Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010


Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?

By

Laura
Stanworth






Abstract



This
 paper
 begins
 by
 assessing
 the
 basic
 premise
 for
 and
 the
 origins
 of
 the
 doctrine
 of
 the

responsibility
 to
 protect.
 As
 states
 within
 Africa
 have
 been
 used
 as
 case
 studies
 to
 highlight
 the

importance
of
this
rising
doctrine,
the
paper
then
flows
in
to
a
brief
discussion
of
why
the
cases
have

been
 limited
 in
 this
 way;
 concluding
 that
 in
 a
 continent
 fraught
 with
 civil
 war
 and
 unrest
 they

provide
 an
 ample
 discussion
 basis.
 The
 case
 studies
 of
 Somalia,
 Rwanda
 and
 Sudan
 are
 then

investigated
 in
 turn,
 each
 highlighting
 different
 difficulties
 that
 the
 international
 community
 has

faced
 in
 deciding,
 not
 only
 whether
 or
 not
 to
 act,
 but
 how
 and
 when.
 For
 a
 more
 in
 depth
 and

empirical
debate,
the
paper
then
discusses
the
international
legal
principles
and
constraints
that
not

only
prevent
states
acting,
but
also
enforce
them
to
in
limited
circumstances.
This
is
followed
by
a

brief
look
at
the
theoretical
surroundings
of
the
doctrine
and
how
these,
alongside
the
practical
and

legal
 implications
 already
 discussed,
 will
 shape
 the
 future
 of
 the
 doctrine
 of
 the
 responsibility
 to

protect.
 To
 conclude,
 it
 is
 established
 that
 even
 though
 states
 do
 have
 a
 responsibility
 to
 protect

through
a
developing
international
norm,
it
is
yet
to
be
seen
whether
this
will
evolve
in
practice,
or

whether
states
will
avoid
acting
for
reasons
of
self‐preservation.



 
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


Introduction


Responsibility
to
Protect
(R2P)
necessitates
striking
a
balance
between
placing
the
individual
as
the

referent
object
at
the
heart
of
international
relations
and
security,
and
then
adapting
this
in
a
way
in

which
 state
 sovereignty
 can
 also
 be
 respected.
 Evidence
 of
 this
 balance
 can
 be
 identified
 as
 all

doctrine
 surrounding
 the
 use
 of
 R2P
 is
 emphasising
 that
 states
 will
 only
 intervene
 when
 the
 host

state
 is
 unwilling
 or
 unable
 to
 protect
 its
 citizens.1
 The
 responsibility
 to
 protect
 as
 a
 concept

emerged
 as
 a
 semantic
 shift
 away
 from
 ‘a
 right
 to
 intervene.’
 The
 civilian
 protection
 agenda
 was

already
 an
 established
 norm
 based
 on
 international
 humanitarian
 law
 and
 therefore
 also
 on
 the

protection
of
human
rights.
The
key
difference
is
that
the
civilian
protection
agenda
is
based
around

protecting
one’s
dignity
and
R2P
around
protecting
one
against
force.This
came
after
The
Cold
War

when
there
was
room
for
fresh
debate
and
a
political
shift
within
the
international
community.
The

move
 was
 seen
 as
 necessary
 after
 the
 international
 community
 failed
 to  prevent
 or
 stop
 mass

killings
during
the
1990s,
Rwanda
and
Bosnia
being
the
main
examples.
State
sovereignty
became
a

major
discussion
point
as
international
law
has
long
been
based
around
the
principle
of
equal
and

sovereign
states.
The
International
Commission
on
Intervention
and
State
Sovereignty
(ICISS)
report

circumvented
 this
 by
 suggesting
 that
 sovereignty
 was
 interlinked
 with
 responsibility;
 in
 order
 to

remain
sovereign
a
State
had
to
accept
responsibility
for
the
fate
of
its
citizens.2
This
responsibility
is

two‐fold;
 default
 responsibility
 is
 that
 of
 the
 host
 state
 and
 coincides
 with
 notions
 of
 state

sovereignty
whereas
residual
responsibility
lies
with
the
wider
international
community.



In
 order
 to
 provide
 a
 reasoned
 answer
 to
 this
 question,
 this
 paper
 will
 centre
 on
 Africa.
 As
 a

continent
fraught
with
civil
wars,
it
represents
a
vast
percentage
of
the
United
Nations
budget,
time

and
resources.


Basic
Premise
for
R2P


Whilst
 there
 is
 no
 need
 to
 go
 in
 to
 depth
 at
 this
 juncture
 about
 the
 reasons
 for
 R2P,
 as
 these
 will

become
clear
throughout
the
paper,
it
is
worth
outlining
the
basic
arguments
for
the
establishment

of
such
a
doctrine.
R2P
is
a
doctrine
rather
than
a
principle
because
it
is
a
continuum
(prevent,
react,
































































1

‘Unwilling
or
unable’
within
the
context
of
host
states
failings,
can
be
found
a
staggering
eight
times
within

the
International
Commission
on
Intervention
and
State
Sovereignty
Report
alone.
Including
in
the
foreword 
(pg.
VIII)
and
listed
within
the
basic
principles
(pg.
XI).

2

This
notion
has
also
been
strongly
endorsed
by
Secretary
General
–
Special
Representative
Francis
Deng

‘Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management In Africa’
Washington
D.C
(1996)


2


Published
by
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GOA:
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March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


rebuild)3
and
is
not
isolated.
It
encompasses
more
than
a
mere
foundation
upon
which
a
decision
to

intervene
can
be
made.




R2P
 was
 endorsed
 after
 the
 international
 community
 failed
 to
 prevent
 and
 protect
 on
 several

occasions
when
millions
of
people
could
have
been
saved.
In
this
sense
the
international
community

is
not
being
asked
to
look
out
for
and
protect
other
states,
but
rather
to
save
citizens
of
the
human

race
 to
 which
 we
 all
 belong.
 The
 premise
 for
 this
 argument
 is
 based
 around
 the
 morality
 of

preventing
mass
killings.
This
was
made
clear
by
Kofi
Annan
in
his
address
to
the
International
Peace

Academy
Seminar
when
he
wholeheartedly
endorsed
R2P.


