entrusted to
administrative authorities
3. The law which governs public officers including their competence
(to act), rights, duties, liabilities, election etc.
4. The law which creates, administrative agencies, defines their
powers and functions, prescribes their procedures.
5. The law which provides the remedies, administrative or judicial
available to those aggrieved by the administrative or judicial decisions
6. The law which governs the judicial review of or relief against
administrative actions or decisions
7.
The rules, regulations, orders and decisions made by
administrative authorities dealing with the interpretation and
enforcement of the laws entrusted to their administration

8. The body of judicial decision and doctrines dealing with any of the
above.
Administration defined.
In the institution sense, administration refers to the aggregate of
individuals in whose hands the reins of government are for the time
being. It refers to the persons who actually run the government.
However, government is the agency or instrumentality through which
the will of State is formulated, expressed and realized.
In the function sense, administration means the actual running
of the government by the executive resources through the
enforcement of laws and the implementation of policies.
Administrative Agency
It is a body endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it
for enforcement or execution.
Theoretically, the Administrative Agency is composed of
persons who are, at the outset, or at least eventually, experts in the
particular field of specialization under jurisdiction. They are
appointed by law and informed by experience
Major Powers of Administrative Agencies
1. Quasi-legislative authority or rule- making power
Legislative in nature, the rule making power of the administrative
body is intended to enable it to implement the policy of the law and to
provide for the more effective enforcement of its provisions. (Cruz,
2007)
2. Quasi-judicial power or adjudicatory function

This is the power the administrative agency to determine

questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself. The
administrative body exercises the quasi judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. (Cruz, 2007)

Sources of Administrative Law

Administrative law is derived from four sources or is of four (4) kinds:
1. Constitution or statutory enactments

a set of fundamental principles or established precedents

according to which a state or other organization is governed; formal
written enactment of a legislative authority that governs a state, city
or country. Currently, the 1987 Constitution is in place. Specifically,
provisions of the constitution in Articles VI (The Executive), VII (The
Legislative), VIII (The Judiciary), X (The Local Government), XI
(Accountability of Public Officers) pertain to the administrative
organization of the government.
e.g. Social Security Act which established the Social Security
Commission.
2.
Decisions of courts interpreting the charters of
administrative bodies
Court decisions regarding the interpretations embodied in the
description of basic laws and principles of a particular administrative
body.

3.

Rules and regulations issued by the administrative bodies

e.g.Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

4.
Determinations and orders of the administrative bodies in
the settlement of controversies

ELECTION LAW
Election is defined as the act of casting and receiving the ballots from
the voters, counting the ballots, and making the returns thereon
(Hontiveros v. Atlavas, 24 Phil. 632), it is also a choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the

ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will
of the electorate, the embodiment of the popular will, the expression
of the sovereign will of the people (Rulloda vs. Commission on
Elections, 395 SCRA 535). Since election involves the whole process
of nominating, selecting, voting, and processing the votes for
candidates who will hold public office, election laws fall under
administrative law. Election law, thus, are all laws related to the whole
electoral process and remedies on electoral contests and violations.
These laws cover the preparations leading to the election such as the
registration of voters and filing of candidacy, limits on the manner of
conducting electoral campaigns including limits on electoral
contributions and expenditures, how the actual election should be
conducted, the proclamation of winners in the election, and manners
as to how to address electoral competitions and how to remedy
electoral violations if they occur. (Hillary, 2004)
Previous Sources for Election Law are as follows:
1. Philippine Commission Act No. 1582, modified by Act Nos.
1669, 1709, 1926, and 1786. All of which were incorporated in the
Administrative Code.
2. Philippine Legislature Acts No. 2310, 3336, 3387.
3. Commonwealth Act Nos. 233, 357 until June 21, 1947.
4. Republic Act No. 180 (The Election Code) superseded all
previous legislations.
5. Republic Act No. 6388 superseded R.A. 180 in 1971.
6. Presidential Decree No. 1296 (Election Code of 1978).
As of 1983, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (The Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines) is the primary source for Election Law.
Other sources which supplement the Omnibus Election Code include
the following (Bellosillo et al., 2007):
1. Republic Acts amending the provisions of B.P. 811.
Some noteworthy revisions of are Republic Act Nos. 6646 (The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), 7166 (Synchronized Elections Law
of 1991), 7941 (Party-List System Act of 1995), 8189 (Voters
Registration Act of 1996), 8436 (Election Modernization Act of 1997),
9006 (Fair Elections Law of 2001), 9369 (Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003)

2.

