STATCON REVIEWER

[for June 13, 2014]

A.

Judicial Supremacy - Also known as the power of Judicial Review, states that the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitutionality of acts committed by both
branches of the government.

Necessary Implication - It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power

is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred.

Legal System and Judicial Interpretation

Article VI. The Legislative Department

SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Article VII. The Executive Department
SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Article VIII. The Judicial Department
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (Mendoza, N.)

GR No. L-45081 | July 15, 1936 | [Laurel]
Plaintiffs: Jose A. Angara
Defendant: The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionisio C.
Mayor
DOCTRINE: (These case has multiple doctrines that are IMPORTANT.)
Separation of Powers Principle - The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our government. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

System of Checks and Balances - Each branch of government (Legislative, Executive,

Judiciary) has its own system - provided for by the Constitution - to check if the other
branches are acting within their jurisdiction. The Constitution provided a balance between
the three so as to prevent one branch of government from being too powerful or weaker
than the other, as they are co-equal branches. An example is when the President can
veto laws that are passed by Congress (but the Congress can pass the law upon its
return to both houses provided that it reaches a vote from each house) and while the
President needs the consent of the Senate in order to be a part of a treaty. The Judiciary
through the Supreme Court, is the final arbiter of acts and laws promulgated by both
branches.

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FACTS:
Jose A. Angara filed a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission from taking
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua. Angara, Ynsua, Castillo and Mayor were
candidates for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas. Angara was declared the winner and he took his oath thereafter. On December 3,
1935 (important date to remember), the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming
the winners of the election and that no other protests may be filed afterwards. On December
8, 1935 (important date too), Ynsua filed a motion of protest to the Electoral Commission
(EC). On Dec. 9, 1935, The EC adopted a resolution that the commission will no longer
consider any protest on or before Dec. 9 - the commissions actual first meeting (This means
that Ynsuas protest made it according to the resolution of EC). Angara filed for a writ of
preliminary injunction to the SC arguing that the Consti. confers the National Assembly the
jurisdiction with regard to contests in election proceedings.
ISSUE:
1.
WON the SC has jurisdiction over the EC and the subject matter of the
controversy.
2.
WON the EC acted in GADALEJ
HELD/RATIO:
1.
YES
The SC is the only constitutional mechanism devised to finally resolve conflicts and
allocate constitutional boundaries. Judicial supremacy also dictates that SC, in
exercising judicial review, has the power to adjudicate actual and appropriate cases and
controversies in order to see that no one branch or agency of the government trancends
the constitution.
2.
NO
The EC is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Natl Assembly. The consti also transferred all powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests in elections, returns, and
qualifications to the EC. The said power of EC is full, clear and complete and carried

with it the necessary powers (not conferred, although implied powers) to prescribe rules
and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests
---------B.

Definition of Statutory Construction

CALTEX v. PALOMAR (Nierra, M.)

18 SCRA 247 | September 29, 1966 | CASTRO, J.
Plaintiffs: CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC.
Defendant: ENRICO PALOMAR (In his capacity as The Postmaster General)
DOCTRINE: Definition of Statutory Construction (MEMORIZE THIS!)
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention
of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention
is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).
FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex undertook a promotional campaign dubbed as the Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest. The object of the contest was for people to guess how many liters were dispensed
by a hooded gas pump during a specified period. The contest was open to all motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivers. In order to participate in the contest, all those who were
qualified to participate merely had to get entry forms and submit their guesses. Participants
were not required to purchase any Caltex product or pay any fee to join. There were 3
stages to the contest. The first stage consisted of all participating Caltex dealerships. Three
persons would then be chosen and be given prizes. Those who placed first would then move
on to the second, the Regional stage. 3 winners would then again be chosen. The 7 regional
first-placers would then head to Manila for the final round. In order to achieve the success of
the promotion, Caltex foresaw that it had to use the Postal Service. The Caltex met
resistance from the office of Postmaster General based on Article 1954 of the Revised
Administrative Code, among others:
1954. Absolutely nonmailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following
classes, whether sealed as first class matter or not, shall be imported into the
Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the
Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau
of Posts:
(a) Written or printed matter in any form advertising describing, or in any manner
pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or

