NPC v. Co, G.R. No.

166973, February 10, 2009

value of the property or a mere easement fee.

(In this case, Petitioner is thus liable to pay
respondent the full market value of the property
because the presence of transmission lines
undoubtedly restricts the latters use of his
property.)

FACTS: The petitioner herein, NPC, is a government

corporation created under R.A. No. 6395 to undertake the
development of hydroelectric generation of power and the
production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other
sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis. Its charter grants to petitioner, among
others, the power to exercise the right to eminent domain.

2.

Sometime in June 27, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with

the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, for the acquisition of an
easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots at Barangay
Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga belonging to respondent
herein for purposes of construction of its transmission lines
for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project.
On March 25, 2002, NPC obtained a writ of possession and on
April 15, 2002 they took possession of the property.
On hearing the RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine
the fair market value of the property as of 15 April 2002. The
first two commissioners appraised the property at P1,900.00
per square meter or a total of P1,179,000.00. While the third
commissioner peg the value of the property at P875.00 per
square meter.
The RTC rendered its Partial Decision, wherein it declared the
validity of the expropriation and ordered petitioner to pay the
sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum
beginning April 15, 2002, the date of actual taking, until full
payment.
Not satisfied with the ruling of lower court NPC elevate the
case to CA, which the appellate court also rendered Decision
holding petitioner liable to pay the full fair market value at the
time of actual taking, with interest at 6% per annum from 15
April 2002.
Aggrieved with the order NPC appealed to SC hence this
case.
RULING:

Eminent domain "is the inherent power of a

sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular use to promote public welfare." In the
exercise of its power of eminent domain, just
compensation must be given to the property owner
to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 9, Art. III of the
Constitution. Just compensation is the fair market
value of the property.
Fair market value is that "sum of money which a
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an
owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be given and received therefor."
Judicial determination is needed to arrive at the
exact amount due to the property owner.

The power to expropriate is legislative in character

and must be expressly conferred by statute.

2 Aspects in determining compensation:

1.

The first aspect of the compensation issue is the

amount to be paid whether the full fair market

The second aspect of the compensation issue

relates to the reckoning date for the
determination of just compensation.
a. GENERAL RULE: the value of just
compensation shall "be determined as
of the date of the taking of the property
or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first." (Rule 67)
b. Exceptions:
i.
grave injustice to the
property owner
ii.
the taking did not have
color of legal authority
iii.
the taking of the property
was not initially for
expropriation
iv.
the owner will be given
undue increment
advantages because of the
expropriation.
c. In this case, since none of the
exceptions above are present, the
reckoning date for the determination of
the amount of just compensation is 27
June 2001, the date when petitioner
filed its expropriation complaint.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent

domain cases is a judicial function.

Philippine Veterans Bank v. Bases Conversion

Development Authority, G.R. No. 173085, January 19,
2011
FACTS: Sometime in 2003 respondent Bases Conversion
Development Authority, a government corporation, filed
several expropriation actions before the various branches of
the RTC ofAngelesCity, for acquisition of lands needed for the
construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway Project.Ten
of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court which
was being the concern of this case.
Respondents in Branch 58 cases are Armando Simbillo,
Christian Marcelo, Rolando David, Ricardo Bucud, Pablo
Santos, Agrifina Enriquez, Conrado Espeleta, Catgerube
Castro, Carlito Mercado, and Alfredo Suarez. All of them are
the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they
acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian
reform program.
Land Bank of thePhilippines, another respond herein, is the
mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for
their acquisition.The lands in these cases were located in
Porac and Floridablanca, Pampanga.
Upon notice of the filing of the case, petitioner herein, move
for intervention before the RTC branch 58 which was also
denied by said court.
Page 1 of 11

PVB then filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch 58

denied the same, prompting the bank to file a petition
forcertiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA on its decision
rendered dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence this
case.
ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was
not entitled to intervene in the expropriation cases before
Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC.

RULING: YES, but it is not applicable in this case.

Section 9, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, which authorizes the court adjudicating
the expropriation case to hear and decide conflicting
claims regarding the ownership of the properties
involved while the compensation for the expropriated
property is in the meantime deposited with the
court.
Section 9 above empowers the court to order
payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation
whenever questions of ownership are yet to be
settled. There is no reason why this rule should not
be applied even where the settlement of such
questions is to be made by another tribunal.

Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, 19 December

2005
FACTS: There are two cases has been filed, one is Agan v.
PIATCO which has been decided on 2004 on the basis of
fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Courts 2004
Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law.
The second is this present controversy which involves the
matter of just compensation due the contractor for the
terminal complex it built.
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation
of the Courts decision in Agan v. PIATCO, which nullified the
Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Passenger Terminal III entered into between the Philippine
Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc. as well as the amendments and supplements
thereto. On the ground that the said agreement was contrary
to public policy.
After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3
facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite
the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport
terminal into immediate operation. The Government and
PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the
NAIA 3 facilities.
Sometime inDecember 21, 2004, the Government filed a
Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC, together with
an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate
holding of a special raffle and sought upon the filing of the
complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to
take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3
facilities.

The Government also declared that it had deposited the

amount of P3,002,125,000.00 in Cash with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed
value for taxation purposes.
The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent herein,
who issued the same an order directing the issuance of a writ
of possession to the Government, authorizing it to take or
enter upon the possession
However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order
designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the
Writ of Possession noting its earlier issuance of its writ of
possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
It was found out later that said rule 67 sec. 2 had been
amended by R.A. No. 8974 known as An Act to Facilitate the
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National
Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes.
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No.
8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, issued
another order.
First, it directed theLBP-Baclaran, to
immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to
PIATCO. Second, the Government was directed to submit to
the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by
authorized officials to cover the payment of just
compensation. Third, the Government was directed to
maintain, preserve and safeguard the NAIA 3 facilities or
perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their
direct
operation of the airport terminal,
pending
expropriation proceedings and full payment of just
compensation. However, the Government was prohibited
from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions
or leasing any part of NAIA-3 to other parties.
The government then filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied by public respondent. Hence a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed, praying for
the nullification of the RTC orders dated January 4, 2005,
January 7, 2005, and January 10, 2005, and for the
inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the
expropriation case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 67 prevails over R.A. 8974?
RULING:
NO. Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent
domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no
means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline
through which the State may expropriate private property.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently
more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67,
inescapably applies in instances when the national
government expropriates property for national government
infrastructure projects.[28] Thus, if expropriation is engaged
in by the national government for purposes other than
national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard
and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to
apply.
It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation
proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67
would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3
Page 2 of 11

facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004

Resolution in Agan. This Court cannot sanction deviation from
its own final and executory orders.
Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case
without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that
Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not
necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all,
adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn
violate the Courts requirement in the 2004 Resolution that
there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO
before the Government may take over the property.

Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, February 1,

2006
FACTS: ibid
ISSUE: Is motion for intervention allowed?
RULING: Since this case originated from an original action
filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the
motions-in-intervention in this case if ever was before and not
after resolution of this case. To allow intervention at this
juncture would be highly irregular. It is extremely improbable
that the movants were unaware of the pendency of the
present case before the Court, and indeed none of them
allege such lack of knowledge.
Moreover, the requisite legal interest required of a party-inintervention has not been established so as to warrant the
extra-ordinary step of allowing intervention at this late stage.
As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan have
not been judicially proved or conclusively established as fact
by any trier of facts in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could
not be considered as indispensable parties to the petition for
certiorari.

Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation v. DOTC, G.R. No.

169914, April 18, 2008
FACTS: This is a consolidated case, but in view of the topic of
expropriation we focus more in the case of DOTC vs.
SalacnibBaternia.
In order to better appreciate the case we must first discuss
the facts and rulings in the case ofAgan andGingoyon.
In 1995 Asias Emerging Dragon (AEDC ),( composed of the
6 most influential businessman in the Philippines mainly John
Gokongwei, Lucio Tan, Henry Sy, Andrew Gotianun, George Ty
and Alfonso Yuchengco.,) submitted an unsolicited proposal
to the Government through the DOTC for the development of
NAIA III under a build-operate-and transfer-arrangement
pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718. Wherefore the
proposal was indeed approved by the Government.
Biddings were held, in which in the end the Project was
awarded to PIATCO. Objections were raised by AEDC but in
the end the Government justified the award to PIATCO mainly
because AEDC was not able to match the bid of PIATCO.

