contending counsels cannot be entirely in the dark in this regard.

I feel that it must have been

precisely because of such awareness that despite my known public participation in the discussion of
the question herein involved, none of the parties have sought my inhibition or disqualification.
Actually, although it may be difficult for others to believe it, I have never allowed my preconceptions
and personal inclinations to affect the objectivity needed in the resolution of any judicial question
before the Court. I feel I have always been able to appreciate, fully consider and duly weight
arguments and points raised by all counsels, even when they conflict with my previous views. I am
never beyond being convinced by good and substantial ratiocination. Nothing has delighted me more
than to discover that somebody else has thought of more weighty arguments refuting my own,
regardless of what or whose interests are at stake. I would not have accepted my position in the Court
had I felt I would not be able to be above my personal prejudices. To my mind, it is not that a judge has
preconceptions that counts, it is his capacity and readiness to absorb contrary views that are
indispensable for justice to prevail. That suspicions of pre-judgment may likely arise is unavoidable;
but I have always maintained that whatever improper factors might influence a judge will unavoidably
always appear on the face of the decision. In any event, is there better guarantee of justice when the
preconceptions of a judge are concealed?
Withal, in point of law, I belong to the school of though that regards members of the Supreme Court as
not covered by the general rules relative to disqualification and inhibition of judges in cases before
them. If I have in practice actually refrained from participating in some cases, it has not been because
of any legal ground founded on said rules, but for purely personal reasons, specially because, anyway,
my vote would not have altered the results therein.
It is my considered opinion that unlike in the cases of judges in the lower courts, the Constitution does
not envisage compulsory disqualification or inhibition in any case by any member of the Supreme
Court. The Charter establishes a Supreme Court "composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices", with the particular qualifications therein set forth and to be appointed in the manner therein
provided. Nowhere in the Constitution is there any indication that the legislature may designate by law
instances wherein any of the justices should not or may not take part in the resolution of any justices
should not or may not take part in the resolution of any case, much less who should take his place.
Members of the Supreme Court and definite constitutional officers; it is not within the power of the
lawmaking body to replace them even temporarily for any reason. To put it the other way, nobody who
has not been duly appointed as a member of the Supreme Court can sit in it at any time or for any
reason. The Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court composed as the Constitution ordains that
power cannot be exercised by a Supreme Court constituted otherwise. And so, when as in the instant
cases where, if any of the member of Court is to abstain from taking part, there would be no quorum
and no court to render the decision it is the ineludible duty of all the incumbent justices to
participate in the proceedings and to cast their votes, considering that for the reasons stated above,
the provisions of Section 9 of the Judiciary Act do not appear to conform with the concept of the office
of Justice of the Supreme Court contemplated in the Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The very nature of the office of Justice of the Supreme Court as the tribunal of last resort and bulwark
of the rights and liberties of all the people demands that only one of dependable and trustworthy
probity should occupy the same. Absolute integrity, mental and otherwise, must be possessed by
everyone who is appointed thereto. The moral character of every member of the Court must be
assumed to be such that in no case whatsoever, regardless of the issues and the parties involved, may
it be feared that anyones life, liberty or property, much less the national interests, would ever be in
jeopardy of being unjustly and improperly subjected to any kind of judicial sanction. In sum, every
Justice of the Supreme Court is expected to be capable of rising above himself in every case and of
having full control of his emotions and prejudices, such that with the legal training and experience he
must of necessity be adequately equipped with, it would be indubitable that his judgment cannot be
but objectively impartial, Indeed, even the appointing power, to whom the Justices owe their positions,
should never hope to be unduly favored by any action of the Supreme Court. All appointments to the
Court are based on these considerations, hence the ordinary rules on inhibition and disqualification do
not have to be applied to its members.
With the preliminary matter of my individual circumstances out of the way, I shall now address myself
to the grave issues submitted for Our resolution.
-I-

In regard to the first issue as to whether the questions posed in the petitions herein are political or
justiciable, suffice it for me to reiterate the fundamental position I took in the Martial Law cases, 1
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As We enter the extremely delicate task of resolving the grave issues thus thrust upon Us. We are
immediately encountered by absolute verities to guide Us all the way. The first and most important of
them is that the Constitution (Unless expressly stated otherwise, all references to the Constitution in
this discussion are to both the 1935 and 1973 charters, since, after all, the pertinent provisions are
practically identical in both.) is the supreme law of the land. This means among other things that all
the powers of the government and of all its officials from the President down to the lowest emanate
from it. None of them may exercise any power unless it can be traced thereto either textually or by
natural and logical implication.
"The second is that it is settled that the Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme
Court as the ultimate arbiter of all conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means.
While the other Departments may adopt their own construction thereof, when such construction is
challenged by the proper party in an appropriate case wherein a decision would be impossible without
determining the correct construction, the Supreme Courts word on the matter controls.
"The fifth is that in the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the Executive by the
Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court
and the inferior courts, is the very whole of that power, without any limitation or qualification.
"From these incontrovertible postulates, it results, first of all, that the main question before Us is not in
reality one of jurisdiction, for there can be no conceivable controversy, especially one involving a
conflict as to the correct construction of the Constitution, that is not contemplated to be within the
judicial authority of the courts to hear and decide. The judicial power of the courts being unlimited and
unqualified, it extends over all situations that call for the ascertainment and protection of the rights of
any party allegedly violated, even when the alleged violator is the highest official of the land or the
government itself. It is, therefore, evidence that the Courts jurisdiction to