Cristina Bicchieri

Descartes Lectures

Measuringnorms:consensusandsensitivity
During the summer UNICEF training courses I had the good fortune to
direct,perhapsthemostcommonquestionraisedineverysessionwashow
todiscriminatebetweencustoms,conventionsandsocialnorms.Whenchild
marriageiswidespread,whydopeoplemarrytheiryoungdaughters?Do
theydoitbecauseitissimplyatraditiontheyfindvaluable,ordotheyfeel
compelledtodowhateveryoneelsedoes?Ifso,arethereconsequencesfor
noncompliance? If there is interdependence of decision, what sort of
interdependenceisit?Similarquestionswereraisedwhendiscussingfemale
genitalcutting(FGC).WhyispracticedinpartsofAfricabutnotinothers?
What do the groups involved think about it? All these questions were
complicatedbythepuzzlethat,whereassomeprogramsaimingatcurbing
damagingpracticeshadbeenextraordinarilysuccessful,othershadfailed.
Wasfailurepossiblyrelatedtoalackofunderstandingofthenatureofthese
practices,ofwhatmadepeoplefollowthem,ofwhatapproachwouldhave
hadthebestchanceofchangingpeoplesminds?
For sure, if a practice is interdependent, in the sense that people
followitbecauseofawebofmutualexpectations,focusingonindividual
level interventions, aiming at changing factual beliefs and attitudes, will
havelittleeffectonoutcome.Anewmothermaycometobeconvincedthat
feedingcolostrumtothenewbornisahealthypractice,thatofferingwateris
dangerousbecausethelocalwaterispolluted,andthatsomefoodsbutnot

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

othersarenutritiousandbestsuitedforfeedingbabies.Yetifhermotherin
lawisnotgoingalongwiththesenovelties,iftheelderwomeninthevillage
whoaretheholdersoftraditionsarenotonboard,behaviorwillnotchange.
Whatotherwomeninherconditiondoandwhathermotherinlawexpects
her to domatter toa womans choice, regardless of the amount of new
informationshemayhaveaboutnursing,food,andhealthychoices.Letus
call the network of people who are the mutual objects of normative
expectations the reference network. The reference network is usually
quitelocal:Peoplenormallydonotworrytoomuchaboutwhatstrangers
mightexpectofthem.Mappingthereferencenetworkisanessentialpartof
understandingsocialnorms.
We know that strategies developed at local level succeeded in
addressingsomeofthe(wrong)factualbeliefsofyoungmothersbutdidnot
foster new behaviors, probably because the mothers in law, and older
womeningeneral,whoareregardedasthedefendersofreveredtraditions,
werenotincludedintheintervention(Tchibindat2012). Similarfailures
haveplaguedprogramsaimedattheadoptionofpreventivepracticestocurb
theriskofHIV/AIDS.Paradoxically,ithasbeenobservedthatindividuals
whoareawareoftherisksassociatedwithHIV/AIDS,andknowtheways
the disease can be transmitted and prevented, do not necessarily protect
themselvesduringintercourse(Dolcinietal.2004).Ithasbeenpointedout
thatthisparadoxcouldbeunderstoodbystudyingtheroleplayedbysocial
factorsinacceptingpreventivepractices(Gausset2001).Establishedsocial
normsaboutsexuality,genderstereotypes,andbeliefsaboutillnessshape
the way people behave in sexual relationships, and mutual beliefs about

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

what is commonlydoneandwhatshould bedoneinsuch situationsare

likelytoinfluencebehavior.
AllthepracticesthatUNICEFandsimilarorganizationsaretryingto
improveonaresteepedinthicknetworksofbeliefs(factualandnormative),
sharedvalues,customsandnorms.Howtobesurethatwhatappearstobea
social norm is in fact one, and thus demands attention to empirical and
normativeexpectations, isbynomeansanobvious task. Unfortunately,
mostofthecommonlyusedresearchsurveysdonotcollectdatathatare
specifictosocialnorms.Forexample,surveysliketheDemographicHealth
Survey (DHS) gather data that measure prevalent behaviors within and
acrosscommunitiesinacountryandacrossdevelopingcountries.Themain
objective of these surveys is to gather information about socioeconomic
characteristics, maternal and child health, pregnancy history, marriage,
fertilitypreferences,etc.Throughthesesurveyswemaycometoknowthat
womeninacertaindistricthavealowrateofexclusivebreastfeedingof
newborns,whichputsthechildrenatriskofmalnutritionanddisease. To
understandwhythesepopulationsareatriskrequireshighlightingsocialand
cultural factors that play a role in supporting such harmful practices.
Knowledge,AttitudeandPractice(KAP)surveysoftencomplementDHS
data,sincetheyareexplicitlydesignedtouncoverthesocioculturalfactors
thatcontributetocertainbehavioralpatterns,betheyexclusivebreastfeeding
orcondomuse.
KAP surveys measure the knowledge of participants regarding a
domainofinterest,theirattitudestowardbehavioraroundthatdomain,and

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

theiractualpracticeswithrespecttothatdomain.1 Inthecaseofexclusive
breastfeedingofnewborns(theareaofinterest),knowledgeisassessedby
asking participants questions regarding their factual understanding of
breastfeeding,itsadvantages,drawbacks,etc.Themaingoalhereistoassess
whether the womens knowledge is consistent with current biomedical
knowledge,andhowmuchtheirknowledgedivergesfromsomeobjective
standard (Launiala 2009).This is quite different from assessing how the
localknowledgeaboutbreastfeedingislinkedtogeneralbeliefsaboutmilk,
water, food, and childrens wellbeing. From the UNICEF course
participants,IlearnedthatinmanypartsofAfricamilkisconsideredhot
andwatercold,honoredguestsaregivenwater,andchildrenaretreated
like honored guests. In some communities, children are prevented from
eatingeggs,asitisbelievedthatachildwhoeatseggswillbecomeathief.
ThemanycolorfulstoriesIheardmakeitplainhowimportantitistoknow
thelocalbeliefsthatoftenconstituteabarriertochange,soKAPsurveys
shouldbeenhancedwithquestionsthatuseethnographicdata(Stykos1981).
Thesesurveysalsomeasureattitudestowardspecificbehaviors,andassess
current practices with questions regarding behavior. Measuring attitudes
presentsaseriesofdifficulties.Firstofall,attitudesarenotoriouslydifficult
todefineinaprecise,operationalway,andtheircorrelationwithbehavioris
shaky(BicchieriandMuldoon2011).Butmostimportant,participantsmay
providesurveyworkerswithwhattheythinkisadesirableanswer,rather
thanwiththeanswerthatreflectstheirtrueattitude.Asweshallsee,better
incentivecompatiblemethodsshouldbedevised,andthedefinitionofsocial
1ForarticlesdetailingtheKAPmethodology,aswellasdiscussingitslimits,itisinstructivetogoogle
KAPsurveymethodology.

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

normsIintroducedsuggestssome. Suchmethodscouldbeemployedto
determineifasocialnormisinplace,andwhattodoaboutchangingit.
Assessing practices and identifying behavioral patterns is a useful
starting point,but much moreneeds tobe doneto uncover their nature.
Observationsofactualbehaviorareobviouslyimportant,butitisdifficultto
infer from observations alone thata social norm exists (Bicchieri 2006).
First,somenormsareproscriptive:theytelluswhatnottodo.Ifthenormis
effective,theproscribedbehaviorwillnotbeobserved. Second,astable
patternofbehaviormaybeduetowhatindividualsbelievewouldhappenif
they deviated from the underlyingbehavioral rule. Such beliefs are not
observable,noraretheyinferablefromobservedactions.Socialnormsare
often held in place by the expectation that informal sanctions such as
approvalordisapprovalwillensuefromcomplianceornoncompliancewith
thenorm.Yetapprovalanddisapprovalarehardtomeasure,mayormay
notopenlyoccurandwhatmatters,again,areindividualexpectationsabout
the potential damage/benefit that such informal sanctions will impart.
Finally,theremaybealternativesocialnormsthatentailthesamebehavioral
pattern. Suppose we observe tipping in restaurants. For example, there
might be a norm that says service should always be tipped at a certain
percentageofthetotalbill,nomatterwhat.Butanothernormmightbethat
onlydecentservicedeservesatip. Unlessweobservesituationsinwhich
weexperiencetrulyinferior service,observingtippingbehavior doesnot
allowustodiscriminatebetweenthetwopossibilities. Whatweneedisan
assessmentofthesocialnormlikelytobeinplacethatisindependentofthe
observedbehavior.

