Journal of Fire Protection

Engineering
http://jfe.sagepub.com/

Quantitative Evaluation of "Bleve" Hazards

Richard W. Prugh
Journal of Fire Protection Engineering 1991 3: 9
DOI: 10.1177/104239159100300102
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://jfe.sagepub.com/content/3/1/9

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QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF "BLEVE" HAZARDS

by
Richard W. Prugh
President, Hazard Reduction Engineering, Inc.
Wilmington, DE*

SUMMARY
Rupture of a container in which a liquid is held above its atmospheric-pressure boiling
point can result in explosive vaporization of a large fraction of the contents. This phenomenon is called a Boiling-Liquid Expanding-Vapor Explosion ("BLEVE"). A method for
estimating the TNT equivalence of a BLEVE is proposed, with descriptions of possible
causes and consequences of the explosion and (if the contents are flammable) the consequences of the resulting fireball.

I NTRODUCTION
A

2.

Boiling-Liquid Expanding-Vapor Explosion

an unusual physical phenomenon

3.

(BLEVE) is

method for estimating the energy

TNT equivalent, of a BLEVE;

or

4.

Present methods for BLEVE

and

5.

Show how the

causes

prevention;

become important

inputs into process safety

larly for toxic chemicals.

analysis, particu-

The broad definition of a BLEVE, as used by the

National Fire Protection Associationl, Society of
Fire Protection Engineers2, Lees3, and Kletz4 is
used here; that is, it is assumed that any liquified

The potential for BLEVE creates a hazard for

the fire fighter and presents unusual design
considerations for the fire protection engineer.
The fire fighting hazard results from the blast,
fireball, and missiles which can accompany prolonged fire exposure of a tank of flammable
liquid. The engineering aspects include protection of flammable liquid and liquified gas tanks
from fire and mechanical damage, design of
remote-operated fire fighting facilities, and protection of fire-water systems from the blast and
missiles.

1.

Present

potential,

which results from the sudden release from confinement of a liquid at a temperature above its
atmospheric pressure boiling pointl. The
sudden decrease in pressure results in explosive
vaporization of a fraction of the liquid and a
cloud of vapor and mist, with accompanying
blast effects. If the material is flammable and
an ignition source is present, a fireball may be a
further hazardous consequence of the BLEVE.

The

Discuss the history of BLEVEs, and

describe the important causes;

vapor - flammable

or

non-flammable -

can

pro-

BLEVE. Also, a fireball is not part of this

definition, since a fireball would result only if the
material released were flammable and ignition
occurs. The historical fact is that most BLEVEs
involve flammable liquids, and most of these
BLEVE releases are ignited by the surrounding
fire, resulting in a fireballs. However, the method
described in this paper for estimating the blast
effects of BLEVEs holds for all liquids.

duce

objectives of this paper are to:

TANK, CONTAINER,

Show how BLEVEs differ from other types

of explosions and explain the unexpected
severity of the consequences;

OR

PROCESS-VESSEL EXPLOSIONS
three types of &dquo;physical&dquo; or &dquo;boilertype&dquo; explosions which are of interest to the fire
protection engineer: bursting of a gas-filled container (or of a container of vapor at a temperature above the critical point), bursting of a
liquid-filled container (at a temperature below
There

* Address for

correspondence: 501 Silverside Road,

site 122, Wilmington, DE 19809. Portions of this
paper were published as &dquo;Quantify BLEVE
Hazards&dquo; (Chemical Engineering Progress, 87, No.
2, pp. 66-72, February 1991) and are reproduced
with permission of AIChe. © 1991 AIChe.

are

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full tank cars have been propelled to distances

up to 400 meters, indicating that there must be
another important source of energy in a
BLEVE. It will be demonstrated that this
energy source is that of explosively-flashing

the boiling point of the liquid), and bursting of a

container in which the confined liquid is at a
temperature above the boiling point (and below
the critical point). The last case is the BLEVE
scenario, but the first two cases are discussed
here for reference.

superheated liquid.