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chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of
any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."
ISSUE: Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee (Caltex) is within the coverage
of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
HELD/RATIO:
No. According to the Court the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest does not fall within the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, particularly with regard to the issue of lottery. In El
Debate Inc. vs Topacio, the court ruled that lottery consists of three elements:
consideration, prize and chance. In the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, 2 of the three
elements are clearly present: prize and chance. Consideration, on the other hand, that is the
necessity of foregoing something of value in order to enjoy the chance of winning, is absent.
Hence, the Contest cannot be deemed a lottery. It is instead a gratuitous distribution of
property which does not fall under Article 1954 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to
gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the
contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain.
The Court decided the case based on the Spirit of the Law, that is, the intent which
the authors of the law had although such intent may not be easily gleaned from the
letter or wording of the law.
---------C.

When Does Statutory Construction Come In?

(1) NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) v. EISMA (Uy, M.)

GR L-61236 | January 31, 1984 | [Ponente]
Plaintiffs: National Federation of Labor, Zambowood Monthly Employees Union
Defendant: J. Eisma, Zamboanga Wood Products, et al
DOCTRINE: In labor matters, the Labor Arbiter, NOT THE COURT, has jurisdiction to
entertain it. Examples of issues include complaints for damages by an employer against
his/her employees as a result of a strike, problems with wages, benefits, employeeemployer relations, collective bargaining agreements, and the like.

FACTS:
(For a better understanding, just imagine why/how strikes happen and how companies
usually react to them)

Defendant: Court of Appeals, Hon. Ricardo A. Baculi (in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan), and Spouses Bienvenido and
Victoria de Guzman

The NFL, being the collective bargaining representative of the Zambowood employees
union, went on a strike together with the employees against the company for underpaid
wages, illegal termination (of the union president), unfair labor treatment, among many
others. The company filed a suit against the labor union for obstruction of private property
and disrupting business operations due to road blockages. The petitioners retort with a
motion for dismissal citing that the Labor Arbiter, not the Courts, has jurisdiction over their
case, under Article 217 of the Revised Administrative Code and BP 130. Nonetheless, Judge
Eisma on July 20, 1982 denied the petitioners motion and ordered the restraining of all
persons involved in the strike citing BP 227, which has provisions against violence,
obstruction, and disturbance of strikers.

DOCTRINE: In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect
to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given
such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.

ISSUE:
WON the Court has jurisdiction to handle cases for damages between employers and
employees.

HELD/RATIO:
NO (petition for certiorari granted, previous decision by respondent Judge nulled)
Under Article 217 of the Revised Administrative Code along with its subsequent
amendments in PD 1691 (1980) and BP 130 (1981), places exclusive jurisdiction on Labor
Arbiters for issues of damages between employee-employers, wages, benefits, employeeemployer relations, collective bargaining agreements
The judge was applying an outdated law in PD 1367 wherein the courts had jurisdiction to
entertain moral damages arising from unjust employer-employee relations.
----------

(2) PAAT v. CA (Ongtenco, K.)

GR 111107 | January 10, 1997 | Torres, J.
Plaintiffs: Leonardo A. Paat (in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, Regional Executive
Director (RED), Region 2) and Jovito Laguyan, Jr. (in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR))

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FACTS:
May 19, 1989: The truck of Victoria de Guzman, which was en route to Bulacan from San
Jose, Baggao, Cagayan was seized by DENR personnel in Nueva Vizcaya, as the driver of
the vehicle could not present the documents pertinent to the forest products hidden inside
the truck. Jovito Laguyan, the CENRO officer of Aritao, Cagayan seized the truck invoking
Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The
current respondents brought a petition to the RTC, Branch 2 of Cagayan and the RTC
granted their petition and wrote a writ for the current petitioners to return the truck to the
(private) respondents. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss; denied by RTC.
Respondents claim that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
used in transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to Sec 68 of PD705, as amended by
EO277.
ISSUE:
WON the DENR has the power to seize and forfeit the truck under the law
HELD/RATIO:
YES, the DENR has the power to seize and forfeit the truck. The respondents, in claiming
that only the court is authorized to confiscate, restricted the clear intention of the law and
inevitably reduce[s] the other provision of Section 68-A, which reads:
SEC. 68-A.Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized
Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.