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

ThetheoryofnormsIsummarizedinthepreviouslecturecanprovide
guidance in diagnosingwith some precision the nature of the behavioral
patternsweobserve.Letusrecallthediagnosticdiagramofthefirstlecture:

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Source:C.Bicchieri,SocialNorms,SocialChange.PennUNICEFLecture,July2012

Whatthediagrampointstoaretheexpectations,orlackthereof,that
determinewhetheranobservedpracticeisindependentorinterdependent
andifso,whatsortofinterdependenceisit.Acustomisheldinplacebyits
fulfillingsomeperceivedindividualneed;expectationsarenotafactorin

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

supportingit.Forexample,weallwearwarmclothesinwinterirrespective
of what others around us do. It is an observable pattern, but social
expectations play no role in generating or supporting it. Descriptive
andsocial normsareinstead sustained by expectations, unilateral or
reciprocal,inareferencenetwork.Foraconventionlikedrivingontheright
sideoftheroad,mutualexpectationswillsufficetokeepusfollowingit.
For a social norm of reciprocity, mutual empirical and normative
expectationswillbeneededforthenormtosurvive.Thisisbecausedriving
ontherightsideoftheroadisinonesimmediateselfinterest,whereas
reciprocationmaynotbe.Especiallyinanonymousencounters,likemany
Internet commercial transactions, there is the temptation to cheat.
Normativeexpectationsoftenkeepushonest.
We thus want to supplement observation with anindependent
assessmentofindividualsempiricalandnormativeexpectations,theirbeliefs
aboutthebeliefsandbehaviorsofthepeoplewithwhomtheyinteractand
whomattertothem.Wewanttoknowaboutthereferencenetwork,andits
socialinfluenceonindividualsdecisions.Andwealsowanttoknowwhat
an individual believes would happen if she complies with the shared
behavioral rules,aswell as whatwouldhappenif shedoesnotcomply.
Thoughnormidentificationmaybeacomplextaskinreallifecaseswhere
wefaceintricatewebsofbeliefs,valuesandnorms,itprovestobeamuch
simpler task in experimental games, where we present participants with
relatively plain, anonymous choices, we can easily manipulate their
environmentandassesswhatsortofbeliefsparticipantshold,aswellashow
muchbeliefsaffectactualbehavior.Iwanttoarguethatnormidentification

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

insimplegamesoffersguidanceabouthowtoproceedinmorecomplexreal
lifesituations,aswellasthatithelpstouncovertheimportantelementswe
shouldpayattentiontoinordertopredictthatanorm,ifitexists,willinfact
befollowed.Lestthereadercomestotheconclusionthatnormidentification
isallthereistonormmeasurement,awarningisinorder: Identifyinga
norm,andmeasuringconsensusaboutitsrelevanceinaspecificsituation,
does not guarantee that the norm will be followed by all or even most
participants.Ameasureofnormativeconsensusisdifferentfromameasure
ofsensitivity,orhowmuchindividualssubscribetoanorm.Weneedboth
measurestobeabletosaythatanormexistsandisregularlyconformedto
bymembersofarelevantnetwork.

Normsandgames
So, what are these experimental games on social behavior social
scientistshavebeenusing?Typically,aproposercandecidehowtodividea
certainsumofmoneybetweenherselfandsomebodyelse.Inwhatiscalled
Dictatorgames,thedictatordecidesandthatistheendofit.Intheso
calledUltimatumgames,however,respondersgettheopportunityeitherto
accepttheproposersultimatumortorefuseitinwhichcasenobodygets
anything.(InSocialdilemmagames,subjectsdonotjustdivideafixed
sum,butgivingmoneytoothersismoreefficientthankeepingallthemoney
foroneself,sothatthereisadilemmabetweenmaximizingonesown
payoff and maximizing the payoff of the whole group.) Experimental
economiststypicallylettheirsubjectsplaysuchgamesforrealmoney,inthe

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

lab.
Now,socialnormsarewidelyinvokedtoexplaindatathataredifficult
if not impossibleto explain with existing theories of behavior. When it
lookslikethatthesocialenvironmenthasaninfluenceondecisions,social
norms get mentioned. Camerer and Fehr (2002), for example, provide a
taxonomy of the usual experimental games, from Ultimatum to Social
Dilemmas, and maintain that deviations from gametheoretic predictions
basedonselfinterestarenaturallyinterpretedasevidenceofsocialnorms.
As I mentioned before, observing behavior does not permit any firm
conclusionabouttheexistenceofasocialnormthatwouldexplainit,and
thelackofacleardefinitionofwhatanormismakesitanemptyconcept
fromwhichnosensiblepredictioncanbedrawn.
Studiesofpunishment,inparticular,areinterpretedasevidencethat
the presence of social norms elicits punishment of their violations. We
shouldhoweverdistinguishsecondpartyfromthirdpartypunishment,as
theymaybedifferentlymotivated. BysecondpartypunishmentImean
costlypunishmentofoneofmoreplayersbyaplayerwhohasaninterestin
thegame. WhenrespondersrejectlowoffersinUltimatumgames,these
actionscanbeconstruedascostlypunishmentsofunfairproposals.InFehr
andGachters(2000)studyofpunishmentinpublicgoodsgames,punishing
lowcontributorsoccursbyplayerswhohaveastakeinthegame,atacostto
thepunisher.Bythirdpartypunishment,incontrast,Irefertopunishment
by a subject who has no monetary interest in the game, and is just an
externalobserverofwhatotherplayersdid. FehrandFishbacher(2004)
showthatthirdpartyobserversarepreparedtopunish,atasmallcostto

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10

themselves, dictators who gave too little to receivers. Second party

punishment may be motivated by anger, resentment, reputation and
deterrenceeffects,moralisticaggression,imaginedorrealsocialpressure,or
acombinationofthem.Dependingonthegame,wecanruleoutsome,but
not all reasons. We can tell that punishment has a major effect on
contributionsandonthesustainabilityofcooperativebehaviorinrepeated
socialdilemmagames(FehrandGachter2000).Whatwecannotsaywith
certainty,justbyobservingpunishingbehavior,iswhat motivatesplayersto
punish.Ifonebelieves,withgoodreason,thatpunishmenthasadeterrent
effect,thenitmakessensetochastisedefectionssoastoencouragefuture
cooperationfromonespartners. Itmayalsobethecasethataplayeris
convinced that punishing noncooperators is the right thing to do. Her
retributiveactionwillbemotivatedbyapersonalnorm,notbyasocialnorm
or deterrence considerations. Another player may instead be disposed to
leniency,andthisplayermaynotwanttopunishdefectorsbutforthefact
thatshebelievesitisasociallyapprovedbehavior,expectedofher.Inthis
case,realorimaginedsocialpressureleadshertopunish.Toconcludethat
secondparty punishment indicates the presence of social norms is
premature.
Third party punishment is more interesting, as some of the above
mentionedmotivationsarelikelytobeabsent.Itwouldseemtobeaclearer
case of a behavior that is norm induced, as Fehr and Fishbacher (2004)
conclude. Yeteveninthiscasewecannotunambiguouslystatethekindof
norm (moral or social) we are dealing with. When Jason Dana and I
conductedasurveyof126undergraduatesatCarnegieMellonUniversity,

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11

theywerecastintheroleofthirdpartiesjudgingthefairnessorunfairnessof
awholerangeofpossibledictatorsoffers,aswellashowcommonsuch
offerswouldbe(Bicchieri2006,p.137). Amajorityof56%thoughtthat
(10,0)wouldbethemostcommonallocation.70participantsthoughtthatno
divisionwasunfair,and56insteadconsideredatleastsomedivisionsunfair.
When askedto hypothetically punish offers that they considered
unacceptable,only34%ofthosewhofeltnothingwasunfairchosetopunish
atleastoneallocation,whereas77%ofthe56participantswhofoundsome
allocationstobeunfairpunishedatleastsomeallocation.Overall,54%of
thestudentschosetopunishatleastoneallocation,buttherewasaclear
splitbetweenthosewhoconsideredallallocationsacceptableandthosewho
insteaddrewsomelimit. Askedaboutpunishingsomeallocationsatno
costtothem,evensomeofthetolerantmightbeinducedtopicksomethat
areunfair,butIdoubtthatinarealisticenvironmentsuchpeoplewould
bother. Whenwedidalogisticregressionofadummypunish/nopunish
variableonbothcommonandfairvariables,itturnedoutthatcommonwasa
significantpredictorofpunishment,whereasfairwasnot.Participantswere
more likely to punish an offer that violated what they thought was
commonly done than one that offended their sense of fairness. The
conclusion we may draw is that punishment in Dictator games may not
revealanunderlyingfairnessnormsharedbymostparticipants.2
Observingbehaviorinasinglegamedoesnotallowustoderiveany
conclusionaboutthepresenceofasocialnormor,moregenerally,about
whatmotivatesactorstoactastheydo. Forsure,observingbehaviorin
2ForadiscussionofDictatorgamesandfairnessnorms,seeGualaandMittone(2010).

