Specpro Digests

JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
DIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEIRS, WHEN

ALLOWED
6.
Ernesto Guevara v. Rosario Guevara (12/29/1943)
D: Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a
will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an
extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the
court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They
may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are
contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the
will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is
contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will
and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory
Facts:
1. Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and
natural daughter, respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara,
are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter
2. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario
Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her
strict legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the
deceased- to wit, a portion of 423,492 sqm of a large parcel of
land with an OCT issued in the name of Ernesto
3. It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino Guevara executed a
will which he made certain bequests- devises and legacies
4. He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed
of either by him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto
M. Guevara in order to pay all his pending debts and to defray his
expenses and those of his family us to the time of his death
5. Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra executed
whereby he conveyed to him the southern half of the large parcel of
land of which he had theretofore disposed by the will above
mentioned, inconsideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable
considerations, among which were the payment of all his debts and
Ad astra per alia fideles
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
3-D || Ateneo Law School
obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his maintenance up to

his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral expenses
Later on, an OCT was issued in the name of Ernesto which also
included the northern half of the large parcel of land above (see fact
no. 5)
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and
testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate,
nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the
settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in
the will have received their respective legacies or have even been
given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions
therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the
record of this case
Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son
Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated
to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various
portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her
father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to
invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor,
whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and,
aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of
21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will
But a little over four years after the testor's demise, she (assisted by
her husband) commenced the present action against Ernesto M.
Guevara alone for the purpose of recovering the property; and it
was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the
court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove
that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his
natural daughter
RTC and CA both sustained this theory: Upon that proof of
acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him,
but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the
will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the
betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son
Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded
CA allowed the procedure or the action taken by Rosario: The
majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice,

incovenience, delay, and much expense to the parties, and that
therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status which they
themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for
all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same
criterion (Leao vs. Leao, supra), which is now sanctioned by section
1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Besides, section 6 of Rule 124
provides that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules
of Court, any suitable process or mode of procedure may be
adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the said Rules.
Hence, we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in
accordance with law.
Issues: WON the procedure adopted by respondent is legal
WON the deed of sale to Ernesto was effective
Held: No and Yes
Ratio:
1. The pertinent provisions are the ff: (the law in force at that time)
Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will
shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in
the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the
allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver. The person who has the custody of
a will shall, within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator,
deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named
in the will.
Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. A person
named as executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the
death of the testor, or within thirty days after he knows that he is named
executor, if he obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death of the
testor, present such will to the court which has jurisdiction, unless the will has
been otherwise returned to said court, and shall, within such period, signify to
the court his acceptance of the trust, or make known in writing his refusal to
accept it.
Sec. 628. Penalty. A person who neglects any of the duties required in the
two proceeding sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court,
shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed. If a person having
custody of a will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable
cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the
court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a
warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close confinement until he
delivers the will.
2. The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new
Rules of Court
3. It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the
presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its
allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person
who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not
exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he
may be committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the will
4. SC looked into the rationale of CA (see fact 12). Section 1 of Rule 74
provides as follows:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the
decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no
creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the
death of the decedent.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
5. SC believes that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not sanction the nonrepresentation of a will for probate and much less the nullification of
such will thru failure of its custodian to present it in court for probate
6. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial
partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of
administration." It does not say that in case the decedent left a will
the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves
without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate.
The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of
administration are two different things, although both may be made
in the same case. The allowance of a will precedes the issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can
have a will probated without necessarily securing letters testamentary
or of administration
7. Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left
a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an
extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to
the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the
will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those
provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the
presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law
enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because
unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory
8. As for the deed of sale, the court held that the sale to Ernesto of the
southern part is valid. But although the whole title of the land is issued
under the name of Ernesto, the northern part still belongs to the estate
of Victorino
9. Thus, SC reversed and set aside the decision of CA and ordered the
parties to present the will for probate.
AFFIDAVIT OF SELF-ADJUDICATION BY SOLE HEIR
Portugal v Portugal Beltran (8/16/2004)

D: if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need
to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should
be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself
declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for
its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration
as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the
estate of the deceased.
Justice Carpio-Morales
Facts:
1. Jose Q. PORTUGAL first married PAZ LAZO in 1942
2. Subsequently, PORTUGAL contracted a second marriage with ISABEL
in 1948
3. ISABEL had a son named JOSE DOUGLAS Portugal
4. A year after that, PAZ gave birth to a girl named ALELI
5. Meanwhile, PORTUGALs father died leaving him and his 4 other
siblings a parcel of land in Caloocan
6. By means of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and waiver of rights,
the siblings ceded their rights over the land to PORTUGAL. The RD of
Caloocan issued a TCT in PORTUGALs name
7. PAZ died and eventually so did PORTUGAL died intestate. Claiming
to be the sole heir, ALELI then executed an Affidavit whereby she
adjudicated for herself the Caloocan property. A TCT in her named
was subsequently issued.
8. ISABEL and JOSE DOUGLAS who only learned of late the death of
PORTUGAL, filed in RTC of CALOOCAN a complaint for the
annulment of affidavit of adjudication and TCT in ALELIs name. They
claimed that ALELI perjured herself and made false representations.
9. TC issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things,
the issues as follows: a) Which of the two (2) marriages contracted
by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?; b.) Which of the
plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the
legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?; c.) Whether or not
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested
by plaintiffs.; d.) Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims
under the complaint.
10. TC: without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners status
and right as putative heirs had not been established before a
probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs
of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario: The court, not being a
probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to
establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the
personality to sue
11. ISABEL and PORTUGAL DOUGLAS appealed to CA citing Carino v
Carino1
12. CA: affirmed TC. Carino is inapplicable to the present case as the
issue in the former is the validity of the two marriages, the issue in the
present case however is the annulment of title to property.
Issue: whether ISABEL and JOSE DOUGLAS have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case
for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued
in her name.
Held: No
Ratio:
1
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such cases, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
1. Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay

A. Therein petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, ownersclaimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They later
discovered that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been
titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty
and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof
to the therein individual respondents.
The therein
petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The
therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the
therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove
their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.
B. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[ and Solivio v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in
a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking
the establishment of a status or right.
i. LITAM: Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for
issuance of letters of administration before CFI of Rizal,
alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam
who died in Manila and is survived by him and his therein
named seven (7) siblings who are children of the
decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China
in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the
Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and
that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam
thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration
to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the
decedent. The CFI granted the petition and issued letters
of administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew
Arminio Rivera.
- While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and
his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same
court, against administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios
R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their
complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings
substantially reproduced the allegations made in his
petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage

of the decedent and Marcosa.
- TC rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
declaring, Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the
decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
- SC held that the lower court should not have declared,
in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only
heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in
the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence
of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding
ii. In Solivio: there was a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed
before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, court
declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents
maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister
of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order
declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent,
she claiming that she too was an heir.
- The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness.
Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia
filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC,
for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages.
- RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On
appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the
said judgment.
- Celedonia:whether RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still
pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court,
- SC: [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents
estate, a court should not interfere with [estate]
proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas
v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.
2. RULE: common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which

the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or
parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that
A. if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the
case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other
issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings.
B. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has
lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings
as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an
ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in
order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution
or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the
estate of the deceased.
C. CASE, ALELI believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole
heir to Portugals estate, executed the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
i. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a
person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6,
Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
did, he failed to name an executor therein.
D. ISABEL and JOSE DOUGLAS claim however, to be the exclusive
heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
E. CASE, it appearing that the only property of the intestate estate
of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, to a
special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious,
just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous
in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case could and had
already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined

during pre-trial.
F. the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision
thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear
repeating.
In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of Delgado v. Heirs of Rustia Vda. de

Damian (01/27/2006)
Justice Corona
Facts:
1. This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
6. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to
father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia,
with one Amparo Sagarbarria.
7. On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa
Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption of
their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he
ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
natural children by legal fiction." The petition was overtaken by his death
on February 28, 1974.
8. Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was
survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia
Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia,
Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.
2. The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by

one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the
couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo,
hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of
Felisa Delgado.
9. On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis

Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia"
with the RTC. This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of
Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia,
Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
3. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados
life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis
Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was
admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon
Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
10. On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for
her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa as administratrix of both estates.
4. Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa

Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
5. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no
children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina
6
11. On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the
ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. However, on
motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral arguments,
the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Issues:
1. Whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado.
2. Who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado are.
3. Who should be issued letters of administration.
Held:
1. Yes. There was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.
2. Refer to the Ratio for the answers.
Ratio:
1. In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and
friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and
wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration
filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as
"spouses."
2. Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.
3. To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned
status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon
Osorio must first be addressed. Little was said of the cohabitation or
7
alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors

(now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of
marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the
surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
4. All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of
her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his
half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the
decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.
5. The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and
legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is
unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child
begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be
allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be
allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of
the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal
successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to
the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the
difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives.
There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children
of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of
half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding
succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them.
Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the
portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full
blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.
6. Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her
by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly,
all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
7. We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the
nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado.
Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and
sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives
of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are
her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of
her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate
in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for
the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or
their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with
Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code.
8. Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo
could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the
decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed
only if he is the sole heir to the estate.
9. Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of
Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only
upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She, however,
claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo
Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which
time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect. There was
apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by
which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.
10. The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia
Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a
petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling of
8
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger
to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from
them ab intestato.
11. An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the
intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that the administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
12. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference
does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains
here. It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the
persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed
October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is
hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain
to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her
and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings
who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa
Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall
be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per
stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall
pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs
of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification
and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined
by the trial court.
Cua v Vargas (10/31/06)