Sec 68 should be read with 68-A, which was added upon amendment of PD705 with
EO277.
In relation to the doctrine: The object of the statute is for environmental protection, the
success of which is what the statute must advanced. It should, then, suppress all acts to the
contrary; that is, in this case, the extension of DENRs administrative authority to inclusion of
vehicles (conveyances) used to aid in committing the illegal act.
----------

(3) PEOPLE V. MAPA (Mendoza, L.)

GR L-22301 | August 30, 1967 | Fernando, J.
Plaintiffs: People of the Philippines
Defendant: Mario Mapa Y Mapulong
DOCTRINE:
The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. If a certain law is already clear and explicit in itself, the court does
not have any power to set aside the mandate of a statutory provision.
FACTS:
Mario Mapa Y Mapulong, a secret agent of Hon. Leviste (Gov of Batangas), was accused of
violating the provision on illegal possession of firearms. On or about August 13, 1962, in
Manila, Mapa willfully and unlawfully possessed and controlled one home-made revolver,
Cal. 22 without serial number with six rounds of ammunition, without any license or permit.
On the September 3, 1963 hearing, Mapa admits that he did have possession of the
revolver and its ammunition on Aug 13, 1962. In the hearing, 4 exhibits were shown to prove
Mapas appointment as secret agent of Hon. Leviste. On November 23, 1963, Mapa was
convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and
ammunition were confiscated by the government.
4 exhibits (just in case):
1. June 2, 1962 document
2. Document directing him to go to Manila, Pasay and QC on a confidential mission
3. Oath of office as secret agent
4. Certificate dated March 11, 1963 that he is a secret agent of Leviste
ISSUE:

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WON being a secret agent of a provincial governor is sufficient defense to a prosecution for
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
HELD/RATIO:
NO. Being a secret agent of the governor is not a defense to illegal possession of
firearms.
The law is explicit that it shall be unlawful for any person to possess any firearm or
ammunition, detached parts of firearms or ammunition, etc. The next section of this law
provides a list of people who are excused when such firearms are in possession of such
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their duties and this list does not
include secret agents. Thus, Mapa is still guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
(List includes officers, soldiers, sailors, marines, Phil Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial and municipal treasurers, mayors, guards of provincial prisoners and
jails)
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(4) PARAS v. COMELEC (Ah, Y.)

264 SCRA 49 | November 4, 1996 | FRANCISCO, J.
Plaintiffs: DANILO E. PARAS
Defendant: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan

City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his
recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. The
recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition.
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner
insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first
Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. Petitioner maintains that as
the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for
4

barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election.Since the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no
recall may be instituted.

In statutory construction it is the spirit, rather than the letter of a

law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit
and intent.
----------

ISSUE: WON the SK election may be construed as a local regular election

PROVISION:

"SEC. 74.Limitations on Recall.

(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election
only once during his term of office for loss of confidence
(b)No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election."
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election
once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall
election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute

should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of
Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not
be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution
to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.

Petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which

we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict
rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention
is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth.

(5) DEL MAR v. PAGCOR (Ongtenco, K.)

346 SCRA 485 | DATE HERE | Puno, J.
Plaintiffs: Raoul B. Del Mar
Defendant: Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), Belle Jai-Alai
Corporation, Filipinas Entertainment Totalizor Corproration (FILGAME)
DOCTRINE:
When a statute is vague or ambiguous: That the statute admits of different interpretations is
the best evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a
statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed
persons in either of two or more senses. [...] Sutherland tells us that a statute is
"ambiguous," and so open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract
meaning or the connotation of its terms is uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its
application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar.
FACTS:
PAGCOR is a GOCC organized and existing under PD 1869, enacted 11 July 1983.
PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice, inquiring about whether
or not the PAGCOR Charter allows them to operate jai-alai frontons in the country. The
Secretary of Justice furnished PAGCOR with his opinion on 15 July 1996, which stated that
PAGCORs authority to maintain and operate games of chance or gambling extends to jaialai. In addition, he mentioned that the PAGCOR Charter amounts to a legislative franchise
for that purpose. PAGCOR also sought the opinions of the Office of the Solicitor-General
and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel who, in turn, gave favorable remarks
for PAGCORs project.
Del Mar filed a petition against the respondents, claiming that
KRISTINE!!!!!! Where did you go? Are you still up?
ISSUE:
WON PAGCORs charter includes the franchise to operate jai-alai frontons
HELD/RATIO:
3. [YES/NO.]
[Insert Rationale here]

