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Ombudsman Act -Secs 21, 24, 14, 27

-relate to Sec 40, LGC -EXCEPTION: Lingating v Comelec

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Section 24. Preventives Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and
(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman
are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion
for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: provided, that only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
(1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.( NA AMEND NA NI Kay sa Admin Order no. 07, RULE 43- CA 15 days)
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may
Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (LINGATING VS COMELEC)

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.


Respondent Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan on January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992,
and again in the May 8, 1995 elections, he was reelected.
Petitioner alleged that in 1991, during his first term as mayor of Lapuyan, respondent Sulong, along with a
municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals,4 was administratively charged (AC No. 1291) with various offenses,5 and that, on February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. Petitioner
claimed that this decision had become final and executory, and consequently the then vice-mayor of
Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor vice respondent Sulong on March 3, 1992. (REMOVED
Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory. He averred
that after receiving a copy of the decision on February 17, 1992, he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or
notice of appeal thereof on February 18, 1992; that on February 27, 1992,
In the May 1992 elections, respondent Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur despite
the decision of the Sangguniang dismissing him from office. In the 1995 May elections, respondent Sulong
ran and won the mayoralty elections of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur.
Petitioner cites Reyes v. Commission on Elections14 in which we held that an elective local executive officer,
who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a
candidate for a local elective position under 40(b) of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: whether or not the foregoing decision [in AC No. 12-91], assuming it has become final and executory,
constitutes a ground for the disqualification of herein respondent-movant as a candidate in the elections [of May 14,

Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public
funds, has not until now become final.
Sulong filed a "motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal;" that on February 27, 1992, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment; and that
the complainant in AC No. 12-91 has not filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolved
respondents motion. The filing of his motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from becoming final.
There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del
Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having
become moot and academic because it was "overtaken by the local elections of May [11,]1992."
Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest ranking
municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, be
considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made
pursuant to 6816 of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases
immediately executory.
Having come to the conclusion that respondent Sulong is not disqualified from holding the position of
mayor of Lapuyan, it is unnecessary to pass upon petitioners contention that, as the candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes, he is entitled to be installed as mayor because the votes cast in favor of
respondent Sulong were void.