“I hoped to spark a wide‐ranging and constructive debate on how better we can protect the dignity 
and sanctity of every human life.”4


Africa
as
an
Approach
to
Responsibility


There
are
four
main
reasons
that
Africa,
as
a
continent,
provides
an
ample
discussion
basis
on
the

topic
of
the
responsibility
to
protect.5



First,
 the
 sheer
 scale
 of
 the
 humanitarian
 crisis
 in
 Africa.
 There
 have
 been
 more
 than
 30
 wars
 in

Africa
 is
 less
 than
 40
 years,
 which
 have
 resulted
 in
 more
 than
 half
 of
 the
 worldwide
 war
 related

deaths.
 In
 1996
 alone,
 8
 million
 refugees
 were
 forced
 to
 flee
 their
 homes
 due
 to
 the
 impending

severity
of
intra‐state
wars
that
consume
this
continent.



Secondly,
recognition
must
be
given
to
the
legitimacy
of
intervention.
Due
to
the
non‐intervention

principle
 of
 Art.2
 (7)
 of
 the
 UN
 Charter,6
 respect
 must
 be
 given
 to
 the
 sovereign
 equality
 of
 all

states.7
This
is
a
particularly
topical
debate
in
Africa
where
the
states
themselves
are
already
in
crisis

due
to
the
presence
of
warlords
and
the
presence
of
fragility
through
the
lack
of
stability.


Thirdly,
using
Africa
as
a
large
scale
case
study,
it
is
evident
that
the
self
interest
and
political
bias
of

Western
states
plays
a
large
part
in
not
only
whether
or
not
intervention
will
occur,
but
also
whether

or
not
it
will
prove
to
be
successful.
The
widening
gap
on
this
spectrum
became
more
distinct
at
the

end
 of
 the
 Cold
 War
 when
 the
 West
 had
 no
 self‐
 interest
 in
 Africa
 due
 its
 transparency
 on
 the
































































3

These
separate
notions
are
listed
within
the
synopsis
of
the
ICISS
report,
section
3:
Elements.


4

Kofi
Annan,
‘Secretary General Addresses International Peace Academy Seminar on ‘The Responsibility to 
th
Protect’,
15 
February
2002.

5

James
Mayall,
‘Humanitarian
Intervention
and
International
Society:
Lessons
from
Africa’
in
Jennifer
Welsh,

‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’
Oxford
University
Press
(2004)
pgs.
120‐141.

6
Charter
of
the
United
Nations
1945
Article
2
(7)
‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...’

7

Art.
2
(1)
UN
Charter

3


Published
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GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


international
 ‘radar.’
 Africa
 posed
 no
 threat
 due
 to
 the
 lack
 of
 nuclear
 weapons,
 and
 was
 not
 of

economic
importance
on
an
international
scale.


Lastly,
this
lack
of
state
self‐interest
will
mean
that
most,
if
not
all,
of
the
humanitarian
crises
that

occur
in
Africa
will
obtain
aid
and
assistance
from
international
organisations
rather
than
states.
This

adds
fuel
to
the
debate
of
whose
responsibility
it
should
be
to
intervene
in
the
first
place.



Whose
Responsibility?
–
Rwanda,
Somalia
&
Sudan


The
notion
of
co‐operative
security
suggests
that
in
order
for
international
security
to
be
upheld
to

the
greatest
possible
degree,
co‐operation
from
a
majority
of
states
in
required.
Within
Africa
alone

there
have
been
significant
failings
of
states
to
stop
and
prevent
mass
killings
as
they
have
not
been

working
together
to
achieve
sustainable
security.
It
is
such
failings
that
have
led
to
questions
being

asked
 about
 whether
 or
 not
 responsibility
 exists
 as
 a
 concept
 within
 the
 international
 community

and,
if
it
does,
who
holds
this responsibility?
The
depth
of
such
theoretical
questions
is
staggering.

Once
a
move
away
from
the
basic
presumptions
is
made,
one
can
begin
examining
ideas
such
as
the

proximity
of
a
state,
possibly
concluding
that
a
nearby
state
is
in
the
best
place
to
react8
quickly
and

should
 therefore
 bear
 the
 brunt
 of
 responsibility.
 In
 addition,
 is
 a
 burden
 placed
 upon
 the
 most

militarily
capable
of
states?9
Should
a
greater
burden
be
placed
upon
the
five
permanent
members

of
the
Security
Council,10
not
only
because
it
is
a
hugely
powerful
organisation,
but
also
because
they

can
each
veto
a
decision
to
protect?11



Even
beyond
this,
do
states
have
to
be
at
peace
and
have
a
fully
functioning
democracy
to
have
a

responsibility?
For
example,
it
would
seem
incomprehensible
to
expect
the
Central
African
Republic

to
 intervene
 in
 the
 Darfur
 region
 of
 Sudan,
 because
 of
 the
 problems
 that
 they
 themselves
 have

within
their
own
state,
even
though
they
are
neighbours.
In
this
sense
it
seems
sensible
to
apply
the

age
old
saying
of
‘charity
begins
at
home.’
Once
a
state
is
at
peace,
it
will
have
fewer
national
issues

and
 would
 therefore
 be
 in
 a
 more
 appropriate
 position
 to
 aid
 effectively.
 Although,
 this
 raises

further
issues;
would,
for
example,
the
current
wars
in
Iraq
and
more
significantly
now
Afghanistan

prevent
the
UK
and
the
USA
from
intervening
elsewhere
as
they
are
both
already
at
war?
































































8

It
is
worth
noting
here
that
the
ICISS
Report
is
based
upon
3
fundamental
principles.
The
first
and
most

important
one
being
the
responsibility
to
prevent;
with
the
responsibility
to
rebuild;
and
the
responsibility
to

react
taking
a
joint
second
place.


9 st

Stephen
Groves
‘The U.S Should Reject The U.N Responsibility to Protect Doctrine’
May
1 
2001.

10

China,
France,
Russia,
United
Kingdom,
United
States.

11

For
example
Russia
and
China
have
both
vetoed
decisions
to
act
for
reasons
of
self
interest.

4


Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


An
analysis
of
failings
within
Africa
will
help
to
answer
some
of
these
questions
by
suggesting
who

was
in
the
best
and
most
suitable
position
at
the
time
to
act
most
effectively.