The 1993 Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure.

3.
The 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.
4.

The Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

5.

The 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

6.

Recent Jurisprudence by the Supreme Court on elections.

RESEARCHED CASES

Researcher: Dane Juriel Malate

Samalio vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan passport was taken to
Augusto R. Samalio, an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), because Juliet Pajarilla, an
Immigration Officer, suspected that her passport was fake. Qin,
sensing a demand for money in exchange for her passport, flashed
$500 in front of Officer Samalio which the latter grabbed. Samalio
returned Qins passport but without an immigration arrival stamp.
Thereafter, Qin complained against Samalio.
On February 4, 1993, the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City,
through its resolution No. 0-93-0224, recommended that Samalio be
prosecuted for Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the
Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan.
In an Indorsement Communication dated February 9,1993, former
NAIA General Manager Gen. Guillermo Cunanan enclosed a copy of
the said resolution. Thereafter, BID Commissioner Zafiro L. Respicio
issued Personnel Order No. 93-179-93 commencing an
administrative case against Samalio for violation of CSMC No. 46
Rule 2 Section 1 and asking Samalio to submit his answer to the
charges together with supporting statements and documents, and
whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not
considered satisfactory.

Samalio was preventively suspended for 90 days because the charge

against him involves dishonesty, oppression and misconduct as
stated in the same Personnel Order. Samalio then petitoned to lift his
preventive suspension but was denied. In his Answer, Samalio denied
the charges against him and elected a formal investigation if the
same was not found to be satisfactory. His answer contained the
affidavits of his witnesses namely Rodrigo Pedrealba, Dante Aquino,
Florencio Austria and Winston Vitan. Given that his answer was found
to be unsatisfactory, the case was set for formal hearing before the
Board of Discipline of BID.
On July 25, 1996, BID Acting Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag, issued
the decision finding Officer Samalio guilty of the charges and was
ordered dismissed from service. In the initial Indorsement dated
August30, 1996, former Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
confirmed the consequence of dismissal. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated June 2, 1997.
Guingonas decision was appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) but the CSC in its Resolution No. 974501 dated November 26,
1997, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decisions of Acting
Comm. Liwag and Secretary Guingona. A subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CSC. Samalio filed a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals but the latter dismissed
it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Samalio was not accorded due process.
HELD:
No. Officer Samalio was accorded due process. He was heard
through the various pleadings he had filed and was likewise heard
when in the submission of his answer. In addition, Administrative
bodies are not bound by the technicalities of law and procedure, and
the rules obtaining in courts of law. Rules of procedure are not strictly
applied in and due process in its strict judicial sense is different from
administrative due process. Thus, there was ample evidence which
satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative proceedings
substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
to support the decision of the CSC.|||
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48723 dated May 24,

1999, affirming the decision and resolution of the Civil Service

Commission is AFFIRMED
Researcher: Dane Juriel Malate
Conte, et al vs. COA
G.R. No. 116422, Nov 4, 1996
FACTS:
Former employees of SSS namely, Avelina Conte and Leticia Boiser,
availed of compulsory retirement benefits provided for in RA No. 660.
They also claimed with the SSS financialassistance benefits as
provided for under SSS Resolution No. 56,Series of 1971.
The Court of Appeals rejected the subject SSS resolution in its
previous ruling for the reason that the financial scheme provided for
by the SSS will results to the increase of benefits beyond what is
allowed under the existing retirement laws.
Thereafter, the SSS sought Presidential authority, which the
executive secretary replied to stating that the office of the President
is not inclined to favor such request and to overrule the COAs earlier
ruling.
Above mentioned petitioners sought reconsideration of COAs ruling
disallowing their claim, and also sought payment from the SSS as
prescribed in Res. 56, both of which were denied by COA and SSS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the benefits provided for in the Res. 56 is to be
considered as simply a financial assistance or does such scheme
constitute a supplementary retirement plan as stated by RA. 4968
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Res. 56 constitute a supplementary
retirement plan. Sec 28(b) of CA 186 as amended by RA. 4968, bars
the creation of any insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS
for government officers and employees in order to prevent the undue
and iniquitous proliferation of such plans. Hence, Resolution No. 56 is
therefore invalid, void, and of no effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit,
there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission. The assailed Decision of public respondent
is AFFIRMED, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby declared
ILLEGAL, VOID AND OF NO EFFECT . The SSS is hereby urged to