Explosion of a Gas-Filled Vessel

BLEVE HISTORY

The

bursting of a gas-filled container predictably results in an outrush of gas, at a high

AND

INCIDENTS

(49 INCIDENTS)

initial pressure and with the blast pressure

decreasing with distance from the burst container. The energy is usually calculated by
assuming an adiabatic expansion of the contents, as the pressure decreases from the initial
confined pressure toward atmospheric6,7. The
initial shock-wave pressure is not equal to the
initial confined pressure but can be estimated
rather easily. It is also later shown that the
blast effects of bursting gas-filled containers can
be assessed from the calculated TNT equivalence and a &dquo;virtual distance&dquo; from an &dquo;explosion center&dquo;.

BLEVEs Caused

by Exposure to

Fire

(17 incidents)
Certainly the most important cause of BLEVEs
is fire. The typical incident scenario is that of
fire surrounding a container of liquid, with heat
input to the container resulting in an increase
in liquid temperature and an increase in internal pressure. If the container is fitted with a
relief valve, the valve will open when the internal pressure reaches the relief-valve setting,
and some boiling will occur while the relief
valve is open. If the relief valve is large enough
and the setting is sufficiently below the burst
pressure of the container, all of the liquid may
boil out of the container without further serious
aggravation of the fire situation (as in a pres-

Explosion of a Vessel Containing Cold

Squid
The bursting of a liquid-filled container produces blast effects which are orders of magnitude smaller than those of gas-filled containers,
if the temperature of the liquid is below the
atmospheric-pressure boiling point8. The energy
potential is that of a &dquo;spring&dquo; which has been
expanded by the internal pressure, and this
energy appears as a shock wave propelled by
the escaping liquid. Failure of a vessel being
subjected to a hydrostatic test is illustrative of
this type of &dquo;explosion&dquo;.

sure

cooker).

in many BLEVE situations, the setting

of the relief valve is quite high (particularly for

However,

liquefied gases). Also, the tensile strength of the

container material is typically reduced by exposure to fire, such that the container may not be

capable of withstanding pressure equal to the

relief-valve setting. Thus, even though the relief
valve is open and venting vapor at a rapid rate
(frequently with the vented vapors afire), the container may burst. Table I presents brief descriptions of seventeen accidents in which fire caused
overpressure and subsequent BLEVE. The materials involved were: butane 9~1o ethylene oxidell,

Explosion of a Vessel Containing

Superheated Liquid (BLEVE)
Based on experience with cold liquids, it might
be expected that the blast energy available from
a container almost completely filled with liquid
as in a railroad tank car - could be estimated

gasoline 12-14 hydrogenls, propane~~-24~

and

vinyl chloride17,29.

An important fire-exposure test was conducted by

the U. S. Department of Transportation in
197426. A BLEVE occurred in an uninsulated
125-cubic-meter tank car containing about 6,000
kilograms of liquified propane, after 24.5 minutes
of exposure to a JP-4 jet-fuel fire. Rupture

by only considering the vapor space as being a

gas-filled container. However, experience has
demonstrated that the energy of a bursting container of superheated liquid has far greater
energy than would be estimated from such a
vapor-space calculation. Sections of essentially10

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occurred at an internal pressure of about 155

kiloPascals (kPa), and a bulk temperature near
69C, despite the venting of vapor through a 39kPa, 8.1 cm-diameter, relief valve at rates up to
33 kg per second for 16 minutes and before a very
large relief device could be opened to prevent the
rupture. At the moment of rupture, about 34,000
kg of liquified propane remained in the tank car.
[The average heat flux was 105 kilowatts per
square meter of wetted surface.] This tank-car situation is used as an example for the BLEVE calculations below.

BLEVEs Caused

tional three explosive container ruptures have

occurred with chlorine38, but all were more than
35 years ago. Similar explosive ruptures of overfilled containers have occurred with butadiene39,
butane9, carbon dioxide40, ethyl ether39, and
methyl bromide4l, and it is likely that the San
Carlos da Rapita incident - involving propylene also was a BLEVE caused by overfilling42.
In all of the above incidents, absence of an overpressure-relief device was a major contributing
factor. With the improving standards of overpressure protection, the frequency of BLEVEs
caused by overfilling could be expected to
decline significantly.

by Mechanical Damage

(11 incidents)
Another important cause of BLEVE is damage
to the liquefied-vapor container. Container failure can be caused by corrosion, as occurred in a

BLEVEs Caused

(6 incidents)

fire-extinguisher incident27, or by impact, as

occurred during movement of a tank car at
Waverly28. In the latter incident, the tank car
ruptured explosively as it was being moved (50
hours after a derailment). The contents ignited
almost immediately and burned as a fireball.