Justice Azcuna
D: Persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has
been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is
agreed upon, and not after such an agreement has already been executed
as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed
of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
Facts:
1. Paulina Vargas died and left a 99sqm lot. In February 4, 1994, the
heirs of Paulina executed a notarized Extra-judicial Settlement. Each
of the 9 heirs got 11sqm of the lot. All the heirs signed except
Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria. The Settlement was
published in the Catanduanes Tribune.
2. In Nov. 15, 1994, the same heirs executed another Extra-judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale over the same lot (with same
partition). Only the five other heirs who signed the first settlement
sold the lot (collectively only 55sqm of the lot) to Cua.
3. According to Gloria, she learned of the sale to Cua only on
November 16, 1994 and was not aware of the publication of the
first Extra Judicial Settlement at the Catanduanes Tribune.
4. After knowing of the sale of the 55sqm to Cua, Gloria offered to Cua
the redemption of the property. Cua refused and the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement.
5. Gloria filed a case for the annulment of the Extra Judicial Settlement
and for the Redemption of the lot before the MTC of Virac,
Catanduanes. The heirs of the primitive owners of the lot filed a
petition for intervention.
6. Gloria claims that as a co-owner of the lot, she may subrogate the
purchaser upon reimbursement of the purchase price. Also, there was
no written notice sent by the other co-heirs to effectuate the 30-day
redemption period. She argues that the Settlement is null and void.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
7. MTC: dismissed the case and the complaint-in-intervention. It upheld

the validity of the sale arguing that the sale occurred after the
partition, hence the parties as owners of their specific share in the lot
could freely dispose of their respective shares. It stated that the
actual knowledge Gloria cured the deficiency of the notice
requirement for the right of redemption to take effect.
8. RTC: affirmed MTC
9. CA: Reversed lower courts stating that the Settlement was void hence
the sale to Cua was likewise void. With a denied MR, Cua filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON the publication in the Catanduanes Tribuen constitutes as notice
as required by Rule 74.
Held: No
Ratio:
Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice
that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not
after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the
instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to
the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedents estate. Since Gloria and
her other co-heirs never signed either of the settlement documents, having
discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint, they are not bound by such Settlement and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
However, the other heirs who sold their hereditary shares are not
precluded from doing so. They are free to dispose of their respective aliquot
shares in the lot. They are bound by the sale they executed with Cua.
10
Nevertheless, Gloria and the other heirs still have the right to redeem the
property given that no notice IN WRITING of the sale to Cua was ever given
to them, a requirement for the 30-day redemption period would commence
under Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The very purpose of Article 1088, which
is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the
case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be
willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.
Issue: WON the other heir who signed the Settlement are indispensible
parties to resolve the issue of Gloria et. als right to redemption
Held: No
Ratio:
The complaint filed by Gloria et. al. ultimately prayed that they be
allowed to redeem the shares in the property sold by their co-heirs.
Significantly, the right of the other heirs to sell their undivided share in the
property to Cua is not in dispute. Gloria et. al. concede that the other heirs
acted within their hereditary rights in doing so to the effect that the latter
completely and effectively relinquished their interests in the property in favor
of Cua. Cua thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to become a coowner of the property with respondents. As a result, only petitioners presence
is absolutely required for a complete and final determination of the
controversy because what respondents seek is to be subrogated to his rights
as a purchaser.
REMEDIES OF AGGRIEVED PARTIES AFTER EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

OF ESTATE
Pereira v. CA (6/20/1989)
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
D: Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is
always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings
FACTS:
1. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of PAL, passed away on
January 3, 1983 without a will. He was survived by his sister Rita
Pereira Nagac, and his wife, Victoria Bringas Pererira
2. Rita (the sister) instituted a Special Proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favour pertaining to the estate of her
deceased brother. In the petition, she alleged that she and Victoria
are the only surviving heirs of Andres, that the deceased has no
creditors, and that the deceased left several properties (death
benefits from PAL, savings deposits with several banks, and a land
located in Las Pinas)
3. Victoria filed her opposition and a motion to dismiss the said petition
alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for the purpose
administration and praying that if an estate does exist, she should be
appointed as administrator
4. The RTC ruled in favour of Rita and was appointed as administratrix
upon a bond posted by her. Victoria appealed to the CA, but the CA
affirmed the RTC decision
ISSUE: WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there
are no debts left by the decedent
HELD: No
RATIO:
1. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the
same should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in
Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had
left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to
this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception,
when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from
11
2.
3.
4.
5.
the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without
instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment
of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if
the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort
for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1
allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may
see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said
provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to
take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to
an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an
action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of
court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding without good and compelling reasons
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration,
which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings
The Court held in this case that there is no need to settle the estate
judicially. The present situation does not constitute a good cause as
provided for by law and jurisprudence
There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister,
both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the
deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two
heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private
respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain
possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own
purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of
petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of
the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a
judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the
estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be
substantial especially since the only real property left has been
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful

purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being
wasted or squandered
Alaban v. CA (9/23/2005)
D: A person instituted as a sole heir in the Will of a decedent is entitled to
petition for the probate of the said Will and such instituted heir has no
legal obligation to mention those who are not compulsory or testate heirs
in the probate of the Will
Facts:
1. Nov. 8, 2000 Francico Provido filed a petition for the probate of
the Will of deceased Soledad Provido Elevencionado before an RTC
in IloIlo. Provido alleged that he is Soledads heir and is the executor
of her Will. The notice of hearing was published as required in the
Rules of Court
2. Later, on May 30, 2001, the court allowed probate and directed the
issuance of letters testamentary to Provido
3. October 4, 2001 More than four months thereafter, Alaban and
others filed a motion to reopen the probate proceedings claiming that
they are intestate heirs of Soledad, contesting the extrinsic validity of
the Will, and alleging that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the proceeding in item no. 1 because of non-payment of correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other
heirs
4. RTC:
a) Denied the motion in number 2
b) Held that Alaban, et al. were deemed notified of the hearing
by publication
c) Held that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not
a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely
required respondent to pay the deficiency
d) Held the RTCs Decision was already final and executory
even before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen
5. Motion to Annul Judgment of RTC before CA on the ground of
extrinsic fraud:
12
Alaban, et al. filed a petition with an application for preliminary

injunction with the CA seeking the annulment of the RTCs decision and
claimed that after Soledad died, they actually had a compromise
agreement with Francico but that he later refused to sign the
agreement and feigned ignorance about it. They then claimed that
they only learned about the probate proceeding in IloIlo in July
2001, which is why they filed a motion to reopen the proceeding
6. This motion to annul the judgment of the RTC was denied by the CA
7. The SC found that while the probate proceeding was pending in
IloIlo, one of the petitioners, Flores, filed a petition for letters of
administration with an RTC in General Santos City claiming that
Soledad died intestate and without issue, survived by five sets of
collateral heirs. She was then armed with an SPA from most of the
petitioners authorizing the appointment of administratrix.
a) Denied by said court because of the pending probate
proceeding in IloIlo, where the jurisdiction is proper because
that is where Soledad died
b) Denial was also in accordance with rule that first court
acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the
exclusion of other courts
8. On January 2002, Flores filed a Notice of Appeal of the judgment in
number 7 before the CA
9. In this Petition for Review on Certiorari from the CA decision in
number 6, the petitioners allege that they were not made parties to
the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered
and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other
appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver
that respondents offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify
them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that
necessitates the annulment of the RTCs judgment
Issue: WON despite all the allegations of Alaban, et al., Francico is a proper
party to petition for the probate of Soledads Will
Held: Yeeeeeees
Ratio:
1. The SC began its discussion with some of the remedies that Alaban, et
al. could have availed of but didnt:
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
a) Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party

to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule
permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the
grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of
evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the
decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions should
be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
b) A petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule
38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered,
or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party
in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court
and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or
proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months
after entry thereof
c) A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for
relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties
in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is
rendered and that a person who was never a party to the
case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a
petition for relief from judgment
2. The SC ruled that the petitioners actually became parties to the
probate proceedings, thus
a) Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate
may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of
the time and place for proving the will must be published for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the
probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's
13
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in

the settlement of the estate of the decedent
b) Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding
has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded
to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to
be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings
in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though
petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate,
they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of
the publication of the notice of hearing
c) As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have
validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or
reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact,
petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a
motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the
reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings.
However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of
time, long after the Decision became final and executory
3. For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said
remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a
petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit
from their own inaction or negligence
4. Now to the topic of SpecPro, regarding who may petition for
probate, Alaban, et al. allege that as a result of Francicos deliberate
omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the
other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will,
they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied
their day in court. In addition, they claim that Francicos offer of a
false compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented
them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate
5. The SC, in not giving merit to these allegations, stated that according
to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the Will
shows that Francico was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent.
Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither
compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the
probate proceedings under the Rules. Francico had no legal
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to

personally notify them of the same. Besides, even if petitioners are
entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the
publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs
is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite
REPROBATE; REQUISITES BEFORE WILL PROVED OUTSIDE ALLOWED IN

THE PHILIPPINES; EFFECTS OF PATIENCE.
In the Matter of the Intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Isabel
Cojuangco Suntay (1/16/2010)
D: In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is
the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties
or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation
which obtains here
Facts:
1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),
married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979,
their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico
2. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband,
Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
3. Emillio III (petitioner) is an illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and
Federico but he was reared by the spouse since he was a baby and
was later on acknowledged as a natural child of Emilio I (son of
Federico) (Later, the fact also stated that Federico himself legally
adopted Emilio III)
4. While respondent in this case is a legitimate grandchild of Cristina
and Federico as she was born when Emilio I legally married
5. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of

letters of administration for the intestate estate of Cristina alleging
among others that she was a legitimate granddaughter of Cristina
6. Federico then filed his opposition alleging preference over
administering the estate of Cristina being the surviving spouse and
that the list of heirs of respondent was incomplete as it did not include
Emilio III
7. After a failed attempt of the parties to settle amicably, Federico
filed a manifestation nominationg his adopted son, Emilio IIII as
administrator of Cristinas estate on his behalf
8. RTC rendered a decision appointing petitioner Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate
9. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and
revoked the letters of administration issued to petitioner. Petitioners
MR having been denied, he appealed to SC by certiorari
Issue: Who between petitioner and respondent is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedents estate
Held: Both. They were appointed as co-administrators of the decedents
intestate estate
Ratio:
1. CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest
therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that
under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership.
2. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference
in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a)
To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
14
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and

willing to serve;
Note: I did not include the discussion relating to Art 992 of CC since its a
Succession issue and not a SpecPro issue.
(b)
If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
Fleumer (appellant) v. Hix (appellee) (03/17/1930)