assist petitioners and facilitate their applications under RA 1616, and

to advance to them, unless barred by existing regulations, the
corresponding amounts representing the difference between the two
benefits programs. No costs.|||
Researcher: Precious Morante
Casimiro vs. Tandog
G.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005
FACTS:
The CSC Resolution affirmed the Decision of Municipal Mayor
Filipino Tandog of San Jose, Romblon, finding Haydee Casimiro
guilty of dishonesty and ordering her dismissal from the service.
Haydee Casimiro was appointed as Municipal Assessor.
However, during her office Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andress
submitted a report based on an investigation he conducted into
alleged irregularities in the office of Casimiro. The report spoke of
anomalous cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 0236 in the name of
Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of
petitioners brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380
and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas Sebastian and the issuance of
new ones in favor of petitioners bother-in-law Marcelo Molina.
Upon knowing the said allegations in the office of petitioner
Casimiro, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 13 dated 06
September 1996, placing the petitioner under preventive suspension
for thirty (30) days. Three days later, Mayor Tandog issued
Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to answer the charge
irregularities in her office. Casimiro denied all the allegations against
her claiming that the cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her
brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office
as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax declarations in
favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molinas favor.
On October 23, 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17, Mayor
Tandog extended Casimiros preventive suspension for another thirty
days effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and

collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. On October 28,

1996, respondent again issued Memorandum No. 18 directing the
petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Naraida San
Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. In response to this, Casimiro
submitted a letter stating that with respect to the complaint of Cesar,
she had already explained her side in the letter dated 26 September
1996 and with Matillano, she claimed that it was a certain Lilia
Barrientos who executed the deed absolute sale.
Mayor Tandog was not satisfied with the answer of Casimiro
and so he decided to create a fact-finding committee to investigate
the matter. After series of meetings, the fact-finding committee
submitted its report recommending petitioners separation from the
service. Based on the said recommendation, respondent Mayor
issued Administrative Order No. 1 dated 25 November 1996
dismissing petitioner on the ground of dishonesty and
malperformance of duty as Municipal Assesor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied of substantive due process.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 31 May 2000 and its subsequent Resolution
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In
administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural
due process simply means the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. To be heard does not mean only
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard thru pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has
been recognized to include the following:

1. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of

proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights;
2. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with assistance of a
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to
defend ones rights;
3. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as
to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality;
4. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained
in the records or made known to the parties affected.
In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was
conducted on 01 October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she
answered questions propounded by the members of the fact-finding
committee. Records further show that the petitioner was accorded every
opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge
against her. After a careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee
rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CSC and the Court of
Appeals. The said decision is now affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Researcher: Precious Morante
Evangelista vs. Jarencio
G.R. No. L-29274, November 27, 1975
FACTS:
This case as on orginal action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injuction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul and set aside the order of Justice Jarencio dated July 1, 1968
in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled Fernando Manalastas vs. Secretary
Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc., which reads as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P 5,
000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
petitioner (private respondent) be issued restraining the respondents
(petitioners), their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other
persons acting in their behalf from further issuing of subpoenas in
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner (private
respondent) and from instituting contempt proceedings against the

petitioner (private respondent) under Section 580 of the Revised

Administrative Code.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines created
the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and
responsibilities:
a. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices,
graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness,
subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
b. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of
Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence
to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully
amassed wealth
c. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations
of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any
public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper
charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in
the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including
the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as
Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando
Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as
witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS
AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and
testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas
filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an

Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with

preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case
No. 73305 and assailed its legality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the
authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated
July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
The Supreme Court held that:
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its
subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an
effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer
oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation with the
authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena
duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a
similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all
the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted subparagraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely
exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions
enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or
intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very
purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode
nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the
subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the
Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and
(h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No.
4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the
subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart

from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law
itself makes none.
Researcher: Roni May L. Samarita
Smart Communication, Inc. et.al. vs. National
Telecommunication Commission (NTC)
GR No. 151908, August 12, 2003
Quasi- Legislative & Quasi- Judicial Powers; Rule on Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; When
Applicable
FACTS:
The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated
rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.
1.
Provide a grace period for subscribers when their billing
statements are not received within the 30 day period of each billing
cycle and during said grace period they are prohibited from
disconnecting service
2. Not charge for calls diverted to voice mailbox or similar facility
3. Verify the identification and address of each purchaser of a prepaid
SIM card which will be valid for 2 years
4. Update subscribers of the remaining value of their cards before the
start of every call
5. Reduce the unit of billing from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per
pulse
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular
mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing
of cellular phone units.
This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
addressed to all public telecommunications entities, which reads:
This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07
October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years
from date of first use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.

 In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs
used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and
beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use.
Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07
October 2000.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the Circular as
unconstitutional since NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as prepaid cards, such jurisdiction belongs to
the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the
Philippines. That the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of
property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly
prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call
cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card
buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence,
they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void. A
motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioners
to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss but on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed RTC.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the NTC has jurisdiction and not the regular courts
over the case
(2) Whether the Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and
contrary to law and public policy.
HELD:
Petitions are GRANTED.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers. The NTC circular was issued pursuant to
its quasi-legislative or rule making power. Hence, the action must be
filed directly with the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies. However, where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the

administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative

function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by
an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES- requires that where a
remedy within an administrative agency is provided by law, or
available against the action of an administrative board, body, or
officer, and can still be resorted to by giving the said agency every
opportunity to decide correctly a given matter that comes within its
jurisdiction, relief must first sought by availing this remedy before
bringing an action in or elevating it to the courts of justice for review.
(De Leon, 2013)
DOCTRINE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION- may also be referred to
Exclusive Administrative Jurisdiction or Preliminary resort. It usually
refers to cases involving specialized disputes which are referred to an
administrative agency of special competence to resolve the same, It
applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasijudicial or adjudicatory function. This is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain or not from exercising its jurisdiction over a
matter or question even if it may well be within its proper jurisdiction
where relief may be obtained in an administrative proceeding. (De
Leon, 2013)
The NTC as a regulatory agency of the national government
with jurisdiction over all telecommunication entities is clothed with
authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or
authority. The issuance of the provisional permits or authority on the
basis of its determination on the applicants compliance with the
requirements it has promulgated would be an exercise of its quasilegislative power. If, however, an issue arises from said
determination, opposes its application on the basis of the very rules
promulgated by the administrative agency is called upon to resolve
said contest, such resolution would partake of the nature of an
exercise of its quasi-judicial power. (Cruz, 2007)
Researcher: Roni May L. Samarita
Eastern Shipping Lines vs Court of Appeals and Davao Pilots
Association
GR No. 116356, June 29, 1998

Following the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Laws, because the Philippine

Ports Authority (PPA) circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they
are void and ineffective. Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
of the Constitution
FACTS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER 1088; VALID AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORDING TO THE RULINGS OF THE
COURT.
The Davao Pilots Association filed a complaint for the sum of money
against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. The case was about 2 years of
unpaid pilotage fees. The Lower court ruled in favor of the
respondent.
Eastern Shipping Lines disputed the claims against them, they
insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars instead
of EO 1088 because the pilotage fees under PPA is lower than that of
EO 1088.
Petitioner contends that EO 1088 is unconstitutional, because (1) its
interpretation and application are left to private respondent, a private
person, and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of powers.
Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with
and on the basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA,
the administrative body vested under PD 857 with the power to
regulate and prescribe pilotage fees. In assailing the constitutionality
of EO 1088, the petitioner repeatedly asks: "Is the private respondent
vested with power to interpret Executive Order No. 1088?" . Eastern
Shipping Lines argues for the application of PPA Circular instead of
being guided by EO 1088 because the pilotage fees prescribed under
the former is lower than the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
The petition is unmeritorious. EO 1088 is valid. According
to the Supreme Court:

"It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be
considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of
power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an
administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here as we have
already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services,
including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in
character
It is worthy to note that E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted
pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to
impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The
reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new
pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage
service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates
for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports.
We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the
PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may
increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those
mandated by E.O. No. 1088."
PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they were void
and ineffective. Administrative or Executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to laws or
the Constitution. It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the
PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty
is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore , if there is any conflict between
PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.
Researcher: Jerome Napoleon Gonzales
Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC)
G.R. No. 179271
FACTS:
The May 14, 2007 national elections included elections for party-list
representatives. BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution to the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) on June 27, 2002. On July 9,
2007, the Commission on Elections
ISSUES:

(1) Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a
ceiling?
(2) Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(3) Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
(4) How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
(5) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
HELD:
Researcher: Jerome Napoleon Gonzales
Atong Paglaum, et al. vs. Comission on Elections (COMELEC)
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
FACTS:
From November 23, 2012 to December 5, 2012, The Comission on
Elections disqualified 8 groups; Alagad ng Sining (ASIN), Manila
Teachers Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers),
Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc.
(ALA-EH), 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP), Akbay
Kalusugan (AKIN), Inc., Ako An Bisaya (AAB), Abyan Ilonggo Party
(AI), and Alliance of Organizations, Networks and Associations of the
Philippines, Inc.(ALONA), which manifested their intent to participate
in the May 13, 2013 elections.
From November 7 to December 5 of the same year, respondent
further disqualified 4 groups via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic
review of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions approving registration
of groups or organizations; Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM),
Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN), Association of Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and
Nanny of the Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN), and Pilipinas Para sa
Pinoy (PPP) via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for
reconsideration of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying
registration of groups and organizations. Also on December 5, 2012,
COMELEC denied Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) participation in
the May 13, 2013 as a party-list. These groups were not able to

secure an injunction, thus their names were excluded from the official
ballots.
In scheduled summary evidentiary hearings, COMELEC issued
resolutions from October 10, 2012 to December 4 of the same year
disqualifying 39 other groups from participating in the same elections;
AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB), Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong
Paglaum), Association for Righteousness Advocacy on Leadership
(ARAL), Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC), United Movement
Against Drugs Foundation (UNIMAD), 1-Bro Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. (1BRO-PGBI), 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines,
Inc. (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Blessed Federation of Farmers and
Fishermen International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List), 1st
Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE), Aangat Tayo
Party-List Party (AT), Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO), Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas Movement (AGRI), Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng
Masa (AKMA-PTM), Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
Magsasaka (KAP), Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY), The True
Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country and People) Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY), Pilipino Association for CountryUrban
Poor Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW), Pasang Masda
Nationwide Party (PASANG MASDA), Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na
Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA), Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), Alliance for
Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD), Green Force for the
Environment Sons and Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE),
Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K), Action League of
Indigenous Masses (ALIM), Alliance of Advocates in Mining
Advancement for National Progress (AAMA), Social Movement for
Active Reform and Transparency (SMART). Alliance of Bicolnon Party
(ABP), Bayani Party List (BAYANI), Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong
(AANI), Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (AIPRA), Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED),
Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG LINGKOD), Action Brotherhood
for Active Dreamers, Inc. (ABROAD), Binhi-Partido ng mga
Magsasaka Para sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI), Butil Farmers Party
(BUTIL), 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st
KABAGIS), 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK), and Coalition of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS).
However, these groups were able to secure a mandatory injunction

from the Supreme Court, therefore the names of the 39 organizations

were included in the official ballots.
COMELEC based its ground for the disqualification for the 52
organizations on their compliance with the requirements set by
Republic Act No. 7491 also known as the Party-List System Act and
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency vs. COMELEC.
ISSUE:
(6) Whether or not the Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
upcoming elections, and;
(7) whether or not the criteria for party-list qualifications held in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT vs. COMELEC should be applied by the
said commission in the upcoming elections.
HELD:
The Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the 52 organizations from participating in the upcoming
elections. However, all petitions were remanded to the Commission
for it to decide on the qualifications of the organizations using the new
parameters which the Court created in this decision. It is clear that in
the party-list structure as ordained in Art. VI Section 5(1) and (2) of
the 1987 Constitution is not merely for sectoral parties but also for
non-sectoral parties. In order to harmonize the phrase marginalized
and under-represented in the Party-List System Act with the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Court interpreted the phrase
to include both in economic and ideological status. In line with this,
the Court enumerated the following new parameters;
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,

that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in

party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies.
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties
or
organizations
that
represent
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

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CDASIA ONLINE, cdasiaonline.com