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12

different,butsomewhatrelatedexperimentalgamescanhelpeliminatesome
hypothesesaboutmotives.Forexample,thehypothesisthatofferingclose
toequalsharesinUltimatumgamesreflectsaltruisticmotivesisrefutedby
observingthatinDictatorgames,inwhichrecipientscannotpunish,offers
are much lower and, in double blind experiments, in which a subjects
identityisknowntoneithertheothersubjectsnortheexperimenter,become
extremelylow(Hoffmanetal.1994).Aplayerwhoisaltruisticallymotivated
shouldnotcarewhetherherrecipientcanrespondtotheoffer(andpossibly
reject it)or must simplyacceptwhatever isoffered.Thehypothesisthat
players are motivated by inequality aversion can similarly be tested by
presentingplayerswithaseriesofsimpleUltimatumgamesinwhichthe
Proposer has two possible alternatives, one of which is constant across
games(Falketal.2000).Theconstantalternativeis$8fortheProposerand
$2 for the Responder, whereas in each treatment the second alternative
varies($5,$5or$2,$8or$10,$0).Belowisasummaryoftherejectionrates
foreachofthedifferentUltimatumgamesinwhich$2wasoffered:

Source:Falketal.2000

Whenthe(8,2)offeriscomparedtothe(5,5)alternative,therejectionrate
is 44.4%, much higher than the rejection rates in each of the other

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13

treatments.Infact,therejectionratedependsonwhatthealternativeis.The
rejection rate decreases to 27% if the alternative is (2, 8), and further
decreasesto9%ifthealternativeis(10,0).Asinequityaversionistreated
asastabledisposition,responderswouldbeexpectedtorejectanofferof$2
withthesamefrequencyacrossgames. Clearlysomeothermotiveisat
work.
WhenexplainingbehaviorintheaboveseriesofUltimatumgames,
oneistemptedtosaythatthehighrejectionrateobservedwhenthesecond
alternativeis(5,5)isduetothefactthatrespondersarebeingfocusedona
norm of fairness, whose violation triggers an angry response. This
explanationpresupposesthatpresentingresponderswithafairalternative
prompts expectationsthat must be felt to be legitimate, or their violation
wouldnotprovokeapunitivereaction.Wemaygetalittleupsetwhenwe
getlittleornomoneyfromarandomdevice,aswehopedformore,butwe
usuallydonotrejecttheoffer. Itisadifferentfeelingthatweexperience
whenweknowthatsomeonecouldhavesharedwithusherunearnedbounty
andintentionallychosenotto.Rejectionfollowsfromviolationofwhatwe
thinkarereasonableexpectations.
A normbased explanation presupposes the existence of normative
expectationsthatsupportthenorm,butusuallynoattemptismadetogauge
them.Indirectlyderivingthenormsthatmightbeatworkfromparticipants
choices ishopelesslycircular: we want to explain behavior by invoking a
norm,butwetheninferthenormfromthatverybehavior.Weareleftwith
the task of providingindependent evidence that a norm exists and is
perceivedasrelevanttothesituationbyparticipants.

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Elicitingexpectations
Thefirststeptointroducenormsintheexplanationofbehaviormust
beaspecificationofwhatanorm is. Therearemanydefinitionsinthe
literature(BicchieriandMuldoon2011),butnoneofthemisoperational,in
thesenseoflendingitselftopredictionsabouttheconditionsunderwhicha
normwillexist,aswellastheconditionsunderwhichitwillbefollowed.
Anoperationaldefinitionisalsoonethatsuggestswaystoidentifynorms
independentlyofbehavior.LetmebrieflysummarizewhatItaketobethe
existenceconditionsforasocialnorm(Bicchieri2006):
Anormisabehavioralrulethat:
1. isknowntoexistandapplytoaclassofsituations
2. isfollowedbyindividualsinapopulationif
a. it is believed that sufficiently many others follow it
(empiricalexpectations)
b. it is believed that sufficiently many others believethe
ruleshouldbe followed, and/or may be willing to sanction
deviationsfromit(normativeexpectations)
Thisdefinitionimpliesthatcompliancewithanormisconditionalonhaving
therightkindofexpectations.Itfollowsthatanormmayexistandnotbe
followedatagiventimeifempiricaland/ornormativeexpectationsarenot
met. For example, if one came to realize that many individuals in his
neighborhoodhavetemporarilystoppedpayingtheirduesforthecommon
garden,onemayconcludeitistimetostoppaymentsforthetimebeing,

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eveniftheconvictionthatallshouldcontributeisunabated. Inthiscase,
empiricalexpectationshavechanged,leadingtoachangeinbehavior. It
mayalsohappenthatnormativeexpectationsareabsent:supposeproposers
aretoldthatrespondersinanUltimatumgamebelievethatarandomdevice
willdeterminetheiroffer. Inthatcase,proposerscanbeprettysurethat
responderswillnotfirmlyexpectafairoutcome,sincetheybelievechance
determineswhattheywillget. Also,responderswillprobablyacceptany
offer,forthesamereason.Theydonothaveanormativeexpectationabout
whattheyshouldbeoffered,sincetheythinkthereisnopersonandthusno
intentionbehindtheoffer.Heresomeonewhoisnormallybentonchoosing
afairdivisionmaybetemptedtokeepall,sincethenormativeexpectation
(andtheriskofpunishment)isabsent.
Theconditionalaspectofnormfollowingdifferentiatesanormbased
explanation from those that employ the concept of social or moral
preference. Conforming to a fairness norm is different from having a
preferenceforfairness:ImayconformtoafairnessruleifIhavetheright
kindofbeliefsaboutwhatotherswhoarerelevanttomydecisiondoand
thinkIoughttodo,butImaycarelittleaboutfairnessperse.Iconditionally
prefertobefair,butImaynothaveapreferenceforfairness. Insocial
preferencemodels,fairnessistreatedasastabledisposition,andvariations
in behavior aredifficult toexplain withinthat framework(Bicchieri and
Zhang2011).Aconditionalpreferenceaccountinsteadoffersthepossibility
of empirically testing if a change in expectations induces predictable
changes in behavior. Were the expectations that support a norm to be
different,wewouldpredictbehaviortochangeinspecificdirections.

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16

Totestthatachangeinexpectationsinducesachangeinbehaviorwe
mustbeabletodotwothings:measureexpectationsandmanipulatethem.
Letsdiscussforamomentwhatmanipulatingexpectationswouldinvolve.
We may aim to change (or create)expectations directly, by giving new
informationtotheplayers, or wemay dosoindirectly, bychangingthe
conditions in which a game is played. An example of indirect
interventionisto allow preplay communication;it is well established that
whenplayerscandiscussthegame,highlevelsofcooperationfollow.Inthis
caseplayersmaybeinducedtocooperatebecauseofmutualpledges,andthe
subsequentexpectation that promises will be kept and cooperation
reciprocated.Normsofpromisekeepingandreciprocityaremadesalientby
thecontentofcommunicationthatelicitstherelevantsharedexpectations
(Bicchieri 2002).Adifferentwaytoinduceachange in(or creationof)
expectationsisbymanipulatingtheinformationplayersreceive. Wemay
usesocialhistory,tellingplayerswhatotherssimilarlysituateddidorsaid
shouldbedoneinpreviousgames(BicchieriandXiao2009). Orwemay
use external advice about what a player ought to choose (Schram and
Charness2012).InBicchieriandXiao,thesocialhistoryseemedtoprovide
a focal point, or reference, in a situation like the Dictator game that is
ambiguous to start with. When social history made generosity relevant,
dictatorsbecamegenerous,andexpectedequallygenerousoffersfromthe
other dictators in the experiment. When social history pointed to self
interestasdominant,dictatorsbecamemoreselfish,andexpectedgreater
selfishness in their peers. Social history induced mutually consistent
expectations about similar behavior on the part of other dictators in the

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game. It was these expectations, and not beliefs about what responders
expectedtoreceive,thatmotivateddictatorsbehavior.Anotherexampleof
directmanipulationofexpectationsisthroughinformationalasymmetries,as
whenproposersinanUltimatumgameknowthattheirchipsareworththree
times more than the chips of the responders, but they are also told
respondersdonotknowit(Kageletal.1996).Inthiscase,proposerscan
(anddo)cheatwithimpunity,offeringhalfofthechipsinsteadofthefair
share(3/4),becauseresponderswillnotbeabletotellthattheirnormative
expectationshavebeeninfactflouted.
In all these cases, we should be able to independently measure
playersexpectations,andhowtheyinfluenceobservablebehavior.Wecan
checkpreandpostcommunicationexpectations,howexpectationsdiffer
after different social histories, andwhether changes fromsymmetricalto
asymmetricalinformationaffectproposersbeliefs.Sinceweareinterested
inexpectationsthatsupportsocialnorms,however,wealsoneedtocheck
thatanormisindeedinplace,orthattheappropriatemutualexpectations
exist.