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4. [YES/NO.]
[Insert Rationale here]

them in the tunnels of the mine. A special committee report indicated that PHILEX failed to
provide the miners with adequate safety protection.
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D.

Statutory Construction vs. Judicial Legislation

(1) FLORESCA v. PHILEX MINING (Ah, Y.)

GR L-30642 | April 30, 1985 | MAKASIAR, J.
Plaintiffs:
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and
NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA,
JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S.FLORESCA and CARMEN
S. FLORESCA; LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of
her minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO, JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and
DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ; SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in
her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA, SALUD and
DANILO, all surnamed OBRA; LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf
and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR., all
surnamed LANUZA; EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf
of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA
(Just remember FLORESCA) :p
Defendant:
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch
XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila
DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction vis-a-vis Judicial Legislation

To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is
or has been, is judicial. However, the courts do and must legislate to fill in the gaps
in the law. The Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of the existing
law and jurisprudence.
FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried

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Petitioners filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila based on the
provisions of the Civil Code on damages arising out of negligence. Philex contends that the
action was based on an industrial accident based on the Workmens Compensation Act
(WCA) and therefore CFI has no jurisdiction, and that the work-connected injuries are
compensable exclusively under the WCA and not the Civil Code. The CFI dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. This is a petition raised to the SC to review the decision of
the CFI.
PROVISION(S):
Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmens Compensation Act, reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by
this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...
ISSUE:
1. WON the action of an injured worker (or that of his heirs, in case of death) under the WCA is
executive, selective, or cumulative --SELECTIVE
2. WON the SC, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judicial legislation -- NO
HELD/RATIO:
1. SELECTIVE. The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is
selective (i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies, but that they
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of
recourse under the Workmens Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further
held that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmens Compensation
Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court, as the
choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the
choice as it was not an intelligent choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the
lower court, the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

2. NO. The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does not
legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice
then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution,
amongst other sources of law. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that judicial
decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdictions legal system.
It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of
the law since the Courts application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil
Code, which provides that No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Thus, even the legislator himself
recognizes that in certain instances, the court do and must legislate to fill in the gaps in
the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore
cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.
----------

(2) SALVACION v. CB (Penilla, I.)

278 SCRA 27 | August 21 1997 | Torres, Jr., J.
Plaintiffs: Karen E. Salvacion, minor, through Federico N. Salvacion, Jr. and Evelina E.
Salvacion
Defendant: Central Bank of the Philippines, China Bank Corporation, and Greg Bartelli
DOCTRINE: Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro - When the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond
to the vehement urge of conscience. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
FACTS:
This is in relation to a previous case of Karen E Salvacion filed against Greg Bartelli. On
February 4, 1989, Salvacion was a kidnapped and raped by Greg Bartelli, an American
tourist/ transient. He lured her to go with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue, and there
he held her captive for 4 days and raped her 10 times. Plaintiff was able to ask for help, and
after being rescued, the Salvacion family sued Bartelli. The latter was ordered to pay the
former an amount of more than P 1 Million, for moral and exemplary damages (with
preliminary attachment). Bartelli was charged with 4 counts of Rape and Serious Illegal
Detention, and was detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. However, on February 24, 1989,
on the same day of his scheduled hearing for petition for bail, Bartelli escaped from jail.

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In order to receive the damages theyve been awarded (and which they fully deserve), the
Salvacion family needs to gain access to Bartellis dollar deposit in China Bank, but they
cannot because his account is being protected by Sec 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and the Foreign Currency Deposit Act.
In the case at bar, the Salvacion family filed a petition for declaratory relief, with prayers for
the following: (1) an order restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Sec 113
of Central Bank Circular No. 960, (2) declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners
and respondents, (3) adjudging the said circular no. as contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution and hence, void.
ISSUE:
1. WON this Court may entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction
in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court.

