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EXEVEA
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) but was dismissed by President Fidel V. Ramos
from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993 due to three
complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette ObarZamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR for alleged malversation through falsification
of official documents, violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations on
unliquidated cash advances and defrauding the government by intentionally concealing said cash
advances through falsification of accounting enties, and for oppression and harassment whereby
private respondent was relieved by Lumiqued from her duties as Regional Cashier without just
cause. The issue was referred to the DOJ and Committee hearings on the complaints were
conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992 whereby Lumiqued appeared without the assistance of a
counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to
employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued.
Hence, Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon adopted the recommendation in his
Memorandum to the President. On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the
alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his
retirement and other benefits
ISSUE:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled against Lumiqued saying that the right to counsel, which cannot be
waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect
or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked
or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent
and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime
in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department
Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable
under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to
due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. Whatever irregularity
attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration. Hence, the said petition for certiorari and
mandamus was dismissed and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President was
affirmed.
1. Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his
arrest can be issued and;
2. Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending.
HELD:
1. No. The case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action thus does not justify
the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. The SC
opined that the foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.
2. No. Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition
request and arrest warrant. The constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The
term
of
office
of
all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act
shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of
office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared such provision constitutionally infirm and thus the
present petition was filed by COMELEC to review the decision of the RTC. It declared that the
retroactive application of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for barangay officials to the
1994 barangay elections is unconstitutional. The COMELEC assails that the law is valid and
constitutional and that RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex
post facto la. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided
in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts
that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so
provided and when it does not impair vested rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the retroactive reckoning of the 3 consecutive term limit for barangay officials to
the 1994 barangay elections is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
No, the retroactive reckoning of the 3 consecutive term limit for barangay officials to the 1994
barangay elections is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court held that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has
been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect. It was continued under the Local Government Code and can still be
found in the current law. The equality guaranteed under the Equal Protection clause is equality
under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial
distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or
circumstances, they may be treated differently in law. In the present case there is no basis for an
equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local
elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these
elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction,
expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term
and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the
three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through
legislation. Likewise, there is no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard
because the challenged provision did not result in any differential treatment
between barangay officials and all other elective officials given that there was no actual
retroactive application involved.