The
 most
 infamous
 example
 of
 a
 failure
 was
 the
 Rwandan
 genocide
 
 when
 the
 international

community
 failed
 not
 only
 to
 prevent
 the
 deaths
 of
 nearly
 1,000,000
 Rwandans,
 but
 Belgian

peacekeepers
actually
left
a
school
where
around
2000
Tutsis
were
later
killed.
After
the
killing
of
10

Belgian
 peacekeepers,
 the
 then
 UN
 Secretary‐General
 Boutros‐Ghali
 sought
 to
 increase
 UNAMIR12,

scale
 it
 down
 or
 completely
 withdraw
 it.
 The
 Security
 Council
 voted
 to
 scale
 it
 down
 and
 left
 only

270
troops
on
the
ground.
This
fatal
decision
left
the
RPF13
to
take
control
and
commence
the
mass

killings.
A
reverse
decision
came
too
late
and
few
troops
were
replaced
before
the
end
of
the
killings

in
late
July
of
1994.
The
Carlsson
Committee14
heavily
criticised
the
lack
of
forceful
involvement
by

the
UN,
whose
primary
concern
should
have
been
the
lives
of
those
who
cannot
protect
themselves.

This
is,
after
all,
the
essence
of
R2P.



In
this
case
as
the
Belgians
already
had
troops
on
the
ground
in
Rwanda
they
were
without
a
doubt

in
the
best
position
to
have
prevented
this
particular
massacre
within
the
genocide.
It
is
noteworthy

that
the
Clinton
Administration
deliberately
avoided
referring
to
the
situation
as
‘genocide’
to
avoid

military
engagement.




“On the day the report was released, Mr. Annan ‐‐ who headed UN peacekeeping at the time of the 
genocide ‐‐ said: "All of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it. . . . On behalf of 
the United Nations, I acknowledge this failure and express my deep remorse.”15


The
 UN
 kept
 strictly
 to
 the
 mandate
 allowing
 the
 peacekeeping
 operations
 but
 avoiding

confrontation,
and
the
final
price
for
this
was
paid
via
civilian
deaths.
Here
the
only
way
that
mass

genocide
 could
 have
 been
 prevented
 would
 have
 been
 with
 the
 placement
 of
 more
 troops
 at
 an

earlier
stage
of
intervention
with
more
power
to
eradicate
the
rebel
forces
before
they
managed
to

take
 total
 control
 of
 the
 state.
 This
 method
 of
 intervention
 would
 have
 required
 war
 fighting
 and

inevitably
 deaths
 would
 have
 occurred
 on
 both
 sides;
 but
 with
 the
 aid
 of
 the
 international

community
lending
troops
to
the
UN,
it
seems
that
significantly
fewer
deaths
would
have
occurred.
































































12


United
Nations
Assistance
Mission
for
Rwanda
–
They
were
sent
to
patrol
an
established
ceasefire
and
to

support
the
demilitarisation
and
demobilisation
processes
that
had
been
initiated
in
1993.
The
genocide
then

th
began
on
April
7 
2004.
Timeline
‐

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/crontext.html

13


Rwandan
Patriotic
Front
–
a
Ugandan
based
rebel
force
formed
in
1987
by
Tutsi
refugees.


14


http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1999/12/991216‐rwanda1.htm

15


Africa Recovery, United Nations, New Releases, April 2004 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/newrels/rwanda.htm

5


Published
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GOA:
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March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


A
further
example
is
that
of
Sudan
in
general
and
more
particularly,
the
Darfur
region
within
Sudan.

Unfortunately
 the
 experience
 in
 Darfur
 highlights
 the
 limitations
 of
 the
 R2P.
 Mass
 killings
 were

obvious
by
spring
2004,
and
yet
the
international
community
was
very
slow
to
act.
It
was
noted
at

the
time
that,
“people in Darfur (were) losing faith in the international community’s will or ability to 
help.”16 Here
Colin
Powell
delayed
his
recognition
of
the
killings
as
genocide17
in
order
to
evade
the

United
States
responsibility
to
prevent
genocide.18


In
discussion
of
the
Darfur
crisis,
Badescu
and
Bergholm
conclude
“that the international failure to 
offer meaningful protection in Darfur highlights the need for continued caution and critical analysis 
of the ways in which R2P is conceptualized and implemented.”19
It
is
apparent
that
R2P
is
necessary
if

atrocities
 such
 as
 Darfur
 are
 to
 be
 prevented
 in
 the
 future.
 The
 world
 needs
 a
 responsibility
 to
 be

placed
upon
states;
otherwise
they
will
merely
find
ways
around
having
to
act.20



“Engagement  must  be  patient,  informed,  flexible  and  determined.”21
 Whilst
 it
 is
 clear
 that
 the

‘determined’
element
is
a
key
proponent
to
success,
as
indicated
by
failures
surrounding
the
lack
of

political
will,
the
use
of
the
word
‘patient’
here
is
more
problematic.
Intervention
must
certainly
not

be
rushed
and
care
must
be
taken
to
ensure
that
the
correct
approach
is
adopted,
although
being

‘patient’
can
include
waiting
for
consensus
from
the
international
community,
whilst
collecting
data

and
awaiting
Security
Council
approval.
Although
these
things
are
pivotal
to
the
existence
of
stability

within
the
international
community,
they
are
perhaps
not
as
appropriate
to
a
civil
war
and
internal

conflict
 situation,
 as
 indicated
 by
 not
 only
 the
 Rwandan
 genocide
 and
 Darfur
 situation,
 but
 also

Kenya.
 Towards
 the
 end
 of
 2007
 Kenya
 “showed  just  how  quickly  and  comparatively  unexpectedly 
some situations can explode.”22


The
first
element
to
note
concerning
the
intervention
in
Somalia
is
the
landmark
decision
that
was

made
in
1992
by
the
UNSC
to
intervene
using
Chapter
VII
provisions
without
the
consent
of
the
host
































































16

C.
Badescu,
and
L.
Bergholm
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
and
the
Conflict
in
Darfur:
The
Big
Let‐Down’,

Security Dialogue 40(3),
(2009),
p.301.

17 th

‘Powell
declares
genocide
in
Sudan’
9 
September
2004


18
Genocide
Convention
1948
‐
Article
1
“The
Contracting
Parties
confirm
that
genocide,
whether
committed
in

time
of
peace
or
in
time
of
war,
is
a
crime
under
international
law
which
they
undertake
to
prevent
and
to

punish.”