A fourth important cause of BLEVE is runaway

self-reaction of the contents, such that the container is overpressured and the contents are

heated above the atmospheric-pressure boiling

point. Contamination caused by back-flow of process materials has been implicated in several of
these incidents. The materials involved were:

Collisions also have resulted in nine additional

explosive ruptures of vehicle or ship containers.
These incidents involved: ammonia29,30~ butane3l,
chlorine32,33, propane23,29,34, and propylene1?. In
each of these incidents, the container was &dquo;laid
open&dquo; by the BLEVE, and parts of the containers
were propelled to great distances.

acrolein43,44, chlorine3l, chlorobutadiene45, ethylene oxide25,46, and phosgene3l. If the material

involved is flammable and the temperature
attained prior to container rupture is above the
autoignition temperature, the BLEVE incident
could be accompanied by a fireball. This may
greatly increase the likelihood of serious injury.

A series of tests conducted to evaluate the haz-

BLEVEs Caused

ards of unconfined vapor cloud explosions39,3s

showed that mechanical damage to a steel tank
containing superheated propane could cause a
BLEVE, accompanied by significant blast overpressure (prior to ignition of the cloud). The
maximum pressure recorded was about 75 kPa
(gauge) at a distance of about 10 meters from an
exploding tank containing 450 kg of propylene.

BLEVEs Caused

by Runaway Reaction

by Overheating (3 inci-

dents)
Excessive heat input with an inoperable relief
device can result in container rupture and then
BLEVE if the temperature of the contents is
above the boiling point. This combination of circumstances apparently has occurred with
ammonia29, ethylene25, and water4?. In the last
incident, explosion of a water heater caused
great destruction of a school room and fatal
injury to seven children.

by Overfilling

(10 incidents)
There may have been as many as ten incidents in
which a BLEVE occurred without provocation
(Table I). A 15-ton chlorine tank burst in 1952 in
Germany, destroying the building in which it was
housed, and resulting in 7 fatalities37; an addi-

BLEVE Caused

by Vapor-Space
Explosion (1 incident)
Another possible cause of BLEVE is rupture of a
vessel
containing a liquid at a temperature
-

11

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above its

boiling point
by explosion of gases
or vapors above the liquid. This probably was a
cause of at least one early chlorine BLEVE37,38,
where the atmosphere above liquefied chlorine
was contaminated with hydrogen. If a chlorine/hydrogen mixture were to be ignited, the
resulting explosion could rupture the container,
and the liquefied chlorine would then vaporize
explosively. The resulting explosion might be
considerably more severe than explosion of an
equivalent container filled with a mixture of
chlorine and hydrogen gases.
BLEVE Caused

kg of TNT
For example, the bursting of a 125 m3 tank car
containing propane vapor (k 1.13) at 2,400
kPa in equilibrium with a small amount of
liquid at 66C would release energy equivalent
to 170 kg of TNT:
=

BI

by Mechanical Failure

(1 incident)
At least one BLEVE incident was caused by
abnormal stresses in the container. In 1968, a
compartmented tank truck loaded with ammonia failed along a tank-divider weld line, and
the ammonia vaporized explosively as a
BLEVE48. An ammonia tank failed from
mechanical stresses at Potchefstroom, South
Africa30, but the contents did not BLEVE, probably because the hole in the end of the tank did
not provide the rate of depressurization
required for explosive vaporization27.

Since the tank car would contain about 7,300 kg of

equivalent would correspond to
about 0.023 kg of TNT per kg of propane and about
1.4 kg of TNT per cubic meter of vessel volume.
vapor, this TNT

If 10% of this energy (thus, 7 million kg-m) were to

be applied to two halves of the 22,000 kg tank-car
shell, their final positions would be about 300 m
apartsl (assuming that they would slide along the
ground with a coefficient of friction of 1.0).