In 2002 the Build-operate-and transfer-arrangement (BOT)

between the GOvt. and PIATCO was questioned in the case of
Agan. Wherefore the court ruled among others that, in view
of anomalies in awarding PIATCO the BOT , the contract/
award (BOT) was declared null and void. However the court
ruled that it was not unmindful of the reality that the
structures comprising the NAIA III facility are almost
complete and that the funds have been spent by PIATCO in
their construction. For the Government to take over said
facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of
the said structures. The compensation must be just and
accordance with law and equity for the government can not
unjustly enriched itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors.
The abovementioned pronouncement of the Court in Agan
gave rise to the petition in the GIngoyan case. The facts of
which are as follows .After the promulgation of the ruling in
Agan case, NAIA III was still in the possession of PIATCO,
despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the
airport terminal into immediate operation. Whereby the Govt.
and PIATCO entered into several rounds of negotiation and
even appeared before arbitral proceedings before
International Chamber of Commerce International Court of
Arbitration.
Then on, Dec. 21, 2004 the Govt filed a complaint for
expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Govt seeks the
issuance of a writ of possession authorizing immediate
possession of NAIA III, it also declared that it had deposited
the amount of 3 Billion in cash with the Land Bank,
representing the NAIA 3 terminal assessed value for tax
purposes. The RTC through Judge Gingoyonissued in the
same day the Writ of Possession prayed for by the
Government citing the case of Manila vs. Serrano that the
RTC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession
upon filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance, and upon deposit made by the Government of
the amount equivalent to assessed value of the property
subject for expropriation.
However, on Jan 4. 2005, the RTC issued another order the
assailed order in this case of Gingoyon- to supplement its
earlier order dated Dec. 21, 2004. The RTC noted that the
first order was issued pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court. However, it was observed that R.A.8974, had
amended Rule 67 in many respects. That there are at least
two crucial differences between the respective procedures
under RA 8974 and Rule 67. Under the Statute the Govt. is
required to make immediate payment to the property owner
upon filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Govt. is required only to
make an initial deposit with an authorized government
depositary. Moreover Rule 67 prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for purposes of Tax, unlike in RA 8974 which provides, as the
relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value
of the property as stated in the tax declarations or the current
relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, whichever is higher, and
the value of the improvements and/or structure using the
replacement cost method.
The Govt. in this case of GiNgoyon questioned the above
ruling.
The Supreme Court held the validity of the RTCs ruling. It
held among others that 1. RA 8947 applies in this case,
particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by
the Govt. of at least the proferred value of the NAIA III
Page 3 of 11

facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standard

method for the determination of just compensation. 2. That in
applying RA 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in
favour of the Govt over NAIA is held in abeyance until PIATCO
is directly paid the amount of 3 Billion pesos, representing the
proferred value of NAIA III 3. The Govt. shall pay the just
compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO
immediately upon the finality of said decision.
Finally we tackle the facts of the case of Republic vs. CA and
Baterina. Congressman Baterina, together with other member
of the Lower House filed a petition for Prohibition in
Intervention with application for TRO. Baterina, et. al believes
that the Govt. need not file expropriation proceedings to gain
possession if NAIA 3 and that PIATCO is not entitled to just
compensation, arguing that PIATCO does not own NAIA 3
because BOT contract do not vest ownership. That the land in
which NAIA 3 is situated is owned by the Government.
ISSUE: In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation
proceedings on the ground that NAIA 3 is already a public
property. Hence PIATCO is not entitled to just compensation
for NAIA 3.

RULING: PIATCO is entitled to just compensation and that

the expropriation proceedings commenced by the
Government was proper and valid.. The Government has
chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under
the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process
for the determination of just compensation and the payment
thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a
highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to
expropriated a building complex constructed on land which
the State already owns.

FACTS: In line with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program (CARP) of the government, Wycoco voluntarily
offered to sell the subject land to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. After the DARs evaluation of
the application and the determination of the just
compensation by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), a
notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the
property for P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco. The amount
offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon review,
was modified to P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR
offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located
therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to
indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just
compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. The
case was docketed as DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE 93.
Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account
in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation
offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
DARAB required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda or position papers in support of their claim.
Wycoco, however, decided to forego with the filing of the
required pleadings, and instead filed on April 13, 1993, the
instant case for determination of just compensation with the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23.
Impleaded as party-defendants therein were DAR and LBP.
Wycoco filed a manifestation in VOS Case No. 232 NE 93,
informing the DARAB of the pendency of Agrarian Case No. 91
(AF) with the Cabanatuan court, acting as a special agrarian
court. The DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give
way to the determination of just compensation by the
Cabanatuan court.
ISSUE:
RULING:

The right of eminent domain extends to personal property

and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they
are to the soil, are considered real property. The public
purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should
also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 recognizes the
possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be
titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although
occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment
to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant
expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex
stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion
Development Authority, another agency of the Republic.
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse
by which the government may have acquired the NAIA 3
facilities while satisfying the requisites in the order held by
the SC in the Case of Agan. Eminent Domain though may be
the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which
such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable
immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites
under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which
just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be
no question as to the propriety of eminent domain
proceedings in this case.