Normidentification
Havingdefinedwhatanormis(abehavioralrulesupportedbymutual
empiricalandnormativeexpectations),wemustshowthatinfactanorm
existsfortheplayersinaspecificexperimentalsituation.Afterall,inorder

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tocomplywithanorm,playersmustbeawareofit,andbelievethatthis
particularsituationisonetowhichanormapplies. We maythinkthata
normoffairnessiselicitedinanUltimatumgame,butmaybetheplayers
thinkotherwise. Weshouldnot presuppose thatbehaviorisnormguided,
evenwhenwehaveastrongsensethatitmightbe. Itmustbeprovedthat
indeed participants havetheappropriate normativeexpectations,andthat
thoseexpectationsaremutuallyconsistent.Thisdoesnotguaranteethatthe
norm,ifitexists,willbeobeyed;itwilljusttellusthatplayersknowit
existsandappliestotheirsituation.Armedwiththisknowledge,wecould
thenmanipulateplayersexpectationsandcheckunderwhichinformation
conditionstheywillconformtothenorm.
Thefirstandmostimportantstepisthusanindependentassessmentof
players expectations. Questionnaires are the tool of choice to find out
whetherparticipantsinexperimentsareawarethataspecificnormappliesto
theirsituation,aswellastomeasureconsensusaboutthesalienceofthe
norminthatsituation.Aproblemwithquestionnairesisthatrespondersdo
nothaveaparticularincentivetobesincere,accurate,orthinkseriously
aboutthequestion. Thisisexactlywhyexperimentaleconomistsobserve
peoplesbehavioringamesforrealmoney.Atfirstsighttherethusseemsto
be a dilemma: either you properly incentivize or you go for cognitive
information. Another problem has to do with the experimenter demand
effects(Rosenthal,1976; Zizzo2010):respondersmaywanttosaythings
that they believe will please the experimenter. Anonimizing answers is
thoughttosolvethelastproblem.Nevertheless,fullanonymity,especially
withsubjectsbeingfullyconvinced/awareofit,isdifficultinpractice.Some

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degree of experimenter demand effect might be inevitable after all.

Moreover, according to selfimage maintenance theory, even in fully
anonymous situations, subjects might still answer in a biased way to
maintain a good selfimage, which remains a validity problem for un
incentivized questionnaires. Thus, it is all the more important to pay or
remuneratesubjectsinotherwaysfortheircorrectanswerstoalleviatethe
problemwhenelicitingtheirsecondorderbeliefs.
Whatsortofquestionsshouldbeasked?Dependingonthecontext,
wemaywanttoassessalloracombinationofthefollowing3:

1. Personalnormativebeliefs:doyoubelieveisfair,appropriate,should
bechosen,
2. Empirical expectations(incentivized): how many participants do you
thinkchoose,what doyouthinkmostparticipants choose, whatthe
majorityofparticipantschoose,Ifyourguessiscorrect,youearna$
bonus
3. Normative expectations (incentivized): guess how many other
participantsbelieveisfair,appropriate,shouldbechosen,Ifyour
guessiscorrect,youearna$bonus

When a social norm exists, and applies to a specific situation,

normativeexpectationswillbemutuallyconsistent.Thatis,mostparticipants
willbelievethatmostotherparticipantsthinkthataspecificruleofbehavior
shouldbefollowedinthatsituation.Notethattoidentifyanormwedonot
3Eachquestioncanberepeatedforeachoptionavailabletotheparticipants.

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necessarilyneedtoquestiontheparticipantsinanexperimentalgame.We
mayalsoaskthirdpartiestoobservetheresultsofoneormoregames,and
elicitboththeirpersonalbeliefsaboutappropriatebehavior,aswellastheir
secondorderbeliefsaboutwhatmostotherthirdpartiesthinkisappropriate
behavior(normativeexpectations).Inthiscase,too,mutualconsistencyof
normative expectations tells us there is a norm, and is relevant to that
situation.
Since norm transgression usually triggers some form of negative
sanction,anotherwaytocheckforthepresenceofnormsistoaskpeople
whetheraspecificbehaviorelicitscondemnationorpunishment.Notethat
wecannotestablishthatthereisanormonlybyaskingpeoplewhetherthey
wouldpunishdeviantbehavior.Dependingupontheirpersonalvalues,some
wouldpunishnomatterwhat,andotherswouldnot.Somemayfeeladeep
personalallegiancetoanorm,whereasothersmayjustabidebyitinthe
right circumstances, but evade it whenever possible, and thus look upon
transgressorswithgreat indulgence. Ifweinsteadaskpeoplewhatthey
expectotherstodo(willmostpeoplepunish?),thenwehaveabetteridea
of what sort of behavior is socially required, provided individuals
expectationsareinagreement(Bicchierietal.2011). Onlywhenthereis
such a consensus we are justified in claiming that a norm is present.
Nevertheless,itisstillinterestingtoaskpeoplewhethertheythemselves
would punish the deviant behavior. The comparison between their own
opinionabouttheseriousnessofdeviantbehaviorandtheirbeliefsabout
othersopinionmightcapturethedegreeofentrenchmentofthesocialnorm.
The bigger the difference between respondents own opinion and their

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beliefsaboutothersopiniononhowbadthebehavioris,theeasieritmight
betochangethesocialnorm
Tosummarize:toidentifyanormweneedtoestablishthatthereis
consensusaboutwhatactionsareappropriate/inappropriateinwhatsituation.
Thiscanbedoneinavarietyofways.Wemayindirectlyaskwhatactions
would bring about punishment, and check for mutual consistency of
empiricalexpectations.Orwemaydirectlyelicitpersonalnormativebeliefs
about specific actions, measure secondorder beliefs about what others
believe is appropriate/inappropriate, and check for mutual consistency of
normativeexpectations.Thelastisthemethodofchoicetodetectcasesof
pluralisticignorance.Sincewehavecollectedpersonalbeliefs,wecaneasily
measurewhetherparticipantssecondorderbeliefsarecorrect. Perceived
consensusandobjectiveconsensusmaydiffer:whensecondorderbeliefs
are mutually consistent but systematically wrong, we know that people
upholdanormtheydislike. Iftheirdoubtsarenotshared,thenormwill
persist.