19

C.
Badescu,
and
L.
Bergholm
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
and
the
Conflict
in
Darfur:
The
Big
Let‐Down’,

Security Dialogue 40(3),
(2009),
p.287

20

As
discussed
in
the
cases
where
the
use
of
the
word
‘genocide’
was
avoided
so
states
did
not
have
to
fulfil

their
commitments
under
The
Genocide
Act
1948.

21

Oliver
Ramsbotham
and
Tom
Woodhouse,
‘Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict’,
Polity
Press

(1996),
pg.219.


22

Gareth
Evans,
‘The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All’
Washington,
D.C:

Brookings
Institution
Press,
(2008),
pg.72.

6


Published
by
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GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


state.23
 This
 progression
 in
 policy
 suggests
 that
 the
 international
 community
 does
 have
 an
 R2P.

However
 critics
 have
 argued
 that
 R2P
 comes
 as
 a
 secondary
 principle
 here
 as
 Chapter
 VII

authorisations
 are
 ordinarily
 endorsed
 under
 the
 principle
 of
 maintaining
 international
 peace
 and

security.



However,
prior
to
this,
it
was
famine
that
swept
the
country
and
led
to
a
savage
civil
war.
It
was
the

knowledge
 of
 Mohammed
 Sahnoun
 and
 his
 insight
 in
 to
 the
 Somali
 culture
 that
 finally
 led
 to

intervention
taking
place
as
previously
“all the humanitarian organs of the UN failed to act quickly 
and  effectively  to  stop  the  deaths  of  hundreds  of  thousands  from  malnutrition  and  starvation.”24

There
 are
 many
 political
 and
 economic
 reasons
 for
 the
 failings
 of
 the
 UN
 to
 act
 accordingly,
 and

when
action
was
taken,
it
was
not
as
successful
as
it
might
have
been.



“If  there  is  one  lesson  that  we  have  to  remember  from  what  went  tragically  wrong  in  some 
operations  of  the  90s,  it  is  precisely  when  you  try  to  mix  two  different  types  of  operation,  a 
peacekeeping  operation  and  a  peace‐enforcement,  or  a  war,”  that
 things
 tend
 to
 go
 wrong. 
“Remember what happened in Somalia, where there were basically conflicting goals which led to a 
very disastrous situation. We feel that the key to success is clarity.”25
This
is
a
basic
assertion
as
any

operation
of
such
scale
will
demand
an
aim
and
a
plan
of
action
to
be
clearly
ascertained
before
any

steps
should
be
taken
to
the
commission
of
it.
The
peacekeeping
mission
in
Somalia
was
indubitably

compromised
due
to
the
internal
anarchy
already
rife
within
the
state.
The
UN
had
obviously
taken

on
the
responsibility
to
protect
in
this
case.
Unfortunately
it
proved
to
be
another
example
of
high

expectations
that
could
not
be
met
alongside
poor
planning.




In
terms
of
sovereignty
as
responsibility26,
these
failings
indicate
that
the
international
community
in

theory
 has
 a
 responsibility
 to
 protect,
 but
 it
 is
 still
 unclear
 as
 to
 whether
 or
 not
 this
 applies
 in

practice.
 To
 help
 establish
 this,
 it
 is
 essential
 to
 delve
 deeper
 into
 the
 international
 law
 that

surrounds
the
area.



Legal
Implications
and
Analysis


The
 legal
 implications
 of
 the
 responsibility
 to
 protect
 are
 crucial
 within
 a
 discussion
 of
 whether
 or

not
the
international
community
should
protect.
































































23

N.
Wheeler,
‘Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Security’
Oxford
University
Press

(2002)
pg.172

24

Ibid.
Pg.
172.

25


Secretary‐General
Jean‐Marie
Guehenno
'You are in situations where you show force so as not to use it ‐ 
peacekeeping is not about waging war.'
‘Irish Times’
April
22,
2002
‐

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2002/guehenno.htm

26

As
mentioned
in
the
introductory
comment.


7


Published
by
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GOA:
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2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


Natural
law
theory
is
based
around
the
assertion
that
all
laws
are
derived
from
a
higher
order
and

power,
so
law
is
equal
to
morality.
As
this
is
an
over‐
arching
power,
law
effectively
goes
beyond
the

control
 of
 humanity.
 It
 is
 this
 morality
 that
 is
 crucial
 for
 the
 implementation
 of
 R2P.
 If
 one
 takes

domestic
 law
 as
 an
 example
 it
 can
 be
 seen
 that
 murder
 is
 a
 crime
 across
 the
 globe;
 that
 is

transferable
to
international
law.
If
law
is
morality,
and
it
is
immoral
to
take
another’s
life,
due
to
the

sanctity
 of
 life,
 then
 states
 do
 have
 a
 R2P
 member’s
 of
 the
 human
 race
 from
 their
 counterparts.

Unfortunately,
international
law
is
not
quite
this
clear
cut.



One
of
the
fundamental
and
basic
principles
which
underpin
the
Charter
of
the
United
Nations
is,
as

mentioned,
the
principle
of
state
sovereignty
and
non‐intervention.27
As
all
states
are
sovereign
and

equal,28
 it
 should
 not
 be
 the
 responsibility
 of
 one
 state
 to
 intervene
 within
 the
 internal
 affairs
 of

another
 state.29
 This
 is
 where
 the
 complex
 relationship
 and
 moral
 argument
 creates
 difficulties.
 It

has
been
suggested
by
Francis
Deng30
that
state
sovereignty
should
be
state
responsibility
and
this
is

transferable
 from
 within
 a
 state
 to
 other
 states
 if
 that
 state
 will
 not
 or
 cannot
 protect
 its
 citizens.

States
 lose
 their
 legitimacy
 if
 they
 lapse
 on
 basic
 standards
 of
 humanity.31
 This
 loss
 of
 legitimacy

removes
 sovereignty.
 For
 this
 reason
 the
 ICISS
 seek
 to
 view
 sovereignty
 as
 a
 contingent
 of

responsibility:
the
two
are
intertwined.

Sovereignty
is
therefore
a
privilege
to
be
earned
rather
than

a
right
to
be
claimed.



