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IDENTITY THEORY
An early form of identity theory held that each type of mental state, such as pain, is identical
with a certain type of physical state of the human brain or central nervous system. This
encountered two main objections. First, it falsely implies that only human beings can have
mental states. Second, it is inconsistent with the plausible intuition that it is possible for two
human beings to be in the same mental state (such as the state of believing that the king of
France is bald) and yet not be in the same neurophysiological state.
As a result of these and other objections, type-type identity theory was discarded in favour of
what was called token-token identity theory. According to this view, particular instances or
occurrences of mental states, such as the pain felt by a particular person at a particular time,
are identical with particular physical states of the brain or central nervous system. Even this
version of the theory, however, seemed to be inconsistent with the plausible intuition that felt
sensation is not identical with neural activity.
FUNCTIONALISM
The second major theory of the mind, functionalism, defines types of mental states in terms of
their causal roles relative to sensory stimulation, other mental states, and physical states or
behaviour. Pain, for example, might be defined as the type of neurophysiological state that is
caused by things like cuts and burns and that causes mental states such as fear and pain
behaviour such as saying ouch. Functionalism avoids the second objection against the typetype identity theory mentioned abovethat it seems possible for two people to be in the
same mental state but not in the same neurophysiological statebecause it is not
committed to the idea that the neurophysiological state that plays the causal role of pain
must be the same in all people, or the same in people as in nonhuman creatures. This
point was often expressed by saying that functional states exhibit multiple realizability.
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Functionalism was inspired in part by the development of the computer, which was understood
in terms of the distinction between hardware, or the physical machine, and software, or the
function that the computer performs. It also was influenced by the earlier idea of a Turing
machine, named after the English mathematician Alan Turing. A Turing machine is
an abstract device that receives information as input and produces other information as output,
the particular output depending on the input, the internal state of the machine, and a finite set
of rules that associate input and machine-state with output. Turing
definedintelligence functionally, in the sense that for him anything that possessed the ability to
transform information from one form into another, as the Turing machine does, counted as
intelligent to some degree. This understanding of intelligence was the basis of what came to be
known as the Turing test, which proposed that, if a computer could answer questions posed by
a remote human interrogator in such a way that the interrogator could not distinguish the
computers answers from those of a human subject, then the computer could be said to be
intelligent and to think. Following Turing, the philosopher Hilary Putnam held that the human
brain is basically a sophisticated Turing machine, and his functionalism was accordingly called
Turing machine functionalism. Turing machine functionalism became the basis of the later
theory known as strongartificial intelligence (or strong AI), which asserts that the brain is a kind
of computer and the mind a kind of computer program.
In the 1980s Searle mounted a challenge to strong AI. Searles objections were based on the
observation that the operation of a computer program consists of the manipulation of certain
symbols according to rules that refer only to the symbols formal or syntactic properties and
not to their semantic ones. In his so-called Chinese-room argument, Searle attempted to
show that there is more to thinking than this kind of rule-governed manipulation of symbols.
The argument involves a situation in which a person who does not understand Chinese is locked
in a room. He is handed written questions in Chinese, to which he must provide written Chinese
answers. With the aid of a computer program or a rule book that matches questions in Chinese
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answers. With the aid of a computer program or a rule book that matches questions in Chinese
with appropriate Chinese answers, the person could simulate the behaviour of a person who
understands Chinese. Thus, a Turing test would count such a person as understanding Chinese.
But by hypothesis, he does not have that understanding. Hence, understanding Chinese does
not consist merely in the ability to manipulate Chinese symbols. What the functionalist theory
leaves out and cannot account for, according to Searle, are the semantic properties of the
Chinese symbols, which are what the Chinese speaker understands. In a similar way, the Turingfunctionalist definition of thinking as the manipulation of symbols according to syntactic rules is
deficient because it leaves out the symbols semantic properties.
A more general objection to functionalism involves what is called the inverted spectrum. It is
entirely conceivable, according to this objection, that two humans could possess inverted color
spectra without knowing it. The two may use the word red, for example, in exactly the same
way, and yet the color sensations they experience when they see red things may be different.
Because the sensations of the two people play the same causal role for each, however,
functionalism is committed to the claim that the sensations are the same. Counterexamples
such as these demonstrated that similarity of function does not guarantee identity of subjective
experience, and accordingly that functionalism fails as an analysis of mental content. Putnam
eventually agreed with these and other criticisms, and in the 1990s he abandoned the view he
had created.
ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
The most radical theory of the mind developed in this period is eliminative materialism.
Introduced in the late 1980s and refined and modified throughout the 1990s, it contended that
scientific theory does not require reference to the mental states posited in informal, or folk,
psychology, such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, and intentions. The correct view of the human
mind, according to eliminative materialism, is that there are no mental states in the folkpsychological sense and that the mind is nothing more or less than the brain. Furthermore,
because there are no mental states, both the identity theory and functionalism are trying to do
the impossiblei.e., to reduce nonexistent mental events to neural activity. Just as late
18th-century chemical theory did not try to reduce the fictional concept of phlogiston to
molecular states but simply dispensed with any reference to it, so the entire mentalistic
vocabulary of folk psychology can be eliminated in a sophisticated scientific theory of
the mind. Such a theory will simply describe how the brain works.
Three main objections were posed against this view. The first was that it failed to explain how
semantic properties such as meaning, truth, and reference could be elicited from, or
instantiated in, neural activity. In brief, this objection argued that it is simply a conceptual
mistake to try to ascribe truth or falsity, or any semantic property, to brain processes, as
eliminative materialism would seem to require. The second objection was that eliminative
materialism denied the existence of certain things that all accept as real: namely, felt sensations
(known as qualia). To deny that qualia exist is tantamount to saying that there are no such
things as sounds, only air vibrating at various frequencies.
The third objection to eliminative materialism emphasized the fact that each person has access
to his own mental experiences in a way that no other person has. Pains and visual images, as
well as countless other kinds of thought, possess a kind of subjectivity that cannot be captured
in a purely scientific account, because scientific descriptions concern only the objective
properties of natural phenomena. There were many variants of this position. Among the
philosophers who rejected reductivism on these or other grounds were Searle, Roderick
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philosophers who rejected reductivism on these or other grounds were Searle, Roderick
Chisholm, Zeno Vendler, Thomas Nagel,Roger Penrose, Alastair Hannay, and J.R. Smythies.
That there are still divisions among analytic philosophers concerning the theory of reference
and the theory of mind (though in much-altered form) shows both the continuity of the
movement and the changes that have occurred. Although it is not possible to forecast the
future trends in analytic philosophy in any detail, it seems likely that the two general
approaches to the discipline established by Russell and Moore, formalism and informalism, will
continue well into the 21st century.
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