Landbank v. Wycoco, G.R. No. 140160, 13 January

2004, 419 SCRA 67, 80

Private respondents (Wycoco) direct resort to

the Special Agrarian Court is valid.
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners. This original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC would be
undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative
officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases
and make the RTC an appellate court for the review
of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new
rules speak of directly appealing the decision of
adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian
Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in
the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to
the adjudicators and to convert the original
jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction
would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be
void.
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly
acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos complaint for
determination of just compensation. It must be
stressed that although no summary administrative
proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was
able to perform its legal mandate of initially
determining the value of Wycocos land pursuant to
Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990. What is
more, DAR and LBPs conformity to the pre-trial
Page 4 of 11

order which limited the issue only to the

determination of just compensation estopped them
from questioning the jurisdiction of the special
agrarian court. The pre-trial order limited the issues
to those not disposed of by admission or
agreements; and the entry thereof controlled the
subsequent course of action.

NPC v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, 8 May 1992, 208

SCRA 542
FACTS: On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner
National Power Corporation, a government-owned and
controlled corporation and the agency through which the
government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and
development projects throughout the country, filed two
complaints for eminent domain against private respondents
with the Court of First Instance. Both cases were jointly tried
upon agreement of the parties. On June 15, 1979, a
consolidated decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was
rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that
the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have
entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the
petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private
respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for
their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon until fully
paid."
Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said
consolidated decision were filed by the petitioner. The same
were denied by the respondent court. Petitioner did not
appeal the aforesaid consolidated decision, which became
final and executory.Thus, on May 16, 1980, one of the private
respondents [Sittie Sohra Batara] filed anex-partemotion for
the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that
petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of
P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including
legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said
motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower
court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court
the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated
June 15, 1979.
Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of
money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On
February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents
[Pangonatan Cosna Tagol], through counsel, filed with the
trial court anex-partemotion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying,
for the first time, that the legal interest on the just
compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at
12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue
of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the Supreme
Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the
courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed
at 12% per annum."
On February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the said
motion allowing 12% interest per annum. [Annex L, Petition].
Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions
also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation
awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the
basis of which the lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and
August 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.Petitioner
moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order
dated August 28, 1981, alleging that the main decision had
already become final and executory with its compliance of
depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the

lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that

the said main decision can no longer be modified or changed
by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is
not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code which applies.
On January 25, 1982, the lower court denied petitioner's,
motion for reconsideration, stating that the rate of interest at
the time of the promulgation of the June 15, 1981 decision is
that prescribed by Central Bank Circular No. 416 issued
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116, which is 12% per
annum, and that it did not modify or change but merely
amplified its order of August 28, 1981 in the determination of
the legal interest.

ISSUE: whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate

of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the
law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which
prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular
No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum.
RULING: Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank
Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case at bar.
The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance
of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is
evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential
Decree No. 116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise
known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of
indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than
those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits.
In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose,
the payment of which is without stipulation regarding
interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the
nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required
to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the
properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity
for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore,
since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the
lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by
way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc.
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

City of Manila v. Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20,

2001
FACTS: The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
7833 authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in
Manilas First District in Tondo. One of the properties sought
to be expropriated was that supposedly owned by
respondents.
Petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for
expropriation, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72282, with the
RTC of Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots, which
included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin,
Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano.
Page 5 of 11

Respondents filed a consolidated answer, in which they

alleged that their mother, the late Demetria De Guia, had
acquired Lot 1-C from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the
bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than
40 years; that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would result in
their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to them
by their deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt
from expropriation because dividing the said parcel of land
among them would entitle each of them to only about 50
square meters of land. Respondents, therefore, prayed that
judgment be rendered declaring Lot 1-C exempt from
expropriation and ordering the cancellation of the notice
annotated on the back of TCT No. 226048, regarding the
pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282 for eminent domain filed
by petitioner.