“State  sovereignties  are  not  being  viewed  as  part  of  a  predetermined  structure  but  as  something 
which is subject to change.”32



These
principles
are
particularly
important
to
developing
states
who
feel
disadvantaged
by
the
rapid

development
of
the
Western
world.
It
is
noteworthy
that,
at
this
juncture,
globalisation
has
actually

proved
 to
 have
 a
 positive
 impact
 on
 intervention.
 The
 increased
 use
 of
 communications
 and

technology
has
led
directly
to
citizens
putting
pressure
on
their
governments
to
act.33
This
is
because
































































27

Art.
2(7)
Charter
of
the
United
Nations

28

Art.
2(1)
Charter
of
the
United
Nations

29

For
further
see
Robert
Jackson,
‘The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States’
Oxford

University
Press
(2003),
pg.230;
who
describes
this
moral
dilemma
as
“knotted”.

30

Francis
Deng
‘Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management In Africa’
Washington
D.C
(1996)

31

“The surest means by which a state may avoid outside intervention is to recognise and itself to ensure 
respect for fundamental rights and liberties in the territories under its jurisdiction.”
–
Rene
Cassin,
Nobel

th
Lecture,
11 
December
1968.
In
Louise
Arbour,
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
as
a
Duty
of
Care
in
International

Law
and
Practice’,
Review of International Studies 34:3
(2008)
pp.445‐58

32

T.
Weiss,
‘The
Politics
of
Humanitarian
Ideas’
Security Dialogue, 31(1),
(2000),
pg.12

33

For
example,
Steven
Spielberg
pulled
out
of
a
role
at
the
Beijing
Olympics
in
protest
to
China’s
policies
on

intervention
in
Sudan.
They
refused
to
allow
the
UNSC
to
authorise
intervention
based
wholly
on
self‐interest

reasons.

8


Published
by
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GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


of
 the
 increased
 awareness
 that
 the
 international
 community
 has
 of
 atrocities,
 and
 the
 emotive

nature
that
has
impacted
upon
citizens.


“We  do  not  deny  that  the  UN  has  the  right  and  duty  to  help  suffering  humanity,  but  we  remain 
extremely sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last 
defense against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision‐
making process of the Security Council.” –
President
Abdelaziz
Bouteflike
of
Algeria.34




This
 raises
 additional
 legal
 concerns.
 The
 interpretation
 of
 the
 phrase
 ‘international
 peace
 and

security,’35
in
itself
requires
consideration.

In
African
states,
as
the
civil
wars
that
create
the
need
for

humanitarian
 intervention
 do
 not
 regularly
 pose
 a
 threat
 to
 international
 peace
 and
 security,
 this

has
posed
a
problem
as
the
permanent
members
of
the
Security
Council
have
used
their
veto
power

in
order
to
prevent
intervention
on
these
grounds.
It
is
only
when
civil
wars
spill
across
their
borders

and
 into
 neighbouring
 states
 that
 the
 conflict
 can
 truly
 be
 classified
 as
 ‘international’
 in
 nature.36

This
draws
upon
the
ICISS
report
itself
and
its
notion
of
prevention.
It
is
the
prevention
of
the
spilling

of
a
conflict
across
a
border
which
should
be
prevented,
rather
than
simply
stopped,
once
war
has

broken
out.



Furthermore,
 controversy
 arises
 by
 virtue
 of
 Art.
 2
 (4)
 of
 the
 UN
 Charter.
 It
 lays
 down
 a
 blanket

prohibition
on
the
use
of
force
within
international
law.
The
exceptions
to
this
come
in
the
form
of

self‐defence
 (Art.
 51)
 and
 Security
 Council
 authorised
 operations
 under
 Chapter
 VII.
 Humanitarian

intervention
has
 long
 been,
 and
remains,
a
controversial
stepping
stone
around
this
prohibition.
 It

has
been
dubbed
as
a
‘Chapter
VI
and
a
half’
provision.
To
allow
the
use
of
force
for
humanitarian

purposes,
 and
 therefore
 within
 the
 international
 community’s
 R2P,
 would
 undermine
 all
 efforts
 to

ban
the
use
of
force.



One
could
refute
the
argument,
that
had
the
drafters
of
the
Charter
envisaged
allowing
the
use
of

force
for
humanitarian
purposes,
the
statute
would
have
clearly
stated
this.
The
Charter
was
drafted

at
the
end
of
the
Second
World
War
when
the
world
was
understandably
preoccupied
with
state
on

state
war.
The
prospect
of
internal
affairs,
and
how
damaging
a
regime
could
be
to
its
own
people

was
not
of
concern.37
It
can
therefore
be
upheld
that
simply
because
this
idea
was
not
considered

and
therefore
codified
into
the
law
at
the
time,
then
this
does
not
mean
that
it
was
intended
to
be

or
should
be
illegal.































































34

Thomas
Weiss,
‘The
Sunset
of
Humanitarian
Intervention?’
Security Dialogue
35(2),
(2004),
pg.141.

35

As
used
in
the
Charter
of
the
United
Nations.


36

For
example,
the
conflict
in
Zimbabwe
should
have
been
stopped
before
spilling
over
its
borders
and
into

Botswana.


37 st

Gareth
Evans
‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’
31 
March
2006

9


Published
by
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GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


Further,
humanitarian
intervention
‐
and
indeed
the
use
of
force
to
aid
‐
is
not
a
new
phenomenon,

as
 it
 can
 be
 seen
 within
 many
 treaties
 and
 statutes.38
 The
 “concept  of  responsibility  towards  the 
other is not an add‐on to already existing identities and subjectivities”:
it
is
already
there
in
its
own

right.39
Historically,
the
US
Bill
of
Rights
and
the
English
Magna
Carta
were
extremely
focused
upon

the
political
and
legal
rights
of
the
individual.40
It
is
respect
for
such
rights
that
is
re‐emerging
and

developing
into
an
international
norm.
More
recently,
the
creation
of
the
ICTR
was
the
first
step
to

intrusion
upon
state
sovereignty.