Normcompliance
AsImentionedattheoutset,toidentifyasharednormthatappliesto
agivensituationdoesnotimplythat,inthatspecificsituation,itwillalways
befollowed. Experimentalgamesagainareausefulstartingpoint,since
theyletusmanipulateplayersexpectationsinacontrolledway,toassess
underwhichconditionsnormswillbeobeyedorevaded. Atleastforthe
population under study, systematic deviations from a norm we have

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identified measure how much individuals adhere to the norm, or their

sensitivitytoit.
Thereareseveralcasesinwhichindividualsmaybetemptedtoskirta
norm they know applies to their situation. I am not referring here to
individualsthatwouldregularlyevadeexistingnorms.Suchpeopleexist,
buttheyareaminority.Ireferinsteadtopeoplewhowouldregularlyobeya
normundertherightconditions,butavoiditonothers.Theinterestingcases
are those that present ambiguities that can be exploited to a players
advantage. The ambiguity may be created by a divergence between
empirical and normative expectations, or by the presence of alternative
normative expectations. For example, when empirical and normative
expectations diverge, players may be tempted to cast weight on those
expectationsthat allowthemtoevade anonerousnorm.Wheneveryone
bribes, it is very tempting to follow the crowd, even if the normative
messagesaysotherwise. Wheninsteadmultipleinterpretationsofanorm
areavailable,orwhenseveralnormsmayapplytothesamesituation,itis
temptingtoadoptonethatfavorsus. Theliteratureonselfservingbiases
hasmanysuchexamples.
TakeKnez&Camerer(1995)Ultimatumgameexperiment:Insteadof
specifying that each party earns nothing if the responder rejects, they
assignedpayoffsof$3.00totheproposerand$2.00totheresponderincase
ofrejection.Undertheinterpretationoffairnessasequalityinpayoffs,offers
of $5.00 are fair. However, because the responder can earn $2.00 by
rejecting,anotherinterpretationoffairnessisequaldivisionofthesurplus
abovetheoutsideoffers. Inthiscasetheproposersofferof(5.50,4.50)

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equalizesthedifferencebetweenreceivedandforegonepayoff(5.503=
2.50,and4.502=2.50.)Whereasaveragerejectionratestypicallyare5
25%,inthestudyofKnez&Camererrejectionrateswerecloseto50%.
They interpret their results by suggesting that proposers and responders
adoptedselfservingbeliefsaboutwhatconstitutedafairoffer.
Kagel, Kim, & Moser (1996) manipulation of shared information
about monetary payoffs is another study of egocentric biases. In an
Ultimatumgame,playerswereaskedtobargainoverdivisionsof100chips
whichwereworththreetimesasmuchforoneoftheplayers($0.30vs.
$0.10perchip).Whenchipswereworthmoreforproposers,andthiswas
commonknowledge,Kagelandhiscolleaguesconcludethatbothproposers
and responders adopted selfserving fairness beliefs: proposers offered
slightlymorethanhalfthechipsbutnothingcloseto75%ofthechips,which
wouldbeanofferofhalfthemoney,andrespondersrejected39%ofthe
time.Proposerswantedtoofferafairshareofthechips,whereasresponders
thoughttheyshouldgetafairshareofdollars.
Althoughthesestudiesinferredthatindividualsadoptedselfserving
interpretationsabout what constituted fair behavior,theydidnotdirectly
measure fairness beliefs, and instead based their inferences on behavior
alone.Atleasttwomechanismscouldgiverisetotheobservedbehavior.On
theonehand,proposersmightgenuinelybelievethatunevenmonetarysplits
arefair.Ontheotherhand,proposersmightbelievethatunevenmonetary
splitsareunfair,butbelievethatrespondersbelievethatsuchsplitsarefair.
Uneven offer behavior is consistent with either explanation, but the
psychologicalmechanismsunderlyingthesetwoexplanationsaredifferent.

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Inthefirstcase,aselfservingbiasleadsproposerstoconsiderunevensplits
tobefair.Theychoosetobelievenotonlythatanunevensplitisfair,but
alsothatresponderswouldfinditfair.Giventhatbothevenanduneven
splitsarethoughttobenormativelyacceptable,proposerschoosetheone
thatyieldsahigherpayoff.Inthiscase,theplayersthemselvesmanipulate
their normative expectationstojustifyaselfservingchoice. This might
havebeentheunderlyingreasoningintheKnezandCamererexperiment,as
wellasintheKageletal.experimentwhenplayershadcommonknowledge
ofthedifferentmonetaryconversionvalues. Hadwebeenabletoelicit
players personal normative beliefs about fair splits, as well as their
normative expectations about what both proposers and responders
consideredfairsplits,wewouldbemoreconfidentinclaimingthatwehave
observedselfservingbiasesofthefirsttype.
In the above examples, the ambiguity in interpreting what fair
divisionmeansopensthewaytodifferentinterpretations,somefavoring
oneofthepartiesovertheother.Therejectionratesshowthatthereisno
unanimousagreementabouttheplausibilityofthealternativeinterpretation
offairdivision.Yetproposersmaynothaveconsciouslyviolatedtheequal
division rule, as they could justify their choice as guided bya plausible
alternativerule.Whataboutproposersthatknowinglymakeanunfairoffer,
suffernobeliefbias,andjustrelyonthefactthatresponderscannottellwhat
isgoingon?Inthiscase,playersdonotchoosewhattobelieve. Instead,
theychoosetofloutanormtheyknowholdsinthatsituation.Anexampleof
suchpatentlyunfairbehavioroccursinatreatmentoftheKageletal.(1996)
experiment. WhenonlyProposersknewthatthechipswereworththree

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timesasmuchforthem,theyoffered,onaverage,onlyhalfofthechips.In
thiscase,rejectionswerelow(andlikelyexpectedtobelow.)Hadproposers
beenfair,theyshouldhaveofferedofthechipstoresponders.Thislatter
caseisoneinwhichasymmetricinformationletplayersevadeanormwith
impunity.
To check for the effects of asymmetric information, Bicchieri and
Chavez (2010)performed a withinsubjects experiment in which players
werefacedwithrandomlymatchedopponentsinaseriesofoneshotgames.
Withinsubjects experiments can be particularly revealing, as the same
subjectscanbeobservedtorespondverydifferentlytosmallchangesin
information conditions. In the experiment I am going to describe, the
existenceandpertinenceofsocialnormswasmeasuredthroughincentivized
questionnaires.Sotherecanbenodoubtthatparticipantsknewwhatnorm/s
applied to their situation, as well as being reasonably sure that other
participants,byandlarge,sawthesituationastheydid.
We designeda variant of the Ultimatum game that(a) permitted
multipleinterpretationsofwhatcouldconstituteafairofferand(b)created
informational asymmetries between proposers and responders. Proposers
and responders first and secondorder fairness beliefs were measured,
allowingustoindependentlycheckforthepresenceofsocialnorms,aswell
as to subsequently examinehow different information conditions impact
peopleswillingnesstoobeythenormstheyagreeapplytotheirsituation.
Our experimental design employed a variant of the Ultimatum Game in
whichoneparticipant,theproposer,provisionallyreceived$10provided
bytheexperimenterandthenproposedadivisionofthatmoneytoan

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26

anonymous responder. The responder subsequently decided to accept or

reject the proposal. If the responder accepted, both players received the
amountsspecifiedintheproposal.Iftheresponderrejected,bothplayers
received$0.Theproposerchosefromoneofthethreefollowingoptions:

A:(5,5)topropose$5fortheProposerand$5fortheResponder;
B:(8,2)topropose$8fortheProposerand$2fortheResponder;
C:Cointolettheoutcomeofafaircoinflipdeterminetheproposal:Heads
correspondsto(5,5)andtailsto(8,2).
Participants played three Ultimatum games under different information
conditionsinawithinsubjectsdesign.Inthe publicinformationcondition,
all participants understood that the Coin option was available and that
responderswouldknowiftheproposerwithwhomtheywerepairedchose
Coin.Inthe privateinformationcondition,respondersdidnotknowthat
Coinwasavailabletoproposers,andproposerswereawareofthisfact.In
the limitedinformationcondition,participants knewthattheCoinoption
was available, but that the responder would not be able to distinguish
whether the proposer chose (5,5) or (8,2) directly, or chose Coin whose
outcomewas(5,5)or(8,2).
Weintroducedameasureoffirstandsecondorderbeliefstocheckwhether
therewasconsensusamongplayersaboutwhatoption/swerefair. This
assessmentwasrepeatedforeachUltimatumgameplayedbyparticipants.
Hereissomeoftheinformationwegathered:

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Responderspersonalnormativebeliefs(firstorder)aboutthefairness
oftheoptions:responderswereaskedwhethertheythoughteachof
(5,5),(8,2),andCoinwasfair(bycondition)
Responders and proposers normative expectations (secondorder
beliefs)aboutwhatproportionofrespondersbelievedeachof(5,5),
(8,2) and Coin was fair (by condition). If the guess was correct,
playersearnedaonedollarbonus.
Responderspersonalbeliefsaboutfairnesswereinlinewithwhat
theyexpectedmostotherrespondersconsideredfair,i.e.firstandsecond
order beliefs (i.e., normative expectations)of responders were mutually
consistent. Moreover, also the secondorder beliefs of proposers and
respondersweremutuallyconsistent,suggestingthatboth(5,5)andCoin(in
smaller percentage) were deemed fair and acceptable. When normative
expectationsaremutuallyconsistent,itmeansthereisconsensusaboutwhat
mostpeoplethinkisappropriatebehavior,andwecanconcludethatasocial
normisinplace.
Did proposer exploit informational asymmetries? As the following
figureshows,theydid. ThefrequencyofCoinwashighestinthepublic
informationcondition,whentheCoinoptionwascommonknowledge,and
itsresulttransparent.Hereproposerscouldnotignorenormativeexpectations
tomakeafair offer,but Coingavethemanadvantageover (5,5). The
frequencyof(8,2)washighestinthelimitedcondition,inwhichproposers
couldtakeadvantageoftheopacityofthesourceoftheiroffer.Theycould
getawaywithunfairbehaviorduetotheinformationalasymmetry.