Ponente: Malcolm
(c)
If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
3. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on
the attendant facts and circumstances of each case
4. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant
facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint
administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmothers, Cristinas, estate
5. In Uy v. CA, SC upheld the appointment by the trial court of a coadministration between the decedents son and the decedents
brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate
6. In the same vain, the case of Delgado Vda dela Rosa v. Heirs of Vda
de Damina held that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
7. According to SC, since the subject SC calls to the succession other
putative heirs, (other grandchildren of Cristina and Federico)and
considering the conflicting claims of such heirs, the SC was impelled to
move in joint administration of the estate of Cristina
15
DOCTRINE:
The special administrator of an estate is a person interested in the allowance
or disallowance of a will
FACTS:
1. Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph
Hix , appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason
denying the probate of the document alleged to be the last will and
testament of the deceased.
2. Annie Hix (appellee) contends that the Fleumer as a mere special
administrator is not authorized to carry on this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether Fleumer, as a special administrator, can appeal the denial
of the probate of the deceaseds will.
HELD: YES (but will was not allowed for probate)
RATIO:
Appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these
proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or
disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be
permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of
the will
Other issues:
On Jurisdiction
o It is the theory of the Fleumer that the alleged will was
executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by
Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the
laws of West Virginia govern.
o It was necessary for Fleumer to prove that the testator had
his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
16
The only evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted

of the recitals in the alleged will and the testimony of the
petitioner. Also in the beginning administration proceedings
originally in the Philippine Islands, Fleumer violated his own
theory by attempting to have the principal administration in
the Philippine Islands
o It is to be noted that the application of or the probate of the
will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while
the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been
initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative
of an intention to make the Philippines the principal
administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration.
However , there was no attempt to comply with the
provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of
a will said to have been proved and allowed in West
Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the
deceased left any property at any place other than the
Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West
Virginia.
On due execution of the will
o In addition, the due execution of the will was not established.
The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony
of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to
indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the
presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses
subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the
supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty of the petitioner
to prove execution by some other means
On the issue of divorce
o Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce
purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix
from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of
West Virginia.
The present proceedings do not call for any specific

pronouncements on the validity or invalidity of this alleged
divorce.
ORDER OF PREFERENCE
Angeles v Magalaya (9/2/2005)
D: The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family
Codemay be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis
therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else,
the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not rise.
Justice Garcia
Facts:
1. ALELI MAGLAYA, claiming to be sole heir and legitimate daughter of
her alleged father FRANCISCO, filed a petition praying that she be
appointed as the administrator of the estate of FRANCISO.
2. Second wife of Francisco, Belen ANGELES filed an opposition arguing
that ALELI is not really a legitimate daughter of Francisco. Although
she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. She contends
that it she ANGELES who is the proper person to be appointed as the
administratrix.
3. ALELI: offered her birth certificate which contained an entry stating
that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the
handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question
Legitimate? (Legitimo?); pictures taken during her wedding as bride
to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract.
Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records.
4. TC:ALELI failed to prove her legitimate filiation
5. CA: reversed and ordered that ALELI be appointed as administratrix
Issue: whether CA erred in finding for ALELI
Held: Yes,
Ratio:
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Article 164 of the Family Code: Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
2. CA relied heavily on Tison vs. Court of Appeals: since petitioner opted
not to present any contrary evidence, the presumption on respondents
legitimacy stands unrebutted.
5. Article 172 of the Family Code: legitimate filiation of a child can be

established by any of the modes2 therein defined even without direct
evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents
A.
CASE, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco

against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one
Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth
of a child.
B.
Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private

document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact
of birth of a child.
C.
Jurisprudence: teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered

as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of
recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or
by the mother alone if the father refuses.
A.
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court

evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate
only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive
legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked collaterally.
3. RULE: A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely
on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He
need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption
is prima facie proof of the fact presumed.
A. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact
thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless
overthrown, stand as proved
B. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family
Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual
basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married
and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the
subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a
child is legitimate does not arise.
4. CASE, CA did not categorically state from what facts established
during the trial was the presumption of ALELIs supposed legitimacy
arose.
A. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done
so. For, save for ALELIs gratuitous assertion and an entry in her
certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents
marriage to ALELIs mother.
B. no marriage certificate or marriage contract was offered in
evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority
was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized
the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses
respondent presented could say anything about, let alone
affirm, that supposed marriage.
C. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Franciscos
daughter but NOT the VALID marriage
17
D. Legitimate
filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. It

cannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending
physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child.
For then, an unwed mother, with or without the participation of a
doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her
offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative
fathers name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate
6. ALELI can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty.
Maglaya and from her student and government records which
indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her father.
2
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following: 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments;
or 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or 2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco
giving respondents hands in marriage. These papers or documents,
unsigned as they are by Francisco or the execution of which he had
no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.
San Luis v. San Luis (02/06/2007)