The
principle
of
complementarity
is
also
enshrined
within
international
law.
It
essentially
stipulates


that
 international
 law
 can
 only
 function
 effectively
 if
 it
 complements
 domestic
 law
 and
 does
 not

attempt
to
become
an
over
arching
power.
It
could
be
suggested
that
in
this
sense
the
responsibility

to
protect
becomes
problematic.
However,
one
could
argue
that
due
to
the
emphasis
that
is
put
on

intervention
only
occurring
if
the
host
state
is
unwilling
or
unable
to
act
or
if
the
UN
has
been
invited

by
the
government,
then
this
problem
is
removed.
Here
the
R2P
doctrine
is
respecting
the
principle

of
complementarity
as
it
has
clear
boundaries
of
when
it
can,
cannot,
will
or
will
not
be
invoked.



To
conclude
on
this
legal
dimension,
there
are
many
legal
obstacles
to
overcome
in
order
that
R2P

can
 function
 at
 all,
 let
 alone
 effectively.
 As
 witnessed
 in
 the
 case
 studies
 of
 Rwanda,
 Sudan
 and

Somalia,
 it
 was
 the
 ‘red
 tape’
 constraints
 that
 led
 to
 the
 peacekeeping
 operations
 being,
 for
 the

most
part,
unsuccessful.
So,
if
concluding
that
the
international
community
has
a
R2P,
then
surely
it

also
has
a
responsibility
to
allow
states
more
freedom
in
order
that
they
can
act
effectively
and
that

procedure
can
be
adapted
to
meet
the
needs
of
each
individual
scenario.


The
Practical
Problems
of
R2P
Identifiable
in
its
Life
So
Far


Further
to
the
issues
already
identified
surrounding
whether
or
not
there
is
or
should
be
an
R2P,
are

the
practical
difficulties
that
arise
when
it
is
invoked.



The
 first
 point
 to
 consider
 is
 the
 misuse
 of
 the
 doctrine.
 States
 intervene
 for
 their
 own
 personal

motives
 but
justify
 the
 intervention
 under
R2P.
This
approach
may,
however,
be
questioned.
Does

the
intention
of
the
intervening
state
matter?
Of
course
humanitarianism
should
be
at
the
forefront

of
 policy
 making,
 but
 of
 course
 we
 do
 not
 live
 in
 a
 perfect
 world.
 States
 need
 self‐motivation
 and

political
 will
 in
 order
 to
 intervene
 effectively.
 So
 considered
 pragmatically,
 as
 long
 as
 civilians
 are
































































38

For
example
‐
The
Convention
Against
Genocide
1948.

39

S.
Smith
‘Conceptualizing
Security
in
the
Last
20
Years’
in
Terry
Terriff
et
al
‘Security Studies Today’ Polity

Press
(1999)

40

P.
R.
Viotti,
&
M.
V.
Kaupp,
‘International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond’ 
rd
Longman
Publishers
(1999)
3 
ed.
pg.
402.

10


Published
by
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GOA:
25
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2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


being
helped
in
the
long
run,
this
should
be
what
is
important,
and
not
the
underlying
rationale
for

the
initial
intervention.
It
seems
that,
as
a
doctrine,
R2P
is
“too easily capable of misapplication by 
neo‐conservatives and others to justify unjustifiable military adventures such as Iraq.”41


This
consideration
links
to
a
further
practical
implication.
The
lack
of
political
will
from
states
to
want

to
intervene
creates
problems.
There
is
debate
as
to
whether
or
not
it
is
morally
right
to
force
states

to
intervene
if
they
have
reasons
for
not
doing
so.
The
lack
of
political
will
was
only
too
obvious
in

Rwanda
and
it
is
these
types
of
catastrophes
that
need
averting.42
Further,
with
the
lack
of
a
World

Government
and
overarching
power,
there
is
no
authority
with
which
to
force
states
to
intervene.

This
is
related
to
international
criminal
law
and
the
International
Criminal
Court,
which
has
recently

proved
successful
in
trying
and
prosecuting
criminals.
The
international
community,
however,
lacks
a

substantive
authority,
which
can
enforce
rules
upon
pariah
states
without
military
intervention.
This

is
ironic,
as
it
would
be
states
avoiding
military
intervention
that
would
face
it
coming
back
to
haunt

them
if
such
a
system
were
in
place.



Moreover,
the
lack
of
a
capacity
to
deploy
troops
is
in
itself
a
problem.
As
there
is
no
overarching

world
power,
the
UN
is
left
with
the
responsibility
of
intervention.
States
are
often
reluctant
to
give

troops
to
the
UN
for
fear
that
they
will
be
needed
at
home.
So
even
though
the
UN
has
power,
it
is

rendered
 toothless
 without
 the
 co‐operation
 of
 individual
 states.
 This
 links
 to
 a
 further
 practical

problem
 of
 the
 R2P.
 What
 form
 of
 intervention
 should
 it
 take
 if
 states
 are
 to
 protect
 rather
 than

merely
partake
in
war
fighting?


Evans
 and
 Sahnoun
 outlined
 six
 principles43
 to
 be
 satisfied
 before
 military
 intervention
 should
 be

carried
out.44
The
six
criteria
reiterate
themes
from
just
war
theory
as
the
first
is
just
cause,
followed

by
 four
 precautionary
 principles
 and
 lastly,
 a
 requirement
 of
 right
 authority.45
 In
 theory
 if

consideration
is
given
to
all
of
these
criteria,
then
military
intervention
should
only
occur
when
all

other
 methods
 of
 intervention
 have
 been
 tested
 and
 it
 is
 a
 last
 resort.
 As
 the
 Rwanda
 experience

indicated,
this
is
not
always
appropriate.
The
evidence
from
this
case
study
seems
to
suggest
that
a

strong
military
presence
is
required
for
effective
peacemaking
and
peacekeeping.
In
this
sense
the
































































41 st

Gareth
Evans
‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’
31 
March
2006

42

For
further
discussion,
see
the
comments
made
by
Alex
De
Waal
on
how
R2P
has
failed,
particularly
in

Darfur.
‘Darfur
and
the
Failure
of
the
Responsibility
to
Protect’,
International Affairs
83:6
(2007),
pp.1039‐1054


43

Just
cause,
right
intention,
last
resort,
proportional
means,
reasonable
prospects
and
whose
authority?