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

Source:BicchieriandChavez,2010

28

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Theaboveexperimentoffersacombinationof normviolation(the
offerof$2inthelimitedcondition)andnormmanipulation(thechoiceof
Coininthepubliccondition). Normmanipulationwasmadepossibleby
presentingparticipantswithtwopossibleinterpretationsoffairness:(5,5)and
Coin. Fairnesscouldbeinterpretedasequalityofoutcomes,butalsoas
proceduralfairness,inthatacointossisgenerallyseenasafairwayto
decidetheoutcome.Thechoiceofoneparticularinterpretationoffairness
maybeselfservinginaveryconsciousway,butwewouldknowitonlyafter
elicitingplayersbeliefs.Inourexperiment,Coinsexpectedutilityis$3.5
forresponders,whichislessthanthe$5theywouldgetfromanequalshare.
AselfservingproposermaybelievethatCoinisunfair,butalsobelievethat
most responders believe it is fair. This discrepancy between first and
secondorder beliefs would tells us that the proposers choice of
Coinselfishlyandconsciouslyexploitswhatshethinksarethenormative
expectations of responders. In the 2010 experiment, we did not ask
proposerswhattheypersonallythoughtwasfair,sowecouldnottelliftheir
choiceofCoinwastheresultofselfservingbeliefs,whereproposersthink
that Coin is fairand that responders think it is fair, too. In subsequent
experiments,weelicitedproposersbeliefstoanswerthisquestion(Bicchieri
andChavez2012).Wecametotheconclusionthatwhatappearsasaself
serving bias seems to be rooted in the participants desire to convince
themselvesthatwhatbenefitsthemisalsoright,andapprovedbythosewho
willbeartheconsequencesoftheiractions.
Another case of selfserving bias is one in which there may be
multiple norms that apply to the same situation. In this case, too,

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30

independently assessing expectationsprovides abetter understanding ofthe

natureofsuchbiases.XiaoandBicchieri(2012)examinedTrustgamesin
which there appeared to be a conflict between equality and reciprocity
norms. Thereweretwoconditions.Thebaselineconditionwasastandard
trustgame.Twoparticipantswererandomlyassignedtherolesofinvestor
and trustee. Each of them was given 40 experimental dollars. 4 The
investorcouldretainherwholeendowment,inwhichcasethegameended,
orshecouldtransfer$10tothetrustee.Iftheinvestortransferred$10tothe
trustee,thisamountwasmultipliedby3,sothattheinvestorthenhad$30
andthetrustee$70,andthiswascommonknowledgeamongparticipants.
Thetrusteecouldnowsendbackanyamountofmoneybetween$0and$30
(in$5increments).Inthebaselinecondition,themostsalientamountsto
send back were $0 (the trustee behaved selfishly), $10 (the trustee
reciprocated)and$20(thetrusteereciprocatedandachievedequality,witha
finalgainof$50each).Themodalanswerwastosendback$20,whichcan
be explained by the fact that it satisfies both equality and
reciprocity.Thestandardtrustgamewascontrastedwithasecond,asymmetry
condition. In this condition the investor initially received $80 while the
trusteereceivedonly$40.Thechoicesforbothparticipantswerethesame,
but their effects were different. Here if the investor transferred $10, she
achievedequality,witheachplayerholding$70.Ifthetrusteesentback$0,
she kept all the transferred money while also satisfying equality. If she
transferred $10 or more, she reciprocated but violated equality. In the
asymmetrycondition,amajorityoftrusteessentback$0.Theirviolationof
4 Experimental dollars are only worth 1/6th of their nominal amount in dollars, but
for the sake of convenience they will be referred to as $.

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reciprocity may result from a convergence of selfinterest and supportof

equality.
Inatrustgametheinterestsofinvestorsandtrusteesarenotfullyaligned.It
isthereforenotsurprisingthattrusteessupportequalitywhenitisintheir
interest to demand equality, and back reciprocity otherwise. A simple
conclusionisthatindividualsdisplayaselfishselfservingbias,consciously
privilegingachoicethatbestservestheirinterests.Adifferenthypothesisis
thatsomeofthetrusteeswhobehavedselfishlythoughtofajustificationfor
theirbehavior,namelythatitrespectedanequalitynorm.Intheiroriginal
experiment, Xiao and Bicchieri hypothesized that selfserving biases in
choosingtoprivilegeaparticularsocialnormoccurwhenthechoiceofthat
normispubliclyjustifiableasreasonable,evenifnotoptimalforoneofthe
parties. This suggestion is supported by the literature on motivated
reasoning. Many experiments have shown that people are apt to find
rationalizationsforbehaviortheywanttoengagein(Valdesolo&DeSteno,
2008).Yettheirabilitytorationalizetheirbehaviorisnotunlimited:they
needtofindareasonfortheirbehaviorthat,theythink,wouldpassmuster
withtherelevantaudience(Kunda,1990).
In the asymmetry condition of Xiao and Bicchieri (2010), it is
plausiblehoweverthatsomeofthetrusteeswhosentback$0thoughtofa
justificationfortheirbehavior,namelythatitrespectedanequalitynorm.In
linewiththeliteratureonmotivatedreasoning,thisjustificationshouldfind
somedegreeofsupportamongthirdparties.Ifajustificationonlysatisfied
the person producing it, it would be moot.The nature of the original
experiment prevented testing this hypothesis, as the quality of public

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32

justificationcanbestbeassessedbyaskinguninvolvedthirdpartiestakeon
theissue. Thirdpartiesmayholdtheviewthatareciprocitynormtrumps
anyconsiderationofequality.Thiswouldmeanthattrusteeswhosentback
$0intheasymmetryconditionarenotreallytryingtoengageinjustifiable
behaviorbutmerelyfollowingtheirselfinterest.Orthirdpartiescouldside
withthetrusteesandagreethatitismoreimportanttorestoreequalitythanit
istoreciprocate(atleastwheninequalityisnotstronglyjustified,asisthe
caseintheoriginalexperiment).Theresultsofasubsequentexperimental
surveysupportthehypothesisthatbiasesarenotalwaysunilateralselfish
assessments(BicchieriandMercier2012). Instead,theyoccurwhenthe
choicetofavoraparticularnormissupportedbyasharedsensethatitisa
reasonableandjustifiablechoice.
Wehaveseenthatnormcomplianceisdiminishedinsituationswhere
normscanbemanipulated,aswhentherecanbedifferentinterpretationsofa
norm, or different norms can be invoked. It is also lessened when
transgressioncanbehidden. Whenanormissecretlybreached,wemay
concludethatthetransgressorssensitivitytothenormislow,inthatevenif
she knows what she is expected to do, the absence of monitoring (and
sanctions)leadshertoignorethenorm.Thecaseofnormmanipulationis
morecomplex,aspeoplemayhaveajustificationforchoosinganalternative
interpretationoradifferentnorm,respectively. Still,atleastinthecase
wherebeliefscouldbeelicited(BicchieriandChavez2010,2012),itappears
thatproposerssensitivitytofairnessasequalitywasmuchdiminishedby
theexistenceofanalternative. Finally,therearecasesinwhich,evenif
sensitivity to a norm could have originally been high, feedingconflicting