Explosion of a Container of Liquefied

Vapor

BLEVE BLAST-EFFECTS THEORY

estimating the energy released

of
a container of liquefied vapor
upon rupture
would be to consider the liquid as an inert and
then base the TNT calculation on the volume of
the vapor space and the pressure in the container at the moment of rupture~1.52. This method
cannot be correct, since rupture of a container
completely filled with liquefied vapor would
then have essentially zero TNT equivalent; this
is refuted by the observed severe damage resulting from rupture of overfilled containers.
One

Explosion of a Gas-Filled Container

Since the energy accompanying a BLEVE usually is released unexpectedly, with consequences
much greater than would have been expected, a
method for estimating the blast-pressure hazards is needed.
An expression for calculating the energy
released when a gas, initially having a volume
V (M3), expands in response to a decrease in
pressure from P (in kPa, absolute) to atmo-

spheric iS6,7,49,50:

approach

to

approach would be to estimate the

of
weight liquefied vapor that would flash to
vapor if the pressure were to be reduced to
atmospheric, calculate the volume of vapor corresponding to this weight at the pressure within
the container, add this fictitious volume to the
vapor-space volume, and calculate the TNT
equivalent as above, using the total volume V*
(in m3) and the container pressure P (in kPa,
absolute). Thus:

Another

where k is the specific heat ratio. To obtain the

above result in terms of kilograms of TNT, a
conversion factor of 1,000 J/kPa m3 and a heat
of explosion of 4.2x106 J/kg for TNT (trinitrotoluene), are used to give:

12

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above the boiling point, sufficient

be obtained by using an approximation form of the above equation; thus:

thirty degrees
accuracy

where V* is given

can

by:
However, neither of the above equations ade-

quately expresses the flashing fraction when the

liquid temperature is midway between the boiling
point and the critical temperature, or higher. At
the critical temperature, the latent heat of vaporization is zero and the specific heat is infinite. Use
of the boiling-point values for latent and specific
heats, with a &dquo;Watson&dquo; correction for latent heat
and a similar relationship for specific heat, for

where VT is the total volume of the container (in

cubic meters), WL is the weight of liquid in the
container (in kg), f is the flashing fraction, and
DL;T is the density of the liquid and DV,T is the
density of the saturated vapor at the temperature
and pressure existing in the container at the
moment of rupture (both in kg per cubic meter).
Since the densities of both the liquid and vapor
change as the temperature increases (particularly
as the critical temperature is approached), density values should be taken from saturated-condition

higher temperaturess6, yields satisfactory agreement with flashing fractions obtained from phase
diagrams. The equation is:

thermodynamic tabless3~~.

Flashing Fraction
Sudden release of a liquid stored at a temperature above its atmospheric-pressure boiling point
will result in instantaneous and adiabatic vaporization of
because a
remain at

fraction of the

liquid

at

liquid3.

atmospheric

This

In the above equation, T, is the critical temperature (C or K), 0.38 is obtained from using the

Watson latent-heat exponent of 0.38 and a value

of 0.24 for the specific-heat exponent, and 2.63
is an integration coefficient: the reciprocal of

occurs

pressure cannot

temperature above the atmosphericpressure boiling point and thus will cool to this
temperature. In doing so, the change in sensible
heat would provide the latent heat required to
vaporize a fraction of the liquid.
a

simple heat balance gives an exponential

expression for the flashing fraction f 55:

(1 - (0.38+0.24)).
in Table II for calculation of
flashing fraction for several common materials.
- To aid in such calculations, the independent
parameters have been combined as a dimen-

Data

are

provided

sionless &dquo;Vaporization Factor&dquo;:

Vaporization Factor (Cb lLb) (T~ -Tb)

=

the specific heat of the

the
latent heat of vaporizaliquified vapor and
tion, both evaluated at the atmospheric-pressure boiling point (in J/kg K and J/kg, respectively), and Tc and Tb are the critical temperawhere

In the above

equation, To and Tb are the initial

temperature and the boiling point (in C or K),
C is the average specific heat of the liquid (in
J/kg-K) over the temperature interval To to Tb,
and L is the average latent heat of vaporization
over this temperature interval (in J/kg).

only twenty

or

Cb

and

Lb

are

ture and

As
If the storage temperature is

(9)

or

atmospheric-pressure boiling point (in

K), respectively.

an

example, sudden release of liquified

propane

initially

at

pressure of 2400 kPa and

13-

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where a container becomes liquid-full at the

maximum temperature to which a liquid can be
heated without boiling (the &dquo;Superheat Limit
Temperature&dquo;) and then bursts as a result of
unrelieved hydrostatic pressure.