Evans,
G.
&
Sahnoun,
M.
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect’,
Foreign Affairs
Vol.
81
(Nov/Dec
2002),
Issue
6


44

For
further
discussion
on
the
moral
obligation
on
the
use
of
force
in
peacekeeping
operations
see:
Iain

Atack,
‘Ethical
Objections
to
Humanitarian
Intervention’,
Security Dialogue 33(3),
(2002),
pp.279‐92.

45

Ibid.


11


Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


international
 community
 needs
 a
 report
 such
 as
 the
 ICISS,
 so
 that
 they
 can
 justify
 military

intervention,
if
needed,
to
succeed,
whilst
they
are
carrying
out
their
moral
obligation
to
protect.



Theoretical
Opinion
/
Analysis


There
 inevitably
 exists
 a
 dichotomy
 of
 academic
 opinion
 on
 the
 politically
 charged
 debate(s)

surrounding
whether
or
not
the
international
community
has
a
responsibility
to
protect.
This
paper

will
 consider
 briefly
 what
 realists
 have
 to
 say
 on
 the
 issue,
 but
 will
 initially
 look
 at
 the
 position 
historically.
 There
 was
 a
 general
 consensus
 between
 classical
 theorists,
 such
 as
 Rousseau,
 Hobbes

and
 Locke,
 that
 the
 human
 being
 is
 the
 ultimate
 power
 source
 within
 society.46
 It
 seems
 logical

therefore,
that
they
would
have
endorsed
R2P
because,
as
previously
discussed,
the
entire
notion
of

the
 doctrine
 is
 based
 around
 the
 respect
 for
 human
 life
 and
 dignity.
 This
 analysis
 can
 be
 further

drawn
 upon
 as
 the
 sovereign
 within
 a
 democratic
 state
 draws
 their
 power
 from
 the
 voting
 public;

they
 therefore
 must
 respect
 the
 public
 in
 order
 to
 stay
 in
 power.
 This
 particular
 distinction
 is,

however,
problematic.
It
shares
similarities
with
the
democratic
peace
theory,
in
suggesting
that
to

spread
democracy
would
inevitably
spread
peace.47


As
Viotti
and
Kauppi
point
out,
despite
the
fact
that
respect
for
human
rights
and
dignity
seems
to

be
 a
 recent
 Western
 phenomenon,
 it
 can
 in
 fact
 be
 witnessed
 in
 ancient
 Greek
 and
 Roman
 times.

Although,
“the liberal spirit of the Enlightenment (was) developed further in the nineteenth‐century 
work of the utilitarians and Kantians.”48



As
realists
view
the
state
as
the
referent
object,
intervention
becomes
highly
problematic
due
to
the

upstanding
preference
for
state
sovereignty.
In
addition,
the
presumption
that
war
is
an
inevitable

component
of
international
politics
is
also
problematic.
R2P
is
about
avoiding
war
fighting
and
rather

partaking
 in
 peacekeeping
 efforts
 to
 sustain
 and
 preserve
 human
 rights.
 This
 contradicts
 the

presumption
 that
 war
 is
 inevitable.
 This
 premise
 almost
 suggests
 that
 R2P
 is
 destined
 to
 fail.
 A

further
presumption
is
that
states
are
rational
actors,
promoting
their
own self‐
interest.
This
in
fact

can
be
seen
through
various
peacekeeping
operations
where
R2P
has
been
invoked.49
As
discussed

earlier,
 the
 motivation
 under
 which
 the
 action
 is
 taking
 place
 is
 somewhat
 irrelevant.
 As
 long
 as
































































46

Viotti,
P.R.
&
Kaupp,
M.V.
‘International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond’ 
rd
Longman
Publishers
(1999),
3 
ed.
pg.
401.

47

To
discuss
this
further
would
evade
from
the
true
discussion
point
of
this
paper.
For
further
see

Williams,
M.
‘The
discipline
of
the
democratic
peace’,
European Journal of International 
Relations,
7:4
(2001),
525‐53.

48

Ibid.
pg.
401.

49

For
example
it
has
been
argued
that
the
US
and
UK
would
not
have
intervened
into
Afghanistan,
when
R2P

was
mentioned
as
a
reason
for
intervention,
had
the
not
had
self‐interest
in
intervening.
This
self‐interest

came
in
the
form
of
combating
terrorism,
under
the
notion
of
therefore
seeking
a
more
secure
future.


12


Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


humanitarian
 needs
 are
 being
 met
 in
 the
 state
 in
 which
 action
 is
 occurring,
 the
 issue
 of
 why
 the

states
are
intervening
loses
significance.
This
can
have
both
a
positive
and
a
negative
effect.
The
lack

of
intervention
for
self‐preservation
reasons
is
problematic,
but
intervening
for
self‐interest
and
in

turn
protecting
can
have
many
positive
effects.
In
this
sense
the
international
community
does
have

a
R2P.


Chandler
suggests
that
the
liberal
peace
thesis
tends
to
reflect
the
current
balance
of
power
within

the
 international
 sphere,
 as
 opposed
 to
 being
 a
 moral
 dilemma
 surrounding
 state
 sovereignty
 and

the
complications
of
intervention.50
He
is
therefore
opposing
the
realist
view,
by
suggesting
that
the

notion
 of
 state
 sovereignty
 has
 been
 superseded
 by
 a
 progressive
 norm
 for
 the
 protection
 of

individual
rights.51
This
is
further
support
that
not
only
does
the
international
have
an
R2P,
but
it
is

endorsing
it.





The
Future
of
the
doctrine
of
Responsibility
to
Protect
in
Africa


Recognition
 of
 two
 of
 the
 fundamental
 principles
 identified
 in
 the
 ICISS
 Report
 by
 the
 Outcome

Document
 of
 the
 World
 Summit
 200552
 indicates
 a
 shift
 towards
 a
 developing
 international
 norm.

This
 large
 scale
 recognition
 is
 a
 major
 step
 forward
 for
 R2P
 as
 it
 has
 been
 endorsed
 on
 an

international
scale.
This
creates
a
positive
outlook
for
the
future
of
the
developing
doctrine,
and
in

particular
 as
 to
 the
 effect
 that
 this
 will
 have
 on
 unstable
 African
 nations.
 Having
 said
 this,
 the

doctrine
 may
 be
 in
 place
 but
 it
 will
 be
 the
 practical
 application
 that
 will
 create
 difficulties.
 For

example,
even
though
the
Outcome
Document
endorsed
R2P,
it
did
not
offer
any
sort
of
indication

of
what
the
international
community
should
do
if
the
UN
Security
Council
fails
to
come
to
a
decision

on
whether
or
not
to
act.53


Activities
of
the
UN
and
ICISS
are
norm
creating
behaviour.
The
creation
of
Special
Advisor
on
R2P,

by
 the
 UN
 Secretary
 General54
 is
 a
 clear
 recognition
 of
 this
 norm
 creating
 behaviour.
 