MCWD v. J. King and Sons, G.R. No. 175983, April 16,

2009
FACTS:

Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order,

dated October 9, 1998, directing petitioner to deposit the
amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of
the properties. After petitioner had made the deposit, the trial
court issued another order, dated December 15, 1998,
directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
petitioner.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would
render respondents, who are actual occupants
thereof, landless; that Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation
because R.A. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of
residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly
urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation; that
respondents would only receive around 49 square meters
each after the partition of Lot 1-C which consists of only
343.10 square meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant
to deprive an owner of the entire residential land but only
that in excess of 300 square meters.
On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision holding that Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation
because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no
longer considered a small property within the framework of
R.A. No. 7279. However, it held that in accordance with the
ruling in Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in 9-10 of
the law must first be tried by the city government before it
can resort to expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it
had done so, the Court of Appeals gave judgment for
respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1C.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in concluding that the Order of the
RTC which authorizes the immediate entry of the City as the
expropriating agency into the property sought to be
expropriated upon the deposit thereof as tantamount to
condemnation of the property.
RULING: Yes.
A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing
by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient
in form and substance and upon deposit made by the
government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property subject to expropriation (Sec. 2, Rule 67).
Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this case, these
requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the
ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession.

ISSUE:
RULING:

Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire

private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation.The power of eminent domain is
inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the
existence of the State and inherent in government.
Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional
requirements: first, that there must be just
compensation, and second, that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.

For petitioner to exercise its power of eminent

domain, two requirements should be met, namely:
first, its board of directors passed a resolution
authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was
subjected to review by the LWUA. In this case,
petitioners board of directors approved on 27
February 2004, Board Resolution No. 0152004authorizing its general manager to file
expropriation and other cases. Moreover, the LWUA
did review and gave its stamp of approval to the
filing of a complaint for the expropriation of
respondents lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its
Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioners
manager, Armando H. Paredes, a letter dated 28
February 2005authorizing petitioner to file the
expropriation case against the owner of the fivesquare meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by
TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No.
198, as amended.

The general rule is that upon filing of the

expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or
enter into possession of the real property involved if he
Page 6 of 11

deposits with the authorized government depositary an

amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is
provided by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one
hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to
be expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession.

R.A. No. 8974 provides a different scheme for the

obtention of a writ of possession. The law does not
require a deposit with a government bank; instead it
requires the government to immediately pay the
property owner.The provisional character of this
payment means that it is not yet final, yet, sufficient
under the law to entitle the Government to the writ
of possession over the expropriated property.The
provisional payment is a prerequisiteand a triggerfor
the issuance of the writ of possession.

Indeed, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to

the effect that upon compliance with the guidelines
the court shall immediately issue to the
implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the
project.Under this statutory provision, when the
government, its agencies or government-owned and
controlled corporations, make the required
provisional payment, the trial court has a ministerial
duty to issue a writ of possession.

1935. In compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of

Court, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 42, DTI
deposited with PNB in favor of Benitez P708,490 an amount
equivalent to the provisional value of the land sought to be
expropriated. Subsequently, DTI filed a Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Possession which had been granted but subsequently
quashed by MTC Judge Tagle.
ISSUE: whether the respondent judge may quash a writ of
possession on the ground that the expropriating government
agency is already occupying the property sought to be
expropriated.
RULING: YES, however, in this case, in quashing the writ of
possession, respondent judge violated EO 1035 on the quaint
and whimsical ground that petitioner was already in actual
possession of the property. His assailed decisions are
therefore void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

When the government or its authorized agent makes

the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial
duty to issue a writ of possession.

The expropriation of real property does not include

mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although
eminent domain usually involves a taking of title,
there may also be compensable taking of only some,
not all, of the property interests in the bundle of
rights that constitute ownership.

Republic v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079, December 2, 1998

In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner,

in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest,
seeks to realize the same through its power of
eminent domain. In exercising this power,
petitioner intended to acquire not only physical
possession but also the legal right to possess
and ultimately to own the subject property.
Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the
property fall short of the taking of title, which
includes all the rights that may be exercised by an
owner over the subject property. Its actual
occupation, which renders academic the need for it
to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of
all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did
not attend its initial physical possession of the
property because the lease, which had authorized
said possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted
not merely possession de facto but possession de
jure as well.

Executive Order No. 1035(EO 1035) was enacted to

facilitate government acquisition of private property
to be used for infrastructure or other development
projects. Under Section 7 thereof, it is the ministerial
duty of courts to issue a writ of possession within
five days from the time the government deposits 10
percent of just compensation payable. Moreover,
such writ cannot be nullified by an adverse decision
in an ejectment proceeding involving the same
property and the same parties.