Cristina Bicchieri
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33

empiricalinformationmaylowernormativeexpectationstoapointofno
return.Asintheexampleofcontributingtothemaintenanceofacommon
garden,theholdofanormthatrequiressharingtheburdenmayconsiderably
weakenwhenonerealizesthatmanyofthosewhoshouldpaytheirdues
skirttheirduty.
InanexperimentconductedwithErteXiao(BicchieriandXiao2009),
weexposeddifferentdictatorgroupstoalternativesocialhistories. Social
histories differed about the message: some told the players what other
similarlysituatedplayersdid(eithertheymadeagenerousofferoraselfish
one),otherstoldplayerswhatothersimilarlysituatedplayerssaidoughtto
bedone(eitheroneshouldmakeagenerousofferoraselfishone).Wethen
measured our dictators' expectations about what other dictators in the
present experiment would do. Clearly these expectations weredirectly
influencedbythemessagetheplayersreceived. Wealsoshowedthatthe
newly formed expectations influenced behavior in the same direction.
Interestingly, both descriptive messages (what others did) and normative
messages (what others say one should do) had a major influence on
expectations and subsequent choices, when they were the only message
received. Typically social norms combine descriptive and normative
elements:webelievepeopleobeythenorm,andwealsobelievetheythink
weoughttoobeyit.Receivingjustonemessageprobablyledtheplayersto
inferthatthenormative(orempirical)missingpartwasconsistentwiththe
messagescontent.
Whathappenswhenempiricalandnormativeexpectationsdiverge?
We explored this possibility by giving groups of dictatorscontradictory

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34

messages.Forexample,dictatorsweretoldthatamajorityofdictatorsina
previousexperimentbehavedselfishly,butalsothatamajorityofdictators
inadifferentearlierexperimentsaidthatoneshouldmakeagenerousoffer.
We observed that empirical expectations (what others did)
dominatenormativeexpectations(whatotherssayoneshoulddo)indirecting
individual choices. In particular, bad examples completely crowd out
positivenormativemessages.Thisisadiscouragingrealizationifwehope
tochangebehaviorbydisseminatingnormativemessages.Itis,however,an
importantpieceofinformationifouraimistochangeanorm.Changewill
occur when empirical expectations have changed, since in this case the
threatofsanctionswilldisappear.Ifwerealizethatasignificantnumberof
peopleinourrelevantnetworkarebehavingdifferently,wewilllosethefear
thatwewillbepunishedifwetransgressanormthatmanyhavealready
abandoned.

Throughtheeyesofothers
Howcanweapplywhatwehavelearnedaboutidentifyingnormsin
thelabtoreallifecases?Theimportanceofincentivizedmeasuresofsecond
order expectations does not change from the lab to the field, and the
evaluationoftheconditionsunderwhichanormwillbefollowedisnotof
lesser consequence because we are now dealing with untidyrealities.
Measuringconsensusaroundtheappropriatenessofcertainbehaviors,and
theintensitywithwhichpeopleadheretosuchbehaviorsremaincentralto
understandingwhyandunderwhichconditionscertainpatternsofbehaviors

Cristina Bicchieri
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35

persist. In the UNICEF universe, the cases of interest regardcommon

practices,suchaschildmarriage,genitalcutting,limitedbreastfeedingor
open defecation, that produce physical harm and/or longterm socio
economicdamagetothetargetsofsuchpractices.Someofthesecasesare
drivenbysocialnorms,othersarecustoms,andyetothersseemtobepure
conventions, devoided of a normative component. Encouraging change
requiresunderstandingthereasonsbehindactions,aswellashowtheactors
themselvesviewtheirpractices.
Astartingpointshouldbelearningthefactualbeliefsthataccompany
thebehaviorsofinterest.Thisisthelocalknowledgethatisoftenreferredto
whenpeopleareaskedwhytheydoperformcertainactions.Thesebeliefs
maybefalse,asthoseconnectedtobreastfeedingusuallyare;e.g.,firstmilk
(colostrum)isdirty;thebabyneedswatertosurvive;ifthechildeatseggs,
hewillbecomeathief;ifthemotherispregnantagain,milkwillbecome
poisonous,etc. Factualbeliefsmayhoweverbetrue,asthoseconnected
withchildmarriageoftenare;e.g.,agirlmayeasilylosehervirginity;early
marriageprotectsthegirl,buildstiesamongfamilies,paysfamilydebts,
easestheeconomicburdenofthefamily,keepsthecostofdowryaffordable;
older,moreeducatedwomenwillnotfindahusband,etc.Suchbeliefsare
part of the reasons why individuals adopt certain behaviors, approve of
them,andreproachthosewhoactinwaysthatwouldharmothers,bethey
childrenoradults,becausetheydisregardwhatisgoodforthem.
Yetweknowthatinterventionsaimedatchangingfalsebeliefsoften
fail.Ibelievethishappensfortworeasons.Ontheonehand,theremaybea
failuretorealizethat beliefs,betheyfactualornormative,arepartof a

Cristina Bicchieri
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36

conceptualstructureofideasandvalues,attitudes,idealsandstereotypesthat
helppeopletoorganizeandunderstandtheworldtheylivein. Inthethird
lecture,Ishalladdresstheissueofbeliefchange,butforthemomentletme
just point up that even simple beliefs such as water is good for the
newbornarepartofalargersetofideas,likethedivisionoffoodsandeven
activitiesintohotandcold,thatpeoplemayfinddifficulttoabandon.On
theotherhand,conceptualstructuresareshared,sonottoaddresstheentire
collectivewouldbeamistake.Onemaycometobeindividuallyconvinced
thatfirstmilkisgood,butwhowantstobetheonlyonewhosaysanddoes
things differently? Those who may be disposed to change often face a
problemofcollectiveaction,andunlessthereisconfidencethattherelevant
network,oratlestpartofit,supportsandwillenactthechange,theriskof
sufferingnegativeconsequencesloomslarge.Thisproblemispresenteven
whenbeliefssuchaseducatedwomenwillnotfindahusbandaretrue,and
the intervention aims to let people realize that education and personal
development are good things, also for women, and that these are things
whicharerenderedimpossibleunderthecurrentsystem,sothatitwouldbe
good to enact a few changes (change the attitudes of men towards
women,risethemarriageage,etc.) Again,firstmoversmayfearputting
themselvesatadisadvantage,andsorefrainfromaction.
Thebeliefsofinterestarelinkedtopractices,andthepracticesare
collectiveones. Whenweobserveabehavioralpattern,wewanttoknow
whetherthepatternisperceivedassuchbythepartiesinvolved,i.e.,we
wanttoknowifempirical expectationsexist.Itthusmakessensetoask
participants questions about certain specific actions they perform. For

Cristina Bicchieri
Descartes Lectures

37

example, in the case of breastfeeding, wemay inquireabout first milk

(colostrum), offeringwater tothe child,stopping breastfeeding after two
months,orfeedingbabiesspecificfoods.Wewanttoknowwhatwomenin
thecommunitythink some, most or allnewmothersdo regardingeachof
these practices. We want to know if certain behaviors are perceived as
common,normal,andgenerallyperformedwithinacommunity.Wewould
asksimilarquestionsaboutthefrequencyofchildmarriage,condomuse,
honorkillingoropendefecation. Thefactthatnewmothers,families,or
villagemembersarewidelyexpectedtoperformcertainactions,however,
doesnottelluswhethertheseactionsareindependent,asinthecaseofa
shared custom, or interdependent, as in the case of norms, be they
descriptiveorsocial. Bythesametoken,itdoesnottelluswhetherthe
behavior is approved, who approves of it, and if deviations would be
reprimandedorworse.
Notethat a practice isinterdependentamongthemembers of some
specificreferencenetworkthatneedstobeidentified.Thereferencenetwork
includes all others whose actions and expectations affect an individuals
actions. WhenIdriveinPhiladelphia,myreferencenetworkareallthe
otherdriversandpedestrianswithinthecity.InAfghanistan,thereference
network for child marriage is the tribal group within which wives are
exchanged,whichmaybewidespreadandcompriseseverallocations. Ina
village,thereferencenetworkforlatrineadoptionisallwhodefecatearound
thevillageandwhoareharmedbyopendefecation.Toidentifyareference
network,weshouldaskquestionsaboutthepeoplewhoseactions,beliefsor