 A
 further

development
came
with
the
establishment
of
a
Global
Centre
for
R2P
at
the
City
University
of
New































































50

David
Chandler
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect?
Imposing
the
Liberal
Peace’
International Peacekeeping 11:1,

(2004),
pg.59.

51

Ibid.


52

United
Nations
General
Assembly
2005
World
Summit
Outcome
–
resolution
60/1
paragraphs
138‐140;

Responsibility
to
protect
populations
from
genocide,
war
crimes,
ethnic
cleansing
and
crimes
against

humanity.

53

C.
Badescu,
And
L.
Bergholm
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
and
the
Conflict
in
Darfur:
The
Big
Let‐Down’,

Security Dialogue 40(3),
(2009),
p.291

54 th

This
post
was
established
as
of
the
12 
December
2007
and
is
currently
undertaken
by
Edward
Luck
who

was
appointed
by
UN
Secretary
General
Ban‐Ki
Moon.


st
‘Secretary‐General appoints special adviser to focus on responsibility to protect’
21 
February
2008.


13


Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


York
 in
 February
 2008.
 Such
 a
 development
 highlights
 the
 [academic]
 complexity
 surrounding
 the

use
 of
 the
 doctrine.
 These
 developments
 are
 further
 evidence
 of
 the
 progressive
 and
 accepted

norm.



“The debate about intervention for human purposes has not gone away and it will not go away so 
long  as  human  nature  remains  fallible.”55
 Despite
 this
 negativity,
 as
 discussed,
 the
 provision
 of
 a

solid
doctrine
to
be
followed
and
the
adaptability
of
provisions
should
provide
for
a
more
positive

outlook.



Lastly,
 “if  R2P  is  to  flourish,  the  US  must  be  on  board.”56
 As
 a
 hegemonic
 state,
 the
 US
 has
 spent

many
 years
 acquiring
 and
 strengthening
 its
 independence,
 and
 more
 importantly
 its
 large
 military

capability.
As
the
World’s
dominant
military
power
it
seems
that
the
US
would
bear
the
brunt
of
the

responsibility,
 not
 only
 by
 means
 of
 troops
 but
 also
 economically.
 Despite
 this,
 the
 Obama

administration
 has
 “supported  moves  to  implement  a  U.N.  doctrine  calling  for  collective  military 
action to halt genocide.”57 This
is
an
encouraging
step
forward
for
the
doctrine
and
provides
hope
to

African
nations,
that
should
this
positive
reinforcement
continue,
any
future
‘Rwandas’,
‘Somalias’
or

‘Sudans’
would
be
avoided.



Conclusion


The
 international
 community
 must
 be
 prepared
 to
 act
 to
 prevent
 the
 next
 mass
 killing
 or
 ethnic

cleansing.
 But
 we
 must
 ask
 ourselves
 whether
 making
 a
 law
 effectively
 insisting
 that
 states
 react

positively
to
such
situations
is
the
correct
strategy.
If
the
rationale
behind
the
thinking
is
to
protect

those
 who
 cannot
 protect
 themselves
 and
 is
 therefore
 a
 moral
 obligation,
 then
 we
 must
 also
 ask

ourselves
why
states
are
not
protecting
in
the
first
place.
Surely
if
states
are
not
immediately
acting

to
protect,
despite
its
morality,
then
there
must
be
a
good
reason,
or
explanation
as
least,
for
this.
In

which
case,
the
argument
is
that
it
would
not
be
right
to
legislate
in
this
area;
it
should
instead
be

left
to
a
case
by
case
analysis,
providing
greater
adaptability
and
flexibility,
and
highly
arguably
on

this
 basis,
 therefore,
 a
 more
 effective
 approach.
 In
 the
 current
 world
 climate,
 within
 which
 the

media
is
consumed
by
threats
of
terrorism,
a
state’s
decision
to
intervene
will
be
affected.
States
will

be
less
likely
to
intervene
in
certain
pariah
states
for
fear
of
fuelling
terrorist
cells
within
them.
So

even
 though
 the
 international
 community
 does
 have
 an
 R2P
 through
 a
 developing
 international

norm,
 states
 may
 attempt
 to
 avoid
 such
 responsibility
 for
 reasons
 of
 self‐preservation.
 Moreover































































55

Gareth
Evans
and
Mohammed
Sahnoun,
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect’,
Foreign Affairs
Vol.
81
Issue
6

(Nov/Dec
2002),
pg.99

56

Thomas
Weiss,
‘The
Sunset
of
Humanitarian
Intervention?’
Security Dialogue
35(2),
(2004),
pg.149.


57 th

Joe
Lauria,
‘U.S Backs Implementing U.N Doctrine to Halt Genocide’
The Wall Street Journal 30 
July
2009

pg.A11

14


Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


“the  criterion  for  success  cannot  be  limited  to  the  immediate  military  act;  it  is  dependent  on  the 
longer‐term  developmental  challenge  of  reconstructing  states,  where  the  breakdown  of  societal 
order…is normally the principal cause for intervention58. The
challenge
ultimately
is
how
to
overcome

this.


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Responsibility to Protect’
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58

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Dannreuther,
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Polity
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15


Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010


Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”


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I.
‘Ethical
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Humanitarian
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Security Dialogue
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(2002)
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L.
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Available
at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3641820.stm
accessed
on
18/12/2009
at
12.21.


‘Secretary‐General
appoints
special
adviser
to
focus
on
responsibility
to
protect’
21st
February
2008

Available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25702&Cr=ki‐moon&Cr1
accessed
on

17/12/2009
at
14.35


Timeline
‐
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/crontext.html
accessed
on

18/12/2009
at
15.32.



http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1999/12/991216‐rwanda1.htm
accessed
on

16/12/2009
at
17.25.


17


Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010