Justice Ynares-Santiago
D: Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent
in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to
file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were
acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Facts:
1. The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
2. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry
Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
3. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the
United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
18
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
4. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993,
she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was
raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
5. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo was joined
by his sister Linda in seeking the dismissal of the petition based on the
same grounds.
6. Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
March 5, 1994 her opposition thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public
office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
7. Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their
motions to dismiss.
8. On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the
motions for reconsideration.
9. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters
of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati
City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo
was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. Respondent moved for
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
reconsideration and for the disqualification of Judge Arcangel but said

motions were denied.
10. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the orders of the trial court. The Court of Appeals also held that
Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent.
Issues:
1. Whether venue was properly laid.
2. Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
Held:
1. Yes. The venue was properly laid. The subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the RTC which as territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
2. Yes. Respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration
Ratio:
1. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." It
is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
"domicile."
2. In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
19
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time

of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the
aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc.
3. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa.
4. Republic v. Orbecido III: Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
5. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.
6. Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file
the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
7. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the
co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
8. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in

1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file
the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
9. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
10. In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
20
APPOINTMENT OF CO-ADMINISTRATOR
Uy v. CA (03/16/06)
Justice Ynares-Santiago
D: A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises
all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration. The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate
proceedings is not prohibited.
Facts:
1. Jose Uy died intestate. Lilia Hofilena was appointed as special
administrator, but this was later on revoked and was granted to
Wilson Uy, the petitioner and one of the heirs.
2. Johnny Uy filed to intervene in the case be declared as the
administrator of the estate since he was the brother and creditor
of the decedent. Also, he had knowledge of other properties
which should form part of the estate of Uy.
3. RTC: Earlier denied Johnny Uys motion to intervene. The Cout
later on made Johnny Uy a co-administrator.
4. Wilson Uy moved that Johnny bring to the estate properties
belonging to the deceased. Unsatisfied with Johnny, Wilson filed
for the removal of Johnny as co-administrator.
5. The court denied the removal of Johnny as co-administrator
finding that the latter substantially complied with his duties. The
CA affirmed the RTC.
6. Wilson Uy is asserting that his appointment as a regular
administrator is already final, unassailable or res judicata; that
the inferior court has no authority to re-open the issue of the
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent

administrator; that private respondent is not only alien to the
estate, but has a conflict of interest with it; that the trial courts
appointment of private respondent as co-administrator constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it appointed
Johnny as co-administrator
Held: No. The RTC was correct in appointing a co-administrator
Ratio:
The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of
deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. In
the case at bar, the trial court granted letters of administration to petitioner
and thereafter to private respondent as co-administrator.
Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the preference to whom letters
of administration may be granted are as follows:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
21
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may

be granted to such other person as the court may select.
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on
the attendant facts and circumstances.
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient
reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person
enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint
another person. The determination of a persons suitability for the office of
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered
with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in
error. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In the instant case, the order of preference was NOT disregarded by the trial
court. The court deemed it proper to appoint Johnny Uy, a creditor, as coadministrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a
difficult time attending to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report
regarding the estate under his administration except those involving the cases
he filed and/or intervened in other branches. This may be due to his being
inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason enough to remove him from the
administration of the Estate as Judicial Administrator thereof. However,
considering that the Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family
and who claims to have enormous knowledge of the businesses and properties
of the decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of the court that it will be very
beneficial to the Estate if he be appointed co-administrator (without removing
the already appointed Judicial Administrator) of the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if
only to shed more light to the alleged enormous properties/businesses and to
bring them all to the decedents Estate pending before this Court.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the
powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration. The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate
proceedings is not prohibited.
of the deceased has not yet been settled and the case is still within the
jurisdiction of the court.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of coadministrators has been upheld for various reasons:
Gabriel v. CA (8/7/1992)
D: Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of
co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the
benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and
(5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office
1. To have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to

have different interests represented;
2. There justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;
3. Where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle;
4. To have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to
work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and
5. When a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office.
Issue: WON the trial court can re-open the issue of appointment if
administrator.
Held: Yes
Ratio:
In probate proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in