a temperature of 66C would result in flashing

of a fraction of the liquid. This flashing fraction
would be calculated as:

Alternative Method for

Calculating TNT

Equivalent
equivalent of a BLEVE also can be
computed through use of thermodynamic tables
of specific volumes, enthalpies57, and entropies,

The TNT
where 2430 (J/kg K) is the heat capacity of
liquid propane at the boiling point, 427,000
(J/kg) is the latent heat of vaporization at the
boiling point, and 97 and - 42 are the critical
temperature and boiling point (in C).
As

an

where these are available for the material of

interest53,~4, The flashing fraction f is first computed as (1) the entropy difference for the initial
and final liquid states, divided by (2) the
entropy difference for the vapor and liquid

example of the TNT-equivalent calcula-

phases at atmospheric pressure5l, or:

tion, explosive vaporization of 34,000 kg of liquified propane in a 125 m3 tank-car rupturing at

2,400 kPa (flashing fraction of 59%) would be
calculated from:

where the entropies S (all in consistent units)

are obtained for liquid L and vapor V at the initial pressure P (in kPa, absolute) and at the
final pressure (101 kPa).

where 58 is the density of liquid propane at

66C and 410 is the density of propane vapor at
2,400 kPa and 66C (in kg/m3).

example, the flashing fraction for liquified

propane at a temperature of 66C, equivalent to
an internal pressure of 2,400 kPa) would be calAs

Thus, the TNT equivalent would be:

an

culated

This is about 0.015 kg of TNT per kg of propane,

about 4.1 kg of TNT per cubic meter of vessel
volume, and about three times the energy
equivalent of a tank car containing propane
vapor alone. A 10% energy transfer would separate the halves of the tank-car shell by a distance of about 650 m (almost one-half mile).

The pertinent temperatures, densities, and specific heat ratios for several common chemicals
are presented in Table II, to facilitate calculation of the TNT equivalent of a BLEVE. Also
shown are the calculated TNT equivalents (in
terms of kg of TNT per cubic meter of liquified
vapor) for a particular &dquo;worst case&dquo; condition

as:

where the above entropies54 are in terms of J/kgK For comparison, the flashing fraction calculated using the latent-heatJheat-capacity method
described by Equation 10 above was 0.59.

by the adiabatic expansion is

the product of the mass of
liquified vapor WL and the change in internal
energy of the vapor V and liquid L phases, at
the initial pressure P and atmospheric pressure
The work done
then computed

as

(101 kPa). Thus:

where, for the enthalpies

14

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H in

J/kg,

pressures

P in

kPa, absolute,

and

specific volumes

V in

It does appear that the maximum TNT equivalent for BLEVE of liquified vapor occurs near
the SLT. For almost all materials, the values of
SLT lie within the range 88% to 92% of the critical temperature (in K). Experimental values of
this theoretical maximum limit to superheating
of liquid have been determined for a large variety of organic and inorganic liquids22,61,62,63.

m3/kg:

an example of a vessel burst at the SLT, a

125 m3 container of liquefied propane originally
containing 111 cubic meters (89% full at 21C)
would become liquid-full at the SLT of 53C,
and the equilibrium vapor pressure at this tem-

As

where 1000 is the conversion factor from kPa

m3 to J.
For the above propane-tank-car
metric data54:

perature would be 1,800 kPa. If the container

were to rupture at this point, about 34% of the

example and

explosively vaporize, and

the
BLEVE
about
of
the
would
be
equivalent
; 440 kg of TNT (about 0.007 kg of TNT per kg of
propane, and about 4.0 kg of TNT per cubic
meter of vessel volume).
propane would

TNT

&dquo;Self-BLEVE&dquo;
The SLT increases with pressure P64:

and the TNT equivalent would be:

r

where P and P, are the pressure in the container and the critical pressure (in kPa, absolute),
This TNT equivalent is comparable to the 525
kg of TNT calculated by using the above flashing-vapor-volume method. The methods give
good agreement for flashing fractions less than
50%. However, thermodynamic tables are not
readily available for many materials subject to
the causes of BLEVE, and liquid heat capacities, latent heats of vaporization, critical temperatures and boiling points are readily available for many materials of interest53,54,58,59.