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attitudesindividualstakeintoaccountwhendecidingwhethertoperforma
certainaction.
Havingestablishedthatindividualshaveempiricalexpectationsabout
certain behaviors, we want to find out if they have conditional or
unconditional preferences for acting in the expected way. A practice is
independent if we prefer to act in a specific wayregardless of what we
believeothersinourrelevantnetworkdoand/orthinkweshoulddo.Our
preferenceisunconditionalinthissense.Forinstance,ifparentschooseto
vaccinatetheirchildirrespectiveofwhattheirrelatives,neighborsandfriends
do,thentheycouldbesaidtohaveanunconditionalpreferencetovaccinate
theirchild.Inthiscase,itwouldbeinaccuratetoexplaintheirchoiceby
appealtoasocialnorm,becausetheirchoicewouldbethesameinspiteof
thegeneralnormsthatmaybesharedintheircommunity.Onthecontrary,a
practiceisinterdependentifweprefertoactinaspecificwaybecauseof
whatwethinkothersinourrelevantnetworkdoand/orthinkweshoulddo.
Our preferences are conditional on such expectations. Individual choices
might be fully explained by conditional preferences and empirical
expectations, without any reference to normative expectations. Here, the
personactsinacertainwaybecausetheyexpectotherstodoso,butnot
becausetheyareexpectedto.Forinstance,ifafamilyinIndiamarrieswithin
theircastebecausetheyexpectotherfamiliestomarrywithintheircaste,
theymayactbecauseof(a)aconditionalpreferencetomarrywithintheir
casteifotherfamiliesdosoand(b)theempiricalexpectationthatother
familieswillmarrywithintheircaste.Suchafamilyneednotbelievethat
theyarenormativelyexpectedtomarrywithintheircasteinorderforthemto

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doso.Theymayjustwanttocoordinatewithotherfamilies,dowhatothers
similar families do. Here, we would explain such behavior through a
convention,notasocialnorm.Onthecontrary,whenapracticeisasocial
norm,orissupportedbyasocialnorm,theoughtcomponentisprominent.
Not only are individuals expected to act in a specific way, they are
reprimanded and negatively sanctioned in a host of ways if they fail to
perform.
Toknowthatasociallysharednormativecomponentispresent,we
shouldcheckfornormativeexpectations.AsImentionedattheoutset,KAP
questionnairesonlyaskquestionsaboutpersonalattitudes/normativebeliefs.
Questionsmayvaryfromdoyouthinkitisagoodthingtodo/nottodo,
doyouapprovedoing/notdoingtowhatwouldbetheconsequences
for(thebaby/thegirl/thefamily,etc.)ofdoing/notdoing.Thelastkind
of question should be aimed at uncovering what actors believe are the
concreteconsequencesofcertainbehaviors(thebabymightdie,thegirlwill
be dishonored, etc.) We may get answers that show a positive
attitude/personal normativebeliefaboutacertainbehavior,oftencoupled
withfactualbeliefsthatsupportit.Knowingthepersonalnormativebeliefs
ofthepopulationofinterestdoesnottellusthatasocialnormexists,asthe
only way to determineit is through the mutual consistency of their
(incentivized) normative expectations. Asking about personal
attitudes/normativebeliefsisstillimportant,becausewewanttocompare
these beliefs with the normative expectations about what people expect
others thinkthey should do. Wemaycometorealize,forexample,that
somepeoplemaybemanyhavenegativeattitudestowardbehaviorsthey

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believemostpeopleintheirrelevantnetworkstronglyapproveof.Thereare
reportsofsituationsinwhichonly1%ofrespondentsthinkitisokforaman
tobeathispartner,butthesesamerespondentsalsobelievethat50%often
do,andspousalviolenceisfrequent (Kwazulu/Natal,USAID). Thesemen
maythinkthattheyareexpectedtobeattheirwiveswhentheygetangryor
quarrel,andwouldberidiculedordiminishediftheydonot.Thisdivergence
betweenwhatonewouldwanttodoandwhatoneisexpectedtodomay
makebehavioralchangesomewhateasier,asmakingrealattitudespublic
knowledgehelpstheprocessofchange.
Therearemanywaystogaugeifthebehaviorinquestionisgenerally
approvedandexpected,andwhoapprovesofit.Isanyonetellingtheactors
toperformorrefrainfromcertainactions?Whowouldwanttheactorsto
do/notdocertainthings?Doactorsbelievemostpeopleintheirrelevant
networkthinktheyoughttobehaveinacertainway?Whatwouldhappenif
theybehaveddifferently?Wouldsomeonepunishthem?Thepurposehereis
to uncover what respondents believe about their reference group. If
respondentsnormativeexpectationsaremutuallyconsistent,weknowthata
socialnormexists.
Thereareotherwaystoidentifysocialnorms,similartothethirdparty
assessmentsweemployinexperimentalgames. Wecouldasktheactors
whethertheywouldbewillingtosanctioncertainactions,andhowmany
other respondents they believe would be willing to sanction. The latter
questionshouldbeincentivized,tocheckifthemodalsanctioningbehavior
matchesthemodalanswer.

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41

Oftenthesequestionsareexpressedinthehypotheticalmode. How
wouldtherespondentreactifsheobserved(orweretoldabout)behavior
that is contrary to what is normally done and expected?When we ask
individualstoentertainhypotheticalscenariosinwhichtheyorsomeoneelse
failtoperformcertainactions,wealsowouldwanttoknowifpunishmentis
considered legitimate. Social norms often engender expectations of
compliancethatarefelttobereasonable,andcloseinasensetohavinga
righttoexpectcertainbehaviorsonthepartofothers,whothereforeare
perceivedashavinganobligationtoactinspecificways. Questionslike
Isitrightthatsomeoneismadetodoeveniftheydonotwantto?If
you knew someone who did not do it would be right for you to
report/admonish/punish ... this person? would be appropriate in this
context.Secondorderbeliefsareespeciallyimportantsincetheytellus,if
mutually consistent, that there is widespread agreement that certain
transgressionsrightfullydeservepunishment.
Hypotheticalquestionsmaybedifficult,astheyrequirethecapability
toanswerwhatifquestions,andimaginescenariosthatmayseemprima
facieimpossible.Theyrequiretheabilitytoassumeastrueclaimsthatmay
conflictwithwhatisacceptedastrue,andlackofsuchabilitymaylead,for
example,todenythatthesuggestedscenarioispossible.Itmaybeeasierto
answerhypotheticalquestionsaboutthefuture(whatifweretodo..?)than
counterfactual questions about the past (what if had not done ..?), or
questionsaboutfantasycharactersratherthanfamilyandfriends.Wewould
therefore have tojudge with suitable means whether the individuals
interviewedareableentertainhypotheticalandcounterfactualscenarios.

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42

Counterfactual questions are especially important to establish that,

indeed, respondents have conditional preferences. In laboratory
experiments,wealterexpectationsviamessages,socialhistoryorpreplay
communication,andcheckwhetherbehaviorisaffected.Theseexperimental
manipulationscanbeapproximatedbyaskingactorsiftheywouldchange
theirusual,sociallyacceptablebehaviorifrelevantothershavechangedit,
or if they were to receive different advice, or people in their relevant
network thought they ought to do things differently. Suppose we have
establishedthatacertainruleofbehavioriscollectivelyapproved,andthat
theactorswearequestioningthinkthatmost(orevenall)therespondents
believeitoughttobefollowed.Wemaythenpresentscenariosinwhich
empirical expectations have changed, scenarios in which normative
expectations have changed, and scenarios in which one expectationhas
changedbuttheotherhasnot.Wouldanewmotherbewillingtogivefirst
milktoherbabyifsheweretofindoutthat(one,someormost) other
womensheknowsweretodoit?Wouldshebewillingtogivefirstmilktoher
babyifsheweretofindoutthatnobodyelsewilldoit,buthermotherinlaw
thinkssheshoulddoit?Whatifhermotherinlawwerestillagainstgiving
firstmilk,butmostotherwomenwerenowgivingittotheirbabies?
Throughquestionnaires,wecanmeasureperceivedconsensusaround
theappropriatenessofcertainbehaviors,andidentifytherulesofbehavior
peopleshareandadhereto.Wecanalsomeasuretheintensitywithwhich
peopleadheretotheserules,andtheconditionsunderwhichtheymaybe
temptedtobehavedifferently. Counterfactualquestionsmeasurepotential
normevasion,butalsotelluswhetheranormhascausalefficacy,andthe

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mechanism (preferences and expectations) through which norms induce

conformingbehavior. Inthenextlecture,Ishallexaminetheconditions
underwhichanormwilllikelybeabandoned,oranewnormemerge.

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Bothareincentivecompatiblemethods.
1. giveyourownpersonalratingofeachpossibleaction
2. giveyourassessmentofthemajorityratingofeachpossibleaction
Canthismethodbeusedtodisclosepluralisticignorance?
Describe choice environment, including set of possible actions that are
available. Ask to evaluate (in)appropriateness of each action. If ones
appropriatenessratingforanactionisthesameasthemodalresponseinthe
experiment,onegetsaprize. Anormprovidesafocalpointtomakethe
choice most in line with this norm the expected equilibrium in the
coordinationgame