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  • Surgical Fires in The or

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    Anisa
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    This document summarizes a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis conducted to reduce surgical fire risks at a hospital. It identifies 5 potential failure modes: 1) lack of saline solution available, 2) low humidity allowing static electricity buildup, 3) unavailable or nonfunctioning fire extinguishers, 4) use of oxygen during procedures increasing combustibility, and 5) insufficient barriers between combustible materials and ignition sources. For each failure mode it describes causes, effects, likelihood of occurrence, detection, severity, and proposed actions to address the risks. The total risk priority number calculated for these failure modes is 66.

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    Surgical Fires in the Or

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    This document summarizes a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis conducted to reduce surgical fire risks at a hospital. It identifies 5 potential failure modes: 1) lack of saline solution available, 2) low humidity allowing static electricity buildup, 3) unavailable or nonfunctioning fire extinguishers, 4) use of oxygen during procedures increasing combustibility, and 5) insufficient barriers between combustible materials and ignition sources. For each failure mode it describes causes, effects, likelihood of occurrence, detection, severity, and proposed actions to address the risks. The total risk priority number calculated for these failure modes is 66.

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    44 просмотров2 страницы

    Surgical Fires in The or

    Загружено:

    Anisa
    This document summarizes a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis conducted to reduce surgical fire risks at a hospital. It identifies 5 potential failure modes: 1) lack of saline solution available, 2) low humidity allowing static electricity buildup, 3) unavailable or nonfunctioning fire extinguishers, 4) use of oxygen during procedures increasing combustibility, and 5) insufficient barriers between combustible materials and ignition sources. For each failure mode it describes causes, effects, likelihood of occurrence, detection, severity, and proposed actions to address the risks. The total risk priority number calculated for these failure modes is 66.

    Авторское право:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Скачайте в формате PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd
    Отметить как неприемлемый контент
    из 2

    FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Tool

    SurgicalFiresintheOR
    MercyNorthAmbulatorySurgery
    Ankeny,Iowa,UnitedStates
    Other

    Aim:ReducetheRPNnumberforFireSafetyintheOR(preventionandresponse)by50%
    ProcessData
    Date:02/18/2008
    Step

    Description

    AvailabilityofSalineSolution

    FailureMode

    Causes

    Salinenotonthefield
    forgotten
    salinenotreadilyavailablein spilled
    theORsuite
    used

    Step

    Description

    HumidityControltocontrolstaticelectricity

    FailureMode

    Causes

    Relativehumiditybelow30% Mechanicalfailue
    intheORsuite
    fluctuationofoutsideair
    temp

    Step

    Description

    Availabilityofextinguishers

    Effects
    Delayinextinguishingfire
    Patientorstaffburned
    Firewouldspreadquickly

    Effects
    Airbecomesdrywithgreater
    potentialtoconductstatic
    electricity...potentialsource
    asanignitionpoint(spark)in
    thefiretriangel.

    FailureMode

    Causes

    Effects

    Missing
    Empty
    Lackofknowledgebystaff
    oncorrectoperationof
    extinguisher,Malfunctionof
    equipment,attemptto
    extinguishtoodistantfrom
    fire

    Lackoforientation,training
    Ineffectivelocationof
    extinguisherstoOR

    Firespreads
    Patient/Staffinjured
    Evacuationofentire
    department
    Surgeriesaborted

    Step

    Description

    tentingduringanesthesia

    FailureMode

    Causes

    Effects

    Oxygenadministration
    interfereswiththesurgical
    field

    surgeon/anesthesiarequest
    useofO2duringprocedure

    BuildupofO2,CO2
    Increasethecombustability
    ofafirethatwasstartedby
    anothersource

    Step

    Description

    barrieresbetweencombustablesandsourceofignition

    FailureMode

    Causes

    Effects

    Insufficientbarrierssuchas:
    Dryingoutofnormally
    saturatedmaterials(wet
    towelsorsponges)additional
    wetspongesnotutilizedper
    normalpracticeorpolicy.
    Additionalsalinenotreadily
    available.

    Staffnotknowledgeable
    Lengthofcaseexceeds
    saturationpoint
    Drytowelsorspongesnot
    replacedwithsaturatedones

    Sourceofignitioncould
    triggeraburninthepatient
    Drapingcouldeasilyignite
    Spongesallowedtodryout
    couldeasilyignite

    Occ Det Sev RPN Actions


    2

    2 Considerhavingsalineon
    sterilefieldforall
    procedures,whether
    typicallyusedornot

    Occ Det Sev RPN Actions


    9

    27 SalinestockedinallOR
    suites,Alarmforhumidity
    fallingbelow35%,ORdoors
    keptclosedatalltimes

    Occ Det Sev RPN Actions


    2

    32 Stockfireextinguishersin
    eachORoratminimumin
    ORcorearea

    Occ Det Sev RPN Actions


    1

    1 Stockfireextinguishersin
    eachORorCore

    Occ Det Sev RPN Actions


    2

    4 Followpoliciesand
    proceduresinplace
    Provideadditional
    competenciesforstaff

    CalculatedTotals
    TotalRiskPriorityNumberfortheprocess
    Occ: LikelihoodofOccurrence(110)
    Det: LikelihoodofDetection(110)

    66

    NOTE: 1=VerylikelyitWILLbedetected
    10=VerylikelyitWILLNOTbedetected

    Sev: Severity(110)
    RPN:RiskPriorityNumber(OccDetSev)

    Annotation
    None

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