modifying or revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending
in the same court and timely applications or motions for such modifications or
revocations are made by the interested parties. In the instant case, the estate
22
FACTS
1. Roberto Dindo Gabriel filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
letters of administration alleging that he is the son of Domingo
Gabriel, who died 9 months earlier. He mentioned 8 other next of kin
and heirs of the decedent
2. The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition, on
which date all persons interested may show cause, why the petition
should not be granted. The order even appeared in a newspaper of
general circulation. However, no opposition was filed despite
publication of the notice of hearing. Hence, Roberto was allowed to
present his evidence exparte
3. The probate court issued an order appointing him as administrator
after giving a bond of 30,000 pesos. Subsequently a notice to
creditors for filing claims against the estate was published in
Metropolitan News. As such, Aida Valencia, mother of Roberto filed a
Motion fo File Claim of the intestate estate of Domingo Gabriel
4. Another opposition was filed by Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie,
and Matibel (all surnamed Gabriel) praying that the letters of
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
administration be instead issued to Nilda Gabriel, being the

legitimate daughter of the deceased. However, this was denied by
the probate court
5. As such, they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, This was
denied by the CA on the ground that the appointment of an
administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court
which may not be interfered with unless abused
6. In the present petition for review on certiorari with the SC, petitioners
primarily aver that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is
the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the
appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is
the widow and legal surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo
Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over private respondent
who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant
ISSUE: WON the correct was correct in appointing Roberto as administrator
despite the fact that Rule 78, Section 6 provides for an order of preference
for the appointment of an administrator
HELD: Yes, however, the Court ordered that a co-administrator be appointed
(surviving spouse of Domingo)
RATIO
1. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 783 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select
3
23
administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this

rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have
the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.
2. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her
share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as
much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly
than any other next of kin. On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas
Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has
every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the
estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate
is preferred to another who has less.
3. On the other hand, the SC felt that they should not nullify the
appointment of private respondent as administrator. The
determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not
to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in
error. Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in
the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from
removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the
legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an
administrator.
4. While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in
the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact
legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be
evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court
which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the
administrator.
5. Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of
administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
next of kin. In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
which may arise when there is only one administrator but which may
easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When
an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . .
. ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both
the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the
creditable services rendered to and which may further be expected
from private respondent for the same estate.
6. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment
of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to
have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand
that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from
any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all
interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another
competent person associated with him in the office
7. Under the circumstances obtaining herein, the court ruled for the coadministration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas
Jose-Gabriel and Roberto Dindo Gabriel
Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia Vda. De Damian

(1/27/2006)
or factions be represented in the management of the estates
Facts: Really more of a Succession case so guys, Ill just discuss the SpecPro part
that was only mentioned in the last few sentences of the Decision
1. This is about the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. In its Ratio, the Court held that these two are
24
married so lets settle with that, that Guillermo and Josefa are legally
married. This is important because this is one of the determining
factors of who their legal heirs are (yeah, memoirs of Mison)
2. Now, here is the family tree:
1st partnership
Ramon
not legally married
2nd partnership
Felisa
not legally married
Lucio
Luis
Guillermo
legally married
Josefa
Five other siblings: Nazario,

Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio
Illegitimate child of
Ampun-ampunan (not legally adopted by the couple):
Guillermina and Nanie
Guillermo with one
Amparo: Guillerma
3. From this point on, refer to the tree above in case of confusion. Let us
discuss the antecedent proceedings:
a) On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the
daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estates of the
spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia with the RTC
of Manila, Branch 55. This petition was opposed by:
the sisters of Guillermo: Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz
the heirs of Guillermos late brother, Roman Rustia,
Sr.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina

b) The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were
barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate
half-blood relative Josefa Delgado
But later it will be settled that Ramon and Felisa
were not legally married so lets settle that now
Luisa and the other claimants are also illegitimate
children and so not barred by Art. 992 of the Civil
Code to inherit from Josefa since theyre all
illegitimate children anyway
c) In November of 1975, Guillerma filed a motion to intervene
in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving
descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion
was granted
d) On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed
a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the
estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was
denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and
the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly
threshed out upon submission of evidence
e) Carlota later substituted her sister, Luisa, in 1988 because
Luisa died already. And in 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota
as administratrix of both the estates of Guillermo and Josefa
f) Much later, after some procedural bumps (not really
important), the CA held, among others, that the letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Guillermo in
relation to the intestate estate of Josefa shall issue to the
nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her
qualification and filing of the requisite bond (P500,000)
Issue: Who here is entitled to letters of administration AND will the
appointment of a co-administrator violate the Rules of Court as to the order
of preference in the appointment of an administrator?
Held: Appointment of co-administrator allowed. As to who should be the
administrator, check Ratio
25
Ratio:
1. An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the
intestate estate of the decedent
2. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select
3. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is
the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed
4. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of coadministrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand
that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estates, a situation that obviously exists here!
So the SC eventually appointed as joint administrators Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo. They
are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa and Guillermo,
respectively
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
In the Matter of the Intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Isabel