Superheat Limit Temperature

An

original

BLEVE concept

required the

perature of stored liquid to attain

or

tem-

However, the results of accidents indicate that a

occur
z

cause

for initial temperatures below

the SLT to increase

as

the pressure

increases, with the SLT becoming equal to the

critical temperature at the critical point. Thus,
spontaneous explosive vaporization or BLEVE
would not occur in confined liquefied vapor
under equilibrium conditions, as long as there is
a vapor space. However, if (1) the vapor space
above the

liquid is small, (2) heating causes

expansion to a liquid-full condition, and (3)
there is no overpressure protection, then
hydraulic rupture of the container could lead to
explosive vaporization of the contents and a
BLEVE.

exceed the

&dquo;Superheat Limit Temperature&dquo; (SLT) prior to

vessel burst, in order for a BLEVE to occur59,60.
BLEVE can
the SLT.

respectively. Thus, heating a liquefied vapor in

equilibrium with vapor above the liquid would

BLEVE EFFECTS
Tests to determine the blast effects resulting
from bursting containers65,66 and theoretical
considerationss7 indicate that the blast effects
of a BLEVE can be estimated using a TNT15

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Prugh, Quantitative Evaluation of &dquo;BLEVE&dquo; Hazards

16

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J. of Fire Prot

17

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Engr.,

Prugh, Quantitative Evaluation of &dquo;BLEVE&dquo; Hazards

18

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equivalent method, but

&dquo;virtual distance&dquo;

cor-

rection for distance from an explosion center68

should be used. Need for such correction is a
result of the fact that the blast pressure at the
surface of an exploding pressure vessel is not
equal to the pressure within the vessel prior to
rupture and also is not equal to the pressure at
an

equal radius from a point charge of TNT.

The blast pressure P, (in kPa, absolute) at the

surface of an exploding pressure vessel can be
estimated from52,65:

shipS51,69.

Three of the more-important relafor blast pressures and blast impulse

shown in Figure 1.

tionships
are

For the above BLEVE example involving 34,000

kg of liquified propane at the moment of tank
burst, the energy equivalent would be about 525
kg of TNT, and the maximum blast pressure
would be about 310 kPa (gauge). The value of
the &dquo;scaled distance&dquo; Z corresponding to this
blast pressure (for a free-air explosion) would be
about 1.6. The scaled distance Z is related to
TNT equivalent W (in kg) and distance R (in m)
from the explosion center by:

Thus, the value of R for this example (W 1/3

to 8.1) would be about 13 m. Since the
radius of the cylindrical tank originally was
about 1.5 m, the &dquo;virtual distance&dquo; to be added
to distances for blast-effects evaluations would
be 13 minus 1.5 meters, or 11.5 m.

equal

In the

preceding equation, Pb is the bursting

(in kPa), and k, T, and
M are the specific heat ratio, temperature (K),
and molecular weight of the vapor in the container, assuming expansion into air at atmospheric pressure and 25C. The above equation
cannot be solved explicitly for P., requiring
graphical or trial-and-error solution.
pressure of the container

As

example

of the

The blast pressures and impulses can be determined from the &dquo;surface explosion&dquo; curve on the
&dquo;Z&dquo; graph. For example, the &dquo;reflected&dquo; blast
pressures and impulse, at a distance of 30m
from the center of the tank car (and about 42 m
from the center of an equivilent TNT explosion),
would be evaluated from a Z of 5.3 (42/5251/3).

of this equation, the

cylindrical surface
of a tank car containing propane (k=1.13) and
bursting at 2,400 kPa and 6fiC (339 K) would
be determined from:
an

use

blast pressure at the (former)

example, they are 90 kPa, gauge, and

1,200 kPa-ms, respectively. Such an explosion

For this
would

cause

tial-type

considerable

damage

to

residen-

structure.

Further evaluation of blast effects is beyond the

scope of this presentation. A discussion of the
effects of blast on humans and structures is
given in reference 68.

Fireball Effects

The value of P. which satisfies this equation is

410 kPa (absolute).