2. WON Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as
amended by Pres. Decree No. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act, be made applicable to a foreign transient.
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. This court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a case that involves a
petition for declaratory relief, however, this case may be an exception. Salvacions case
may be treated as one for Mandamus because it has with it immense implications and
questions that ought to be resolved.

2. NO. it should not be made applicable to a foreign transient. Central Bank Circular No.
960 states that, Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever. It was raised by Central Bank that this
was actually just carried over from a portion of R.A. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246.
Furthermore, China Bank also issued in one of their comments that, as much as they
want to empathize with the Salvacion family, they are restrained from doing so, in view of
the said laws.
In the assessment of the case, it was held that the Central Bank Circular No. 960 and R.A.
6426 as amended by P.D. 1246 were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and
investors. Given that Bartelli is a mere transient who only deposited his money for the
purpose of safekeeping during his temporary stay, he shall not be entitled to the protection
of Sec 113 of CB Circ. No. 960 and P.D. 1246 against attachment, garnishment, or other
court processes.

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(3) REPUBLIC v. CA and MOLINA (Wenceslao, C.)

GR 108763 | February 13, 1997 | [PANGANIBAN, J.]
Plaintiffs: Republic of the Philippines
Defendant: CA and Roridel Olaviano Molina
DOCTRINE: Psychological Capacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Psychological Capacity must be characterized by: a)
Gravity; b) Juridical Antecedent; c) Incurability
FACTS:
The case involves the declaration of nullity of marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo
Molino on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
said couple got married on April 14, 1950 at the San Agustin Church. After a year, Roridel
gave birth to their son named Andre Molina. While the child is growing up, Reynaldo showed
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. Instead of attending
his duties as a husband and father, he squandered his money with his friends and was
never honest with his wife regarding his finances. Eventually in February 1986, Reynaldo
was relieved from his job and Roridel had been the sole breadwinner since then. Their
relationship was estranged. Roridel went to live with her parents together with her son, and
Reynaldo totally abandoned them. In the pendency of the declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, Roridel and Reynaldo no longer lived with each other for three years. They agreed
upon a Pre-Trial Conference that Roridel will have the custody of their son and that she will
no longer need financial assistance from Reynaldo in raising their child. BOTH RTC AND CA
declared the marriage VOID. However, due to Family Codes effectivity the issue at hand
(regarding marriages declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity) was being
assailed.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in the interpretation of psychological incapacity as provided in Art. 36 of
the Family Code

HELD/RATIO:
YES. In Santos vs CA, Psychological incapacity had been defined as a mental (not physical)
incapacity. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity to give meaning and significance to marriage.

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Moreover, psychological incapacity must be present at the time the marriage is being
celebrated or prior thereto. Psychological incapacity (Justice Vitug) must be characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
The mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities is not
enough to constitute a ground for psychological incapacity . Even if the married couple do
not intend to live with each other anymore and the failure to meet their duties and
responsibilities as husband and wife still is not a valid ground. HENCE, THE MARRIAGE IS
STILL RENDERED VALID.
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(4) ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC (Ah, Y.)

GR No. 203766 | April 2, 2013 | CARPIO, J.
Plaintiffs: ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot
Defendant: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction vis-a-vis Judicial Legislation
In statutory construction it is the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme
Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. COMELEC, in its assailed
resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that
these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly
representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners argued that the
poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners application
for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest.
ISSUE:
1. WON COMELEC committed GADALEJ in disqualifying the petitioners in the coming May
2013 party-list elections
2. WON the criteria for participating in the the party-list system as laid down by Ang Bagong
Bayani v. COMELEC be applied in the coming May 2013 party-list elections
HELD/RATIO:

1.

NO, COMELEC did not commit GADALEJ.

2.
NO, the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters for the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED.
The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the
discussion then among its framers. Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral
parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list
system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5 (1), Article
VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5.(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more
that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their

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respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties
or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in
Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the
party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
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