Cojuangco Suntay (1/16/2010)
or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation
which obtains here
Facts:
10. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),
married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979,
their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico
11. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband,
Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
12. Emillio III (petitioner) is an illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and
Federico but he was reared by the spouse since he was a baby and
was later on acknowledged as a natural child of Emilio I (son of
Federico) (Later, the fact also stated that Federico himself legally
adopted Emilio III)
13. While respondent in this case is a legitimate grandchild of Cristina
and Federico as she was born when Emilio I legally married
14. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration for the intestate estate of Cristina alleging
among others that she was a legitimate granddaughter of Cristina
15. Federico then filed his opposition alleging preference over
administering the estate of Cristina being the surviving spouse and
that the list of heirs of respondent was incomplete as it did not include
Emilio III
16. After a failed attempt of the parties to settle amicably, Federico
filed a manifestation nominationg his adopted son, Emilio IIII as
administrator of Cristinas estate on his behalf
17. RTC rendered a decision appointing petitioner Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate
26
18. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and
revoked the letters of administration issued to petitioner. Petitioners
MR having been denied, he appealed to SC by certiorari
Issue: Who between petitioner and respondent is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedents estate
Held: Both. They were appointed as co-administrators of the decedents
intestate estate
Ratio:
8. CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest
therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that
under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership.
9. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference
in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a)
To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b)
If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
(c)
If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
10. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on

the attendant facts and circumstances of each case
11. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant
facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint
administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmothers, Cristinas, estate
12. In Uy v. CA, SC upheld the appointment by the trial court of a coadministration between the decedents son and the decedents
brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate
13. In the same vain, the case of Delgado Vda dela Rosa v. Heirs of Vda
de Damina held that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
14. According to SC, since the subject SC calls to the succession other
putative heirs, (other grandchildren of Cristina and Federico)and
considering the conflicting claims of such heirs, the SC was impelled to
move in joint administration of the estate of Cristina
Note: I did not include the discussion relating to Art 992 of CC since its a
Succession issue and not a SpecPro issue.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS;

restriction on the powers
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon (06/08/2006)
Ponente: Austria-Martinez
DOCTRINE: Anchatas omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that
the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC
27
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and
Kyle as Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys estate according to the
project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced
respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati
property.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey
(Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years.
2. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
3. On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also
designated as executor.
4. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court
of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips
as executor due to Richards renunciation of his appointment.
5. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of
the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices
as ancillary administrator.
6. In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon
(respondent) with whom he has two children, namely,
Kimberly and Kevin.
7. On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to
probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
8. As administrator of Audreys estate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties:
(1) Audreys conjugal share in real estate with improvements
located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro
Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property)
(2) a current account in Audreys name with a cash balance of
P12,417.97
(3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth
P64,444.00.5
9. On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
28
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which
he left to Kyle.
The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court
of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty.
William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla
Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary
administrator.
Richards will was then submitted for probate before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Atty. Quasha was appointed
as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed a motion to declare
Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.
Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of
partition of Audreys estate, with Richard being apportioned
the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333
shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank
current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the
Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and
P3,104.49 in cash.
The motion and project of partition was granted and
approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12,
1988.
The trial court also issued an Order directing the Register of
Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT in the name of Richard and to
issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard
Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided
interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to
transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey
and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to
release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary
administrator for distribution to the heirs.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in the other Special
proceedings also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of
Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was
allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to
Richards three children.
17. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under

the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the
Makati property should be given to respondent.
18. The trial court found merit in respondents opposition and
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the
Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richards
entire undivided interest in the Makati property to
respondent.
19. CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts
orders
ISSUE: Whether the Petioner Ancheta did not commit fraud, either extrinsic
or intrinsic, in the performance of his duties as ancillary administrator of
Audrey oNeil Guerseys estate in the Philippines.
HELD: NO
RATIO:
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the
title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous
may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in
exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be
set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
A party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable
to negligence.
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for
the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April
7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that
petitioners failure to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the
latters declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The
CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law
of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
29
distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will.

The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute
Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally
benefit Audrey and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill.
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the
discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge
of the terms of Audreys will is immaterial in this case since it is not the
fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the
fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been
committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period
should be counted from the time of respondents discovery thereof.
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As
such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence,
and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in
entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is
not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he
expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care
and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and
ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the
standard by which his conduct is to be judged.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated
by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA
Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen
domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in
Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the
time of Audreys death, she was residing in the Philippines but is
domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated
August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphans
Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated
and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested
by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the
Orphans Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will
was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the

Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will,
especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her
national law,
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and
responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle
which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign
law in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law . In
defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however,
it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary
responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject
estate in accordance with the will of Audrey ONeill Guersey.
Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed
domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant
was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the
matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove
the national law of Audrey ONeill Guersey during the proceedings
before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in
distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws,
the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of
discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioners
abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon
petitioners pleasure as to which law should be made applicable
under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus
excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no
fault or negligence of her own, as petitioners omission was beyond
her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of
petitioners omission and it was belatedly that she realized the
adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage
of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty
to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.
JUDGE CALDONA
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
30

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JUDGE CALDONA

DIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES

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obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his maintenance up to

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ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice,

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list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage

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2. RULE: common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which

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assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined

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4. Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa

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alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors

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REMEDIES OF AGGRIEVED PARTIES AFTER EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

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extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful

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Alaban, et al. filed a petition with an application for preliminary

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a) Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party

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jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in

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