Evaluation of fireball effects is also outside the

scope of this presentation, due to the complexities of fireball size and duration, distance from
the fireball center, emissivity, atmospheric

To determine the pressure effects of a BLEVEtype explosion, the TNT-equivalence analogy

allows use of well-known blast-effects relation-

transmission of radiation (humidity effects), and

the relationship between thermal radiation
intensity and injury. This subject is discussed in
detail in other references31,~1,
19

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APPLICATION

Some tank trucks and tank cars carrying materials with BLEVE potential are protected with
double containers, with insulation in the annular spaces, although the outer shell may not
provide much protection against mechanical
damage from collision or overturning. It would
be desirable to fabricate the outer container
from a material which would provide protection
for the inner tankage.

BLEVE HISTORY
THEORY

OF

AND

Prevention of BLEVE from Fire Exposure

The approaches to prevention of BLEVE from
fire exposure are presented in References 1, 11,
67, 70, 71, and 72.
1.

Sloping the ground away from fixed containa slope not less than 1% (1 cm per
meter), and leading any spilled material to a
ers, at

safe
2.

the containers in which materiheld above their atmospheric-pressure boiling points, with the insulation held
in place with stainless-steel sheathing and
stainless-steel bands. A better alternative is
steel-in-steel double containers, as is frequently used for ethylene storage.
are

Water-spray protection

or, in

lems has led to &dquo;in series&dquo; installation of rupture disks as pluggage protection under relief
valves and sometimes to &dquo;in parallel&dquo; installation of relief valves with rupture disks as &dquo;last
resort&dquo; protection.

emergencies,

unattended water-cannon &dquo;monitors&dquo; for

cooling of containers exposed to fire, at a
rate of 0.01 cubic meter per minute per
square meter (1 cm per minute) or more.
4.

Overfilling

Overfilling and overpressure incidents are

becoming less frequent because of higher standards in filling and weighing, with proper
installation and testing of relief devices. Also,
the recognition of relief-device plugging prob-

area.

Insulating
als

3.

Prevention of BLEVE from

Providing depressuring facilities, to reduce

the pressure to 700 kPa (gauge) or one-half
the design pressure within 15 minutes.
Remote-operated fireproof valves bypassing
the installed relief valve can be provided to
serve this purpose.

Prevention of BLEVE from Mechanical

Prevention of BLEVE from

Runaway

Reaction
Instrumentation should be provided for measurement of temperature and pressure within
all process equipment likely to contain self-reactive materials. Further, facilities should be pro-

vided for counteracting overpressure or

overtemperature; this would include internal
cooling coils or external jackets, remote-controlled venting valves, inhibitor-injection systems, and internal deluges, as well as high-temperature and/or high-pressure alarms for control-room and field personnel73.

Damage
For fixed

Prevention of BLEVE from

their atmospheric-pressure boiling points

should be isolated from areas in which cranes
and other construction equipment operates frequently and should be installed outside a radius
equal to the height of stacks, towers, and
columns.

Prevention of explosion in process equipment is,

of course, essential to process safety, but partic-

storage tanks, overhead suspended

loads or nearby stacks present the greatest hazards. Tanks containing materials stored above

For railroad tank cars, the present trends in providing shelf couplers and head shields can be
expected to reduce the frequency of punctures and
potential BLEVEs from mechanical damage.

Vapor-Space

Explosion
ularly
vapors

so
or

equipment containing liquified

liquids above their boiling points.

in

Preventing contamination with reactive materials (such as hydrogen with chlorine), inerting
vapor spaces with nitrogen or other nonreactive
gas, and installing explosion-suppression systems are methods of avoiding explosion and possible aggravation of the incident with release of
toxic

or

flammable vapors.

20
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Prevention of BLEVE from Mechanical

Failure
Proper design and pre-use testing of containers
can be expected to prevent distortion and possible rupture of containers. Periodic wall-thickness measurements, with internal inspection

CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the potential and
demonstrated hazards of BLEVEs and the
quantitative evaluation of BLEVE causes and
effects. The guidelines and suggestions presented here may assist in reducing the frequency
and_ consequences of this severely destructive

where the contained material could be corrosive

and with acoustic emission testing where cracking of the container could occur, should be performed to assure the integrity of containers. A
philosophy to be developed is that the information obtained during inspections and tests
should be sufficient to assure proper performance during the interval between such inspections and tests (thus, &dquo;predictive&dquo; maintenance).

physical phenomenon.

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2.

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24
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