FACTS: Helena Benitez is a registered owner of 2 parcels of

land in Bgy. Salwag, Dasmarinas, Cavite. Sometime in Sept.
1982, the Philippine Government, through the Philippine
Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC), an agency
under the Ministry of Human Settlements, negotiated with the
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey
Team on technicalities of the establishment of ASEAN Human
Resources Development Project in the Philippines. Among the
the 5 main programs of the proposed project was the
Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC), an
agency now under the Department of Trade and Industry.
Several transaction and agreements were entered into
between Benitez (together with Philippine Womens
University) and the PHRDC with regards to the lease and
consequently, the possible sale of the land which did not push
through because of Benitezs desistance. Thereafter, Benitez
and PWU demanded from PHRDC the payment of rentals and
to vacate the premises. Benitez later filed an unlawful
detainer case against PHRDC. In turn, the state through DTI
(with GMA as undersecretary), to which CMDF is attached
instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to EO

City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No. 142971, May

7, 2002

In cases where Eminent Domain is exercised by the

LGUs, just compensation shall be determined based
on the fair market value at the time of the taking
of the property.(Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160)

FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed

a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses
Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein
that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the
construction of a public road which shall serve as an
access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General
Page 7 of 11

Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel

Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just
compensation at P20,826,339.50.
Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the
amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just
compensation should be based on the prevailing market price
of the property at the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.
The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the lower courts decision in toto.
ISSUE: whether just compensation should be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint
RULING:
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of
reckoning for the determination of just compensation is
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that
just compensation shall be determined as of the time of
actual taking. The Section reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local government
unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further,
That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That,
the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property.

Spouses Ortega v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 181562-63,

October 2, 2009
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted
City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to
expropriate one-half (1/2) portion (2,856 square meters) of
the spouses Ortegas land (which is occupied by the
squatters), and appropriating for that purpose the amount of
P3,284,400.00.
Based on the recommendation of the appointed
Commissioners, the value of the land subject to expropriation
was fixed at P31,416,000.00.

of Execution was issued on September 17, 1999 to enforce

the courts judgment.
Cebu City moved to withdraw its complaint for expropriation
because the just compensation fixed by the court is too high.
ISSUE:Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of
Cebu Citys Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be
Allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.
RULING: No, both the Order of expropriation and the Order
fixing just compensation by the RTC can no longer be
modified. Hence, Cebu City cannot withdraw from the
expropriation proceedings.
An order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of
expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second
stage the determination of just compensation, and,
ultimately, payment. An order of expropriation puts an
end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the
petitioner to condemn the respondents properties.
Because an order of expropriation merely determines the
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the
payment of just compensation. After all, there would be no
point in determining just compensation if, in the first
place, the plaintiffs right to expropriate the property
was not first clearly established.
Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the
trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a prior
order of expropriation. As applied to the case at bar, Cebu
City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment, much
less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the
first stage of the expropriation proceedings.

BPI v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160890, November

10, 2004
FACTS:NAPOCOR filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain,
seeking to expropriate a portion of petitioner Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) property located in Barrio Bucal,
Dasmarias, Cavite, for the purpose of constructing and
maintaining its Dasmarias-Zapote 230 KV Transmission Line
Project.
The trial court fixed the amount of just compensation at Php
P753,400.00 based on the fair market value of Php 10,000.00
per square meter as determined by the Commissioners.
After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NAPOCOR
appealed to the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ordered NAPOCOR to pay defendantappellant BPI the amount of P3,000.00 per square meter as
just compensation for the expropriated land.
Petitioner BPI moved for the reconsideration of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition for review

The Decision of the RTC became final and executory because

of Cebu Citys failure to perfect an appeal on time, and a Writ
Page 8 of 11

ISSUE:Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its

discretion and seriously erred in fixing the just compensation
for the subject property at P3,000.00 per square meter.

MTC dismissed the case for lack of interest for

failure of the [respondent] and its counsel to appear at the
pre-trial.

RULING:NO because this finding of fact by the CA was

sufficiently supported while the rate imposed by the
Commissioners is unsubstantiated.

2nd [C]omplaint [Civil Case No. 2845-99-C] was

filed before RTC on October 18, 1999. This [C]omplaint also
sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D. Petitioner, by
way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this [C]omplaint by
alleging in the main respondents cause of action is barred by
prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair

equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain,
but the owners loss. To compensate is to render
something which is equal in value to that taken or
received. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation; to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property taken shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample.

In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the

general rule is that the just compensation which the
owner of condemned property is entitled to is the
market value. Market value is that sum of money
which a person desirous but not compelled to buy,
and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would
agree on as a price to be given and received
therefor.

After a careful perusal of the records, we find no reason to

disturb this finding of fact by the Court of Appeals, sufficiently
supported as it is, by the evidence on record.
We find that the rate imposed by the Commissioners is
unsubstantiated. No official documents were presented to
reflect the true market value of the subject lots in the
surrounding area. The Commissioners Report merely states
that the value of the land is based on sales and listings of
comparable property registered within the immediate vicinity
without any evidence to support the market data provided.

Judge denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss, holding

that the MTC which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No.
3648 has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation
proceeding. 2nd complaint was ordered in favor of Barangay
Masili.
Court of Appeals
CA held that RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Orders. It ruled that the second
Complaint for eminent domain was not barred by res
judicata. The reason is that the MTC had no jurisdiction over
the action.

ISSUE:

RULING:

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery

of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise
by the government of its authority and right to take
property for public use.As such, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the
regional trial courts.

It should be stressed that the primaryconsideration

in an expropriation suit is whether the government
or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence,
the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In
the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The value of the property to be expropriated

being estimated in monetary terms is merely
incidental to the expropriation suit.

Bardillon v. Barangay Masili, G.R. No. 146886, April 30,

2003

An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the

RTC regardless of the value of the land, because the
subject of the action is the governments exercise of
eminent domain -- a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

FACTS: Two [C]omplaints for eminent domain were filed by

herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating the land
owned by petitioner.
1st [C]omplaint [Civil Case No. 3648] was filed
before the MTC on Feb. 23, 1998, following the failure of
Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner
on the purchase offer of P200,000.00. The expropriation of
Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay
Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its
constituents.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160379, August

14, 2009
FACTS:

Page 9 of 11

ISSUE:
RULING:
ISSUE:
RULING:The procedure for determining just compensation is
set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that upon the rendition of
the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more
than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. However,
we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule 67
presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain
with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such
complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have
violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the
usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we clarified that when there is no action for
expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for
damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of
Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions
of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before
commissioners is dispensable.
In this case, petitioner took possession of the subject
property without initiating expropriation proceedings.
Consequently, private respondent filed the instant case for
just compensation and damages. To determine just
compensation, the trial court appointed three commissioners
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. None of the parties objected to such appointment.
The trial courts appointment of commissioners in this
particular case is not improper. The appointment was done
mainly to aid the trial court in determining just compensation,
and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court
is not bound by the commissioners recommended valuation of
the subject property. The court has the discretion on whether
to adopt the commissioners valuation or to substitute its own
estimate of the value as gathered from the records.

where private property is taken by the Government

for public use without first acquiring title thereto
either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the
owners action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe.
Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also
failed to question the taking of their property for a
long period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990s)
and, when asked during trial what action they took
after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis,
one of the respondents, testified that when we have
an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always
asked for compensation. It is likewise undisputed
that what was constructed by the city government on
respondents property was a road for public use,
namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as
in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped
from recovering possession of their land, but are
entitled to just compensation.
if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted
to determine just compensation, the trial court is still
mandated to act in accordance with the procedure
provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not
more than three competent and disinterested
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court
the just compensation for the subject property.
it is settled jurisprudence that where property was
taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and its owner files an action for
recovery of possession thereof before the
commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is
the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling.

In this case, the trial court should have fixed just

compensation for the property at its value as of the time of
taking in 1980, but there is nothing on record showing the
value of the property at that time. The trial court, therefore,
clearly erred when it based its valuation for the subject land
on the price paid for properties in the same location, taken by
the city government only sometime in the year 1994.

Eusebio v. Luis, G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009

FACTS:

However, in taking respondents property without the

benefit of expropriation proceedings and without
payment of just compensation, the City of Pasig
clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents
proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be
countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking,
the City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for
damages to respondents.

Page 10 of 11

RULING:
Landbank v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, 3 October 2012
FACTS:

Landbank v. Peralta, G.R. No. 182704, 23 April 2014

ISSUE:

FACTS:

RULING:

ISSUE:
RULING:

Landbank v. Araneta, G.R. No. 161796, 8 February 2012

FACTS:
ISSUE:

Page 11 of 11